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On 10 February 1927, the “First International Congress against Imperialism and Co-
lonialism” in Brussels marked the establishment of the anti-imperialist organisation, 
the League against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI, 1927-37). The 
complex preparations for the congress were though initiated already in 1925 by Willi 
Münzenberg, a German communist and General Secretary of the communist mass 
organisation, Internationale Arbeiterhilfe (IAH, 1921-35), together with the Com-
munist International (Comintern, 1919-43). Berlin was the centre for the LAI and its 
International Secretariat (1927-33), a city serving the intentions of the communists 
to fi nd colonial émigré activists in the Weimar capital, acting as representatives for 
the anti-colonial movement in Europe after the Great War. With the ascendancy to 
power of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) on 30 January 1933, the LAI reached an abrupt, but 
nonetheless, expected end in Berlin. This doctoral thesis examines the role, purpose 
and functions of a sympathising communist organization (LAI): to act as an inter-
mediary for the Comintern to the colonies. The analysis evaluates the structure and 
activities of the LAI, and by doing so, establish a complex understanding on one of 
the most infl uential communist organisations during the interwar period, which, de-
spite its short existence, assumed a nostalgic reference and historical bond for anti-
colonial movements during the transition from colonialism to post-colonialism after 
the Second World War, e.g. the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. 
Fredrik Petersson’s study, based on archives in Moscow, Berlin, Amsterdam, London, 
and Stockholm, uncovers why the Comintern established and supported the LAI 
and its anti-imperialist agenda, disclosing a complicated undertaking, characterised 
by confl ict and the internal struggle for power, involving structural constraints and 
individual ambitions defi ned by communist ideology and strategy.
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Commendatory Foreword  
 
Robert JC Young 
Silver Professor; Professor of English, Comparative Literature 
 
While conducting research on the anti-colonial movements between the two world wars, I 
repeatedly encountered mentions in passing of the League against Imperialism (henceforth LAI) 
and the eminent activists from Willi Münzenberg to Jawaharlal Nehru to Albert Einstein who were 
involved in its organisation or the remarkable Congress against Imperialism that took place in 
Brussels in February, 1927. Substantive information about the LAI and associated organisations, 
however, was remarkably scarce. A whole chapter of radical history was effectively off the 
historical radar. While this was not altogether unusual with respect to the often shadowy and 
deliberately poorly documented organisations that straddled Europe and the colonial world in this 
period, the lacuna surrounding the LAI, the first international anti-colonial organisation, was 
perhaps the most serious gap for anyone carrying out research in this period. It was therefore with 
considerable interest and excitement that I first encountered the work of Fredrik Petersson and the 
discovery that he had been carrying out extensive research to fill this much-needed lacuna. His 
description of his archival sources in Moscow made clear the reasons why there had been such a 
scarcity of knowledge up to this point: it was only when the archives were fully opened after the 
fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 that the history of transnational revolutionary communist 
organisations in Europe in the twentieth century could be uncovered and recovered. 
 
What is most remarkable about Petersson’s research in fact is the amount of detail that he has been 
able to document and to reveal: where there had been scarcity there is now abundance. This book 
represents the product of a very substantial amount of original research which transforms our 
understanding of the history of the League against Imperialism. Until Petersson availed himself of 
the opportunities afforded by the opening of the Russian archives comparatively little was known 
about the LAI, its organisation, its relations with the Comintern, or the role of its principal players, 
particularly that of Willi Münzenberg. Petersson has transformed that situation, and tracked the 
complex history of the development of the LAI as a result of his extensive research in the archives 
of RGASPI (Moscow), SAPMO-BA ZPA (Berlin), IISG (Amsterdam), together with a number of 
other minor sources. What is most remarkable, however, is Petersson’s ability to put together a 
historical narrative about a somewhat shadowy and secretive organisation from such a complex 
ii 
 
range of sources concerned with activities which were deliberately designed to make their 
operation opaque to any outsider.  
 
The book presents its material chronologically, beginning with the relations to the Comintern, and 
the evolution of a series of anti-colonial organisations, including the Internationale Arbeiterhilfe 
and League against Colonial Oppression, that eventually were transformed into the better known 
League against Imperialism. We are shown how a number of specific international movements, 
such as ‘Hands Off China’ and ‘Against the Cruelties in Syria’ campaigns of 1925, also provided 
the constituency from which the LAI was established. The narrative that is presented could be 
described as the progress upwards towards the Brussels Congress of February1927 (Part I), the 
high point of the congress itself and the confusion of its aftermath (Part II), followed by the 
decline of the movement, encapsulated in its enforced relocation to Paris and London in 1933 (Part 
III). Petersson shows how the course of the LAI as an organisation was determined by a series of 
difficulties: the tense relations that often obtained between the Comintern and the LAI, the 
attempts towards control and autonomy among the parties involved, the changing situation in the 
Soviet Union particularly after Lenin’s death in January 1924 and the rise of Stalin and the 
consequential changes in Comintern policy, and the rise of fascism in Germany which made it 
impossible for the LAI to continue in Berlin after 1933. The broad frame of this narrative is 
charted in extraordinary and fascinating detail, with the author managing to keep us in touch with 
the overall trajectory of the story whilst painstakingly picking out the often complex and 
convoluted relations between the main actors involved, ending in Münzenberg’s own tragic and 
ignominious death in June 1940.  
 
While the history of the anti-colonial movements has been told in terms of individual movements, 
and from a broader perspective in terms of the global resistance to imperialism that developed into 
the decolonization movements after the Second World War, this is the first time that we have been 
given a history of the operation of anti-colonial movements within Europe itself. In providing this, 
Petersson has provided a new way of understanding the history of colonialism and its opponents in 
the twentieth century.  
 
New York University 
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List of Abbreviations 
The readability of a history of an organisation often suffers from the frequent use of acronyms in 
sentences and phrases, e.g. “the indifferent attitude of the communist parties, especially the PCF, 
the CPGB, and the KPD” or “as members of the CEQCCB. Granted a term of ten working days to 
complete a report, the ECCI Secretariat expected the commission to examine the available 
documents on the LACO at Comintern headquarters and to present a report. The ‘Resolution of the 
CEQCCB’ was given in person by Roy to the ECCI Secretariat”, are almost like a cipher for the 
reader. I have made an effort not to use acronyms for organisations mentioned here and there in the 
text. However, there has been no getting around the fact that this is a history of an organisation 
(the League against Imperialism; LAI), intimately linked to another organisation (the Communist 
International; Comintern) which itself had affiliations and links to other organisations, 
associations and committees, the majority of which occur so frequently that it has been impossible 
to completely avoid the use of abbreviations. However, this does not represent a major problem in 
the following study, or as Geerth van Goethem observed, “it takes only a small effort to memorise 
the most frequently used acronyms”.2  
 
AAAIL   All American Anti-Imperialist League 
Agitprop  Agitation and Propaganda   
A-I-Z  Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung 
AITUC    All India Trade Union Committee 
ANC   African National Congress 
ANLC American Negro Labour Congress 
ARAB Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek (Labour Movement Archives and 
Library) 
AUCCSLU  All Union Central Council of Soviet Labour Unions (Allunionistischen 
Zentralrats der Sowjetgewerkschaften) 
CEQCCB Commission for the Examination of the Question of a Colonial 
Congress in Brussels  
CGWCC   Commission to Guide the Work of the Colonial Congress 
CIB   Colonial Information Bureau  
CNA  Chinese National Agency 
CO  Colonial Office  
Comintern  Communist International; Third International 
CPCh  Communist Party of China 
CPCz  Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
CPGB  Communist Party of Great Britain 
CPH  Communist Party of Holland 
CPSU (B)  Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) 
CPUSA  Communist Party of the USA 
ECCI  Executive Committee of the Communist International 
FESAIL   Far Eastern Secretariat of the Anti-Imperialist League  
                                               
2 Geert van Goethem, The Amsterdam International. The world of the International Federation of Trade Union  
(IFTU), 1913-1945, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, pp.8-9.  
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FWA   Furniture Workers’ Association 
HO  Head Office 
IAH Internationale Arbeiterhilfe (Workers’ International Relief; 
Mezhdunarodnaia rabochiia pomoshch, MPR) 
ICC   International Control Commission 
ICB  International Colonial Bureau 
ICBu   International Colonial Bureau of the Comintern (1924)  
IFTU  International Federation of Trade Unions; Amsterdam International 
IISG Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (International 
Institute of Social History) 
ILP  Independent Labour Party 
ILS   International Lenin School 
INC   Indian National Congress 
Inprecorr  International Press Correspondence 
IRH Internationale Rote Hilfe (Mezhdunarodnaia organizatsiia pomoschchi 
revoliutsioneram; International Red Aid; MOPR) 
ITUC  Indian Trade Union Council 
ITUCNW  International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers of the RILU  
KIM  Kommunisticheskii Internatsional Molodezhi (Communist Youth 
International; CYI) 
KMT  Kuomintang 
KOSTUFRA  Kommunistische Studenten Fraktion (Communist Student Fraction) 
Krestintern  Peasants' International (Krestianskii Internatsional) 
KUTV Kommunisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia Vostoka (Communist 
University for Eastern Workers) 
LACO League against Colonial Oppression (Liga gegen Koloniale 
Unterdrückung) 
LAI  League against Imperialism and for National Independence (Liga gegen 
Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit) 
LAICNI  League against Imperialism and Colonial Rule and for National 
Independence  
LDRN Ligue de Défense de la Race Négre (League for the Defence of the 
Negro Race) 
LHR  League for Human Rights’ (Liga für Menschenrechte) 
LRD  Labour and Research Department 
LSI  Labour and Socialist International; the Second International 
KPD  Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (Communist Party of Germany) 
MdI  Ministerium des Innern (Prussian Ministry of the Interior) 
MFGB  Miners’ Federation of Great Britain 
NA  National Archive, Stockholm (Riksarkivet) 
NAACP   National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People  
NAFTA  National Amalgamated Furniture Trades Association 
NAFTU   Native Federation of Trade Unions  
NEP  New Economic Policy 
NSDAP  Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (the Nazi Party) 
OMS  Department for International Liaison (Otdel mezhdunarodnoi sviazi) 
PCF  Partei Communiste Francais (Communist Party of France) 
PI  Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association) 
PKI  Communist Party of Indonesia 
Profintern Red Trade Union International (Krasnyi internatsional 
professional’nykh soiuzov; RILU) 
ix 
 
RGASPI Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Arkhiv Social’no-Politicheskoj Istorii 
Russian State Archive for Social and Political History), Moscow 
RK  Reichskommissar (Reich Commissar) 
RKÜöO  Reichskommissar für Überwachung der öffentlichen Ordnung (Reich 
  Commissar for the Supervision of Public Order) 
RMdI  Reichministerium des Innern (Reich Ministry of the Interior) 
SA  Sturmabteilung (Storm Troopers of the Nazi Party)   
SAPMO- 
BA ZPA Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im 
Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv, Lichterfelde, Berlin 
SATUC   South African Trade Union Congress 
SCA   Stockholm City Archive (Stockholms stadsarkiv) 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (Social Democratic Party of 
Germany) 
TNA  The National Archives, Kew, London 
TUC  Trade Union Council 
UNIA  Universal Negro Improvement Association  
WAFU   West African Farmers’ Union  
WASU  West African Students’ Union 
WEB   West European Bureau  
WES   West European Secretariat 
WPA  Workers’ Party of America   
WZSPS   see AUCCSLU 
ZK KPD   Zentralkomitee des Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Germany) 
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Introduction  
 
[T]o act as a neutral intermediary between the Communist International and nationalist 
movements in the colonies. 
Manabendra Nath Roy, Moscow, to 
Münzenberg, Berlin, 29/5-1926 
 
The organisation for a special purpose (Zweckverband) is a peculiarly discreet sociological 
formation; its members are in psychological respects anonymous; and, in order to form the 
combination, they need to know of each other only that they form it. 
Georg Simmel, “The Sociology of Secrecy 
and of Secret Societies”, in American 
Journal of Sociology, Nr.11, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1906, p.449 
 
Achmed Sukarno, the President of Indonesia, stated in his opening speech at the Afro – Asian 
Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, 17 – 24 April 1955: “I recognise that we are gathered here 
today as a result of sacrifices. Sacrifices made by our forefathers and by the people of our own and 
younger generations. […] It is a new departure in the history of the world that leaders of Asian and 
African peoples can meet together in their own countries to discuss and deliberate upon matters of 
common concern. Only a few decades ago it was frequently necessary to travel to other countries 
and even other continents before the spokesmen of our peoples could confer. I recall in this 
connection the Conference of the ‘League Against Imperialism and Colonialism’ which was held 
in Brussels almost thirty years ago. At that Conference, many distinguished delegates who are 
present here today met each other and found new strength in their fight for independence. But that 
was a meeting place thousands of miles away, amidst foreign people, in a foreign country, in a 
foreign continent. It was not assembled there by choice, but by necessity”.1 This was a historical 
bond highly treasured by Sukarno, but what did this bond represent? Whilst the Bandung 
Conference was the scene of conviction and determination amongst the leaders from twenty-nine 
                                               
1 George McTurnan Kahin (ed.), The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, Cornell University  
Press, Ithaca, New York, 1956, p.40. Parts of the quote above are found in Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations. A 
People’s History of the Third World, The New Press, New York, p.30. For an introduction on the Afro – Asian 
Conference in Bandung, see Christopher J. Lee, “Introduction”, in Making a World after Empire. The Bandung 
Moment and its Political Afterlives, Christopher J. Lee (ed.), Ohio University Press, Athens, 2010, pp.1-32. In 
commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Bandung conference, the Indonesian Ambassador in Tunis, S. A. M. 
Alaydroes, wrote that the conference was the “beginning of a movement in world politics”, which had created “a 
flame, a spirit of solidarity and of determination that kindled the hearts of men and women” on a transcontinental level 
– Africa – Asia – Latin America, see S. A. M. Alaydroes (Ambassador of Indonesia, Tunis), Thirty Years Asian African 
Conference, Ambassade de la Republique D’Indonesie, Tunis, 1985, p.1.  
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African and Asian countries, who had gathered to solve the potential future direction of the post-
colonial world, the “First Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism” in Brussels on 
10-14 February 1927 was the scene of euphoria. Representing the place and occasion to celebrate 
the inauguration of the League against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI), the 
congress was guided by the spiritual motto “National Freedom – Social Equality”. On 13 February, 
Willi Münzenberg (1889 – 1940), the German communist and General Secretary of the communist 
mass organisation Internationale Arbeiterhilfe (Workers’ International Relief; IAH; 1921 – 1935) 
which had been set up by the Communist International (the Third International; Comintern; 1919 – 
1943), addressed delegates of anti-colonial movements, leaders of the European left-wing 
movement and European intellectuals on the “establishment of a permanent worldwide 
organisation linking up all forces against imperialism and colonial oppression”. Münzenberg 
concluded his speech by stating “this time the optimists, believers, have been proven right […]. 
From this day, the story of the League against Imperialism begins”.2 A story referred to, after the 
Second World War, in nostalgic terms and which assumed mythological proportions, having the 
LAI symbolise the spiritual bond between the colonial liberation movements of the inter-war era 
with the ones emerging during the post-war period. Thus, the idea and understanding of the LAI 
reached its crescendo at the 1955 Bandung Conference with Sukarno’s reference that “[I]t was not 
assembled there by choice, but by necessity”. The Brussels Congress and, later, the establishment 
of the LAI, had in fact been the results of meticulous planning and construction rather than “by 
necessity”, in a cleverly-disguised interplay between Münzenberg, the IAH and the Comintern, an 
important focus of the following study. 
      Münzenberg’s role in the history of the LAI is pivotal. Tied to the Comintern and to the 
German communist movement, he experienced a fairly independent organisational and political 
position within the Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (KPD). Described by his contemporaries, 
as well as in biographies and scholarly works, as the entrepreneurial genius of communist 
propaganda and organisational manoeuvres in Europe during the inter-war era, the mythology of 
his persona in the historiography of national and international communism is not only obscured, it 
is characterised by misconceived narratives. Münzenberg, one of Lenin's friends, experienced a 
thriving and turbulent career within the European communist movement. After having been forced 
into exile in Paris once the Nazi Party (Nationalsozialistiche Partei; NSDAP) seized power in 
                                               
2 Louis Gibarti (ed.), Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont, Neuer Deutscher Verlag, Berlin, 1927; IISG LAI  
Collection 3392.1/5, Agenda of the Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism, Brussels, 10/2-1927; 
RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Manuscript of Willi Münzenberg’s speech, Brussels, 13/2-1927. The LAI was alternatively 
referred to by its contemporaries and in scholarly works as the Anti-Imperialist League, League against Imperialism 
and Colonial Oppression, League against Imperialism and Colonialism. However, throughout this study, the 
abbreviation LAI shall be retained as the point of reference.  
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Germany 1933, his relations to the KPD and the Comintern were cut short in 1938 after, first, 
being expelled, and then recognised and described as a persona non grata. Along with other 
German communist émigrés, Münzenberg was incarcerated in the Chambaran internment camp on 
the direct orders of French authorities after the German invasion of France on 10 May, 1940. In 
June the same year, the decision was taken to evacuate the camp, thus, every prisoner was left to 
his own devices. What followed is still, to this day, a mystery. On 17 October 1940, two hunters 
found Münzenberg's decomposed body with a noose around his neck, in the forest outside the 
French town Montaigne. Saint Marcellin authorities categorised the cause of death as suicide, 
although the circumstances leading to Münzenberg’s demise have, in retrospect, produced a series 
of interpretations, which suggests that he was murdered either by the German SS or by Soviet 
NKVD agents, rather than having committed suicide. The crux of the matter is that the murder 
claim is not supported by any empirical evidence. Hence, the conspiratorial perspective has filled 
the gap to interpret and explain the reasons behind Münzenberg’s death, although it had also 
foreshadowed his life and career within the socialist, pacifist and communist movements.3 
      Acting as the leader and General Secretary of the IAH, formed on Lenin’s instructions in 
August 1921, Münzenberg was the architect behind the invisible web of loosely-knit committees, 
propaganda campaigns and relief activities outside Soviet Russia. Münzenberg’s fundamental aim, 
initially, was to use the committees and campaigns as instruments in procuring material and moral 
support for the war-stricken Soviet Russian society, which had suffered famine and destruction 
after the Great War and the Russian Civil War in 1918-1921. By adopting the theme of proletarian 
solidarity, Münzenberg hoped to illuminate and unite the political struggle of the working class. It 
was an operation and objective which grew and manifested itself over time as a self-perpetuating 
propaganda machine but which, first and foremost, abided by the rules and rationale of the 
Comintern and the international communist movement during the 1920s.4 The LAI was a part of 
                                               
3 Research and writings on Münzenberg’s life, career and persona are scattered and elusive and still require a  
definitive assessment, in particular his involvement in the Comintern while being active in the service to spread 
communism. Babette Gross’s political biography, Willi Münzenberg. Eine politische Biographie, Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, Stuttgart (1967), is a canonical work, which offers an insight into the life and career of Münzenberg. In 
contrast to Gross' book is the biased and ill-conceived interpretation in Sean McMeekin’s The Red Millionaire. A 
Political Biography of Willi Münzenberg, Moscow’s Secret Propaganda Tsar in the West (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 2003), a work complemented by Stephen Koch’s attempt to understand Münzenberg’s activities as disclosed in 
Double Lives: Stalin, Willi Münzenberg and the Seduction of the Intellectuals (Harper Collins, London, 1995). A more 
thorough account of the last years of Münzenberg's life is given in Harald Wessel, Münzenbergs Ende. Ein deutscher 
Kommunist im Widerstand gegen Hitler und Stalin. Die Jahre 1933 bis 1940, Dietz Verlag Berlin, 1991, and, the short 
biography provided in Hermann Weber and Andreas Herbst (Hrsg.), Deutsche Kommunisten – Biographisches 
Handbuch 1918 bis 1945, Karl Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 2004, pp.521-524.  
4 Interpretations of the IAH and Münzenberg are found in the works mentioned above. See further in the dated, but  
valid accounts in Helmut Gruber, “Willi Munzenberg’s German Communist Propaganda Empire 1921-1933”, in The 
Journal of Modern History, Vol. 38, No. 3, University of Chicago (Sep., 1966), pp.278-297, and, Robert Nigel Carew 
Hunt, “Willi Muenzenberg”, in International Communism, St Antony’s Papers Number 9, David Footman (ed.), Chatto 
& Windus, London, 1960, pp.72-87. PhD student Kasper Braskén’s forthcoming thesis on the conceptual framing and 
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this process. However, the organisation was also the result of the IAH’s ambition to assist the 
Comintern in spreading communism around the world. In Brussels, in February 1927, Münzenberg 
wanted everyone to observe that the congress was “tremendous and historically significant” due to 
the fact that it had managed to link together “liberal thinkers” with workers’ representatives, as 
well as political and trade union organisations in Europe and the USA. Bringing the congress to a 
euphoric finale, Münzenberg provided the crowd with a feeling of relief and collective joy which 
aimed to embrace, wrap up, and shed light on the spiritual message that a movement against 
colonialism and imperialism had finally been created: “[W]e have come together, we have got to 
know and feel that we belong together and must stay together. […] We know very well that a 
conference only offers a limited opportunity, the effect and the work must be carried out outside on 
the real battlefields”.5  
      This study is based on primary archival sources; documents which throw new light on the 
mythological proportions the LAI and the Brussels Congress have, over time, acquired. Whilst 
post-colonial or subaltern studies work within their own contextual settings, chronological 
divisions and separations of time, I shall be interpreting the LAI as a source of concerted 
inspiration for the liberation movements in the colonial and semi-colonial countries after the 
Second World War, which set ablaze the process of decolonisation.6 However, is the history of the 
LAI a precursor to the history of decolonisation and post-colonialism? The issue is far more 
complex and intricate than this. For example, it is connected to different sets of chronologies, e.g. 
the decolonisation process and post-colonialism. However, the LAI is also unquestionably linked 
to the political developments of the inter-war years (1918 – 1939) and, above all, to the 
chronology and study of international communism and the Comintern. 
 
* 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
practical usage of solidarity as a political delineator in the context of the IAH and Münzenberg shall contribute with an 
in-depth understanding of the ramifications of the IAH as a part of the German communist movement in the inter-war 
years.  
5 RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Manuscript of Willi Münzenberg’s speech, Brussels, 13/2-1927. Euphoria as a concept and 
its implications is discussed in Richard Stites intriguing study of utopia and experimentalism in the Soviet Union; see 
Richard Stites, Revolutionary Dreams. Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1989, p.39. 
6 See Prashad (2007); Lee (2010); Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism. An Historical Introduction, Blackwell  
Publishing, Oxford, 2001; Dohra Ahmad, Landscapes of Hope. Anti-Colonial Utopianism in America, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009; Jürgen Osterhammel, Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zu 
Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2001; David B. Abernethy, 
The Dynamics of Global Dominance. European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
2000; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2000; Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of 
Culture”, in Lee (ed.) 2010, pp.45-68; Marc Ferro, Colonization. A Global History, World Heritage Press, Quebec, 
1997.  
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The Mosaic of the Research  
The European continent was shattered after the ending of the Great War in November 1918. 
Characterised by the loss of millions of lives, an indescribable devastation on all societal levels, a 
number of former, major European empires had either collapsed or were confronted by revolution: 
tsarist rule in Russia and the Romanovs, the Austro-Hungarian Empire under the Habsburgs, the 
Ottoman Empire and the rule of the Hohenzollerns in Germany. It was the dawning of a new era 
for mankind, as the end of the war set in motion “new ideas and movements” which, during the 
inter-war years (1918 – 1939) challenged former systems of international relations and called into 
question the existing structures of global order, sending vibrations throughout Europe and beyond. 
It was within the context of the aftermath of a great ordeal which, according to historian Zara 
Steiner’s study on the reconstruction of Europe after the war, the 1920s has to be understood as a 
“post-war and not a pre-war decade” to the 1930s. Hence, the global society witnessed the co-
existence of old and new structures, which in turn determined the character of international 
relations after the war. The principles required to secure world peace and restore global order were 
outlined in the renowned Fourteen Points, formulated and presented by the President of the USA, 
Woodrow Wilson, in spirit and flesh at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, which celebrated the 
establishment of the guarantor of world peace, the League of Nations. These peace negotiations 
were epochal in the history of international relations, providing the emotional and ideological 
impetus to increase the demand for national self-determination for all peoples. This was a message 
which set ablaze the hopes of nationalists from the colonial and semi-colonial world who had 
arrived in Paris to pursue the struggle for national independence and liberation for their countries. 
The representatives of anti-colonial movements hoped to be a part of and to influence the 
“Wilsonian moment”. Thus, for a brief moment, Wilson assumed the icon-like status of the 
guarantor of a righteous and better world. This was, however, a vision which faded rather quickly 
as, according to Erez Manela, it left in its trail “bitter dissolution”. Instead, the peace conference 
provided an arena for the victorious Entente: USA, Great Britain, France and, to a lesser degree, 
Italy. The conference celebrated in ritualistic terms a new global divide. For Germany, the peace 
negotiations were particularly humiliating, as the Entente held on to their colonial possessions, 
whilst the victorious nations distributed former German colonies amongst themselves, re-
designated as mandates. The political and social classes in Germany experienced the Versailles 
Peace Treaty as degrading, particularly the vast war reparation demands. This defined the picture 
of the newly-born republic – the Weimar Republic – as having been “born in defeat”. Confronted 
not only by the hostility of foreign nations, German society faced a revolutionary attempt by the 
communists during the “November Revolution” in 1918, which culminated in the transformation 
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of the Spartacist Group, under Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht’s leadership, into the KPD in 
December the same year.7 For the anti-colonial representatives present in Paris at the peace 
conference, it was a question of positioning themselves within the new world order, which was 
either characterised by nationalism and the principle of self-determination, or the Bolshevik 
conception of internationalism. With the removal of the tsarist regime after the February revolution 
in Russian in 1917, and the ensuing Bolshevik coup in Petrograd in October the same year, the 
international political scene included a radical and new actor which attracted attention from the 
anti-colonial movement. The anti-colonial movements criticised the civilising mission of European 
empires in the colonial and semi-colonial countries; a practice put into effect during the height of 
colonialism in the nineteenth century. Thus, representatives for these movements focused solemnly 
on one particular object of interest, that of achieving national liberation based on the principles of 
self-determination. This was a process and a frame of mind which, according to Vijay Prashad’s 
observation, inspired the “anti-colonial nationalist movement” to produce “a series of gatherings 
and a language of anti-colonialism which elicited an emotional loyalty among its circle and 
beyond”.8 
      The “Wilsonian moment” had evaporated by the end of 1919, whereupon the agenda and 
language of the anti-colonial movements turned towards the internationalism and solidarity 
embraced by the socialist movement. In some cases, the radicalism of communism and the display 
of popular utopia that the Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia espoused – justice, community and rebellion 
– enabled the anti-colonial movement to be perceived as the answer to creating a foundation for 
the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.9 This became evident with the establishment of 
the Comintern in Petrograd on 3-7 March 1919, which aimed to function as a political response to 
the so-called failure of the international labour movement, particularly the Second International 
(the Labour and Socialist International; LSI), to protest against the “imperialist war”. However, the 
Comintern aspired to “creating not just a Communist world, but also a world of communism”.10 In 
                                               
7 Zara Steiner, The Lights That Failed. European International History 1919-1933, Oxford University Press, Oxford,  
2005, pp.1-5, 602-603; Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp.3-7; Eric D. Weitz, Creating German 
Communism, 1890-1990. From Popular Protests to Socialist State, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997, pp.83-
95; Kevin McDermott & Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern. A History of International Communism From Lenin to Stalin, 
Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 1996, p.11; András Siklós, Revolution in Hungary and the Dissolution of the 
Multinational State 1918, Budapest, 1988. The “Spartacist Uprising” was thwarted in January 1919 by the 
paramilitary Freikorps, culminating in the brutal murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht in Berlin.  
8 Prashad 2007, p.13. For a discussion on “civilizing mission”, see further in Michael Adas, “Contested Hegemony.  
The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission”, in Lee (ed.) 2010, pp.69-106.  
9 Manela 2007, p.7; Carsten Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought, Palgrave  
Macmillan, New York, 2003, p.69; Joachim Schröder, Internationalismus nach dem Krieg. Die Beziehungen zwischen  
deutschen und französischen Kommunisten 1918-1923, Klartext Verlag, Essen, 2008; Stites 1989, p.14.  
10 Alexander Vatlin, Die Komintern. Gründung, Programmatik, Akteure, Karl Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 2009, pp.34-39;  
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this “world of communism”, anti-colonialism and the colonial question proved, however, to be a 
daunting challenge for the Comintern. In principle, the question focused on justifying arguments to 
provide an ideological and organisational base for the anti-colonial movement in the heart of world 
revolution, i.e. Bolshevism, the Comintern and international communism, although communism, 
as defined as the societal phenomenon in Russian history which existed as an ideology and a state 
system for 73 years (1917 – 1991), is a topic usually interpreted and understood in terms of its 
rigid monolithic structure, repression and terror. However, from an ideological perspective, 
communism is a movement and political tradition which belongs to the radical social labour 
movement where, as noted by Hermann Weber, communism builds upon the utopian vision to 
create “a better world”.11 
 
Berlin was the capital of the Weimar Republic, a mosaic and hefty brew of political, cultural and 
social expressions as well as home to about four million residents during the inter-war years. To 
walk around the city, as suggested in Eric D. Weitz’ study of Weimar Germany, was to “experience 
voyeuristically” the components of German society during the inter-war years. Most importantly, 
Berlin provided a political space, determined by the heritage of the Great War and the humiliating 
Versailles Peace Treaty, characterised by hope and despair, political struggles in public and 
informal spheres but also by intensity and expectations, cultural relations unified in connections 
linked together in networks.12 The history of the LAI is firmly rooted in Berlin as much as Berlin 
was firmly rooted in the LAI. The heart of the LAI was the International Secretariat, the pivotal 
link in establishing and sustaining communist as well as anti-colonial networks. Located at 24 
Friedrichstraβe, in the hub of the government and entertainment districts, the International 
Secretariat was within walking distance of the IAH headquarters at 48 Wilhelmstraβe. However, in 
order to bring to mind the topography of where the International Secretariat was once located (its 
actual position having been physically obliterated at the end of the Second World War), one must 
stand at the “Checkpoint Charlie” intersection, the symbol of the Cold War. During the 1920s, 
                                                                                                                                                          
Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe, “Introduction”, in International communism and the Communist International 1919-43, 
Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe (eds.), Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1998, p.10. Vatlin suggests that the 
“Germanocentrist” paradigm explains why the KPD holds a dominant role in the historiography of the international 
communist movement and the Comintern. However, other elements need to be included in the equation, Vatlin argues, 
e.g. Lenin’s position and the ensuing effects of his death in 1924; the political development(s) in the Soviet Union; 
and, the isolation of the European communist movement in Europe, see Aleksandr Vatlin, ”The Theory and Practice of 
World Revolution in the Perception of Inter-war Europe. An Attempt at a Historical Generalisation”, in Politics and 
Society under the Bolsheviks, McDermott & Morison (eds.), Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999, pp.245-249. 
11 For the distinction on rigid systems and the historical tradition of communism as a radical labour movement, see  
Hermann Weber, “The Stalinization of the KPD”, in Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern. Perspectives on 
Stalinization, 1917-53, LaPorte, Morgan, & Worley (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, pp.27-28; Ahmad 
2009, p.8.  
12 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany. Promise and Tragedy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, pp.41-79.  
According to Weitz, “Weimar was Berlin, Berlin Weimar”. 
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however, the neon-lit pavement and goings-on on Friedrichstraβe symbolised modern Berlin, a city 
shaped by liberalism and radicalism, which offered pleasurable entertainments of all sorts.13 
      Berlin was the administrative hub for the international communist movement in Europe. 
Described as the Comintern's “global village”, the city provided the communists with a scene for 
its activities and, most importantly, an impetus rooted in the people’s deep resentment towards the 
Versailles Peace Treaty, which kept feeding the radicalism on the extreme Left and Right. 
According to Karl Schlögel’s topographic analysis of the Weimar capital, “Red Berlin” represented 
a place that reproduced and physically distributed the social and political image of Bolshevism and 
the Soviet Union. As the “Org-Welt” of the Comintern, the communist movement used Berlin to 
administrate and co-ordinate its activities across the world. Hence, the city, covered by networks 
linking together the activities of the Comintern, was a haven for the KPD and the communist 
“planetary system” of mass and sympathising organisations as well as for foreign residents. For the 
KPD, Berlin resembled a hotbed in which to organise and continue the struggle to represent itself 
as the safeguard for the German proletariat against social democracy and fascism, an undertaking 
which reached a bitter end after the NSDAP seized power on 30 January, 1933.14 
      The radicalism and explicit political milieu of Berlin corresponded to the desires and 
expectations among individuals who belonged to the colonial émigré community. Either living in 
the capital as students, journalists or as sojourners in a continent which had instigated the modern 
system of colonialism during the nineteenth century, the anti-colonial movement found a haven in 
Berlin. According to the demands of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to renounce its colonial 
possessions to the victorious powers, which produced a confused relationship to and understanding 
of colonialism and imperialism in Germany during the 1920s. In turn, this gave impetus to the 
activities of the anti-colonial movement in the country.15 Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime 
Minister of India in 1947, attended the Brussels Congress and, as an elected member of the LAI 
Executive Committee Berlin, visited Berlin in 1927 after the congress. In the city, Nehru realised 
that a majority of the activities carried out by the 5,000 colonial residents in the “colonial 
metropolis”, had links to either radical or communist movements. The political discussions 
                                               
13 Karl Schlögel, Berlin Ostbahnhof Europas. Russen und Deutsche in ihrem Jahrhundert, Siedler Verlag, Berlin,  
1998, pp.163-165; Brendon 2002, pp.125-126. The LAI International Secretariat was located at the headquarters of 
IAH at 48 Wilhelmstraβe in 1927. From 1928 to 1931, the International Secretariat had a bureau at 24 Friedrichstraβe 
and, in 1932-33, 13 Hedemannstraβe functioned as a refuge for its activities. 
14 Schlögel’s informative account of “Red Berlin”, the “global village” of the Comintern, includes the notation that  
Münzenberg was one of the most important Comintern representatives in Berlin. Yet there is no mention of any of the  
functions and activities of the LAI or the anti-colonial movement, see Schlögel 1998, pp.136-158; Weitz 1997, p.280. 
15 Gross 1967, p.197; Mary E. Townsend, “The Contemporary Colonial Movement in Germany”, in Political Science  
Quarterly, Vol.43, No.1 (Mar., 1928), The Academy of Science, pp.64-75; Jared Poley, Decolonization in Germany. 
Weimar Narratives of Colonial Loss and Foreign Occupation, Peter Lang, Oxford (2005).  
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amongst Indian nationalists focused on expressing anti-colonial ideas, which aimed to create some 
kind of action or movement in support of “the oppressed nations”.16 
      The following study refers to place as a decisive prerequisite determining the LAI’s 
opportunities in both carrying out political activism and its results. Eric D. Weitz writes that 
German communists “did not operate” in an environment “of their own choosing”, an observation 
which can also be applied to the colonial people who were living in Berlin during the inter-war 
years. The political space in which the LAI and the International Secretariat existed, defined itself 
by both the potential and limitations of place. For example, the organisation and carrying out of 
public rallies, demonstrations, the scheduling and preparation of curricular activity, the openness 
and restrictiveness of city plazas and markets; and how national and local security services 
administrated its surveillance, solely in order to monitor the activities and relations between the 
German communist movement and colonial individuals. All of the above represent arenas which 
housed “realms of political engagement and conflict”.17 Place represents a particular symbolic role 
in this study; but why? The political backdrop in Berlin contributed to the shaping of the political 
identity amongst the individuals engaged in the LAI. As a common meeting ground, the physical 
location of the International Secretariat functioned as an intersection of “particular bundles of 
activity spaces, of connections and inter-relations, of influences and movements”, which in turn 
the LAI and the Comintern supported feverishly.18 The International Secretariat wanted to pose as 
the location and hub for the anti-imperialist movement in Europe and beyond; however, its 
relations with its ideological and material supporter, the Comintern headquarters in Moscow, was 
the determining factor behind this. 
      A majority of the ideas introduced by the LAI never came to fruition, however. The history of 
the Comintern is a significant part of the LAI narrative. This “world party” was dissolved on the 
direct orders of Stalin in 1943, during the turbulence of Second World War, and was interpreted as 
having been a failed political actor of grandiose proportions. However, by interpreting the world of 
communism(s) as a failure is a rash mistake. Such a postulation reproduces and strengthens the 
misconception of the history of communism, while at the same time neglecting the activities and 
                                               
16 Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography with musings on recent events in India (first edition: 1936), The Bodley Head,  
London, 1953, p.161. The term “colonial metropolis” is further discussed in Jennifer Anne Boittin, Colonial 
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Brent Hayes Edwards, “The Shadow of Shadows”, in Positions II:I, Duke University Press, 2003, pp.11-49. 
17 Weitz 1997, p.6.  
18 The discussion on “place” is taken from human geography research, see, for example, Doreen Massey, “The 
conceptualization of place”, in A Place in the World?, Doreen Massey and Pat Jess (eds.), Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1995, pp.58-59. Historian Josephine Fowler’s study on Japanese and Chinese immigrant activists during the 
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“place”, see Josephine Fowler, Japanese and Chinese Immigrant Activists. Organizing in American and International 
Communist Movements, 1919-1933, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 2007, p.5.  
10 
 
undertakings of the communist parties and its mass and sympathising organisations. Above all, 
such a perspective reduces the value and history of the individuals, the majority of which devoted 
their entire lives as visionaries and believers to creating “a world of communism”. The following 
study aims, therefore, to fill in the gaps, silences and histories which remain in the shadows; 
hence, it is a recovery of “lost” history.19 This is a perspective that concerns a historiographical 
distinction of “good and bad histories”,20 which depends on placing the history of the LAI within 
its proper context. What is the aim of this approach? This narrative strives to look behind the one-
dimensional contention that communism, as an ideology, was the only motive endorsing the LAI 
and its activities. The fundamental quest is, firstly, to achieve an understanding as to the structure 
and ideology which united the LAI, Comintern and the anti-imperialist movement. This requires 
an examination of the inner dynamics and structures linking the network together, e.g. ideology, 
institutions and individuals. Secondly, this analysis aims to discern how loyalties and obligations 
evolved over time, space and place by evaluating and discussing the history of the LAI in order to 
reach an understanding of the organisation's achievements and its historical legacy. Intertwined 
with all of the historical twists and turns outlined above, this analysis strives to place itself within 
the LAI by looking outwards from the inside. Its purpose and aim is to investigate the networks 
and structural dynamics of the system which emerged and gained momentum once the IAH and 
the Comintern had decided to establish and support the LAI. The following study is an in-depth 
study of how and why the euphoria of the Brussels Congress evaporated, only to be replaced by 
despair. 
      The comprehensive aim of this thesis is to analyse and interpret the inner structure and 
functions of the LAI. My first point of departure will be the causal dynamics after the Comintern 
endorsed the decision to establish and support the LAI as a cover for Comintern activities in the 
                                               
19 The argumentation on gaps, silences and “lost” history is found in Fowler (2007, pp.12-14). Franz Borkenau, a 
former communist and engaged in the KPD and the Comintern, was one of the first critics to describe the Comintern 
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introduced by historian Jane Degras in 1965. According to Degras, any research on the Comintern has to look beyond 
failure as the end of the Comintern, in fact, is an understanding refuted as an “irrelevant question”. On the contrary, 
any examination of the Comintern should focus on discerning its accomplishments. Failure, as a paradigm, rests on the 
postulation that the Comintern was a structure and idea established in a milieu characterised by a misreading of socio-
political conditions, whilst its sudden liquidation in 1943 was an embarrassing moment for the promoters of world 
revolution. In conclusion, Degras states that the history of the Comintern deserves a broader context, which includes 
the “epochal event” the Russian revolution and the emergence of the Bolsheviks as the trumpeters of state power. 
Hence, the Comintern is “inseparable from Soviet history”, see Jane Degras, The Communist International 1919-1943, 
Documents – Volume III, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965, p.ix. Historian Apollon Davidson et al. (2003) 
introduced a similar argumentation, stating that the “Comintern was without doubt one of the most important global 
organisations ever to have existed”, see Apollon Davidson; Irina Filatova; Valentin Gorodnov & Sheridan Johns (eds.), 
South Africa and the Communist International: a Documentary History. Volume I, Socialist Pilgrims to Bolshevik 
Footsoldiers, 1919-1930, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p.1.  
20 Chakrabarty 2000, pp.97-99.  
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shape of a sympathising organisation (for more, see below). Secondly, to analyse whether there 
existed any patterns of independence of the International Secretariat and, on the basis of the above, 
how the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters in Moscow implemented its practices in 
subjugating the LAI. While the LAI represented itself in public as a non-party organisation, 
claiming to have no affiliations with any political party or ideological conviction, the LAI was a 
political actor nonetheless. Intertwined with the Comintern and its network of subsidiary sections – 
the national communist parties, the mass and sympathising organisations – this thesis aims to 
introduce a historie totale of an organisation which is largely a marginalised feature within the 
historiography of international communism. One must not forget, however, that the LAI was the 
symbol of a political message which the engaged individuals treasured highly and which was 
worth defending. After the Second World War, some of these individuals became influential 
agenda-makers in the post-war societies, particularly in the decolonisation process. At the same 
time, one finds individuals who ended up as casualties to an ideology, communism, which they 
had regarded as being the answer and solution with which to retaliate against the system of 
colonialism and imperialism. The general expectation of this thesis is to present and establish a 
more nuanced understanding of a particular aspect of communist inter-war history. This study of 
the LAI brings to light what went on behind the façade and the often made-up plot. 
      The study of the LAI is a topic one can approach from different perspectives. The retrospective 
and nostalgic approach, for example, places the LAI within the context of decolonisation, a story 
which culminates in the 1955 Bandung conference. Yet, this perspective only confirms the 
mythology of the LAI and strengthens its ambiguous history. Thus, the initial and determinant 
perspective offers a more constructive approach. The initial perspective focuses on the initial 
purpose, intentions and goals of the LAI: e.g. how the LAI and the Comintern interacted to reach 
an understanding on how and why they collaborated to achieve the outspoken hopes attributed to 
the LAI. This perspective also helps to determine the origin of the LAI, and to explain how and 
why the LAI carried out its various strategies and directives, sanctioned by the Comintern, or 
whether the organisation acted independently.21 The determinant perspective focuses on two 
aspects, the distinction between external and internal factors, in order to evaluate the result and 
consequences of particular events and episodes. The external framework, or as Hermann Weber 
refers to it, the “exogenous explanations”, determines the structural position of the LAI within a 
general political and social context. For example, the emergence of the political struggle in the 
Soviet Union and Weimar Germany; the ideological twists and turns inside the Comintern; the 
trans-continental relations; and finally, the NSDAP’s ascendancy to power in Germany, which 
                                               
21 For a discussion on reasons and causality, see C. Behan McCullagh, The Truth of History, Routledge, London, 1998,  
pp.236-238.  
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marked the literal end of the Weimar Republic after the Reichstag Fire in Berlin on 27 February 
1933. The internal factors focus on the structural constraints and obligations imposed on the LAI, 
particularly its relations with Comintern headquarters in Moscow. This is, essentially, a question 
which addresses how the actors interacted to assess the course of the LAI, e.g. by establishing a 
number of working commissions in Moscow. Furthermore, this analysis aims to expose how the 
process to work out and formulate directives in the departments at Comintern headquarters 
developed, and to reveal the system set up by the communists to monitor and register how the 
European-based anti-imperialist movement was progressing over time.22 At this stage, therefore, it 
is logical to introduce the following two assumptions. Firstly, if perceived as a pawn in a larger 
scheme, whether the LAI acted exclusively as a promoter and defender of Soviet foreign policy. 
Secondly, whether the LAI was a unique entity, considered by the Comintern to be one of the most 
valuable organisations outside the Soviet Union, the main purpose of which was to find and 
establish contact with anti-colonial activists in Berlin and beyond. Yet, in the end, did the LAI 
willingly carry out its obligation to act as a distributor of Bolshevik propaganda in Europe, the 
USA, Latin America as well as in the colonial and semi-colonial countries on a global scale? 
      The fundamental field of enquiry of this study focuses on the question of motive, purpose and 
intention: i.e. why the LAI was established. The analysis has a chronological framework; however, 
thematic questions narrow down the postulation that the LAI was an ideological and organisational 
instrument of particular value for the Comintern in order to expand the colonial work of the 
international communist movement. Thus, the question addresses the need to discern patterns of 
relations by following a number of research questions: what was the character and nature of the 
process leading to the establishment of the LAI in February 1927? Was it one of mutual 
understanding between the actors in Berlin, the IAH and Münzenberg and Comintern headquarters 
in Moscow? How did the International Secretariat and the Comintern experience and respond to 
the effects of the LAI in 1927? Was the LAI self-sustaining, based on its own organisational 
strength, or was the International Secretariat dependent on receiving regular support from the 
Comintern? Of equal relevance is to address the question on whose behalf the LAI aimed its 
activities and its political agenda. Was the LAI merely a cover organisation for and serving the 
interests of the Comintern, or did the LAI promote an independent anti-imperialist agenda which 
                                               
22 Hermann Weber discuss exogenous and endogenous factors in his reassessment of the KPD in connection with new 
empirical findings and scholarly conclusions after the opening of the Russian archives, see Weber (LaPorte, Morgan & 
Worley [eds.]) 2008, pp.22-44. The political scientist Philip Selznick emphasizes in his the study of “Bolshevik 
strategy and tactics” (1952) the need to discern externally and inherent tensions. Externally relates to when an 
organisation “faces a harsh environment, leading to inner stress and adaptive change of both the organisation and its 
environment”, whilst the inherent tension is “generated by the very act of delegation, which creates new centres of 
interest and power […] an indispensable phase of organizational experience”, see Philip Selznick, The Organizational 
Weapon – A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Second Edition), The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1960, pp.x-
xi.  
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attracted the anti-colonial movement? This last question concerns how the LAI made its anti-
imperialist agenda known to the public, e.g. propaganda campaigns, public meetings, conferences 
or congresses. Thus, these public displays of propaganda form a crucial part of this study; in 
particular, to evaluate the process of how the Comintern and the International Secretariat prepared 
their campaigns and congresses. The last thematic thread addresses the nature of the LAI and its 
actual historical legacy from a short and long perspective. How did the involved actors perceive 
and experience the LAI? In addition, is it possible to verify hierarchical relations between the 
actors, both on an individual and an institutional level? 
      The reason why there is an emphasis on chronology in this analysis is due to the structure of 
the empirical material and the relative scarcity of previous research. Furthermore, this is a history 
of the life and decline of an organisation. According to historian Geert van Goethem, “the history 
of an organisation” is likewise the “story of a life”. Thus, such a perspective promotes chronology 
with all its restrictions and narrative pitfalls, which in turn imply thorough and separate 
evaluations. A thematic approach would, however, face similar pitfalls. For example, anti-
colonialism and the Comintern; the European anti-imperialist movement and its peripheries; the 
colonial question and the left-wing movement in Europe; or the structure and impact of 
colonialism and imperialism in a socio-political context during the inter-war years, thematic 
departures which would have to (largely) ignore the organisational dynamics and scope of the LAI. 
Therefore, to assess the political and organisational life of the LAI, this analysis merges 
chronology with thematic approaches.23 The LAI, particularly the deliberations and activities 
developed at the nerve centre – the International Secretariat in Berlin – is the focus of our 
evaluation and analysis. On the one hand, its relations to the Comintern and, on the other hand, the 
individuals involved in dispersing anti-imperialism as an idea and as an activity. Several episodes 
or cases have posed a challenge to understand, e.g. why the decision-making process at Comintern 
headquarters assumed the direction it did and how this affected the International Secretariat. Much 
of the above, however, concerns the policy shifts that the Comintern promoted during the 
chronological limitation of the study, 1925-1933. This was a period, commonly understood in 
terms of Bolshevization and Stalinization, in which the Comintern subjected the sections to swift 
policy changes. Whilst the LAI had been founded during the height of the united front strategy, by 
1928 however, the Comintern had changed course and introduced the radical doctrine of the “third 
period”, also known as “the new line”, or the infamous “class against class” policy,24 which left in 
                                               
23 Goethem 2006, p.8.  
24 Jürgen Rojahn, “A Matter of Perspective: Some Remarks on the Periodization of the History of the Communist 
International”, in Centre and Periphery. The History of the Comintern in the Light of New Documents, Mikhail 
Narinsky and Jürgen Rojahn (eds.), IISG, Amsterdam, 1996, pp.35-45.   
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its wake much confusion and had immense consequences for the international communist 
movement. Another qualitative perspective, which is vital for the general context, is to make the 
distinction between the LAI as a representative for the anti-imperialist movement; and the 
intertwined relations of the LAI with the Comintern and the international communist movement, 
an organisational prerequisite that existed from beginning to end. However, after the NSDAP came 
to power in Germany in 1933, the International Secretariat escaped to Paris and, in August the 
same year, the apparatus of the LAI was transferred to London, and finally dissolved 
undramatically in 1937.25 The study and ambition of this thesis do not, however, strive to analyse 
the endeavours of the International Secretariat in Paris or London. The focal point is to discern 
how and why the actors at the International Secretariat in Berlin realised that the LAI had come to 
the end-of-the-road in Berlin, due to reasons beyond their control. 
      This thesis is not a study of how the German communist movement created proletarian 
solidarity as an expression to orchestrate political and social campaigns to amass support from a 
moral or a financial perspective. Neither is it a study of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU [B]; Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); RCP [B]), nor of the KPD. However, one 
cannot disregard the influence and omnipotent role of the CPSU (B) and the KPD within the 
communist movement during the inter-war years. Nevertheless, the history of the LAI is not out of 
necessity written in the context of these two communist parties. Other contexts are equally 
relevant, e.g. the policing and monitoring carried out by national security services and the politics 
of empire; colonial liberations movements, the spread of radicalism and communism on a global 
scale, and the incursion of ideologies within Weimar Germany and their expressions on a socio-
political level. 
      This thesis is a critical investigation of the LAI, based on how the contemporary actors 
experienced, described and referred to the organisation. Represented by its protagonists: the 
international communist movement, anti-colonial activists and the Comintern, as well as by its 
antagonists: the various national security services across the world, the European socialist 
movement and particularly the LSI,26 the LAI was one of few political actors, which seriously 
questioned and criticised the system of colonialism and imperialism during the inter-war years. 
Further, the covert activities, sponsored and carried out by the LAI, offer a complex account of the 
                                               
25 John Saville, “The League Against Imperialism, 1927-1937”, in Dictionary of Labour Biography, Volume VII,  
Macmillan Press, London, 1984, p.46.  
26 The LSI made efforts to oppose the political agenda and origin of the LAI. Founded in 1889, the LSI acted as the 
official representative for every European socialist party, functioning as an umbrella organisation influenced by the 
Marxist maxim, which aimed to protect and support the democratic process, the peaceful development of political 
power, and to regulate the labour market. The LSI's main ambition was the establishment of a broad political agenda in 
order to act as a political power on a national and international level, see Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of 
Socialism. The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, Harper Collins, London, 1996, pp.xx-xxi. 
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difficulties experienced gaining momentum in an organisation which introduced itself as a 
sympathising organisation, but which was also a cover organisation for the Comintern. Introducing 
itself in public as a radical non-party organisation, and yet its links to the Comintern largely 
determined the course of its history. Established in a milieu of consent and hope, both the LAI and 
the International Secretariat witnessed how the balance of power shifted in favour of the decision-
making process at the Comintern headquarters in Moscow. This did not, however, imply the end of 
the LAI; it merely resulted in the LAI ending up serving other purposes than the one originally 
intended: to act as the Comintern's intermediary in colonial and semi-colonial countries. 
 
* 
 
Previous Research: Historiography in Passim 
The scholarly interest and historiographical trends in international communism and the Comintern, 
as both a social and a political phenomenon, introduce a vast academic vista. In the aftermath of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, formerly closed archives were finally allowed the light of 
day in Moscow, a prerequisite that finally provided the scholarly community with the possibility of 
studying the Comintern and the impact of international communism as a political, cultural, social 
and economic actor. Thus, in the early 1990s, this gave rise to an increase in rich empirical studies 
of the Comintern and of the global impact of communism.27 However, some aspects of 
international communism faced a reverse trend. Research on international actors that had intimate 
and structural relations to the Comintern – the mass and sympathising organisations – are often 
characterised by misconceptions and ambiguity. In reference to the LAI, two conclusions shed 
some light on the existing dilemma. According to the correct observation made by historian Peter 
Martin in the article “Die ‘Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrückung’” in Ulrich van der Heyden, and 
Joachim Zeller’s anthology on German colonialism, “the interest in this organisation has, for a 
long time, been at a low ebb”, while Vijay Prashad concludes that the “legacy of the LAI is 
ambiguous” despite its connection to the Bandung Conference in 1955.28 The basic challenge here 
is two-fold. Firstly, to draw a distinction between historiographical trends and scholarly fields and, 
secondly, to discuss the academic and narrative contexts which have examined, interpreted and 
presented the LAI as a historical topic. Is the question of the LAI and its history exclusively a part 
of the historiography of the Comintern, or is it likewise a part of the history of decolonisation and 
                                               
27 Weitz 1997, p.12. Weitz resembled the results from the scholarly community as a “great outpouring of rich empirical  
studies” which, however, offered “few new questions or approaches to the history of communism”.  
28 Peter Martin, “Die ‘Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrückung‘“, in „…Macht und Anteil an der Weltherrschaft“. Berlin  
und der deutsche Kolonialismus, Ulrich van der Heyden, Joachim Zeller (Hrsg.), Unrast Verlag, Berlin, 2005, pp.261-
269. Martin's focus is to introduce the process that led to the establishment of the LAI in Brussels, February 1927, 
above all on the forerunner to the LAI, the League against Colonial Oppression (established in Berlin on 10 February, 
1926); Prashad 2007, p.29, 32.  
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the post-colonial critique? From a broader perspective, the topic of the LAI has been marginalised, 
treated and described in a peripheral sense when it comes to historical works of a general character 
on the inter-war period, above all in critical studies on international communism, anti-colonial 
movements, anti-imperialism as both a theory and practice, and the international labour movement. 
All of which can be wholly explained by the fact that previous research has limited itself either to 
pondering limitations, possibilities and cursory generalisations or through a biased framework. 
Firstly, John D. Hargreaves states in African Affairs (1993) that the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the subsequent opening up of the Russian archives “greatly enhanced possibilities for 
research” on anti-colonial movements and the LAI. This was, however, an observation which had 
already been made by John Saville in his momentous survey of the British labour movement 
(1984), concluding that any attempt to write a “comprehensive evaluation” of the LAI and its anti-
colonial history would fail because of the current inaccessibility to the empirical material locked 
away in Moscow. In 2008, historian Jonathan Derrick continued developing arguments on the 
challenge of conducting a “closer study of episodes, themes or individuals” linked to anti-colonial 
activity and organisations such as the LAI in his study of militant anti-colonialism in Africa and 
the West during the inter-war years.29 Secondly, the empirical and ground-breaking study of the 
LAI by historian Mustafa Haikal, as introduced in the anthology Aufstieg und Zerfall der 
Komintern (1992), based exclusively (for the first time) on documents filed in the Comintern 
Archive in Moscow (RGASPI), offered a first glimpse into the possibilities of compiling a 
“comprehensive evaluation”. Yet, in this article, Haikal was content with determining the LAI’s 
chronological patterns from its inception in 1927 till 1929, with a focus on defining patterns of 
disintegration. In 1995, Haikal re-assessed his opinion of the LAI in his anthology Willi 
Münzenberg: ein deutscher Kommunist im Spannungsfeld zwischen Stalinismus und 
Antifaschismus (1995), emphasising the pivotal role Münzenberg had had in establishing the 
LAI.30 Finally, the last perspective is the biased research results on the LAI, produced by curricular 
departments in the Soviet Union (the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow) and in the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) at the Karl-Marx Universität in Leipzig, studies based on the 
principle of supporting communism as an ideology. Grigorii Zakharovich Sorkin’s study, 
Antiimperialisticheskaia liga, 1927-1935, published in Moscow 1965, is a pioneering account of 
                                               
29 Jonathan Derrick, Africa’s ‘Agitators’. Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West, 1918-1939, Hurst &  
Company, London, 2008, p.5, 180-185.  
30 Mustafa Haikal, “Die Kommunistische Internationale und die ‘Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale 
Unabhängigkeit‘“, in Aufstieg und Zerfall der Komintern. Studien zur Geschichte ihrer Transformation (1919-1943), 
Theodor Bergmann/Mario Keβler (Hg.), Podium Progressiv, München, 1992, pp.239-252. This anthology is one of the 
first critical assessments of the Comintern after the archives had been opened in Moscow; Mustafa Haikal, “Willi 
Münzenberg und die ‚Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit‘“, in Willi Münzenberg: ein 
deutscher Kommunist im Spannungsfeld zwischen Stalinismus und Antifaschismus, Schlie/Roche (Hrsg.), Peter Lang, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1995, pp.141-153.  
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the LAI from the perspective that it introduced the LAI as one of the first organisations to support 
the struggle against imperialism. The glorification of the LAI was a view further developed in the 
official historiography of the Comintern in the book Outline History of the Communist 
International, endorsed and issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) in 1971, which described the organisation as “the first broad-based anti-imperialist 
united front” of the international “working class”. In 1987, a biased conception of the LAI 
culminated in the release of the anthology, Die Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale 
Unabhängigkeit, issued under the tutelage of the History Department at Karl-Marx-Universität in 
Leipzig, a book aiming to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the LAI at a conference in Leipzig 
on the symbolic date of 9-10 February, 1987. According to its foreword, the anthology addressed 
“the history and actuality of a little-known anti-colonial world organisation” by assessing the 
international ramifications of the LAI and its contacts with nationalist organisations and 
individuals (without any reference to archival sources). Hans Piazza, the acting editor of the 
anthology, stated that the LAI had been an organisation “motivated by the desire” to end “barbaric 
colonial rule and act in solidarity against imperialism”, conceding nevertheless that its outcome 
had had “varying consequences”.31 After the end of communism in the Soviet Union and in the 
GDR, Piazza and Haikal (the latter also attended the Leipzig conference in 1987), continued their 
work of analysing the LAI throughout the 1990s, with the slight but significant difference that the 
research based itself on documents located in the Comintern Archive in Moscow. For Piazza, the 
findings in the archive provided him with a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the LAI, 
which he described in the article “The Anti-Imperialist League and the Chinese Revolution” 
(2002): “the documents … shed new light on the history of the AIL [LAI], which has enabled me 
to revise my previous view of the subject”.32 
                                               
31 Grigorii Zakharovich Sorkin, Antiimperialisticheskaia liga, 1927-1935. Istoricheskii ocherk, Glav Nauka, Moscow,  
1965; A. I. Sobolev (“Head of group”), Outline History of the Communist International, Institute of Marxism-
Leninism, Central Committee of the CPSU, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, pp.260-262; Hans Piazza (Hrsg.), Die 
Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit 1927-1937. Zur Geschichte und Aktualität einer wenig 
bekannten antikolonialen Weltorganisation, Karl-Marx-Universität, Leipzig, 1987, p.5. Other examples of biased 
research is found in the theoretical organ of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), Beiträge zur 
Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED, 
Hrsg.). During the 1960s, the Beiträge… functioned as a channel to revise, and re-introduce a history of the party, an 
undertaking that also had an effect on the anti-colonial discourse. See Emil Langer, „Konferenz über die 
antikolonialistischen Traditionen des Kampfes der deutschen Arbeiterklasse“, in Beiträge zur Geschichte, 4/1963, 
Leipzig, pp.716-721, and, Adolf Rüger, „Die Erste Internationale Konferenz der Neger-Arbeiter (Hamburg 1930)“, in 
Beiträge zur Geschichte 5/1967, Leipzig, pp.782-797. The LAI is mentioned in a peripheral sense, mentioned merely 
as one of many actors in the German communist movement. Historian Catherine Epstein has examined the 
background and causal effects of the SED and the revision of party history, see The Last Revolutionaries. German 
Communists and Their Century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (2003).  
32 Hans Piazza, “The Anti-Imperialist League and the Chinese Revolution”, in Leutner et al. (eds.), The Chinese  
Revolution in the 1920s. Between Triumph and Disaster, Routledge, London, 2002, pp.166-176. 
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      The above overview introduces three particular aspects. Firstly, one should not conclude that 
the LAI belongs to the historiography of the Comintern and international communism, a research 
field which divides itself into different scholarly interpretations and theories, e.g. the study of 
dynamics and structural relationships taking place at the centre (Moscow) and the periphery (the 
national sections/communist parties), deduced and interpreted through theoretical perspectives 
such as the totalitarian, revisionist or the comparative approach.33 However, Frank Borkenau’s 
somewhat dated and biased study of the Comintern, The Communist International (1938), 
introduced an essential thematic idea when it comes to the evaluation of the history of international 
communism and the Comintern, stating that it was a “puzzling phenomenon” built on “the firm 
hopes of the communists”. Historian Apollon Davidson et al re-addressed the question in their 
documentary narrative on the South African communist movement in 1919-30 (2003), concluding 
that communism is an ideology that represents one of the “most important phenomena of the 
twentieth century”, in which the Comintern symbolised the ambitions of the Bolshevik regime to 
spread communism on a global scale.  
      The second aspect relates to the challenges that the scholarly community has been forced to 
confront due to the archival discoveries after the collapse of the Soviet Union which, according to 
historian Kevin McDermott, has either confirmed existing interpretations or opened up “new 
vistas”.34 Thus, in the context of these “new vistas”, a pivotal task is to carry out critical 
evaluations of the complex structure, functionality and instrumental use of the sympathising 
organisations which represented a crucial part of the international communist movement during 
the inter-war years. In conclusion then, prior to the demise of communism in Russia, critical 
assessments of the structure and involved actors in the Comintern were topics approached mainly 
from a political perspective which, additionally, in some cases, was lacking in its methodological 
and theoretical coherency. By now, however, as accurately observed by historian Alexander Vatlin, 
the study of the complex apparatus and ideological connotations of the Comintern is a scholarly 
field where “legends and myths co-exist” in document editions, academic assessments and 
dissertations, as well as on the Internet.35 
      Thirdly, the quest is to discover why the narrative character of the previous research on the 
LAI is a field aptly defined here as historiography in passim. The major reason is that a majority of 
                                               
33 Examples of the revisionist school are found in Milorad M. Drachkovitch & Branko Lazitch (eds.), The Comintern:  
Historical Highlights – Essays, Recollections, Documents, Praeger, New York, 1966; Helmut Gruber, Soviet Russia 
Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin’s Ascendancy, Anchor Books, New York, 1974; 
Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform, Monthly Review Press, New York, 
1975. For the comparative approach, see Matthew Worley (ed.), In Search of Revolution – International Communist 
Parties in the Third Period, I. B. Tauris, London, 2004.  
34 Borkenau 1938, p.413; Davidson et al. 2003, p.1; Kevin McDermott, “The history of the Comintern in light of new 
documents”, in Rees & Thorpe (eds.) 1998, p.38.  
35 Vatlin 2009, p.9.  
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the research results on the LAI are either inaccurate or incoherent assumptions. However, the 
intention here is not to chronologically locate and describe the interpretations of the LAI in 
different categories, e.g. in a pre-Soviet or post-Soviet category. My focus is on assessing former 
interpretations of the LAI and their narrative contexts. The challenge is where to begin. A logical 
point of departure is from biographical works and memoirs that include, or focus, on 
Münzenberg’s persona. The reason for this is that Münzenberg was the key individual in the 
history of the LAI, from its inception until its end. Additionally, the biographical approach in the 
study of communism and the Comintern has contributed to a greater understanding of its history 
via the methodology and theoretical approach addressed as prosopography.36 Hence, biographical 
works on Münzenberg have contributed to establishing an understanding of his role in the 
Comintern, especially the range of organisational enterprises and manoeuvres masterminded by 
him. The biographies authored by Münzenberg’s life-long companion, Babette Gross, Willi 
Münzenberg. Eine politische Biographie (1967), and Gross’ sister, Margarete Buber-Neumann, in 
Von Potsdam – Nach Moskau (1957), as well as her second book, Kriegsschauplätze der 
Weltrevolution (1967), have determined the contextual scope and understanding of Münzenberg’s 
life and career within the international communist movement, interpretations which have been 
adopted either in their entirety or partially in consecutive research. Those of Gross and Buber-
Neumann are characteristic with their anti-communist bias, a consequence of their suffering from 
Stalinist repression and the societal turmoil caused by the Second World War, narratives which 
depict a period in their lives they shared together with other committed and well-known 
communists in Germany. While Gross’ book is “a political biography” of Münzenberg, Buber-
Neumann’s two memoirs focused on her experiences of the KPD and the Comintern. Gross 
summarised the contextual panorama of the LAI as “Der Schrei der unterdrückten Völker”, which 
describes how Münzenberg approached the colonial question in 1925, to fulfil the two-fold 
                                               
36 Prosopography, as a theoretical and methodological approach, is outlined in Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen & Andrew 
Flinn (eds.), Agents of the Revolution. New Biographical Approaches to the History of International Communism in 
the Age of Lenin and Stalin, Peter Lang, Oxford (2005), and, John McIlroy, Kevin Morgan, Alan Campbell (eds.), 
Party People, Communist Lives. Explorations in Biography, Lawrence & Wishart, London (2001). Historian Lewis 
Namier focused in his study of eighteenth century English politics on examining a large number of individuals in order 
to establish an understanding of the larger context. According to Arthur Marwick, this developed a perspective that 
moves from an individual level and upwards, a methodology later addressed as prosopography, see Arthur Marwick, 
The Nature of History (third edition), Macmillan, London, 1989, p.91, 402. The abundance of biographical works on 
national and international communism and the Comintern is located in Weber & Herbst (Hrsg.) (2004); Lazar Jeifets, 
Víctor Jeifets & Peter Huber (eds.), La Internacional Comunista Y América Latina, 1919-1943. Diccionario 
Biográfico, Instituto de Latinoamérica de la Academia de las Ciencias, Moscow (2004); Michael Buckmiller & Klaus 
Meschkat (Hrsg.), Biographisches Handbuch zur Geschichte der Kommunistischen Internationale. Ein deutsch-
russisches Forschungsprojekt, Akademie Verlag, Berlin (2007); Theodor Bergmann/Mario Keβler (Hrsg.), Ketzer im 
Kommunismus. 23 biographische Essays, VSA-Verlag, Hamburg, (2000); Branko Lazitch & Milorad M. 
Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern. New, Revised and Expanded Edition, Hoover Institution, 
Stanford, 1986; William J. Chase, Enemies Within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939, 
Yale University Press, New Haven (2002).  
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purpose of developing the IAH's international activities and, most importantly, assisting the 
Comintern's ambition to gain access to the colonies. According to Gross, the establishment of the 
LAI in 1927 was, in a sense, the culmination of Münzenberg’s colonial work, the organisation of 
which by 1929 found itself completely subjected to the dictates of Comintern headquarters in 
Moscow. Buber-Neumann describes the functionality of the LAI in both of her books, included in 
a discussion on “Moscow and the coloured world”, and Lenin’s attitude towards the colonial and 
semi-colonial countries. However, in contrast to Gross, Buber-Neumann had a closer relationship 
to the LAI and its International Secretariat in Berlin after having worked there as a steno-typist in 
1927.37 Despite the insightful information provided by both Gross and Buber-Neumann, the books 
are littered with inconsistencies and misconceptions. For example, individuals are either misplaced 
or confused with other actors, yet this does not deny the fact that they represent standard works on 
the history of Münzenberg and the LAI. Published prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
GDR, they were a useful source for the studies produced outside of the communist sphere during 
the Cold War, introducing insightful interpretations on Münzenberg, but leaving the LAI 
categorised as one of his many entrepreneurial adventures. For example, the wistful articles by 
Robert Nigel Carew Hunt (1960) and Helmut Gruber (1966) on Münzenberg are still valid and 
vivid interpretations of his central role in establishing the LAI.38 G. L. Ulmen’s biographical 
appraisal of Karl August Wittfogel, the well-known Sinologist from Germany and engaged 
communist, in The Science of Society (1978) provides an insight into the teething problems the 
communists had in creating an the anti-imperialist agenda for the LAI.39 Furthermore, in Pan-
Africanism or Communism (1971), George Padmore describes in riveting detail the intentions and 
manoeuvres of the German communist movement (with a focus on Münzenberg’s leadership) to 
turn the LAI into a stronghold able to capitalise on the colonial question to the fullest. Burdened 
                                               
37 Gross 1967, pp.196-210; Margarete Buber-Neumann, Von Potsdam Nach Moskau. Stationen eines Irrweges,  
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1957, pp.97-110; Margarete Buber-Neumann, Kriegsschauplätze der 
Weltrevolution. Ein Bericht aus der Praxis der Komintern 1919-1943, Seevald Verlag, Stuttgart, 1967, pp.299-307. 
Buber-Neumann worked together with other leading actors in the LAI, for example the Indian nationalist 
revolutionary Virendranath Chattophadyaya and the Hungarian communist Laszlo Dobos (see further below). Gross 
was engaged to Münzenberg, whilst Buber-Neumann was married to the well-known German communist Heinz 
Neumann (1902 – 1937), who was executed during the Great Terror and purging of the Comintern apparatus in 
Moscow in 1937, see Weber & Herbst 2004, pp.531-533.  
38 Carew Hunt (1960) based his article on interviewing Gross and Buber-Neumann, in which the LAI is described in a  
cursory fashion; Helmut Gruber, “Willi Munzenberg’s German Communist Propaganda Empire 1921-1933”, in The 
Journal of Modern History, Vol.38, No.3 (Sep., 1966), University of Chicago Press, pp.278-297. See also Jörgen 
Schleimann, “The Organisation Man. The Life and Work of Willi Münzenberg”, in Survey: a Journal of Soviet and 
East European Studies, No.55, April 1965, London, pp.64-91, which was based on the narratives found in Gross' and 
Buber-Neumann. Other accounts that fall within the same framework as the ones above are Til Schulz (Hrsg.) Willi 
Münzenberg. Propaganda als Waffe. Ausgwählte Schriften 1919-1940, März Verlag, Frankfurt am Main (1972); and, 
Rolf Surmann, Die Münzenberg-Legende. Zur Publizistik der revolutionären deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1921-1933, 
Prometh Verlag, Köln (1983).  
39 Gary L. Ulmen, The Science of Society. Toward an Understanding of the Life and Work of Karl August Wittfogel,  
Mouton Publishers, The Hague, 1978, pp.80-85, 103-105. The sections on the LAI in Ulmen are based on his 
interviews with Wittfogel, Gross and Buber-Neumann, see p.ix.  
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by its lack of accurateness, however, Padmore’s narrative of the 1927 Brussels Congress relies on 
secondary sources.40 A majority of the misconceptions about the LAI after 1991 are, however, 
attributable to the vast number of biographical works on Münzenberg. Two representative 
examples of this are Stephen Koch’s sensationalist biography of Münzenberg, Double Lives 
(1994), and Sean McMeekin’s attempt to present Münzenberg's life within an academic 
framework, The Red Millionaire (2003). Koch’s presentation of the LAI contains a number of 
critical source inaccuracies, e.g. brusquely concluding that the organisation was an “instrument for 
propaganda, sabotage and espionage” without any further assessment.41 McMeekin’s biography 
was a remake of Gross’ “political biography”, which aimed to respond to Koch’s “careless 
polemic” and “dramatic claims”. Yet, where Koch magnified the extent of Münzenberg’s 
influence, McMeekin perceived Münzenberg as a topic of prejudice, portraying him as a person 
who acted as an unabashed, calculated and stern believer, who promoted communism only in order 
to fulfil his own needs, above all, to make money. McMeekin’s short passage on the LAI gives the 
wrong impression (based on a misreading of Gross) that the organisation disappeared in 1929, at 
the same time as the dissolution of the LAI's theoretical organ, The Anti-Imperialist Review. 
Considering the fact that Koch and McMeekin had access to the Comintern Archive (RGASPI) in 
Moscow,42 the misconceptions of the LAI in these two books leave us with more questions than 
answers. Nevertheless, in juxtaposition to both Koch and McMeekin, Nirode K. Barooah’s 
biography on Virendranath Chattophadyaya, an Indian nationalist revolutionary and the 
“International Secretary” of the LAI, Chatto. The Life and Times of an Indian Anti-Imperialist in 
Europe (2004), is in many respects a detailed study of the LAI, its inner dynamics and its ambition 
                                               
40 George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism, Doubleday & Company, Garden City, 1971, pp.300-307.  
Padmore described Münzenberg as a “likeable German” in which “the colonial peoples” had a “sympathetic friend” 
(p.305). Padmore’s own experience of the Comintern, Profintern, and its network(s) left him puzzled as to whether the 
Pan-African movement or communism would solve Africa’s dilemma in the heyday of decolonization. Padmore opted 
for the former alternative in the end. 
41 Koch 1995, p.64. For example, a typical example of an erroneous statement from Koch is a meeting between  
Münzenberg and Jawaharlal Nehru in Berlin, after the establishment of the LAI in 1932 (!) see p.39.  
42 McMeekin 2003, p. 208, 310 (footnote 3), 348 (footnote 15). McMeekin borrowed the title for his book from a 
subtitle in Gross' biography on Münzenberg (“Der ‘Rote Millionär’”), see Gross 1967 pp.211-215. The International 
Secretariat re-launched The Anti-Imperialist Review in 1931; see The Anti-Imperialist Review, Vol.1, No.1, September-
October, Berlin, LAI International Secretariat, 1931. One of the most astonishing remarks made by McMeekin is how 
he compares Münzenberg and the Comintern with the “world’s most formidable terrorist organizations” of today, i.e. 
“Islamic terrorists” (p.307). This comparison is not only bold; it pays lip service to speculations. One of the harshest 
critiques against Koch's and McMeekin’s narratives was published by literary critic Michael Scammel in New York 
Review of Books (2005, pp.32-35), which concluded that the basic problem with Koch's and McMeekin’s narratives is 
the flagrant categorization of Münzenberg’s life “as a cautionary tale”. Historian Tania Schlie had already in Die Zeit 
(1994, Nr.8) criticized Koch’s “thesis” for its lack of evidence. See Michael Scammel, “The Mystery of Willi 
Münzenberg”, in New York Review of Books, New York, 3/11-2005, and Tania Schlie, “Griffige These ohne Beweise”, 
in Die Zeit, Nr.08, 18/2-1994. Rightfully then, in-depth assessments and interpretations of Münzenberg are preferably 
found in Wessel (1991); Tania Schlie/Simone Roche (Hrsg.), Willi Münzenberg: ein deutscher Kommunist im 
Spannungsfeld zwischen Stalinismus und Antifaschismus, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; Theo Pinkus (Hrsg.), 
Willi Münzenberg. Eine Dokumentation zur Muezenberg-Tagung im September 1989 in Zuerich, Zusammengestellt 
von Peter Vonderhagen und Brigitte Walz-Richter, Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Zürich (1990).  
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to organise international anti-imperialist activity and propaganda. Nevertheless, Barooah focuses 
on Chatto’s ties to the Indian nationalist movement in Europe and India and his personal relations, 
e.g. his intimate relationship with Jawaharlal Nehru as well as on Chatto’s engagement to the well-
known Agnes Smedley. After having conducted research over a period of thirty years, Barooah 
presents a balanced and thorough study of Chatto, although crucial aspects in the histories of both 
the LAI and Chatto are inaccurate.43 
      The LAI was an international organisation which aspired to make an impact on the 
international political scene, thus, this has resulted in different historical interpretations: the 
historiography of transcontinental racial and nationalist movements, subaltern studies on colonial 
oppression as well as in regional and national studies of the growth of communism in both an 
imperialist as well as a colonial and semi-colonial context. All of the above fields concur in 
recognising the LAI as a distributor of anti-imperialist propaganda and, above all, as a source of 
inspiration. Research on Pan-Africanism, the “Black Belt” movement, and African nationalism 
during the inter-war years has largely discussed the LAI and its role in the framework of the Negro 
question and communism. Immanuel Geiss’ ground-breaking study, Panafrikanismus (1968), 
claimed that communism and the LAI contributed to the strengthening of the struggle against 
colonialism in Africa, as communism was also an ideological alternative to the socialist and 
eclectic agenda of the Pan-African movement, inspired by the writings of William E. Burghardt du 
Bois and Marcus Garvey. J. Ayodele Langley elaborated further on Geiss’ contentions in Pan-
Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945 (1973), basing his narrative on the LAI on 
the writings of Padmore, Carew Hunt, A. Fenner Brockway’s memoir Inside the Left (1942) and by 
interviewing the British socialist and one-time Secretary of the British LAI Section, Reginald 
Bridgeman. The opening up of the archives in Russia significantly changed the scientific and 
critical evaluation of the Pan-African movement and African nationalism and its links to 
international communism. Research results presented by historians such as Hakim Adi, Robbie 
Aitken and Mark Salomon as well as Holger Weiss’ research project, “Comintern and African 
Nationalism, 1921-1935” initiated at Åbo Akademi University, link together the African and 
transatlantic Black radical movements with the anti-imperialist movement in Europe during the 
inter-war years.44 
                                               
43 The errors included in Barooah are further discussed in this analysis. Nirode K. Barooah, Chatto. The Life and Times  
of an Indian Anti-Imperialist in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp.246-282. Other biographies and 
memoirs that mention the LAI are John Callaghan, Rajani Palme Dutt. A Study in British Stalinism, Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 1993; Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography Volume One 1889-1947, Jonathan Cape, 
London, 1975; Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru, Routledge, Oxon, 2004. Nehru’s own account of the LAI in 1927 is worth 
reading, see Nehru (1953). 
44 The Comintern addressed Africa and the Afro-American population in the USA as the “Negro question”, see further  
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      Research on the emergence and characteristics of the Indian independence movement during 
the inter-war years and the history of Indian communism is vast and encompasses a wide variety 
of interpretations. Sobhanalal Datta Gupta’s study, Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in 
India 1919-1943 (2006), is a pertinent example of the peripheral understanding of the LAI and its 
involvement in Indian politics. So too is the discerning analysis by Milton Israel in 
Communications and Power (1994), which unravels the links of communication and networks 
within the Indian nationalist struggle and links them with the anti-imperialist movement in Europe, 
in which the LAI and its International Secretariat played “a key role”, as Israel states.45 
      Josephine Fowler’s analysis of the organisational contribution of Japanese and Chinese 
immigrants in international communist movements (2007) illustrates the global spread of the anti-
imperialist movement, and is shrewd from the perspective that it puts the LAI in a migratory, 
multilingual, and transnational context, defining the organisation as a subject of inspiration.46 The 
LAI’s activity has also featured in national studies of the inter-war political history. Susanne 
Heyn’s article, “Der kolonialkritische Diskurs der Weimarer Friedensbewegung zwischen 
Antikolonialismus und Kulturmission” (2005), analyses the colonial discussion in Germany after 
the Great War. Heyn categorises the LAI and its forerunner, the League against Colonial 
                                                                                                                                                          
in James A. Miller, Susan D. Pennybacker, and Eve Rosenhaft, “Mother Ada Wright and the International Campaign to 
Free the Scottsboro Boys, 1931-1934, in The American Historical Review, The American Historical Association, 
Washington, Vol.106, Issue 2, 2001; Imanuel Geiss, Panafrikanismus. Zur Geschichte der Dekolonisation, 
Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main, 1968, pp.251-264; J. Ayodele Langley, Pan-Africanism and 
Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945. A Study in Ideology and Social Classes, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973, 
pp.308-310; P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, Pan-Africanism. The Idea and Movement, 1776-1991, Howard University Press, 
Washington, 1994. For Marcus Garvey, see the editorial work of Robert A. Hill (ed.), The Marcus Garvey and 
Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, University of California Press, Berkeley (1986). For W. E. B. du 
Bois, see Bill V. Mullen, “Du Bois, Dark Princess, and the Afro-Asian International”, in Positions, 11:1, Duke 
University Press, Durham Spring, 2003. For research on the African question, carried out from the 1990s and onward, 
see Hakim Adi, “The African Diaspora, Pan-Africanism and Anticolonial Ideologies”, in The Dark Webs. Perspectives 
on Colonialism in Africa, Toyin Falola (ed.), Carolina Academic Press, Durham, 2005, pp.75-96; Hakim Adi, “Pan-
Africanism and communism: the Comintern, the ‘Negro’ Question and the First International Conference of Negro 
Workers, Hamburg, 1930”, in African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal, 1:2, Routledge, London, 2008, 
pp.237-254; Robbie Aitken, “From Cameroon to Germany and Back via Moscow and Paris: The Political Career of 
Joseph Bilé (1892-1959), Performer, ‘Negerarbeiter’, and Comintern Activist”, in Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol.43, No.4, Sage Publications, London, 2008, pp.597-616; Mark Salomon, Cry was Unity. Communists and African 
Americans, 1917-1936, University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, (1998); Holger Weiss, The Making of a Radical 
African Atlantic, 1922-1937: African American Agency, African Nationalists and the Comintern Connection 
(unpublished manuscript), Åbo Akademi University (2011). 
45 Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India 1919-1943. Dialectics of Real and a  
Possible History, Seribaan, Kolkata, 2006; Milton Israel, Communications and power. Propaganda and the press in 
the Indian nationalist struggle, 1920-1947, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994. See John Callaghan, “Storm 
Over Asia: Comintern Colonial Policy in the Third Period”, in In Search of Revolution. International Communist 
Parties in the Third Period, Matthew Worley (ed.), I. B. Tauris, London, 2004, pp.18-37. The dated yet still useful 
studies which provide biographical information on individuals tied to the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement, are 
Gene D. Overstreet & Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1959, and 
Cecil Kaye, Communism in India. With Unpublished Documents from National Archives of India (1919-1924), 
compiled and edited by Subodh Roy, Editions Indian, Calcutta, 1971; see also John Patrick Haithcox, Communism and 
Nationalism in India. M. N. Roy and Comintern Policy 1920-1039, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971.  
46 Fowler (2007). 
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Oppression (LACO), within the context of the pacifist movement, as one of the most scathing 
critics against the pro-colonial movement in Germany in the 1920s.47 In-depth accounts of the 
British and Irish LAI sections are to be found in Jean Jones' (1996) and Kate O’Malley’s (2003) 
articles, studies which shed light on how the LAI gained attention among anti-colonial circles in 
Great Britain.48 Ricardo Melgar Bao’s examination of the Latin American anti-imperialist 
movement is illustrative of how the LAI has been a misunderstood topic and, despite recognising 
its central role within the international anti-imperialist movement, Bao only re-enacts the existing 
misreading of the organisation by referring to secondary sources.49 Thomas Kampen’s article, 
“Solidarität und Propaganda: Willi Münzenberg, die Internationale Arbeiterhilfe und China”, is an 
intriguing study which analyses how the IAH and Münzenberg strove to consolidate the theme of 
“proletarian solidarity” in order to strengthen their material and moral campaigns in support of the 
Chinese struggle in 1925 and onwards throughout the 1920s. Kampen concludes that the LAI was 
a relevant actor which developed and strengthened the anti-imperialist movement and functioned 
as a centre of experience for the individuals involved in the organisation.50 
      This critical survey of previous research into the LAI has shown, in its essence, that there 
exists a fundamental scarcity of information on how and why the LAI came into existence. 
However, from this historiography in passim, it is clear that the LAI is a topic which has been 
primarily interpreted as a political history from below, with a focus on the involved individuals 
(Münzenberg, Chatto), the Comintern connection or the socio-political milieu of which the LAI 
was a part during the inter-war years. This is an approach found particularly in the works of 
Haikal, Piazza and Martin, whilst biographical works and memoirs are frequently littered with 
inconsistencies or erroneous accounts. With the inclusion of the LAI within the history of 
decolonisation, and as a central actor within the postcolonial critique, the organisation has been 
raised to a different level, assuming a symbolic value driven by a ceremonial impetus. For 
example, the nostalgia of the LAI and its spiritual bond to the “Bandung moment” in 1955 is a 
                                               
47 Susanne Heyn, “Der kolonialkritische Diskurs der Weimarer Friedensbewegung zwischen Antikolonialismus und  
Kulturmission”, in Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für Kritische Afrikastudien, Nr.9/2005, 5. Jg, pp.37-65.  
48 Jean Jones, The League against Imperialism, Preston, 1996; Kate O’Malley, “The League Against Imperialism: 
British, Irish and Indian connections”, in Communist History Network Newsletter, Kevin Morgan & Richard Cross 
(eds.), No.14, Spring 2003, University of Manchester, Manchester. Matthew Worley’s description of the LAI in Class 
against Class. The Communist Party in Britain Between the Wars, I. B. Tauris, London, 2002, p.228, is based on 
Jones. See also Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence. Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 2008, p.100-101, 205, and for a brief introduction to the LAI in France, see 
Martin Thomas, “Albert Sarraut, French Colonial Development, and the Communist Threat, 1919-1930”, in The 
Journal of Modern History, 77 (December 2005), University of Chicago, pp.917-955. 
49 Ricardo Melgar Bao, “The Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas between the East and Latin America”, in Latin  
American Perspectives, Issue 159, Vol.35 No.2, March 2008, pp.9-24.  
50 Thomas Kampen, “Solidarität und Propaganda: Willi Münzenberg, die Internationale Arbeiterhilfe und China“, in  
Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, Hans-Heinrich Nolte (Hrsg.), Jahrgang 5, Heft 2, Peter  
Lang, Berlin, (Herbst 2004), pp.99-105. 
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process described as a “historical sequence” which connected world events with intellectuals and 
activists, according to Christopher J. Lee (2010). However, Robert J. C. Young observed in 
Postcolonialism (2001) that one must recognise the relevance of the Comintern and the LAI as 
actors which “laid the basis for the orientation” of the post-war anti-colonial movements.51 Thus, it 
is fair to conclude that the historiographical leniency on the LAI has a stronger linkage to the 
history of the Comintern and, consequently, the present challenge is to discern the complex 
processes that focus on the formulation of ideas, objectives and instructions emanating from the 
connections between the LAI and the Comintern. Pivotal to this backdrop is the unravelling of the 
relations and ties which constituted the networks linking the LAI, the Comintern and the anti-
imperialist movement.  
* 
 
Archives, Documents and Method 
This analysis of the LAI relies extensively on unpublished source material located in Russian and 
European archives.52 Printed documentary collections of official communist press material, or 
those taken from archival holdings in Germany, Russia, Great Britain and the USA, have assisted 
in providing both evidence and contextual explanations.53 Another essential source is the official 
protocol of the 1927 Brussels Congress, Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont, published in 
June 1927, a publication preceded by the abridged version, Der Brüsseler Kongreβ gegen 
Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit, released in March 1927, two accounts which 
explain how the LAI was introduced to public. The aim here is to: firstly, discuss the vast number 
of documents extracted from the archives and secondly, to argue for the analytical methodology. 
                                               
51 Lee 2010, pp.9-10; Prashad 2007, p.32. See also Young’s discussion on why the LAI and the Comintern “laid the  
basis for the orientation” for the development of post-war anti-colonial movements (2001, p.176).  
52 For this study, the consulted archives have been the Comintern Archive (RGASPI) in Moscow; Stiftung Archiv der  
Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv Zentrales Parteiarchiv (SAPMO-BA, ZPA) in 
Lichterfelde, Berlin, the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG) in Amsterdam; the National 
Archives (TNA) in Kew Gardens, London (research and extracted documents on the LAI in the TNA have been 
provided to me by my supervisor professor Holger Weiss); Stockholm City Archive (SCA); Riksarkivet (RA) in 
Stockholm; and Arbetarrörelsens arkiv & bibliotek (Labour Movement Archive & Library; ARAB) in Stockholm.  
53 The following documentary works have been consulted: Jane Degras, The Communist International, 1919-1943:  
Documents Volume 1-3 (Oxford University Press, London, 1956-1965), Robert V. Daniels, A Documentary History of 
Communism and the World. From Revolution to Collapse (third edition, University of Vermont, Hanover, 1994); 
Edward Acton and Tom Stableford, The Soviet Union. A Documentary History Volume 1 1917-1940 (University of 
Exeter Press, Exeter, 2005); Elfriede Lewerenz & Helga Geisler (Hrsg.), Komintern und revolutionäre Partei. Die 
Kommunistische Internationale über die revolutionäre Partei und die marxistische-leninistische Weltanschauung der 
Arbeiterklasse. Auswahl von Dokumenten und Materialien 1919-1943 (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1986); John Riddell’s 
editorial corpus, The Communist International in Lenin’s Time. Lenin’s Struggle for a Revolutionary International. 
Documents: 1907-1916. The Preparatory Years (Monad Press, New York, 1984), The Communist International in 
Lenin’s Time. Founding the Communist International. Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress, March 1919 
(Pathfinder, New York, 1987) and To See the Dawn. Baku, 1920 – First Congress of the Peoples of the East 
(Pathfinder, New York, 1993); Davidson et al. (2003).  
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      The most valuable archive is the Comintern Archive, a section of the Rossiiskii 
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (Russian State Archive for Social and 
Political History; RGASPI) in Moscow. Prior to the collapse of communism in Russia in 1991, the 
Comintern Archive was a mythological institution in the study of international communism, kept 
under lock and key and located in the Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. 
In October 1991, the archive re-designated itself as the Russian Centre for Preservation and Study 
of Modern History Records (RTsKhIDNI) and, with the Rosarkhiv reform in March 1999, the 
archive assumed its present name (RGASPI). Known for being the major source for the historical 
study of international communism and the Comintern during the existence of the Soviet Union, the 
Comintern Archive was, as noted by historian Branko Lazitch, subjected to the “Kremlin’s 
silence”. However, after 1991, it was no longer possible to remain silent. According to the former 
Director of the RGASPI, Kirill Anderson, in connection with the declaration of the “openness of 
archival information” in Russia in October 1991, the scholarly community could critically test the 
myths of communism by either visiting the archive in person, or consulting the Comintern Archive 
on the Internet (INCOMKA).54 
      The Comintern Archive is an eclectic documentary resource. Despite its large quota of personal 
files (lichnye delo) on Comintern cadres,55 the archive is not primarily a biographical source. On 
the contrary, the archive is a political archive which delineates the dynamics of communism as an 
ideology as well as the practical and theoretical efforts to promote communism and world 
revolution on a global scale. This involves, above all, an organisational framework and belief 
system represented by high-ranking decision makers and departments that reached all the way 
down to the grass roots of the movement. From its inception a multi-linguistic organisation, the 
Comintern engaged people from all the corners of the world who were not skilful in the Russian 
                                               
54 The bulk of literature in Russian archives illustrates the inquisitiveness amongst the scholarly community to discuss  
openness versus political sensitiveness, the character and content of the archives, collections and research possibilities. 
See further in the writings of historian and researcher on Russia, Patricia Kennedy Grimstead, and her research papers 
on Russian archives, for example, Archives of Russia Five Years After: ‘Purveyors of Sensations’ or ‘Shadows Cast to 
the Past’?, Research Papers, IISG, Amsterdam, 1997, and “Russia’s ‘Trophy’ Archives—Still Prisoners of World War 
II?” (March 25 2002; taken from the Internet: < http://www.osa.ceu.hu >). Stephen Kotkin’s conclusion on the archival 
situation is also worth noting in this context, Stephen Kotkin, “1991 and the Russian Revolution: Sources, Conceptual 
Categories, Analytical Frameworks”, in The Journal of Modern History, Vol.70, No.2 (Jun., 1998), The University of 
Chicago Press, pp.384-425; Lazitch 1986, p.viii; and Kirill Anderson, ”A New Life for the Comintern Archives”, in 
Comma, International Council on Archives, Paris, 2002.3-4, pp.157-158. INCOMKA (International Committee on the 
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Archival Service of Russia (Rosarchiv), and the International Council on Archives (ICA) in 1996. The original idea 
was to digitize a minor part of the holdings in the Comintern Archive (not the fonds of communist parties) to make the 
archive “visible”. The Comintern Archive consists of approximately 220,000 collections/fonds (between 20 and 25 
million documents). The INCOMKA project has digitised approximately 1 million documents. For quantitative data, 
see Internet: < http://www.osa.ceu.hu/db/fa/381.htm >.  
55John Earl Haynes, “170,000 Names for the INCOMKA Database of the Comintern Archives. The Results of  
International Cooperation”, in Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung / The International Newsletter of 
Communist Studies, Mannheim, 2003, pp.360-375.  
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language, but who either chose to live in Moscow, travelled abroad on assignments or acted as 
plenipotentiaries of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI).56 This 
meant that the Comintern had to issue directives and administrative instruction in a language 
comprehensible to everyone, thus, and considering the dominant influx of German communists as 
KPD representatives in Moscow, the German language was the lingua franca within the 
Comintern apparatus, lasting well into the 1930s.57 
      The documents on the LAI are, at first glance, filed in a separate collection in the Comintern 
Archive or, according to the Russian archival system, fond 542 “Antiimperialististitsheskaja liga”, 
which holds 103 dossiers.58 The documents in the LAI fond consist of a mixed assortment of 
correspondence, protocols of meetings and conferences, monthly reports from the International 
Secretariat in Berlin to Comintern headquarters in Moscow. In addition, there are personal letters, 
reports on individuals involved in the LAI, lists of members and attending participants at the two 
LAI congresses in Brussels (1927) and Frankfurt am Main (1929), budget proposals and financial 
negotiations, analytical reports of global events and political assessments in the shape of 
resolutions or intelligence.59 
      The Comintern Archive is an organic archive. Despite the existence of a separate LAI fond, 
one must not overlook the observation that other documents on the organisation are located in a 
number of other fonds in the archive. From this standpoint, having attained this understanding of 
the archive, which tacitly unravels the structural functions of the Comintern, this analysis provides 
an in-depth study of the organisational dynamics at work, which existed in both horizontal and 
vertical structures. Thus, the understanding of the archive has, in turn, assisted the process of 
linking together the LAI with an array of institutional bodies, all active at the headquarters of the 
Comintern in Moscow: the ECCI Secretariat (495/18), the ECCI Bureau (495/20), the ECCI 
Bureau Secretariat (495/103), the Political Secretariat (495/3), the Political Commission (495/4), 
                                               
56 For conspiratorial work and behavioral norms imposed on the ECCI representatives and within the Comintern  
apparatus, see Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, The ”Special” World. Stalin’s power apparatus and the Soviet system’s secret 
structures of communication 2, Museum Tusculanum Press, Copenhagen, 2009, pp.169-184.  
57 Weitz 1997, p.242. The documents examined and referred to in this study are in the following languages: German,  
English, French, Spanish and Russian. 
58 Fond designates collections that contain “personal papers and/or collections as well as groups of institutional  
records”. The reference system in this study follows the logic of fond/collection, opis/inventory, delo/dossier, and 
list/page: RGASPI fond/opis/delo, and list/page (fol.). See Grimstead (2002).  
59 “Intelligence” is perceived as a systematic strategy the LAI adhered to in order to supply Comintern headquarters 
with information on how both the organisation and the anti-colonial movement(s), were progressing. Its primary 
purpose was to facilitate the process of establishing strategies, or improve and enhance the policy choices made in 
Moscow. Thus, intelligence constituted a crucial part in the decision-making process. Martin Thomas' discussion in 
Empires of Intelligence on human intelligence (Humint) as an “essential feature of the modern nation-state” to 
“integrate incoming information” is well-worth bearing in mind in this context, see Thomas 2008, pp.21-22. However, 
the collection of intelligence and the system of administration connecting Berlin with Moscow is not referred to as a 
process of “Humint” throughout this study. A similar definition of “intelligence” is given in Edward Waltz, Knowledge 
Management in the Intelligence Enterprise, Boston, 2003, p.1.  
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the Small Commission (495/6), the Standing Commission (495/7), the Eastern Secretariat 
(495/154), the West European Bureau (499/1), fond of secretary Iosif (Osip) Piatnitsky (495/19), 
the ECCI Organisational Bureau (495/25), the ECCI Agitprop Department (495/30) and the fond 
for “temporary” commissions of the ECCI (495/60). In addition, the LAI had extensive or brief 
collaborations with other international mass or sympathising organisations of the Comintern, e.g. 
Internationale Arbeiterhilfe (538), Internationale Rote Hilfe (539), Peasants 
International/Krestintern (535), Profintern/Red International of Labour Unions (534) as well as 
playing a crucial part in the emerging anti-Fascist movement (543/1). Documents on the LAI in 
the above-mentioned fonds are of a different character in comparison to the ones located in the 
LAI fond, e.g. protocols and decisions that focus on political, organisational and individual 
questions. This also concerns documents of different commissions, e.g. the “Commission for the 
Examination of the Question of a Colonial Congress in Brussels” (CEQCCB) in Moscow in 1926-
27, as well as sources that disclose investigations and evaluations carried out by the Comintern on 
the anti-imperialist movement and the colonial work amongst the European communist parties, as 
well as accounts of the consistent interactionism the LAI had with the communist movement.60 
The large number of personal files (lichnye dela) in the Comintern Archive is, nevertheless, a 
valuable source, especially the ones linked directly to the LAI. Due to ethical restrictions on the 
release of the whole file, this is a challenge and a conundrum which, as noted by Alexander Vatlin, 
has to change in order to aid the process of reaching a full understanding of the nature of the 
Comintern. However, despite this conundrum, I have been fortunate enough to have been able to 
consult a fair share of the documents (not entire dossiers) in personal files. Material that has shed 
additional light on how the individuals experienced and, in some cases, described their 
commitment to the international communist movement. These personal files are, in a sense, 
testimonies which expose the obscure and tragic fates that a majority of these actors ultimately 
faced.61 
      The Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BA  ZPA) in Lichterfelde, Berlin, is quite similar to the RGASPI: 
a political archive containing the dossiers of the Zentralkomitee der KPD (ZK KPD), the 
documents of the Berlin and Prussian police authorities (the Schutzpolizei and the 
Reichskommissar für Überwachung der öffentlichen Ordnung/Reich Commissar for the 
                                               
60 53 fonds have been analysed in the Comintern Archive during this research, see further in Bibliography: Archives,  
Sources and Literature.  
61 The archival staff at the Comintern Archive informed me prior to being able to examine the personal files, e.g.  
Münzenberg’s file (RGASPI 495/205/7000), that personal affidavits from the next of kin are needed in order to consult 
personal files. See further discussion on ethical questions in Vatlin 2009, p.169. A constructive and well-structured 
analysis, based on an extensive examination of personal files in the Comintern Archive, is Peter Huber’s study of the 
Swiss communist community in Moscow during the Stalinist repression; see Peter Huber, Stalins Schatten in die 
Schweiz. Schweizer Kommunisten in Moskau: Verteidiger und Gefangene der Komintern, Chronos Verlag, Zürich, 
(1995).  
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Supervision of Public Order, RKÜöO) as well as of governmental agencies such as the Auswärtige 
Amt (the German Foreign Department) and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior (Ministerium des 
Innern; MdI).62 The content of these documents provides an account, for example, of the 
correspondence from the ZK KPD to the German ECCI delegation in Moscow, the activities of the 
LAI and the anti-imperialist movement in Germany,63 whilst articles (collected by the national 
security services) from the German communist press, e.g. the Comintern weekly paper, the 
International Press Correspondence (Inprecorr), Die Rote Fahne, Welt am Abend, Arbeiter-
Illustrierte-Zeitung (A-I-Z), illustrate the public presentation of the LAI, sources which the 
German security services used to analyse the German communist movement. Additionally, 
RKÜöO reports and assessments on the colonial community in Berlin and across Germany, reveal 
the ties linking active foreign residents with the LAI and the International Secretariat. In 1926, 
Auswärtige Amt decided to keep a special dossier on the anti-colonial movement, a file which 
reveals the emergence of the anti-colonial movement in Berlin and, later, within the LAI. The 
personal files at SAPMO-BA are quite different from the ones at RGASPI. The content in these 
files exposes the retrospective experiences and agony of numerous individuals during the Second 
World War, actors who later assumed leading positions in connection with the establishment of the 
GDR. Hence, this is a source of information that makes it possible to assess the efforts of the 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (the KPD’s successor; SED) in order to revise the 
history of German communism during the inter-war years. This historiographical process, aptly 
described as “politics of biography”, emerged in the GDR during the 1950s and 1960s, often 
resulting in former communists (e.g. Münzenberg) being subjected to degradation, erroneous 
descriptions or simply being erased from the annals of history.64 
      The dossiers and documents on the LAI at the National Archives (TNA), Kew Gardens, 
London, are characteristic of the type of intelligence linked exclusively to national security 
services (MI5, Scotland Yard), but also of the work of colonial administrative agencies such as the 
Colonial Office (CO) and the Home Office (HO).65 A majority of the documents are assessments, 
                                               
62 Groundbreaking empirical research in this context is Hermann Weber, Der deutsche Kommunismus: Dokumente, 
Köln (1963), and Karl Dietrich (Hrsg.), Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien. 
Bd 6, Die Generalinie: Rundschreiben des Zentralkomitees der KPD an die Bezirke 1929-1933, Düsseldorf, Droste 
(1981).  
63 Microfilmed documents from the Comintern Archive were passed on from the Central Party Archive of the Institute  
of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow during the 1970s to the Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus in Berlin.  
64 Epstein 2003, p.10. Illustrative of the above is the SED-sanctioned biographical work, Geschichte der deutschen  
Arbeiterbewegung Biograpisches Lexikon (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1970), which reduce Münzenberg’s role and 
involvement in the German communist movement during the inter-war years, see K. Haferkorn, „Münzenberg, 
Wilhelm“, in Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung Biograpisches Lexikon, Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus 
beim ZK der SED (Hrsg.), Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1970, pp.340-342. With the opening of the archives in Moscow and 
Berlin, it has been possible to produce a more balanced biographical presentation, see Weber & Herbst (2004).  
65 For an in-depth analysis of the activities and strategies of British security services in the colonies during the inter- 
war years, see Thomas (2008).  
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compiled by the British security services, of the spread of anti-colonial/imperialist activism across 
the Empire and in Great Britain, embodied either by the LAI or by Comintern personages and 
colonial activists on British soil. This surveillance was an extensive system which relied on the 
interception of correspondence, a thorough scrutinizing of the British communist press and an 
exchange of intelligence with other foreign security services, e.g. the German and the Dutch. The 
principal strength of the TNA documents serves a two-fold purpose. Firstly, these accounts 
illustrate how British authorities pressured and demanded of its German counterpart to increase its 
surveillance of the communist movement in Germany. Secondly, a number of personal files on 
leading and less known communists, e.g. Münzenberg, the Hungarian Laszlo Dobos/Louis Gibarti 
and the Ukrainian Comintern emissary, David Alexandrovich Petrovsky, have contributed to 
establishing a deeper understanding of these actors’ activities. 
      The IISG in Amsterdam has, aside from the LAI fond in the Comintern Archive and the LAI 
dossier at Stockholm City Archive (SCA, see below), a specified LAI collection. Located and 
divided chronologically into three dossiers, this collection contains (for the most part) published 
material on the LAI: invitations to and resolutions from the two international LAI congresses, and 
the General Council in Brussels, 9-11 December, 1927; transcripts of speeches; articles on the 
congresses of the LAI in contemporary journals; and newspapers. These sources have aided the 
analytical work of piecing together an understanding of the official presentation of the LAI. Oscar 
H. Swede (1900 – 1942), a pacifist from Great Britain, collected and passed on these documents to 
the IISG, a service also performed by the Dutch socialist and journalist Gijsbert Jasper van 
Munster.66 Other collections at the IISG, e.g. the “Labour and Socialist Archives” contain 
documents that provide an account of how the LSI perceived the LAI and how it established a 
political discourse towards the LAI, a process directed by both the social democratic leader of 
Switzerland and secretary of the LSI, Friedrich Adler, and the International Secretary of the British 
Labour Party, William Gillies. Additionally, the papers of Swiss socialist and Münzenberg’s 
personal friend, Fritz Brupbacher, a refreshing detour from the political narrative, provide an 
insight into the life of Münzenberg and Babette Gross in both Berlin and Paris.67 
      Official publications, released by the LAI during 1928-1932, have been located in an LAI 
dossier in the personal collection of Carl Lindhagen at the SCA in Stockholm. Lindhagen was the 
Mayor of Stockholm, but was most renowned for his commitment to the pacifist and socialist 
                                               
66 Biographical information on Oscar H. Swede is taken from the IISG website, see Internet: <  
http://www.iisg.nl/archives/en/files/s/10770731full.php >. Prashad’s account of the LAI is based (to a large extent) on 
the LAI Collection (3392.1) at IISG.  
67 Other examined collections at the IISG are the two dossiers on the “World Congress against the Imperialist War”  
(3390.2); the personal papers of socialist Leo Levy; the catalogue of the P. C. Joshi’s Archives (volume 7) deposited at 
the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Archives on Contemporary History in New Delhi.  
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movements. Two reasons explain why Lindhagen collected material on the LAI. Firstly, his 
personal relationship to Chatto (established during Chatto’s exile in Stockholm in 1917-21), and 
secondly, Lindhagen fervently supported issues focusing on pacifism, colonialism and 
international relations.68 The publications gathered by Lindhagen are Pressedienst, and 
Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, material released by the International 
Secretariat during 1928-32. Additionally, the dossier contains official material (resolutions and 
transcripts of speeches) from the second LAI Congress in Frankfurt am Main, in 1929, and letters 
from Münzenberg and Chatto. Other archives, consulted in Stockholm, are a crucial source for 
research on the labour movement, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv & bibliotek (Labour Movement Archive 
& Library; ARAB),69 which consist of a vast collection of literature on international communism 
and the labour movement during the inter-war years, as well as the collections of the Swedish 
Foreign Department and the national security service at Riksarkivet (National Archives; RA). 
 
The ambiguous history of the LAI confirms itself from this brief review of the available 
documents. It is therefore essential to establish methodological patterns in order to categorise, 
evaluate and analyse the empirical material. This observation comes from the realisation that the 
documents introduce a multitude of thematic threads which, due to their sheer quantitative size, 
require that the sources are placed in their proper context before attempting to establish causal 
explanations. Therefore, my analytical process has gone through three phases. Firstly, the history 
of the LAI is primarily a political history, with a focus on the obligations and restrictions the 
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters in Moscow imposed on the individuals at the 
International Secretariat in Berlin. Yet, of equal relevance is a discussion of the observation that 
the history of the LAI does not only comes across as a topic, explained within a political 
framework, but rather, this is a history that belongs to the global history of international 
communism. For this reason, and in order to avoid an overtly deterministic political narrative, the 
beginning and end of which are well known, other interpretative schemas have to be included. 
Biographical accounts (personal files, or biographies and memoirs, have made it possible to place 
                                               
68 The documents on the LAI at the Stockholm City Archive are referred to as the SCA CL Collection in this study.  
Carl Lindhagen's involvement with the LAI has been discussed by me in two articles, see Fredrik Petersson, 
“‘Proletariatets proviantkolonn’: Internationella arbetarhjälpen i Sverige”, in Historisk tidskrift för Finland, 2:2009, 
Historiska föreningen, Helsingfors, pp.220-247, and CoWoPa (Comintern Working Papers) 5, “Varför en liga mot 
imperialism? Grundandet av League against Imperialism 1927”, Holger Weiss (red.), Åbo Akademi University, 2005, 
see Internet: < https://www.abo.fi/student/media/7957/cowopa5petersson.pdf >. Barooah (2003) has also consulted the 
LAI dossier in the CL Collection at SCA, “Carl Lindhagens samling 820, volume 131: Ligue contre l´Imperialisme, 
1927 – 1932”. 
69 In 1965, Witold S. Sworakowski stated that the literature collection at ARAB was a very useful source for scholars  
and researchers on the labour and communist movement, see Witold S. Sworakowski, The Communist International 
and its Front Organisations – a Research Guide and Checklist of Holdings In American and European Libraries 
(Stanford, 1965). An opinion highlighted by Weber & Herbst (Berlin, 2004).  
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the individuals in a central role, especially by revealing their engagement and the pressure(s) 
imposed upon them. This approach also entails a social context, e.g. living conditions, social ties 
and personal conflicts, factors that give the analysis a deeper dimension. In order to do this, this 
analysis must establish a fundamental understanding of the LAI within the context of the 
international situation in the 1920s and 1930s. A perspective that focuses particularly on the 
emergence or continuance of conflicts in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the political and 
social struggles in Germany and the Soviet Union and the global effects of the economic recession 
and its ensuing depression after 1929, contexts which provided the LAI with the impetus to shape 
an anti-imperialist agenda. Linked to the general research objective of this study, these contexts 
help to explain how and why the LAI and the Comintern conceived its strategies or put into 
practice political and organisational directives.70 Secondly, this thesis relies primarily on 
documents in the Comintern Archive; however, this empirical dictum makes it necessary to reflect 
upon Kevin McDermott’s remark that the Comintern Archive is “an indispensable source” where 
“historians … tend to find what they want to find”. Consequently, to reach a deeper understanding 
of the actual political and geographical ramifications of the LAI, sources located in other archives 
have corroborated the “central workings” of the Comintern apparatus in Moscow and enabled an 
understanding not only from above, but also, from below.71 The third phase concerns the logic of 
categorisation. By dividing the empirical material into three categories – political, organisational, 
and individual – this has helped to elucidate and evaluate the content of the documents as well as 
strengthened the analytical process. Furthermore, by categorising the sources, this has either 
clarified or validated critical source questions, e.g. authenticity, provenance, the date of production 
and type of documents (letters, protocols, directives, consultative material, intelligence and 
resolutions), purpose and aim as well as author and receiver. This categorisation has also either 
questioned the credibility of some sources or determined the position of various actors within the 
network. Finally, the categories have distinct thematic threads which separate the political – 
organisational – individual levels from each other, especially the relations between the 
International Secretariat and Comintern headquarters. 
 
 
                                               
70 Weitz is critical of a deterministic reading of communist history, above all the political history, a perspective of  
essential value for the methodology of this thesis, see Weitz 1997, pp.12-13; C. Behan McCullagh, The Logic of 
History. Putting postmodernism in perspective, Routledge, London, 2004, p.185.  
71 McDermott 1998, pp.37-38. An example of McDermott’s proposition is the empirical study of the German October  
1923, which introduces and analyses documents from the party records of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) 
located in the Comintern Archive and the Presidential Archive in Moscow, see Bernhard H. Bayerlein, Leonid G. 
Babicenko, Fridrich I. Firsov & Aleksandr Ju. Vatlin (Hrsg), Deutsche Oktober 1923. Ein Revolutionsplan und sein 
Scheitern, Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin (2003).  
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Table 1.1: Categorisation of the Empirical Material 
Theme Level 
Political/Ideology High/From Above/ Institutional/Hierarchical  
Organisational Middle/The Methodological Link between the Political and 
Individual Level/Bureaucracy   
Individual Low/From Below/Hierarchical  
  
This categorisation also helps to distinguish a system of hierarchies of relations (see further below) 
which flow in both a vertical and a horizontal direction. Thus, the methodological approach has 
eased the process of establishing generalisations on the political and individual level, with the 
organisational level being the connection linking together the necessary incentives to realise an 
idea, a strategy or directives. However, this was a process determined by the rigid and bureaucratic 
structure at the headquarters of the Comintern in Moscow. Ultimately, historical investigations 
which seek to explain organisational changes focus on mapping out the origin of changes, a 
perspective which aims to discern patterns either from above or from below. The former focuses 
on how “rules were implemented, who came up with a plan for a change, who lobbied whom to 
support the proposal” (Comintern headquarters), while the latter focuses on the study of 
“departures from regulations” from above, which became so regular “as to constitute a new 
practice” in the behaviour within the sections of the Comintern (the International Secretariat).72 
The sources show that the Comintern's authority followed its own rational logic and, therefore, this 
study aims to interpret how the International Secretariat reacted to the system of administration 
sponsored by the Comintern headquarters in Moscow. 
      Aside from categorising the sources in a proper context, especially since a majority of the 
documents extracted from the archives (the Comintern Archive, SAPMO and TNA) were never 
intended to undergo a critical investigation, this study seeks to accomplish (as far as possible) a 
“genuine” history of the LAI.73 As separate accounts, each archive reveals an incomplete narrative; 
the methodological principle in the study has therefore adopted the cut-and-paste approach,74 an 
                                               
72 McCullagh 2004, p.187.  
73 John Costello and Oleg Tsarev’s sensationalist study Deadly Illusions (Century, London, 1993) on Soviet espionage  
techniques concluded that “Soviet intelligence officers of that time never thought that their files would become a 
historical source, since it was never anticipated that even a formal institutional history would ever need to be written. 
The contemporary records were only kept to satisfy immediate and practical needs”, see Costello & Tsarev 1993, 
p.xxi. Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov’s The Secret World of American Communism 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995, p.4) corroborate this opinion. A similar discussion is outlined in Davidson 
et al (2003, p.2), whilst Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen & Andrew Flinn (eds.) (2005, p.14) focus on the present 
opportunity to reach a “genuine historicisation” on the history of international communism.  
74 The “cut and paste” methodology was introduced by the author in Fredrik Petersson, “The League against  
Imperialism: The Most Valuable Organizational Tool for Bolshevik Propaganda in the ‘Imperialist’ and Colonial World 
during the Interwar Era? Synopsis of a doctoral thesis”, in The International Newsletter of Communist Studies Online, 
Bernhard H. Bayerlein (ed.), The European Workshop of Communist Studies, Mannheim, Vol. XIII (2007), No.20, 
pp.105-110.  
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approach which has contributed to the unravelling of the inner dynamics of structural relations 
and, in particular, the discussion concerning the reason why the Comintern endorsed the 
establishment of the LAI and how the organisation received support from the Comintern. The cut-
and-paste methodology strives first to establish a number of observations in order to validate 
causal explanations and, secondly, to map out the empirical labyrinth. This is comparable to 
locating previously unknown “doors” to unknown “rooms”; hence, this methodology has helped to 
solve a number of questions. As noted in the critical assessment of structural analysis by 
sociologist Barry Wellman, this is a methodology inspired by tracing “lateral and vertical flows of 
information”. According to Wellman, this belongs to the “whole network approach”, which strives 
to identify “sources and targets” and “detect structural constraints on flows of resources”, a 
methodology and perspective which help to explain the structural boundaries of this study: to 
introduce and evaluate the relationships between the actors on an individual and institutional level, 
with ideology representing the mobilising factor. The network approach in this study aims to link 
together actors in a network of networks, actors belonging to separate or similar political groups 
and social categories, but who were unified by their political and anti-colonial activism.75 Hence, a 
pivotal task for this study is to distinguish these network(s), particularly the interactionism 
between the International Secretariat in Berlin and Comintern headquarters in Moscow. The 
challenge is, however, according to the proposition outlined in historian Niels Erik Rosenfeldt’s 
analysis of the “secret apparatus” of the Comintern, to detect the “highly fragmented system” 
which the Comintern constructed in order to obscure and blur communications and connections.76 
As the LAI was a result of ideas introduced by the Comintern, the network analysis also strives to 
differentiate between ties of exchange and dependency. The reason for doing so is to understand 
the nature of the central functions within the LAI and the Comintern, e.g. to delineate the exchange 
of communications, the implementation of authority, power and control, to identify senders and 
                                               
75 Barry Wellman, “Structural analysis: from method and metaphor to theory and substance”, in Social Structures. A  
Network Approach (first edition: 1988), Barry Wellman & S. D. Berkowitz (eds.), Contemporary Studies in Sociology, 
Volume 15, JAI Press Inc, London, 1997, p.21, 26. A network can in many cases be interpreted and perceived in terms 
of a web. J. R. McNeill and William McNeill define a web as a “set of connections that link people to one another. 
These connections may take many forms: chance encounters, kinship, friendship, common worship, rivalry, enmity, 
economic exchange, ecological exchange, political cooperation, even military competition. In all such relationships, 
people communicate information and use that information to guide their future behaviour. They also communicate, or 
transfer, useful technologies, goods, crops, ideas and much else. […] The exchange and spread of such information, 
[…] and inconveniences, and human responses to them, is what shapes history”, see J. R. McNeill & William McNeill, 
The Human Web. A Bird’s-Eye View of World History, New York, 2003, pp.3-4. 
76 Rosenfeldt (2) 2009, p.179. An example of the above and, above all, in reference to the administrative system of the  
Comintern apparatus, see the table introduced in “Kominternhovedkvarteret – ‘Verdensrevolutionens generalstab’ – 
1926-35”, in Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Verdensrevolutionens generalstab. Komintern og det hemmelige apparat, Gads 
Forlag, Kobenhavn, 2011, p.139. Edward Waltz' analysis of the flow of communications in organizations, implies that 
the study of networks and the “structure and flow of knowledge” is somewhat “as mapping – explicitly representing 
the network of nodes (competencies) and links (relationships, knowledge flow paths) within the organization”, see 
Waltz 2003, p.112.  
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receivers and to establish both the actors who were a part of the LAI network and those who 
established networks of their own.77 
      Central actors in this study are both individuals and institutions. In two cities, Berlin (the 
“global village” of the Comintern), and Moscow (Comintern headquarters), the individual actors 
came from different social, cultural and political backgrounds, whilst the institutions, above all the 
departments of the Comintern in Moscow, had a structural constraint on the LAI, either by 
sanctioning or restricting its activity. Who were the leading individuals within the LAI network? Is 
it possible to differentiate between the individual and institutional actors within both the LAI and 
the Comintern? Firstly, the dramatis personae (see Appendix II) of each actor focuses on 
disclosing their function and position within the LAI, a perspective that must include a 
topographical factor (Berlin and Moscow), especially as the social and political setting of these 
two cities were diametrically opposed to each other. Secondly, the “secret apparatus” and “basic 
rules of conspiracy” of the Comintern is a thematic framework that becomes evident in the “whole 
network approach”. However, where and when such aspects appear, first and foremost the highly 
secretive “Department for International Communications” (Otdel mezhdunarodnoi svyazi; OMS), a 
department which nevertheless must be perceived as a constituent and natural part of an 
organisational system that facilitated the distribution of political and administrative directives from 
Moscow to the national sections.78 Thirdly, in order to coherently illustrate the networks of the 
LAI, the Comintern and of the anti-imperialist movement, especially its clusters (institutions, 
committees or commissions), a number of tables in the study delineate relevant organisational and 
egocentric networks.79 
      The International Secretariat was the host, political and organisational educational centre, and 
meeting place for actors belonging to either the international communist movement or the anti-
colonial movement. Throughout the chronology of this study, Münzenberg possesses a symbolic 
role as the informal leader of the LAI who took care of the contacts with both Comintern 
headquarters in Moscow and the ZK KPD in Berlin. However, other individuals were of equal 
importance, especially the secretaries: the Indian nationalist revolutionary and journalist 
Virendranath Chattophadyaya (1880 – 1937); the Hungarian communist and journalist Louis 
Gibarti (real name: Laszlo Dobos, 1895 – 1967); CPGB member and journalist Clemens Dutt 
(1893 – 1974); the Turkish communist and Comintern emissary Bekar Ferdi (real name: Mechnet 
                                               
77 Wellman 1997, pp.29-32; Cilja Harders, ”Dimensionen des Netzwerkansatzes. Einführende theoretische  
Überlegungen”, in Die islamische Welt als Netzwerk. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des Netwerksansatzes im 
islamischen Kontext, Roman Loimeier (ed.), Ergon Verlag, Würzburg, 2000, p.41.  
78 See Rosenfeldt (2009 [2], pp.169-292) and Huber’s analysis on the “secret apparatus” of the Comintern and OMS  
(1995, pp.28-36).  
79 Wellman 1997, p.27, 43. 
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Schefik, 1890 – ?); Bohumíl Smeral from Czechoslovakia and emissary of the Comintern (1880 – 
1941); and the Japanese-Danish communist Hans Thögersen (pseudonyms: “York”, “Miller”; 1902 
– ?). Assisting the work of the secretaries, functionaries also played a crucial role: the Chinese 
Kuomintang representative and communist Hansin Liau (? – 1964); the Swiss communist and IAH 
functionary Federico Bach (real name: Fritz Sulzbacher, 1897 – 1978); the radical Japanese 
nationalist Teido Kunizaki who, during his German tenure, turned to communism (1894 - ?); the 
German communist and Sinologist Karl August Wittfogel (1896 – 1988); CPGB member Emile 
Burns (1889 – 1972); the German communist and IAH functionary Allo Bayer (?–?); the Swiss 
communist and IAH functionary Otto Schudel (1902 – 1979); and the German communist and 
steno-typist at the International Secretariat Ella Windmüller (?–?). Frequent visits by Comintern 
representatives to Berlin played a pivotal role in the administrative system of the International 
Secretariat. The well-known Indian revolutionary and communist, Manabendra Nath Roy (1887 – 
1954), played a symbolic role in the initial phases of developing both the anti-colonial project and 
the LAI. The veteran communist from Japan, Sen Katayama (1859 – 1933), who appeared in 
public at LAI congresses, had a secret function as the leader for the ECCI delegations from 
Moscow. The British communist, Robin Page Arnot (1890 – 1986), examined the colonial work of 
the European communist parties in 1929, a process which also influenced the course of events 
linked to the LAI. Alexander Bittelman (“Alex”, 1890 – 1982), member of the Workers’ Party 
America (the WPA was the precursor to the Communist Party of the USA, CPUSA), acted for a 
short period as liaison for the International Secretariat in Moscow. Finally, the Ukrainian 
communist and Comintern emissary David Alexandrovich Petrovsky (real name: David Lipetz, 
1886 – 1937) carried out a crucial and highly secretive mission (using the pseudonym “Isolde”) 
preparing the Brussels Congress in Berlin in January 1927. Petrovsky was an actor with numerous 
aliases: all used in different contexts and for widely-differing purposes.80 
      The clandestine and secretive functions of the West European Bureau (the “foreign bureau of 
the ECCI”; WEB), an institutional actor established in 1928 for the purpose of strengthening the 
contacts between the ECCI and the national sections in Western Europe, were of great importance 
                                               
80 MI5 compiled a dossier on Petrovsky’s function as an emissary of the Comintern and ECCI representative in the  
CPGB, see TNA PRO KV2/1433. Davidson et al. (2003) introduced concise biographical sketches of individuals in 
the Comintern and the anti-colonial movement which, if supplemented with the biographical richness in Jeifets, Jeifets 
and Huber (eds.) (2004), disclose a majority of the pseudonyms used by Comintern agents and emissaries on 
international missions. Vilém Kahan had also pondered over the initial purpose as to why pseudonyms were used by 
the Comintern. For example, to maintain relations with the national sections and the mass organisations under the 
guise of secrecy, but also the aliases illustrate and give an “insight into the close personal relation between the 
delegations of the different parties”. The pseudonyms protected also the identity of the emissaries on a mission, as they 
also increased the chance to manipulate “the organs of the Comintern and its sections”, see Vilém Kahan, 
Bibliography of the Communist International (1919-1979) – First Volume, Leiden, 1990, p.33.  
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to the LAI.81 As a relay station for the ECCI, the WEB monitored and controlled whether or not 
the national sections were implementing the directives from Moscow. Acting as WEB leader in 
Berlin from 1929 till 1933, the Bulgarian communist Georgi Dimitrov (“Helmut”; 1882 – 1949), 
was a central actor not only for the LAI, but also for the European communist movement. The 
German communist Richard Gyptner (“Alarich”, “Magnus”; 1901 – 1972) was the secretary of the 
WEB and assisted Dimitrov’s work. Other prominent European communists were conscripted to 
do work for the WEB, e.g. the CPGB member Aitken Ferguson (“Neptun”), the German 
communist and Profintern representative Fritz Heckert, and Jacques Doriot of the Partei 
Communiste Francais (PCF).82 Dimitrov co-ordinated the WEB's contacts with the LAI through 
Münzenberg, Smeral, Ferdi and Clemens Dutt. 
      The leaders and members of the national LAI sections were also indispensable in the creation 
and maintenance of the anti-imperialist network. The British socialist and pacifist Reginald 
Bridgeman (1884 – 1968) was a leading actor in developing and fomenting LAI activities in Great 
Britain.83 Other well-known socialist characters, e.g. the elderly George Lansbury (1859 – 1940) 
of the British Labour Party; the leader of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) James Maxton 
(1885 – 1946) and A. Fenner Brockway’s (1888 – 1988) brief but passionate connection with the 
LAI in 1927, were all prominent characters within the LAI during its initial phases. Edo Fimmen 
(1881 – 1941), the Dutch trade unionist and distinguished leader of the Amsterdam International,84 
was also one of Münzenberg’s friends and contributed greatly to paving the way for the LAI both 
                                               
81 The WEB is not to be confused with its forerunner, the West European Secretariat (WES), which was formed in  
1919, located in Berlin. In 1925, the WES was a defunct and shallow actor, according to the internal discussion in the 
Comintern. Empirical observations, especially the documents filed in the WEB fond in the Comintern Archive 
(RGASPI 499/1), have verified a gap in time between the years 1925 and 1927. Any critical assessment on the 
functions and activities of the WEB remains to be told, an actor that only appears in a peripheral sense in the history of 
international communism. Imperative research on the WES has, though, been conducted, see for example Vatlin 
“’Genosse Thomas’ und die Geheimtätigkeit der Komintern in Deutschland 1919-1925”, in Alexander Vatlin, Die 
Komintern 1919-1929. Historische Studien, Decaton Verlag, Mainz, 1993, pp.21-44. This chapter was re-worked and 
included in Vatlin 2009, pp.247-254. The somewhat dated but intriguing depiction of the WES in Branko Lazitch and 
Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern Volume I, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1972 pp.164-201, 
recounts the tale of the complex attempts to spread communism during the initial phase of the Comintern in 1919.  
82 See fol. RGASPI 499/1; Huber 1995, p.148. Some of the members of the WEB are included in the biased biography  
on Georgi Dimitrov, Hans-Joachim Bernhard, Krysto Dontschew, Wolfgang Gruhn, Horst Hering & Ljubow 
Pawlowna Petrenko (Hrsg.), Georgi Dimitroff, Urania-Verlag, Leipzig, 1982, pp.27-31. The primary functions of the 
WEB was to nominate and send instructors to visit the communist parties in Western Europe; collect and disburse 
administrative and political instructions to the parties, send intelligence to the ECCI in Moscow for further 
consideration and to determine financial guidelines for the work of the parties. 
83 For Reginald Bridgeman, see John Saville, ”Bridgeman, Reginald Francis Orlando”, in Dictionary of Labour  
Biography Volume VII, Joyce M. Bellamy & John Saville (eds.), The MacMillan Press, London, 1984, pp.26-40. 
Bridgeman’s personal archive is located at Brynmor Jones Library, Hull University in England.  
84 The Amsterdam International, also known as the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), was established  
in Amsterdam (hence the name) in July of 1919, an organisation inspired by the Versailles peace treaty negotiations. 
Primary aim was to act in response to the devastation of the Great War by proclaiming “war on war” under the slogan 
to free the worker from capitalism. Whereas the LSI aimed its activities towards the socialist parties in Europe, the 
Amsterdam International wanted to act as a representative for the European labour movement and the trade unions, see 
Goethem (2006).  
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in the Netherlands and on an international basis. Charles Shipman from the USA, also known as 
Manuel Gomez and a member of the WPA/CPUSA, was one of the few actors in the USA striving 
to create a vigorous anti-imperialist movement who also had intimate ties to the International 
Secretariat in Berlin. 
      At Comintern headquarters in Moscow were the actors (the decision and agenda-makers) who 
decided the theory and practice of the LAI. In comparison to the relatively few contacts between 
the International Secretariat and the IAH and the ZK KPD in Berlin, the apparatus of the 
Comintern had a far more complex structure. In the capital of the Bolshevik state, its actors were 
located in networks differing in character, size and authority. Otto Wille Kuusinen (1881 – 1964), a 
Finnish émigré communist and distinguished Comintern secretary, often played a leading role in 
co-ordinating Münzenberg’s activities and vision of turning the LAI into an international mass 
organisation. Furthermore, Kuusinen was a symbol of authority who provided the LAI and the 
colonial question with direction and ideological impetus. From an organisational point of view, 
Kuusinen was involved in a range of departments at Comintern headquarters, especially the 
Eastern Department/Secretariat, which was the Comintern's communicative link with the LAI. One 
of Kuusinen's co-workers, the Deputy Head of the Eastern Secretariat and Hungarian communist 
Ludwig Ignatovich Magyar (real name: Lajos Milgorf; 1891 – 1937), had a pivotal role within the 
network, whilst Pavel Aleksandrovich Mif (real name: Mikhail Aleksandrovich Fortus; 1901 – 
1938) and Robin Page Arnot were also on occasion particularly influential. Mauno Heimo 1894 – 
1937), a Finnish communist, carried out chancellery work at Comintern headquarters and was a 
key actor who from time to time acted as Münzenberg’s personal liaison in relation to the LAI. 
Two authoritative characters crucial for the development and continuation of the LAI were, firstly, 
the Ukrainian communist Dmitri Manuilsky (1883 – 1959), the “eyes and ears” of the CPSU (B) in 
the Comintern. Along with Kuusinen, Manuilsky was a theoretical authority who provided 
Münzenberg with guidelines on how to develop both the IAH's and the LAI's colonial work. The 
second person was the Russian-Lithuanian communist Osip Piatnitsky (1882 – 1938), who was 
responsible for financial, personnel and liaison matters within the Comintern.  
      The Comintern was an organisation characterised primarily by its hierarchy. Within this 
hierarchical structure, the LAI was a topic discussed, assessed, evaluated and determined at 
various levels, reaching all the way to the top of the structure. Both its authoritative department, 
the Political Secretariat, and its consultative organ, the Political Commission (established in 1929), 
frequently discussed the LAI. However, it was the ECCI Secretariat which began discussing the 
IAH's anti-colonial project and the preparations for the Brussels Congress in 1925-26, whilst after 
1927, the Eastern Secretariat was the connective point. Sensitive or secretive matters were first 
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assessed by Piatnitsky before being transferred to the Small Commission (Malaja komissija 
Politsekretariata). Other departments which either frequently or intermittently discussed the LAI 
were the Standing Commission (Postoiannaia komissiia), the ECCI Bureau, the ECCI 
Organisational Bureau (Organizatsionnyi otdel; Orgotdel) and the ECCI Agitprop Department 
(Otdel propagandy i agitatsii).  Temporary commissions (Raznye komissii) were also devoted to 
examining the LAI.85 
 
* 
 
Linking the Ties that Bind Together 
The Bolsheviks in Moscow governed the Comintern from its inception until its end. As noted by 
the historians Grant Adibekov, Eleonora Shakhnazarova and Kirill Shirinia in their anthology 
Centre and Periphery (1996), the “Comintern was inseparably linked” to the CPSU (B) “in respect 
of ideology, policy, organisation and material support”. In 1921, with the introduction of 
democratic centralism in the Comintern, an organisational principle establishing hierarchical 
relations from top to bottom, the one-way system of control exercised by the Comintern from the 
centre of Moscow over the periphery was confirmed.86 Consequently, the dictates issued from the 
“centre”/from above (Comintern headquarters in Moscow) and broadcast to the “periphery”/from 
below (the national sections/communist parties) implied, according to McDermott and Agnew, a 
structure built on dependency and total loyalty towards the “centre”.87 Is the history of the LAI a 
part of this “centre-periphery” paradigm or are other paradigms visible? Bearing in mind the 
relative scarcity of previous research done on the LAI and, more importantly, the richness of the 
empirical material, other questions are brought into focus here than just the “centre and periphery” 
paradigm. Thus, in order to outline and interpret, firstly, the complex relationships and behavioural 
patterns linking the International Secretariat to the Comintern apparatus, and secondly, the 
undertakings of the LAI and the Comintern to create a credible anti-imperialist agenda, it is 
relevant to search beyond the rigid a priori understanding of the LAI’s complete obedience 
                                               
85 The latter part of this section is based firstly, on the observations and conclusions drawn during the research and,  
secondly, on the following works: Rosenfeldt 2 (2009); Huber (1995); Lazitch (1986); Chase (2001); Vatlin (2009); 
Kimmo Rentola, “Finnish Communism, O. W. Kuusinen, and Their Two Native Countries”, in Communism. National 
& International, Tauno Saarela and Kimmo Rentola (eds.), Societas Historica Finlandiae, Helsinki, 1998, pp.159-181; 
Grant Adibekov & Eleonora Shakhnazarova, “Reconstructions of the Comintern Organisational Structure”, in Centre 
and Periphery. The History of the Comintern in the Light of New Documents, Narinsky & Rojahn (eds.), IISG, 
Amsterdam, 1996, pp.65-73; Alexander Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution 1919-1927, Curzon 
Press, Richmond, 2000.  
86 Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.72; Kirill Shirina, “The Comintern: A World Party and Its National Sections”,  
in Centre and Periphery, Narinsky & Rojahn (eds.), IISG, Amsterdam, 1996, p.169. The policy of democratic 
centralism, initially designed by Lenin, was introduced at the Third International Comintern Congress in Moscow (22 
June – 12 July 1921) on the initiative of the ECCI.  
87 McDermott & Agnew 1996, p.xxi. 
40 
 
towards the Moscow elite. This requires a reconsideration of other perspectives. According to 
Norman LaPorte et al in the anthology Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern (2008), once the 
research goes “beyond generalist claims and particularist modifiers” this calls for a reassessment 
of a more “complex, sophisticated and pluri-disciplinary understanding” of communism(s). 
Typical of this is research and theoretical conceptions taken from the prosopographical approach, 
the “history of everyday life”, or network theory. These academic advances have added rational 
depth to the understanding of the dynamics of the systems, structures and networks of international 
communism. Yet, at the same time, one must not ignore the reflection, as introduced in Hermann 
Weber’s ground-breaking study of German communism, Die Wandlung des deutschen 
Kommunismus (1969), that despite communism having introduced itself as either national or 
international, any ensuing analysis and discussion has to include factors such as functionality, 
instrumentality and practical connotations caused by the hierarchical structure of the communist 
apparatus. It is therefore essential to highlight the impact of external (exogenous) and internal 
(endogenous) factors in order to establish a clearer understanding of communism as a political and 
social phenomenon.88 
 
Movements 
The theoretical framework of this study aims to clarify the interactionism between the 
International Secretariat and the headquarters of the Comintern which developed over time. This 
perspective also addresses how the LAI and its International Secretariat interacted with 
representatives of the anti-colonial movement both in Berlin and around the world. Focusing on 
the character and outcome of political and organisational processes, this analysis aims to uncover 
intersections and mobilised networks, or networks which existed parallel to each other. The former 
is a discussion on direct and indirect links between individuals and institutional actors, while the 
latter relates to, according to the definition introduced by political scientist Sidney B. Tarrow, a 
process which tied “leaders” to the organisation of collective action in order to set in place 
“movement co-ordination and allowing movements to persist over time”.89 This definition 
                                               
88 Norman LaPorte, Kevin Morgan and Matthew Worley (eds.), “Introduction: Stalinization and Communist  
Historiography”, in Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern. Perspectives on Stalinization, 1917-53, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Houndmills, 2008, pp.1-3. For an adaptation of everyday life “stories”, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday 
Stalinism. Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1999); 
Bert Hoppe, In Stalins Gefolgschaft. Moskau und die KPD 1928 – 1933, R. Oldenburg Verlag, München, 2007, pp.11-
19; Hermann Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer 
Republik Band 1, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main, 1969, pp.7-20. 
89 Sidney B Tarrow, Power in Movement. Social movements, collective action and politics, Cambridge University  
Press, New York, 1994, p.136. Tarrow focused on the study of social movements in Italy and France during the 
nineteenth century and strove to develop Charles Tilly’s political process theory; Steven M. Buechler, Understanding 
Social Movements. Theories from the Classical Era to the Present, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, 2011, p.125, 129, 
136.  
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addresses the importance of finding out how and why relations between the International 
Secretariat in Berlin and Comintern headquarters in Moscow developed and changed over time. 
Most importantly, to examine how the Comintern put into practice its control over administrative 
questions and ideology. Fundamental to the above is to make a distinction between the terms 
interactionism and movements. Sociologist Georg Simmel observed, as noted in his analysis of 
“The Web of Group-Affiliations” (Die Kreuzung sozialer Kreise), that “as a higher concept binds 
together the elements […] so do practical considerations bind together like individuals, who are 
otherwise affiliated with quite alien and unrelated groups”.90 For the LAI, therefore, it is logical to 
concede that the “higher concept” and “practical considerations” were anti-colonialism and anti-
imperialism. Thus, for this study it is essential to elucidate how, why and where individuals chose 
to “bind together” around a “cause or modify interest groups, unifications, organisations”. It is, 
therefore, of particular interest to define interactionism as a political and organisational process, in 
order to establish an understanding of how the actors responded to “shared understandings and 
common expectations” as well as the organised efforts to obtain change and to “establish a new 
order of life”. Tarrow suggests that this process of interactionism is defined by “collective action”, 
“feelings of solidarity”91 and “expressive behaviour and communication”, factors which contribute 
to the evaluation of the character and dynamics of social or political relationships. These 
collaborations, which address the major challenge to interpreting the LAI as a political topic, as 
expounded the political scientist Steven M. Buechler, focus on a macro-orientated view which has 
little to say in relation to “motivation, recruitment, conversion, or inter-personal dynamics within 
                                               
90 Georg Simmel, Conflict and The Web of Group-Affiliations (translated by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix), The  
Free Press, New York, 1955, p.128.  
91 Solidarity is a historical term based on the Christian notion of fraternity which, taken from the Latin socius  
(companion) has been associated with socialism and should be perceived as the adversary to nationalism, a political 
framework that emerged during the nineteenth century. Solidarity, as a social concept, strives to make participants 
recognise a common interest in the construction of an ideological identity. According to sociologist Emile Durkheim, 
the process of social interaction builds on social relationships and ties that bind individuals to groups, organisations 
and, in the end, to society. Hence, this marks the formation of a moral, devotional or an ideological contractual 
relationship. The LAI used solidarity as an impetus for its activities; however, the idea of solidarity existed in a limited 
socio-political context, which the communists used as a concept rather than in practice in order to maintain control 
over the movement. Furthermore, as noted in Steinar Stjernö’s reflection on Max Weber’s conceptualisation of 
solidarity, solidarity as such is not only integrative, it is also divisive, see Steinar Stjernø, Solidarity in Europe. The 
History of an Idea, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p.25, 35, 37; Michele Dillon, Introduction to 
Sociological Theory. Theorists, Concepts and their Applicability to the Twenty-First Century, Wiley-Blackwell, West 
Sussex, 2010, p.97; Norman Davies, Europe. A History, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, p.835. In 
conclusion, the conceptual and practices of a “limited solidarity” was a topic addressed by the author at the conference 
“Solidarities Through History”, arranged by the Centre for International History at Columbia University, New York, in 
collaboration with The Harriman Institute, the Weatherhead Institute, the Middle East Institute, University of Leipzig 
and the Graduate School Advisory Council, March 30 2007. For the conference paper, “In Control of Solidarity? Willi 
Münzenberg, the Workers’ International Relief and League against Imperialism, 1921-1935”, see Comintern Working 
Paper (CoWoPa) 12, Internet: < https://www.abo.fi/student/media/7957/cowopa12petersson.pdf >. 
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movements”.92 One of the fundamental aims of this study is to look beyond this so-called macro-
orientated interpretation. 
      The anti-colonial movement was the impetus for the LAI. The question is, nevertheless, 
whether one can perceive the LAI as a part of the anti-colonial movement, or whether the LAI 
strove to function as a political platform in order to unite the anti-colonial movement. It can be 
argued that the LAI was a construction that never intended to pose as a spokesperson for the anti-
colonial movement. Instead, its primary ambition was to act as an international anti-imperialist 
voice, declaring its support for the struggle of the oppressed peoples in the fight against 
colonialism and imperialism. The conceptual relationship between colonialism and imperialism in 
the context of the Comintern and international communism deserves further clarification. 
Colonialism must be perceived as a practice, explicitly referring to the “occupation of a foreign 
land”, whilst imperialism is a concept representing a system that combined ideology and economic 
initiatives. Furthermore, administered from the centre to the periphery, imperialism is driven by 
the motive of preserving its grandiose projects of power. The common theme for colonialism and 
imperialism is power, a framework which seeks confirmation and validation through the 
establishment of an administrative system characterised by institutions of governance, economic 
patterns, ideas and values, which the colonisers imposed on the colonised.93 In order to document 
and interpret the history of resistance against colonial oppression and imperialist exploitation, 
according to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s postcolonial critique of modernity and “history itself”, the 
study of colonialism is a subaltern history which aims to describe and “make the world more 
socially just”. One must, therefore, question and discuss cultural dichotomies such as “Europe/not 
Europe”, “developed/undeveloped” etc,94 where nationalism, as advocated by anti-colonial 
activists during the inter-war years, considered the internationalism of the communist movement 
as a haven.95 For the LAI, imperialism represented the pièce de résistance and structural 
framework used to attract attention from the anti-colonial movement in Europe. The Bolsheviks’ 
political interpretation of imperialism (Imperializm) ritualistically mirrored the “social and 
political realities” of the Soviet Union and its perception of Western society, referred to as a hostile 
political system in such terms as the “camp of imperialism” (lager ‘imperializma') or 
“international imperialism” (mezhdunarodny imperialism). Soviet propaganda also placed 
imperialism within the context of the “militarism” of the West and capitalist society, and therefore 
                                               
92 Simmel 1955, p.15; “Social Movements”, in The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought, 
William Outhwaite & Tom Bottomore (eds.), Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1993, p.598; Buechler 2011, p.90. 
93 Young 2001, p.17; Ferro 1997, p.1; Abernethy 2000, p.12. 
94 Chakrabarty 2000, p.72; Osterhammel 2001, pp.14-16. 
95 Thomas 2005, p.19. 
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imperialism was a colonial system the “imperialist nations” wanted to retain.96 From a theoretical 
standpoint, to question a political system involving occupation and conquest, any critical study of 
imperialism should include an assessment of factors such as empire and imperial ambitions. 
Accordingly, the Marxist-Leninist conception of imperialism defines it as a broad structural system 
characterised by economic domination, though not necessarily political domination. Yet, 
imperialism as an idea and practice inherently distinguishes itself by its exercise and practice of 
power through “direct conquest”, or “political and economic influence”, administered via 
institutions and by ideological conviction. Construed and administered “from the centre” – the 
home country, e.g. Great Britain or France, the two leading empires in Europe during the inter-war 
years – the Empire used any measure at hand to extend its control over the furthest “reaches of the 
peripheries”. After the Great War in 1919, the resentment against the state-sanctioned system of 
“the centre” assumed theoretical and practical expressions amongst anti-colonial activists and 
movements residing in the “colonial metropolises” of Europe (Berlin, Paris, and London). For the 
Comintern, and then the LAI, these groups of anti-colonial activists would be their main target. In 
the heyday of the Comintern’s united front strategy, the LAI emerged as the actor and solution best 
suited to establishing connections with the anti-colonial movement(s) in Europe, which would, in 
turn, guarantee a political and organisational corridor to the colonial and semi-colonial countries. 
The Comintern's primary motive in endorsing the establishment of the LAI in 1927 was to create 
an organisation that would realise the political and organisational efforts required to spread 
communism, thus enhancing the possibility of spreading communism to regions and countries 
previously inaccessible to the international communist movement due to the international fear 
caused by the practice of communism and the Bolshevik regime in Russia.97 Foreign governments 
hostile towards the Bolshevik regime described the Comintern as a menace. Yet, for the mobilised 
anti-colonial movements after the Great War, communism was a vibrant ideology, which 
corresponded to their desire of achieving national independence; movements inspired by the 
nineteenth-century developmentalist view of history, explicitly formulated by Marx and Darwin. 
According to Elleke Boehmer, the anti-colonial movements strove to change the world order, 
fuelled by a nationalist agenda “in terms of political organisation” which emphasised a “cross- or 
                                               
96 “Imperialism (Imperializm)”, in Ilya Zemtsov, Encyclopedia of Soviet Life, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick,  
1991, p.158. 
97 Young 2001, pp.25-27; Abernethy 2000, pp.9-11; Chakrabarty 2000, p.41; Matthew G. Stanard, “Interwar Pro- 
Empire Propaganda and European Colonial Culture: Toward a Comparative Research Agenda”, in Journal of 
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transnational in their range of reference and reception of influence”.98 Protests by anti-colonial 
movements against the oppression of colonialism were, however, not the IAH’s primary focus in 
1925. As the idea of the anti-colonial project took shape, the IAH used philanthropy as the 
incentive to create reactions to anti-imperialism. In 1925, the IAH’s philanthropy was a political 
framework, broadcast to the public in various campaigns and committees in order to introduce a 
social message focusing on the “shaping of the future of society”. Philanthropy was the concept 
which defined the colonial question for the IAH, particularly its role as a donor and towards the 
recipients.99 What was the nature of the IAH’s philanthropy? It was to declare a social message 
under the pretext of “proletarian solidarity” in order to gather material and moral support, an 
undertaking driven by securing organisational support rather than altruistic motives. The question 
is why. Accordingly, the IAH’s anti-imperialist activism and propaganda, carried on by its 
offspring the LAI, is essentially a question of “political solidarity”. This is a question further 
addressed by the philosopher Sally J. Scholz, who writes that commitment to a political cause is a 
pivotal factor in the organisation of collective action, as in this case, against colonialism and 
imperialism. Thus, movements are, regardless of their political or social nature, a response to 
“collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction 
with elites, opponents and authorities”. Furthermore, as observed by Tarrow, this makes it 
necessary to evaluate the structural source of “collective political activity”.100 The LAI justified its 
                                               
98 Ahmad 2009, p.6; Manela 2008, p.13; Boehmer 2002, p.3. See the discussion on the Western conception of the  
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100 Sally J. Scholz, Political Solidarity, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 2008, p.33, 59. Scholz  
writes that “starting a social movement is no easy task. The different commitments of the members of the solidarity 
group account in part for the sustaining force of political solidarity […] some people will work diligently and 
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individual members and the power of the bond of the collective, political solidarity makes certain requirements on the 
participants” (p.70); Tarrow 1994, pp.4-5. Hence, the collective challenge for individuals, either in the form as densely 
or loosely-knit associations, is in resisting the pressures from “elites, authorities, other groups or cultural codes” 
which, according to Tarrow, often take on exaggerated expressions due to the lack of resources, for example, money, 
organization or access to the state. One of the primal reasons for joining a movement is to go into opposition against 
the claims and policies of its adversaries – authorities or elites – a process that contributes to shaping an identity 
around a common cause. This represents collective action, in which the LAI wanted to attract the anti-colonial 
movement by organising public demonstrations and meetings, and the establishment of propaganda campaigns (public 
and letter writing campaigns; protest telegrams). However, failing to maintain collective action at a certain level, this 
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existence, either via the directives from the Comintern or through individual initiatives in Berlin, 
by identifying “collective challenges” around particular political incidents and causes, driven by 
the ambition to “sustain collective action” and solidarity in order to influence and control the anti-
colonial movement. 
 
Hierarchy of Relations 
The hierarchy of relations is a theoretical account of how the organisation of the Comintern, 
according to the historian Inessa Iazhborovskaia, addressed questions concerning position, role as 
well as the functionality of “particular individuals and groups”.101 What, therefore, are the basic 
requirements to be included in the framework of the hierarchy of relations?  Most importantly, this 
theoretical framework aims to explain the complexity of the organisational and political 
phenomena the Comintern has come to represent in retrospect. By identifying the nature and 
dynamics of the administrative systems which existed both at the International Secretariat and at 
Comintern headquarters, it is possible to distinguish the strategical incentives which aimed to 
determine and locate the activity of individuals “into certain channels”. This depended primarily 
on the existence of a hierarchy of relations, a structural phenomenon which placed the departments 
of the Comintern in a hierarchy. Furthermore, it defined the hierarchical position of the 
individuals, as well as their relations towards each other, hence, the system circulated around 
questions of “subordination and responsibility, of rights and obligations”. The following 
theoretical challenge for the study is to see whether Iazhborovskaia’s theory of organisation, which 
focuses in its essence on evaluating the dynamics and mechanisms of the “centre” in Moscow and 
its adherence to “the political line”,102 also existed outside the “centre”, and also whether it 
adhered to its own rational logic.  
      The LAI was a network which, in turn, twirled around a complex set of other networks, 
consisting of actors who shared a common belief both in the struggle against imperialism and, 
most importantly, in communism. From an internal perspective, the hierarchy that emerged among 
the individuals at the International Secretariat made a conscious separation between the people 
who had responsibility and rights, while others were bound to subordination and commitment. 
Hence, the distribution of rights and obligations at the International Secretariat, which constitutes 
the focal point of the hierarchy of relations, witnessed a division into three sections: the core, 
believers and followers. The core was a position reserved for trusted individuals who were granted 
                                                                                                                                                          
forces the movement to retreat “into isolation”. See also Wellman’s discussion (1997, p.46) on network and “collective 
political activity”. 
101 Inessa Iazhborovskaia, “The Logic of the Development of the Organisational Structure and Mechanism of  
Administration in the Comintern”, in Centre & Periphery, Narinsky & Rojahn (eds.), IISG, Amsterdam, 1996, p.57. 
102 Iazhborovskaia 1996, p.57, 59. 
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responsibilities and rights on the basis of their long-standing devotional relationship to the 
Comintern and communism: Münzenberg, Smeral, Ferdi, Clemens Dutt and Gibarti. The believers 
consisted primarily of anti-colonial activists who were living in Berlin and who had intimate 
connections with the International Secretariat. However, these individuals were largely restricted 
from gaining access to the core, even if they wanted to do so. The believers were a group 
represented by Chatto, Hansin Liau, Kunizaki and Otto Schudel. The followers were left-wing 
political, cultural or social groups, e.g. socialists, social democrats, pacifists, national 
revolutionaries, trade unionists and intellectuals, elements the LAI wanted to get involved in the 
anti-imperialist movement.      
 
Table 1.2: The International Secretariat & the Comintern, 1927 – 1933  
The International Secretariat   The Comintern 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The focal point of this analysis is on the relations between the core and the believers, with the 
followers acting in the background as a contextual backdrop. What is the motive for such a 
demarcation? Whilst this study aims to portray the LAI as a global actor, in order to uncover the 
system and nature of the hierarchy of its relations, the central question is to evaluate the 
interactionism between the International Secretariat and Comintern headquarters. This also leads 
us to see whether the authority of the decision-makers in Moscow vis-à-vis the dependency of the 
LAI altered literally over time, or whether the organisation was a subservient slave to the dictates 
of Moscow from the beginning, existing merely as a vessel to broadcast its loyalty towards the 
”kom.Fraktion” 
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Soviet Union. To illustrate how these hierarchical relations developed, it is crucial to distinguish 
how and why the International Secretariat organised its activity as a sympathising communist 
organisation through, for example, congresses and conferences, anti-imperialist propaganda 
campaigns and curricular activity. This depended, almost without any exception, on carrying out 
the directives issued by Comintern headquarters, and also on the ideological constitution of the 
International Secretariat, the political composition of the LAI Executive Committee, the 
organisation of international missions and on the conscription of reliable and suitable members. 
This hierarchical administrative system depended, therefore, on its members swearing allegiance 
to the cause, i.e. the establishment and the continuance of an international anti-imperialist 
organisation. 
 
A Sympathising Communist Organisation from the Inside 
To comprehend the nature and structural foundation of the LAI, and the reasons why it was 
established, it is essential to address the functionality and instrumental use of the sympathising 
communist organisation. The erroneous term, front organisation, a term utilised by their 
antagonists, does not portray the LAI from an impartial perspective and blurs what it initially set 
out to be: a sympathising communist organisation and organisational cover initiated by the 
Comintern to work in the service of the international communist movement. The aim of this study 
is not to contribute to the narrative tradition which portrays the LAI as a front for the Comintern, a 
framework established during the existence of the LAI and, especially, during the Cold War.103 
Firstly, a sympathising communist organisation is not in any way connected to the general 
                                               
103 The writings and total number of works that describe the LAI as a “front organization” is monumental. However,  
the usage of the term is incorrectly linked to the “united front” strategy of the Comintern, a doctrine supported by the 
communist movement during the 1920s, formally abolished in 1928 and replaced by “the new line”/class against class 
policy. Characteristic examples of the above that have contributed to establishing the understanding of the 
sympathizing communist organizations as “fronts” are the following works: the pamphlet The Communist Solar 
System (The Labour Party, London, September, 1933), authored by William Gillies, the International Secretary of the 
Second International. According to Gillies, the fronts and the “sympathizing mass organizations” concerned 
themselves primarily with “communism in disguise”. Elizabeth Kirkpatrick Dilling’s The Red Network: A “Who’s 
Who and Handbook of Radicalism for Patriots (Chicago, 1934) was a self-financed enterprise aiming to define the 
anti-communist bias of the author vis-à-vis the American communist movement. Dilling defined the “International 
League against Imperialism” as “the parent organization” that had “branches in all parts of the world and is Moscow’s 
agency for spreading revolutionary doctrines amongst colonial peoples” (p.104). The report by the Joint Fact-Finding 
Committee, supported by the Senate of the USA, Fourth Report on Un-American Activities in California: Communist 
Front Organizations, more or less confirmed the perception of communist organizations as “fronts”. Released in 1948, 
the authors of the report stated that “front organizations are indispensable” to supporting and establishing “the 
‘vanguard position’ of Communism and to pose as the only true friend of the ‘struggling masses’” (p.25). In reference 
to the LAI, the committee concluded that it had been an organization “directly under the control of the Communist 
International” (p.107). The last example is Louis Nemzer’s article, “The Soviet Friendship Societies”, in The Public 
Opinion Quarterly, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1949, pp.265-284. According to Nemzer, who focused 
essentially on the association the Friends of the Soviet Union only to conclude that these so-called societies (or fronts) 
were “one aspect of the Kremlin’s power position in world politics in the extent and intensity of support given to its 
policies in foreign countries” (p.265). 
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perception of an organisation as a unified and permanent constellation.104 The term sympathising 
was in fact a strategy implemented for the sole purpose of circumventing suspicion and probation 
by governmental authorities and agencies (national security services). However, the principal goal 
for a sympathising communist organisation was to extend communist influence. In October 1917, 
after the Bolsheviks had seized power, Lenin was adamant about the necessity of establishing 
organisations, associations and committees, organisational entities formed under the pretext of 
acting as an interactionist link between the communist party and the masses. According to the 
lingua franca of the Comintern, this form of organisation was a shape described as “auxiliary” 
(podsobnyye), “camouflage organisations” (maskiruyuschiye organizatsii) or as a “cover” (maska, 
skryvat’). The fundamental purpose of the sympathising communist organisations was expounded 
in Kuusinen’s “Report of the Commission for Work among the Masses”, introduced at the Sixth 
ECCI Plenum in Moscow (17 February – 15 March 1926). As noted in the “Resolution of the Sixth 
ECCI Plenum on the Development of Methods and Forms for Consolidating Communist Party 
Influence on the Masses”, based on Lenin’s dictum “to use everything and everyone”, Kuusinen 
emphasised that the “organisatory [sic] role of the proletariat is its main role”. What did this 
imply? For Kuusinen, the international communist movement could only be strengthened by 
building up “not only communist organisations, but other organisations as well”. This primarily 
concerned the channelling of communist influence “over the masses” through “sympathising mass 
organisations” which, according to Kuusinen, needed an organisational structure that was “as 
flexible as possible”. This depended nevertheless on the creation of “a solar system of 
organisations and smaller committees around the Communist Party … under the influence of our 
Party [Comintern]” rather than “under [a] mechanical leadership”.105 According to Ludmila Stern’s 
study of the sympathy and moral support given by Western intellectuals towards the Soviet Union 
                                               
104 The general understanding of an organisation is not that it is a random and chaotic entity, but rather, an organization  
is perceived as a coherent entity that exists and functions around systems of rules and objectives, in co-existence with 
administrative and hierarchical structures, which is required to meet and challenge changes “in unanticipated ways”. If 
so, this calls for the adoption of “new routines and functions”, which depend on consultations from the “stakeholders” 
which, in the context of the study, was the Comintern. The organisational theorist, Clive Archer, defines the primary 
functions of an international organization as the following: functionality, the aims, activities and response from the 
members that justify the existence of the organisation; instrumentality, how the organization is “used by its members 
for particular ends”, and the set of common values every member shares; arena, the public places of the organisation, 
i.e. meeting places for the members to “come together to discuss, argue, co-operate or disagree”; and finally, level of 
independence, see Clive Archer, International Organizations, London, 1983, pp.1-2, pp.128-141. For further 
discussions on organisation, see Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization. Executive Edition, Sage Publications, 
London, (1998), and Michael Barnett & Marha Finnemore, Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global 
Politics, Cornell University Press (2004). 
105 Ludmila Stern, Western Intellectuals and the Soviet Union, 1920-40, Routledge, Oxon, 2007, pp.43-45; Bernhard S.  
Morris, “Communist International Front Organizations”, in World Politics, Vol.9, No.1 (Oct.1956), Johns Hopkins 
University Press, pp.76-87. For the Sixth ECCI Plenum and the discussion on the “sympathizing mass organizations”, 
see “Resolution on the Development of Methods and Forms of the Organisation of Masses under the Influence of the 
Communist Parties”, in Inprecorr, Vol. 6, No. 40, 13/5-1926, pp.649-650; (Otto W. Kuusinen) “Report of the 
Commission for Work among Masses”, in Inprecorr, Vol.6, No.28, 15/4-1926, p.429. 
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during the inter-war years, and regardless of her erroneous use of the term “front”, the 
sympathising (as referred to here) organisations intentionally concealed their links to the 
Comintern, with the latter assuming the role of a silent partner/leader. Thus, the primary ambition 
was to extend communist influence outside the communist movement, an objective attained by 
distributing propaganda in cultural, social, or political left-wing spheres. For the Comintern, the 
sympathising organisation was an organisational design, devoted to establishing connections with 
the core of the left-wing movement, e.g. workers, pacifists, petit bourgeois and intellectuals. By 
focusing on particular topics of interest (“focus centred”) – educational and curricular activity, 
thematic study groups, war veterans’ organisations, sport associations, theatre groups, the pacifist 
and anti-colonial movements and questions of gender – the sympathising communist organisation 
assumed the shape of either an organisation, committee or an association. A fundamental 
prerequisite was that the sympathising organisation introduced a non-communist leadership to the 
public, and kept the public membership of communist party functionaries in the organisation 
(known in a political context) to a minimum. The organisational and political work was a process 
controlled by a “communist faction” (“kom.Fraktion”; kommunistische Fraktion), the primary aim 
of which was to ensure the inclusion of the maxim “in defence of the Soviet Union” and the 
process of socialist construction in the Soviet Union in its agenda.106 Cultural and political 
organisations linked to the web of sympathising communist organisations of the Comintern (aside 
from the LAI) were the Friends of the Soviet Union (established 1927), the Anti-Fascist League 
(1923), the International Association of Revolutionary Writers (1930) and the Anti-War 
Amsterdam/Pleyel Movement (1932). However, it is essential to make a distinction between the 
sympathising organisations as distributors of propaganda and the functionality of mass 
organisations, where the latter in a majority of cases identified and introduced themselves in public 
as communist, and as members of the Comintern. Above all, the mass organisations targeted 
membership’s representative of society, in terms of place of residence, work, age, ideological 
conviction and gender.107 The mass organisations of the Comintern were the IAH, the Red 
                                               
106 Stern 2007, pp.44-45. The sympathising communist organisation is a topic frequently subjected to biased  
interpretations. However, it must also be noted that the topic is a challenging one to research, examine, analyse and 
interpret. According to Selznick, the communist “front” was one of the organisational “weapons” at hand for the 
international communist movement to disguise the real political activities of the party, almost as the “architectural idea 
of a façade”. In Hannah Arendt’s ground-breaking study of totalitarianism, published after World War II, she observed 
that the “first glimpse of a totalitarian movement [is] through its front organisations”, whilst Witold S. Sworakowski 
concluded that the “global aims, the open and secret forms” took on the “bizarre methods of operation” in the “front 
organisations” of the Comintern, see Selznick (second edition) 1960, p.145; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Harcourt, San Diego, 1985 (first edition 1951), p.367; Sworakowski 1965, p.7. For a brief 
presentation of the “front organisations” of the Comintern, see Edward Hallet Carr, The Twilight of Comintern, 1930-
1935, MacMillan Press, London, 1982, p.398. 
107 Gregory J. Kasza, The Conscription Society. Administered Mass Organizations, Yale University Press, New Haven,  
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International of Labour Unions (RILU; Profintern), Internationale Rote Hilfe (IRH; International 
Red Aid), Krestintern (Peasants' International) and the Sportintern (the Red Sport International). 
Was not the sympathising communist organisation required to carry out the decisions of the 
Comintern, and was it a relation free from a “mechanical leadership” by the Comintern, based 
rather on “influence”? For this study, these questions represent a vital theme. The proposal is that 
the LAI was no exception to the subjugation imposed on the mass organisations by the decision-
makers at Comintern headquarters. The obligations and commitment avowed by the LAI and its 
International Secretariat need to be revealed and interpreted in order to establish an understanding 
of the dynamics of a sympathising communist organisation.  
      The question of the intellectuals and their symbolic position within the sympathising 
communist organisations deserves a brief introduction in this context. Previous research offers 
well-informed and detailed studies of the intellectuals as fellow travellers to communism, who 
functioned as political sojourners to the homeland of the revolution and embraced “radicalism at a 
distance”. For example, Ludmila Stern’s critical assessment of the spiritual declaration of support 
western intellectuals gave to the Soviet Union, and David Caute’s somewhat dated, yet still valid, 
analysis of the theoretical character of fellow travelling as a lifestyle, represent constructive 
research. In fact, as noted by the Marxist historian Eric J. Hobsbawm, the Comintern and the 
Soviet Union only managed to attract intellectuals “on the left” in literature and the arts to openly 
declare their support.108 Hobsbawm’s observation nevertheless corresponds to one of the 
fundamental aims of the LAI to exist as a sympathising communist organisation: to use 
intellectuals as an ideological varnish for the simple reason that they added credibility to the LAI’s 
anti-imperialist propaganda and agenda. Despite placing the intellectuals – the followers – at the 
forefront, this group was nevertheless a peripheral factor when it came to the measures taken by 
the LAI to gain access to the anti-colonial movement. They were used merely to ease the process. 
                                                                                                                                                          
1995, p.7. Kasza concluded that the general practice of treating and understanding administered mass organisations as 
weak interest groups or abortive political parties, in fact “obscures their true character” (p.11), a point of view that has 
much in common with the perception of the sympathising communist organisation. 
108 Stern (2007); David Caute, The Fellow Travellers. Intellectual Friends of Communism (revised edition), Yale  
University Press, New Haven, 1988; Eric J. Hobsbawm, How to Change the World. Marx and Marxism 1840-2011, 
Little Brown, London, 2011, pp.264-265. For a biased study of Western intellectuals and their connection to 
communism, see Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims. Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and 
Cuba 1928-1978, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981. A more balanced examination is presented in Michael 
David-Fox, “The Fellow Travelers Revisited: The ‘Cultured West’ through Soviet Eyes”, in The Journal of Modern 
History, 75 (June 2003), The University of Chicago, pp.300-335. A majority of the research on the phenomenon of 
“fellow travellers”, in the context of communism, takes its point of departure in the apologist work introduced by 
Richard Crossman (ed.), The God that Failed (Bantham Books, New York, 1950), a book that discussed the idea of 
“the journey into Communism, and the return”. This book includes the writings of well-known intellectuals such as 
Arthur Koestler (who was a friend of Münzenberg, and who later wrote the introduction to Gross' biography), Ignazio 
Silone, Richard Wright, André Gide, Louis Fischer and Stephen Spender. 
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      The LAI adopted these tactics in order to function as a cover for the Comintern by addressing 
itself as a league. This term disguised the internal structure of the organisation and, above all, 
defined the LAI’s objective to pose as a campaigner “against imperialism”. The initial aim of a 
league, a perspective often neglected in critical assessments of such an organisational form, is of 
prime importance in this present study. A league strives to act as an ideological and organisational 
centre, driven by its ambition to join together associations, organisations and individuals which, in 
the present case of the LAI, meant the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. To emphasise 
the difference between a league and the aims of an “interest group”, with the latter being an 
organised association that strives to “influence governmental decisions”, a league feverishly 
advocates radical change and, moreover, a league is not equivalent to an organisation.109 
Therefore, it is logical to propose that, regardless of the fact that the LAI introduced itself in public 
as an organisation, the LAI was from the beginning never designed to function as one. Rather, the 
LAI was an agency, established solely for the purpose of functioning as a connective point and as 
an educational centre for activists and organisations in league with the anti-colonial movement 
across the world. The present challenge is both to examine and to reach an understanding as to 
whether the LAI merely functioned as a cover for the political and organisational ambitions of the 
Comintern, while at same time it also wanted to convince devoted individuals, associations or 
organisations that it worked exclusively in the interest of the anti-colonial movement. 
 
This analysis is divided into three thematic categories and chronological parts. Part I introduces the 
background of how and why the IAH conceived the anti-colonial project in 1925, with a focus on 
how Lenin and the Comintern approached and defined the colonial question during 1914 – 1924. 
This part, comprising two chapters, establishes an understanding of the construction of the anti-
colonial project from 1925 to February 1927. The focus of Part II is on the impact, euphoria and 
aftermath of the “First Congress against Colonialism and Imperialism” held in Brussels on 10-14 
February, 1927. By introducing and evaluating the formal establishment of the LAI in 1927, Part II 
ends with a critical assessment of how and why the idea of an anti-imperialist utopia vanished. 
Moreover, in comparison to Part I, which is devoted to issues of construction and preparations, 
Part II highlights the initiatives taken by the LAI International Secretariat in Berlin and at 
Comintern headquarters in Moscow to exploit both the Brussels Congress and the LAI as the 
international representatives of the anti-imperialist movement. By far the largest section in the 
                                               
109 Kasza 1995, p.9. Political scientist Maurice Duverger's definition of a league is: “[A]ssociations set up with  
political aims, […] they are solely organisations for propaganda and agitation. […] by their very nature, leagues are 
violently anti-parliamentary: […] The line development natural to the league is thus a transformation into an extremist 
party”, see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, Lethuen & Co. 
London, 1954, xxxii-xxxiii. 
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thesis – comprising four chapters which cover the two international LAI congresses – this analysis 
ends with a thorough assessment of the precarious interactionism in preparing the “Second 
Congress against Colonialism and Imperialism” held in Frankfurt am Main on 21-27 July, 1929. 
This part also investigates the Comintern's colonial strategy, and how the international communist 
movement struggled to adapt itself to the policy change from the united front to “the new line” (the 
“third period”/ class against class) in 1928, a turning point which forced the Comintern to reassess 
its colonial work. In Part III, the focus is on the ideological and organisational crisis (the anni 
confusionis; the year of confusion) in the LAI in connection with the aftermath of the second LAI 
Congress in 1929, leading to the transformation of the initial purpose and aim of the LAI. This 
involves a discussion on how and why the LAI and its network changed, becoming a malformed 
structure characterised by disintegration, hesitancy and indifference. Four chapters cover how 
particular internal and external episodes contributed to determining the bitter demise of the LAI 
and the International Secretariat which, during the first months of 1933, ultimately led the 
International Secretariat to realise that it did not have what was required to salvage the political 
situation in Berlin.  
 
* 
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PART I 
 
Chapter 1. Conceiving the Anti-Colonial Project 
The history of the LAI was created, formed and influenced by a series of episodes and incidents. 
Characteristic and symptomatic of the political and social landscape of the inter-war years, the LAI 
and its anti-imperialist agenda spurred a reaction amongst the representatives of the anti-colonial 
movement in 1927. In 1925, however, the IAH and Münzenberg did not proceed from the initial 
idea to use anti-imperialism as the guiding principle for its political drive. In fact, the IAH 
approached the colonial question under the pretext of stimulating relief activities outside Europe. 
Addressed under the guise of philanthropy and proletarian solidarity, the IAH had begun to 
manifest its presence in the Far East in 1923, culminating in the summer of 1925 in the 
introduction of the Hands off China campaign in Germany. Thus, the anti-colonial project of the 
IAH did not serve the purpose of paving the way for the establishment of an international anti-
imperialist organisation. On the contrary, the project was an interactionist process which unified 
IAH’s discourse of solidarity and philanthropy under the ideological supervision of the Comintern. 
As the enterprise reached its peak in 1925, previous tentative attempts of the Comintern to solidify 
the colonial work, e.g. the establishment of the International Colonial Bureau (ICBu) in 1924, had 
ended embarrassingly. Thus, the colonial work of the IAH in Weimar Germany resulted in an 
unexpected success for the IAH and Münzenberg in 1925, which further convinced Münzenberg to 
develop the anti-colonial project, an idea that would lead to the establishment of the LAI in 1927.  
      The focus and aim of this chapter is to analyse the loose threads which, from the outset, 
represented the structure of IAH’s anti-colonial project. This concerns an examination of the ideas 
and organisational measures the IAH took to initiate its colonial work, which came to life with the 
introduction of the Hands off China campaign in June 1925, and the Against the Cruelties in Syria 
Committee in December 1925. For Münzenberg and the IAH, the anti-colonial project was a 
pivotal source of inspiration and potency the Comintern could not fail to acknowledge. Hence, the 
mobilisation of proletarian solidarity, under the guise of philanthropy, was the turning point for the 
Comintern in developing the colonial question and strengthening the IAH’s activities in 1925. 
 
* 
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Lenin, the Comintern and the Colonial Question, 1914 – 1924 
The internationalism of the Comintern responded to the frantic calls for independence against the 
European domination of African and Asian peoples after the Great War. Delegates from the 
colonial world, who attended the Paris Peace Conference in Versailles 1919, were seeking an 
ideological platform which opposed and supported their struggle against colonialism and 
imperialism. Once the bliss of the “Wilsonian moment” had begun to fade, some of the colonial 
delegates began drifting towards Lenin and the Comintern as the answer to solving the colonial 
question. Whilst the peace conference turned into a disappointment for the colonial delegates, the 
material and human support wrested from the colonies to support the Great War left the European 
continent dependent on maintaining the colonial system in order to rebuild their shattered empires. 
Consequently, the colonised people and anti-colonial activists lost the confidence, as noted by 
David B. Abernethy, “they may have placed in their rulers’ ability or desire to improve their 
lives”.110 From this perspective, the euphoria of communism and the impact of the Comintern, 
along with the vision to create a better world, became an ideological haven for the anti-colonial 
movement in its struggle against colonialism and imperialism. 
      The inaugural congress of the Comintern in 1919, celebrated the unification of “revolutionary 
parties of the world proletariat”. However, the congress left much unsaid about the colonial 
question. Nevertheless, Lenin believed that the revolutionary upheavals emerging in Europe after 
the Great War would affect the heart of imperialism in “the metropolitan states” in Europe, leading 
to provocations and the final liberation of the colonies. A point of view which was supported by 
Nikolai Bukharin who, in an article in Pravda on 6 March, 1919, argued that “all the filth and dirt 
[…] in the colonies” was the result of the “most active agent generating it: capitalism”. For the 
Comintern, therefore, a fundamental task was to support the “oppressed in their liberation 
struggle”.111 
      The Comintern’s general understanding of the colonial question as well as colonialism and 
imperialism as a societal phenomenon was a result of Lenin’s theories on national self-
determination and imperialism. Theories which had been inspired by the earlier writings of Rudolf 
Hilferding, John Atkison Hobson and Bukharin, which Lenin had referred to while living in exile 
in Switzerland during the height of the Great War, writing his own theories and acting as the leader 
                                               
110 Adas 2010, pp.79-80; Steiner (2005); Manela (2007); Abernethy 2000, p.104, 129; Vatlin 2009, pp.21-34. 
111 John Riddell (ed.), The Communist International in Lenin’s Time. Founding the Communist International.  
Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress, March 1919, Pathfinder, New York, 1987, pp.307-308; Young 
2001, p.127; Michael Weiner, “Comintern in East Asia”, in The Comintern, McDermott & Agnew (eds.), Macmillan 
Press, Houndmills, 1996, p.159. In October, 1917, the Bolshevik regime reached out to the Caucasus region and 
Central Asia to support the Petrograd coup. This was a strategy that aimed to consolidate the newly-born Bolshevik 
state, and to undermine the influence amongst the imperialist powers on the Russian border, above all from the British 
Empire. This also introduced the image of the October 1917 “revolution” as an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist 
revolution, see further in Callaghan 2004, p.19. 
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of the Zimmerwald movement.112 According to his Theses on the Socialist Revolution and the 
Right of Nations to Self-Determination (1916), Lenin distinguished three types of national states: 
the capitalist countries in Western Europe and the United States; the “developed bourgeois-
democratic national movements and the heightened national struggle” in Eastern European and 
Tsarist Russia, whilst the last category, the colonial and semi-colonial countries, found themselves 
in a stage “beginning or far from finished” of developing “bourgeois-democratic movements”. It 
was the release of Lenin’s study, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917), which had a 
strong historical impact on the communist perception of imperialism. Based on Hobson’s 
Imperialism: A Study (1902) which had highlighted the colonial system at the turn of the century, 
Lenin stated that economic and political factors are essential to realising that imperialism was a 
phenomenon which stood on “the threshold to socialist revolution”.113 A postulation further 
developed by Stalin in 1918. According to an article by Stalin, published in Pravda on November 
1918, “Der Oktoberumsturz und die nationale Frage”, the theory of imperialism had become a 
political reality in tsarist Russia. Stalin stated in the context of the enslaved colonial and semi-
colonial countries (India, Persia and China) and the right to national self-determination, that the 
“international significance of the October Revolution” had altered the political disavowal of the 
“colonised countries”. Comparing the colonial struggle to the victorious feat of the Bolsheviks in 
1917, Stalin concluded: 
It has widened the scope of the national question and converted it from the particular 
question of combating national oppression into the general question of emancipating the 
oppressed nations, colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism; […] It has thereby erected 
a bridge between the socialist West and the Enslaved East, having created a new line of 
revolutions against world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the West, through 
the Russian revolution, to the oppressed nations of the East.114 
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The Comintern introduced itself as both the arch-enemy of world imperialism and as the moral 
supporter of the struggle of the oppressed, a political declaration given due attention at the Second 
International Comintern Congress in 1920 (19 July – 7 August). As anti-colonial disorder had 
erupted in 1919, characterised by the protests in China against Japanese colonialism and European 
imperialism, as well as in Korea, India and Egypt, these episodes determined the colonial 
discussion at the congress. Yet, the debate between Manabendra Nath Roy and Lenin on the 
latter’s colonial theses left a lasting imprint, a discussion which focused on how the Comintern 
should sponsor the development of a communist movement in the colonies. In Lenin’s opinion, the 
communists had to establish an alliance with national bourgeoisie elements, an argument Roy 
refuted as being illogical, urging Lenin to understand that the movement should consist of class-
conscious workers in the colonies. The outcome of their discussion was a compromise as the 
congress endorsed Lenin’s Theses on the National and Colonial Question, which advocated co-
operation and independence.115 The introduction of the “Twenty-One Conditions” at the congress 
nevertheless superseded the message of the colonial theses,116 principles that determined how the 
members of the Comintern, or members seeking admission into the Comintern, should behave. 
According to these conditions, which included the stipulated opinion of the Comintern on the 
colonial question, the following was required of every member of the world party: 
In the Colonial question and that of the oppressed nationalities, there is necessarily an 
especially distinct and clear line of conduct of the parties of countries where the bourgeoisie 
possesses such colonies or oppresses other nationalities. Every party desirous of belonging to 
the Third International should be bound to denounce without any reserve all the methods of 
“its own” imperialists in the colonies, supporting not only in words but practically a 
movement of liberation in the colonies. […]117 
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To manifest a political opinion on the colonial question, the Comintern focused on the Far East 
(the “people of Asia”) and the Muslim population. In an attempt to highlight the question, the 
Comintern organised the “First Congress of the Peoples of the East” in Baku, Azerbaijan, on 1–7 
September 1920, a location recognised as the “heart of the oil industry” in Russia. In total, 2,050 
delegates attended the congress, representing a cross-section of political and anti-colonial activists, 
which fitted the nascent oriental policy of the Comintern. The Baku Congress was not an extension 
of the colonial discussions that had taken place at the second Comintern Congress; on the contrary, 
the ambition of the event was to establish an understanding amongst the delegates “in the fight 
against imperialist domination and capitalist exploitation”. Nonetheless, the far-reaching objective 
was to form an alliance between the Comintern and the colonial liberation movement in Asia and, 
above all, “to win them fully to communism”. Grigori Zinoviev (1883 – 1936), the Chairman of 
the Comintern, and the Polish communist Karl Radek (real name: Karol Sobelson; 1885 – 1937), 
promised at the congress that the Comintern intended to support the liberation movements in 
Turkey, Persia and the Transcaucasian Republics. In retrospect, the Baku Congress was one of the 
first forums where anti-colonial activists met, discussed ideas and exchanged opinions on the 
future of the “peoples of the East” after the Great War. Amongst the delegates, the congress had a 
mobilising effect, while for the Comintern, the event provided impetus to develop its colonial 
work. However, this was not a congress of different political, social or cultural groups. In fact, it 
was an event characterised as being a “heterogeneous gathering of communists, anarchists and 
radical nationalists”.118 The Far Eastern liberation movement had assumed extraordinary 
proportions in connection with the Chinese nationalist struggle, and with the practices of Japanese 
imperialism. For the Comintern, this movement represented a vital source in order to establish 
support for its colonial policy, especially after the revolutionary tide in Europe had petered out in 
the beginning of the 1920s. The Comintern approached the anti-imperialist “bourgeois-nationalist” 
Kuomintang (KMT), and its leader Sun Yat-sen, while at the same time supervising the foundation 
of the Communist Party of China (CPCh). Hence, the strategy of the Comintern was to merge the 
Bolshevik theory of imperialism with Lenin’s concept of the united front in China. For Lenin, the 
Far Eastern revolutions were not destined to follow the logic of socialist progression, since the 
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liberation movements were in their essence nationalist, thus, requiring the communists to enter 
into temporary alliances with the bourgeois liberation movements.119 
      The advances of the Bolshevik regime and the Comintern to extend communist influence in 
colonial and semi-colonial countries attracted the attention of the national security services, 
especially those of Britain and France. In Germany, however, the KPD had to confront a 
humiliating defeat after its unsuccessful quest for power in March 1921 had been thwarted by the 
paramilitary group, the Freikorps.120 Hence, the colonial question turned into a far more 
problematic question than expected for the Comintern, a conclusion introduced at the Fourth 
International Comintern Congress in 1922 (5 November – 5 December). According to the speech 
delivered by Tan Malaka, the leader of the Communist Party of the Dutch East Indies [forerunner 
to the Communist Party of Indonesia; PKI], revolutionary socialism should be moulded upon the 
existing cultural conditions in the Far East in comparison to the tentative, political steps taken thus 
far. Aside from Malaka’s observation, the only measure taken at the congress to strengthen the 
colonial discourse of the Comintern, was to endorse theses on the Eastern and the Negro 
question.121 Much to the displeasure of the international communist movement, the Bolshevik 
regime and the sections of the Comintern had, by the beginning of the 1920s, realised that they 
were defending an ideology that met with resistance around the world. In the aftermath of the 
KPD's ill-conceived plot in 1921, which the Comintern had eagerly supported, the KPD 
nonetheless made a second attempt to seize power in Germany in October 1923 (also known as the 
“German October”). Due to a lack of communications between the KPD and the Comintern, this 
attempt was (again) a failure, which forced the party briefly into illegality, leaving the German 
communist movement debarred and humiliated. Because of the “German October”, the Comintern 
advocated a change in its political and organisational work in order to become a political actor of 
importance in international politics. The decision-makers in Moscow launched the principle of 
Bolshevization to either mould or correct the sections, a policy introduced at the Fifth International 
Comintern congress in 1924 (17 June – 2 July). According to the Comintern, Bolshevization 
implicitly recommended that every communist party adopt the historical experiences of the 
Russian Communist Party.122 Expecting the policy to contribute to a structural fortification within 
the parties, in the context of the national and colonial questions addressed at the congress, 
Manuilsky urged (later included in the “Resolution of the Fifth Comintern Congress on the Report 
of the ECCI”) the necessity of adopting the united front as a strategy to develop its colonial work:  
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[…] the Comintern has to win the revolutionary movements of liberation, amongst the 
colonial peoples and all Eastern peoples, as allies of the revolutionary proletariat of the 
capitalist countries.123  
Yet, Manuilsky only uncovered the Comintern's internal and external difficulties in building 
bridges to colonial and semi-colonial countries and the Comintern had, therefore, no other option 
than to turn its attention towards the “colonial metropolises” in Europe in order to solve the 
colonial question. 
 
* 
 
The International Colonial Bureau of the Comintern in Paris, 1924 
In 1924, the ECCI authorised Manabendra Nath Roy, the recognised expert on the colonial 
question in the Comintern, to lead the International Colonial Bureau (ICBu) in Paris. The initial 
idea behind the ICBu was to establish contacts with French and British anti-colonial movements in 
France and Great Britain, and to get the PCF and CPGB to carry out colonial work. Roy worked 
together with the PCF leader Jacques Doriot, and with the ECCI representative of the PCF August 
Guralski in Paris, to realise the objectives of the Eastern Department. However, the ICBu turned 
into an agency affected by external episodes and internal pressure, all of which contributed to its 
sudden demise in January 1925. 
      Roy arrived in Paris on July 1924, and began by observing the nature of the colonial work 
within the communist movement, only to conclude that the Comintern’s colonial question, as well 
as the activities of the anti-colonial movement, existed parallel to each other on both an 
organisational and political level. For the ICBu, therefore, the primary aim was to break this 
established structure, and to make Paris the connective centre for anti-colonial activists, an 
objective Clemens Dutt, the British communist, assisted Roy in achieving. Did the ICBu realise 
any of the above? The ICBu confirmed contact with, for example, the leader of the Rif Liberation 
Army and tribal chieftain Abd el-Krim al Khattabi,124 and organised a small conference against 
                                               
123 “Resolution of the Fifth Comintern Congress on the Report of the ECCI”, in Jane Degras, The Communist  
International 1919-1943 Documents. Volume II 1923-1928, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1960, p.106. Taken from 
Inprecorr, iv, 91, p.1154, 17/7-1924. This congress adopted resolutions on the national and colonial question, and on 
the Negro question, Kahan 1990, p.21. The congress was convened after Lenin’s demise in January 1924. 
124 Abd el-Krim al Khattabi (Abdelkrim) did not initially intend to seek a conflict with the French Mandate powers in  
the initial stage of a campaign that put forward the demand to liberate the Rif region in Morocco from the Spanish 
protectorate. In May 1925, however, a military clash between French military and tribesmen from the Rif region 
occurred, which resulted in a conflict that lasted for one year, dominated by the strength of French (armaments and 
personnel). The disorder ended on 25 May 1926, with Abdelkrim’s arrest and subsequent deportation to the island La 
Reunion. Abdelkrim spent twenty years in exile, but en route to France, he managed to escape in Port Said, and settled 
down in Egypt. In Cairo, he co-ordinated the liaison service for the North African nationalist movement. Abdelkrim 
died in 1963, see Marvine Howe, Morocco. The Islamists Awakening and Other Challenges, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2005, p.66. 
60 
 
colonialism in Paris. In 1924, the French anti-colonial movement was starting to take hold, and the 
activities of the ICBu contributed to increase anti-colonial propaganda. However, after the 
dissolution of the ICBu, the anti-colonial work of the PCF culminated, in 1925-26, in a large 
campaign against colonial war, which was supported by the Union Intercoloniale, an association 
that was a sub-section of the PCF, formed under the pretext of supporting rebellion in the French 
colonies and providing native propagandists with political education in France.125 There were two 
reasons why the ICBu never gained momentum. Firstly, Roy was embroiled in a personal conflict 
with Rajani Palme Dutt, Clemens Dutt’s brother and self-professed expert on the Indian question 
in the CPGB. Secondly, the constant lack of money contributed to bringing the ICBu to its knees 
and, once the French security service Sûreté decided to act, this bureau ceased to function. On 30 
January, 1925, French police arrested Roy who, on the direct orders of the authorities, was 
deported with immediate effect from France, and he left by crossing the Luxembourgian border. 
His arrest marked the swift end of the ICBu, but it also left the colonial work of the PCF and 
CPGB without any direction, and “dislocated” the contacts of the European communist movement 
within the Indian communist movement.126 
      The ICBu’s setback affected the Comintern's vision of developing colonial work in one of the 
leading “colonial metropolises” in Europe at the beginning of 1925. Concurrently, the anti-colonial 
movement in Berlin was progressively assuming its role as the executor of the Comintern’s hopes 
and expectations of having “a centre” for its colonial work in Western Europe. For Münzenberg 
and the IAH, the colonial question was not a defined topic but, at the beginning of 1925, the 
question represented a chance for organisational growth and political transformation. This 
depended totally on finding a motive for the IAH to initiate some level of colonial work. 
According to Mustafa Haikal’s analysis, the IAH founded the LAI,127 but what led to its 
establishment and why did the IAH get involved in colonial work?  
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
125 Derrick 2008, p.151; Edwards 2003, p.16. 
126 Mustafa Haikal, “Das Internationale Kolonialbüro der Komintern in Paris“, in Jahrbuch für Historische  
Kommunismusforschung, Bernhard Bayerlein (ed.), Mannheim, 1993, pp.126-130. The Ministry of Interior in France 
arranged for the immediate deportation of Roy from France to Luxembourg. For Roy and Dutt’s “diplomatic” 
relations, see Callaghan 1993, pp.86-94. Roy visited Berlin before travelling back to Moscow, see Overstreet and 
Windmiller 1959, p.74. 
127 Haikal 1995, p.141. 
61 
 
Internationale Arbeiterhilfe, Philanthropy and the Colonial Question  
In 1926, the IAH celebrated its first five years of existence. Commemorating its role as a 
progressive socio-political actor, and organiser of relief support and solidarity campaigns, the IAH 
published Münzenberg’s book, Fünf Jahre Internationale Arbeiterhilfe. According to Münzenberg, 
this book was an overview setting out the original aim and growth of IAH’s organisational 
structure from 1921 to 1926, an organisation no longer comparable to its original shape due to the 
changes in the political landscape since 1921. Münzenberg stated that the IAH had succeeded in 
transforming itself into an “international proletarian relief organisation”, existing not only for the 
purpose of functioning as a social almsgiver, but rather as a social actor acting “through the 
proletariat for the proletariat”. Münzenberg emphasised that the IAH’s work was being carried out 
by the IAH sections in Europe (England, France, Belgium, Elass-Lothringen, Holland, Sweden, 
Norway, Germany, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Russia), as well as in Africa, North 
and South America, Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Japan and Mexico.128 
      The growth of the IAH also explained the transformation of the organisational structure of the 
organisation, as Münzenberg stated, a process which included a shift in focus for its socio-political 
work by including questions of philanthropy, e.g. the oppression of colonial and semi-colonial 
countries. The question is what purpose did the IAH’s philanthropy serve? Was it in the interest of 
the donors rather than those of the recipients? For Münzenberg, the IAH’s “strong, international 
connections and relations” were a convincing fact illustrating the IAH’s capacity to organise strong 
campaigns of agitation and propaganda which, in 1925, had made it possible for the organisation 
to support “the struggle for the liberation of the colonial peoples”. An operation, co-ordinated by 
the “special colonial section” at IAH headquarters in Berlin, and subordinated to the direct 
supervision of the Central Committee IAH in Berlin, Münzenberg claimed that the colonial work 
had confirmed contacts with “hundreds of social revolutionary colonial groups and 
organisations”.129 However, from an internal perspective the situation looked somewhat different, 
and the so-called “special colonial section” was merely a reference to an institution which only 
involved of a handful of individuals. 
 
* 
 
Enquiries into the Philanthropic Approach and the ZK KPD Circular  
The IAH’s “proletarian solidarity” relief operations were the guiding principle behind its colonial 
work. For example, the gathering of material support for Japan after the earthquake there in 1923 
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and, in 1924, after the catastrophic flood in China.130 The advance towards philanthropy as a new 
activity for the IAH did not, however, occur unnoticed. In Berlin, Auswärtige Amt (the German 
Foreign Department) questioned the transformed political character of the IAH, making enquiries 
into the reasons for the change. Realising that the IAH had become a political actor across Europe, 
Auswärtige Amt sent out information to the German consulates on the organisation, which also 
included a brief account of the German communist movement. As noted in a “Secret report”, dated 
30 March, 1925:  
Since its foundation [the IAH has] gone through a transformation, there cannot be any doubt, 
that the activity in the philanthropic area only functions as a means to prepare Bolshevist 
ideas and preparation for world revolution.131   
According to Auswärtige Amt, the IAH’s philanthropy indicated a definite change in its political 
direction, as well as a new focus for its activities. If so, German authorities had to expose the 
supporters of the new agenda. In an analysis of the publications (Not und Brot, and 
Mitteilungsblatt für die Funktionäre des Bundes der Freunde der IAH), released by the IAH, 
Auswärtige Amt linked together a number of associations, Bund der Freunde der IAH, 
Künstlerhilfe der IAH and the Anti-Fascist League, to the IAH.132 
      This “Secret report” included an elusive query. Allegedly, in December of 1924, Münzenberg 
had transferred through the IAH the sum of five million francs to the PCF in France. Auswärtige 
Amt suspected this transaction to be the first of many too come, particularly as there was a 
reference to the fact that the money would finance a colonial sub-section of the PCF in Paris: the 
“French Committee for Colonial Propaganda” [Colonial Commission of the PCF]. For the 
Auswärtige Amt, therefore, the IAH’s philanthropy was a strategy and cover for distributing money 
to France in order to finance Bolshevik propaganda using the colonial question as its pretext. 
Despite the empirical shortcomings of the “Secret Report”, e.g. Auswärtige Amt had omitted any 
reference to the original source; it is the report’s conclusion that deserves attention, which implied 
that the IAH had reserved the right to lead the colonial work in Europe.133 Yet, at this stage, it is 
rather bold to suggest that this was the beginning of the IAH’s anti-colonial project. Instead, this 
report indicates that the IAH was but one link in a long chain of money distribution from Moscow 
to Paris. Additionally, other documents verifying Münzenberg’s transaction of five million francs 
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have not surfaced. If the network of the IAH was functioning as one of many financial links of the 
Comintern within Europe, this activity had to remain secret, with no trail being left in the 
documents. In conclusion, as noted in a report from IAH headquarters in Berlin on 5 January to the 
KPD “Org-Büro” (Organisational Bureau) in Berlin, which summarised the activities of the 
organisation in 1924 and its scheduled plans for 1925, any reference to colonial work or contacts 
with the Colonial Commission PCF was to be omitted.134 
      Yet, in January 1925, the ZK KPD announced the IAH’s colonial work in a “Rundschreiben” 
(circular letter) to the German communist movement. According to the ZK KPD, the IAH should 
begin by establishing a proletarian solidarity campaign in support of the liberation struggle of the 
“oppressed peoples” in China, Japan and in other colonial countries. The political discourse of this 
campaign would focus on raising awareness in Europe of the “economic backwardness” of the 
oppressed colonial peoples and nations caused by “capitalist oppression”, while the IAH also 
intended to enlighten “the colonial masses” with education on the question of “class”. The ZK 
KPD wanted the IAH to construct “bridges of solidarity”: firstly, between the labour movement in 
Europe and the USA and, secondly, to link these “bridges” with “the oppressed peoples” in the 
colonies. This would establish “a natural alliance of class struggling workers’” around the world. 
The ZK KPD expected the IAH to become an organisation which could unify the labour 
movement in Europe and the USA in order to protest against the “Imperialist system”. If 
successful, the second step for the IAH would, therefore, be to build a “bridge of solidarity” with 
“the oppressed peoples” in the colonies, a “natural alliance of class struggling workers’” across the 
world.135 
 
* 
 
Null and Void  
The colonial question had an impact on the IAH. Yet, in 1925, a serious question overshadowed 
the transformed character of the IAH. Apparently, due to internal squabbles and controversial 
decisions, the IAH was on the brink of collapse.136 The proposition that internal dissent 
represented one of the reasons why the colonial question had surfaced as a new field of activity for 
the IAH is, however, a vague one. Above all, the question, at this stage, was a tentative topic, in 
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which the IAH had no strategy, or focused objective. The German context was also different from 
the French one. In the spring of 1925, the PCF took the colonial anti-war campaign out onto the 
streets. On 16 May, the PCF organised a public meeting at Luna Park in Paris, attended by 
representatives of the KIM (Kommunisticheskii Internatsional Molodezhi; the Communist Youth 
International), the communist trade union Confédération Générale du Travail-Unitaire (CGTU) 
and the Association Républicaine des Anciens Combattants (ARAC).137 In Moscow, Nikolai 
Bukharin pondered the colonial question. At the Fifth Enlarged ECCI Plenum (21 March – 6 April, 
1925), Bukharin concluded that the colonial question was “nothing but the question of the 
relations between town and country on a world scale”.138 Hence, none of the above explains the 
starting point for the IAH’s colonial work (aside from the aforementioned vague reference in the 
January “Rundschreiben” from the ZK KPD). On 22 April, Karl Müller (? – ?), Münzenberg’s 
liaison at IAH headquarters in Moscow, defined the dilemma facing the IAH with respect to 
developing any colonial activity in a letter to the Ukrainian communist and Secretary of the ECCI 
Isaak Romanovich Kornblum:  
If you can recall, you requested a proposal from us concerning the planned IAH campaigns 
that would be forwarded in writing to the ECCI Secretariat. That is no longer possible, 
because at this time no campaign is planned to take place in China, and after the catastrophic 
flood last year [in China], no additional tasks have been given to our Chinese delegates […] 
I do not even know whether it is necessary to provide the Comintern with any specific 
proposals. If you are of a different opinion, then we will look at what kind of proposal you 
might have. We have, in this case, acted in full accordance with the 1 December, 1924 
guidelines from the Comintern, concerning the activity of the IAH.139       
Nevertheless, the IAH nourished the ambition to use China as a focal point for its anti-colonial 
project. Chinese campaigns by the IAH and the Comintern (the IAH campaign in China after the 
catastrophic flood and the Hands off China campaign, a joint effort by the ECCI and the Profintern 
                                               
137 Derrick 2008, p.153. 
138 Nikolai Bukharin, “Extracts from the Theses of the Fifth ECCI Plenum on the Peasant Question”, in Degras vol.II  
1960, p.201. Taken from Inprekorr, v, 77 [80], 1026 [1078], 11/5-1925. The plenum agreed on the necessity to 
reorganize the Eastern Department in order to get the colonial work operational. Thus, the overarching aim was to get 
the Eastern Department to establish an “own organization”, supported by “propaganda sub-departments”, under the 
leadership of 24 “comrades from eight Eastern countries”. The primary aim of this re-organization was to confirm 
“contact with non-communist revolutionary organizations and help them to work out their programme and tactics”, see 
Degras vol.II 1960, p.247. 
139 RGASPI 538/2/27, 39-39b, Letter from Karl Müller, IAH Headquarters, Moscow, to Kornblum, ECCI Secretariat,  
Moscow, 22/4-1925. The Fifth Enlarged ECCI Plenum in Moscow (21/3 – 6/4-1925) discussed the colonial question 
and, according to the resolution introduced by the ECCI Colonial Commission, focused on India, Java, Egypt and 
other “dependent countries”, see Degras vol.II 1960, p.187. For a biography on Kornblum (1880 – 1948; known 
pseudonym: “Wladimir Tulsky”), see Jeifets, Jeifets, & Huber 2004, p.167. 
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in the summer of 1924), having quickly lost their momentum,140 Müller questioned what kind of 
focus the IAH should have within the Chinese context. 
 
* 
 
Hands off China and Against the Cruelties in Syria 
Sun Yat-sen, the KMT’s undisputed leader, died in Beijing on 12 March, 1925.141 Prior to his 
demise, Sun Yat-sen had travelled to Shanghai in January, in order to strengthen the nationalist 
struggle in China. However, a majority of the KMT’s activities were conducted in the Cantonese 
region, where members of the Communist Party of China (CPCh) were co-operating with the “left-
wing” KMT to such an extent that foreigners visiting China, as well as members of the “right-
wing” KMT, believed that the communists had hijacked the movement. Both Chinese and foreign 
communists were prominent figures in Canton, the most prominent being Chou En-Lai, the 
Russian emissary Michael Borodin and the Russian “General Galen” (V. K. Blykher/Blücher).142 
      Whilst this was all part of the political struggle in China, the episode which set the IAH’s 
activities in motion in 1925 took place in Shanghai on May 30, 1925. The British Concession 
police in Shanghai, a part of the British Mandate military forces, killed thirteen individuals at a 
demonstration, an incident which created a wave of international reaction. This action led to large-
scale strikes and student unrest in China itself, a movement focusing on the social unrest, poor 
economic conditions and the slave-like working conditions in the Chinese textile industry. When 
the Chinese labour movement demanded the organisation of trade unions, an argument introduced 
by the communists, the Chinese workers went on strike. After this bloody episode in Shanghai and 
the ensuing turbulence throughout China had ended, Inprecorr published a written statement from 
the CPCh, accusing the British of having carried out an “act of imperialist policy” and, later, 
Inprecorr started to run the news feature “Hands off China” on a regular basis.143 For the IAH, the 
                                               
140 Degras vol.II 1960, p.169. Taken from Inprekorr, iv, 117, 1538, 9/9-1924. The establishment of the “first” Hands  
off China campaign occurred after an armed uprising in Canton in 1924, between the “Merchants’ Volunteers” (an 
association armed and financed by local merchants’ and the British Mandate authorities) and the KMT. By October, 
the KMT had disarmed the association, and British military forces avoided confrontation.  
141 Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions. China from the 1800s to the 1980s, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990,  
p.191. Sun Yat-sen suffered from cancer to the liver. After his death, he quickly earned a national and international 
reputation. 
142 Edward L. Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949, Longman, London, 1995, pp.124-125; Pantsov (2000). 
143 The Shanghai episode and its ensuing strike doubled the total number of members in Chinese trade unions over a  
couple of weeks which, after a while, the communists controlled. According to Jack Gray, the work of Borodin 
reached its climax in connection with the Shanghai episode, see Degras vol.II, 1960, p.218; Gray 1990, p.217, 219; 
Münzenberg (1926). In February, 1926, Manuilsky stated in the Communist International that the “events in 
Shanghai” had ushered in a “new era in human history”, see Günther Nollau, International Communism and World 
Revolution. History & Methods, London, Hollis & Carter, 1961, p.102. Manuilsky’s understanding of what was 
happening in China was a product of the notations made by one of his assistants in Moscow in January 1926. See fol. 
RGASPI 523/1/58, 1-13, Material on China, compiled by unknown author, Moscow, to Manuilsky, Moscow, January, 
1926. 
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violence in Shanghai corresponded with its aim of establishing a proletarian solidarity campaign in 
support of the Chinese national liberation struggle. According to Münzenberg, the China campaign 
was the IAH’s “fourth largest international action”.144  Thus the political message of the Hands off 
China campaign in its protest against colonialism began to overshadow the IAH’s relief activities 
and would become its guiding principle. 
 
* 
 
The Birth of a Campaign: Anti-Colonialism in Germany 
In June 1925, Münzenberg instructed the IAH apparatus in Berlin to distribute information on the 
Hands off China within the German labour movement. Optimistic about the outcome of its 
campaign, Münzenberg informed Kornblum that much depended on getting the German 
communist movement to express its support for the campaign before developing the issue further. 
On 12 June, the Comintern contributed by releasing a joint manifesto from the ECCI, Profintern 
and the KIM protesting “against imperialist atrocities in China”. Nonetheless, for Münzenberg, the 
first step in consolidating the campaign was to get prominent intellectuals to sign petitions, and to 
initiate negotiations with representatives of the Amsterdam International in order to get their 
support for the campaign. However, the fundamental dilemma that needed to be solved was the 
financial question. According to Münzenberg, the protest rallies provided a perfect arena for the 
IAH to galvanise support, e.g. money collections and to sell “Chinahilfmarken” (Chinese 
obligations) in Europe, the latter symbolising a “proletarian bond”, using the surplus of the sales to 
sponsor the Chinese workers on strike. The ECCI had to approve this obligation idea; however, 
Münzenberg argued that it would be foolish to delay something that had already been set in 
motion, especially as the IAH intended to celebrate the birth of the campaign at a “China Evening” 
in Berlin on 22 June.145 In a report from “D. O” [?], a functionary at the ZK KPD secretariat in 
Berlin, the evening was convened in a “good atmosphere” and was a “unified political rally” 
which had every chance of “making progress”.146 
      The “China Evening” was a test for the IAH in order to evaluate whether the anti-colonial 
rhetoric had had any impact. This rhetoric is illustrated in the transcript for a speech which was 
given at an IAH demonstration in Berlin in July, which declared that the “Chinese brothers” faced 
                                               
144 Münzenberg 1926, p.104. 
145 RGASPI 538/2/27, 75, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum, Moscow, 3/6-1925. The enclosed documents  
were not filed in connection with the report. Münzenberg promised Kornblum to send a detailed report on the “China 
evening”, see fol. RGASPI 538/2/27, 78, Letter from Münzenberg to Kornblum, 18/6-1925. See further in 
Münzenberg 1926, pp.104-120 for the China campaign, and for the 12 June manifesto, see “Manifesto of the ECCI, 
RILU, and YCI against Imperialist Atrocities in China”, Inprecorr, v, 93, 1260, 12/6-1925, taken from Degras vol.II 
1960, pp.218-220. 
146 SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 20-22, Letter from D. O, Berlin to Heinz Neumann, Moscow, 23/6-1925. 
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the “canons of unified English – American – French – Japanese Imperialism”, a struggle in which 
European workers had to support the anticipated hopes of “their Chinese labour brothers” in order 
to achieve revolution.147 Münzenberg informed Kuusinen that the general objective of this 
campaign was to follow the dictates of the united front strategy. Firstly, the campaign had to 
establish itself as a progressive feature in Germany before introducing the campaign, via the 
organisation of large demonstrations, in “every country”. Secondly, Münzenberg requested that 
Kuusinen instruct the European communist parties to support the campaign and the IAH, and 
asked whether the CPSU (B) would consider the idea of organising money collections in the 
Soviet Union. If the CPSU (B) supported the Chinese campaign, Münzenberg promised to include 
this in the propaganda, with a focus on how the Soviet proletariat had declared its solidarity with 
the struggles of the Chinese worker.148 
      The IAH was not entirely on its own in drawing attention to the Chinese question. On 18 June, 
the ECCI and the Profintern sent a telegram to the LSI Executive in Zürich, requesting a chance to 
collaborate against the “politics of the imperialist powers” and to support the struggle of the 
Chinese workers’. The LSI Bureau replied and thanked them for their proposal, however, the LSI 
criticised the Comintern for only acting “at the last moment, when a political crisis has reached its 
climax”. In comparison to the Comintern’s modus operandi, the LSI favoured “a timely and 
conscientious preparation for common action” rooted in firm organisational groundwork, rather 
than a “method of improvisation”. Confirming that they were poles apart on the political 
barometer, the LSI questioned why the Comintern had proposed the creation of a “common 
platform”.149 Nevertheless, the LSI had already established an antagonistic position towards the 
Comintern, the international communist movement and the IAH. On 6 May, 1924, Friedrich Adler, 
the secretary of the LSI, despatched a circular letter to every association and party affiliated with 
the LSI, instructing everyone to avoid the IAH for the simple reason that it was “a communist 
                                               
147 SAPMO-BA ZPA 1507/67115, 83-86, Manuscript of speech, 15/7-1925. 
148 RGASPI 538/2/27, 77, Telegram from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow [undated, 1925]. Münzenberg  
organized (at least) three other campaigns and relief committees in 1925. “In defence of Soviet Russia”, a solidarity 
campaign in support of the Hungarian communist Mátyás Rákosi, who had been imprisoned and faced trial in 
Budapest in the fall of 1925 and, finally, a protest campaign against Mussolini and the Italian Fascist regime, which 
had prohibited the activities of the IAH. The modus operandi of the IAH campaigns was a process Münzenberg 
gradually refined, in which the focus on getting prominent individuals (intellectuals) involved became a focal point. 
On October 7, 1925, Münzenberg informed the ECCI Secretariat that several intellectuals had promised to support the 
work of the Central Committee of the IAH in the Rákosi campaign, see fol. RGASPI 538/2/27, 138-141, Letter from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 7/10-1925. In the 1930s, the CPSU (B) was described as the All-
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (bol’shevikov), VKP (b), see J. Arch 
Getty & Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror. Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 2010, p.xiii. 
149 IISG LSI Collection 3033/10, Telegramm der Kommunistischen Internationale und der Roten Gewerkschafts- 
Internationale, [signed] Kuusinen & Nin, Moscow, to the LSI, 18/6-1925; IISG LSI Collection 3033/19-20, (Draft) To  
the Executive of the Communist International, Zürich, 4/7-1925. 
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institution which, under the cloak of the so-called ‘United Front’, works politically for the 
Communists”.150 
      The ZK KPD kept the trickle of information flowing from Berlin to Comintern headquarters in 
Moscow. Ernst Schneller (1890 – 1944), German communist and functionary at the ZK KPD 
secretariat in Berlin, notified Heinz Neumann in Moscow in a letter dated 18 June, that the Hands 
off China campaign had had an impact on the political scene both in Berlin and throughout 
Germany, and had encouraged Chinese activists in the city to willingly participate.151 Leo Flieg 
(1893 – 1939), the “grey eminence” at the KPD Polbüro in Berlin, in charge of the KPD’s covert 
business and liaison services, and Münzenberg’s friend, informed Neumann on 26 June that the 
Hands off China campaign had exceeded the KPD's expectations, concluding that the campaign 
had every chance of becoming a political “success” (ein Schlager werden wird).152 
      The Hands off China campaign relied from the outset foremost on the nature of individual 
relations. Introduced to the public and taken out onto the Berlin streets in the summer of 1925, the 
communication links running between Berlin and Moscow (the IAH, KPD, the KPD representative 
in Moscow and the ECCI), are possible to trace, re-construct and evaluate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
150 IISG LSI Collection 3050/3, To the Parties affiliated to the L. S. I., Friedrich Adler, Zürich, 6/4-1924. The  
European labour movement continued to question the very nature of the IAH in 1925. According to Gross, the Belgian 
Workers’ Party published several documents that mentioned the communist links of the IAH, a public stunt that 
resulted in a joint resolution from the British Labour Party and the British Trade Union Council, demanding the IAH 
to focus on relief campaigns rather than instigating political propaganda, see Gross 1967, p.159. 
151 Schneller was a party theoretician in the KPD, acting both as editor of the journal Internationale and as the leader  
of the study circle, “Marxistisch-Leninistischen Zirkel”, in Berlin. On 11 October, 1944, the SS executed Schneller in 
the KZ Sachsenhausen along with 26 other prisoners; SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 18, Letter from Schneller, Berlin, to 
H. Neumann in Moscow, 18/6-1925. “Ernst Schneller“, in Weber & Herbst (Hrsg.) 2004, pp.687-688. Arthur Koestler 
wrote in The God that Failed that Schneller resembled “a thin, bony man […] with a pinched, taut-skinned face and an 
awkward smile”, who only read the “official Party organ, Rote Fahne”, see Arthur Koestler, in Crossman (ed.), 1954, 
p.25. 
152 SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 23-25, Letter from Flieg, Berlin, to Neumann, Moscow, 26/6-1925. Flieg’s comment  
(in German) was “Ich hoffe, dass ein Schlager werden wird.” 
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Table 2.1: The Network behind the Hands off China Campaign, June-August 1925 
 
 
 
Münzenberg’s ties confirm that he was in contact with both the Comintern's high-ranking 
secretaries Kuusinen and Kornblum, and with the Chairman of the Comintern, Zinoviev. Flieg and 
Schneller had Neumann as their liaison in Moscow (KPD representative at the ECCI). More 
importantly, the anti-colonial project and the China campaign depended on the nature of these 
individual relations rather than on maintaining a system which relied on receiving directives per se 
from the ECCI Secretariat, the Eastern Department or from the ZK KPD. For Münzenberg, Kurt 
Müller was the key actor in developing the anti-colonial project. 
 
* 
 
A Mission to Beijing and Ambitions of a “Great Demonstration” in Berlin 
In May (“not later than 12 May”), Müller left Moscow on an IAH mission to Beijing, travelling 
with the Swiss communist Siegfried Bamatter and “a Russian Comrade”. Müller sent a report to 
the ECCI Secretariat members (Kornblum, Piatnitsky and the Russian Grigorii Naumovich 
Voitinsky), outlining the IAH’s area of operation and the Hands off China campaign in China.153 
Francesco Misiano (1884 – 1936), the Italian communist, in charge of the IAH film production 
company Mezhrabpom-Film at IAH headquarters in Moscow, visited Münzenberg in Berlin to 
work out the details of the Hands off China campaign in July. In a report from Münzenberg and 
Misiano to the ECCI, the IAH had begun to evaluate the results of the Hands off China campaign, 
                                               
153 RGASPI 538/2/27, 45-50, Kommerz-Abteilung [bericht] IAH, to, ECCI Secretariat [?], Moscow [?], undated, year:  
1925; RGASPI 538/2/27, 91-94, Letter from Karl Müller, Beijing, to Kornblum, Piatnitsky, Voitinsky, Moscow, 14/7-
1925. For biography on Siegfried Bamatter (1892 – 1966), see Jeifets, Jeifets & Huber 2004, pp.42-43, and, for 
Grigorii Naumovich Voitinsky, see Pantsov 2000, p.295. 
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e.g. “well-known” characters in China [unknown] had sent “greetings of sympathy” to the Central 
Committee of the IAH. However, as the leadership in both the CPGB and the Workers’ Party of 
America (WPA) showed no intention of supporting the IAH in its work, the ECCI was forced to 
exert pressure on these parties, Münzenberg argued.154 It seems, however, that Münzenberg was 
either unaware of, or had overlooked the steps taken by the WPA. Manuel Gomez, the leader of the 
All American Anti-Imperialist League (AAAIL, established in Chicago in 1925, the colonial 
section of the WPA), had published a communiqué on 2 July appealing to “all trade unions, the 
Socialist Party and every organisation in sympathy with the cause of the Chinese people” to 
support the Hands off China campaign. The signatories of this communiqué disclosed the overt 
communist connotations of the appeal: the Executive Secretary of the WPA, C. E. Ruthenberg, the 
Chairman of the WPA, William Z. Foster and the secretary of the Trade Union Educational 
League, Jack W. Johnstone.155 
      It was a difficult undertaking to break the communist parties’ ignorance vis-à-vis the IAH. 
Münzenberg told Kuusinen that it did not matter whether the IAH had the ambition to “create the 
widest relief campaign” so long as the communist parties took no notice of the organisation. 
According to Münzenberg, this point of view had been expressed in the reports from the IAH 
sections in Germany, France, Czechoslovakia and England, fearing the imminent collapse of the 
campaign. However, this represented a division of authority in Münzenberg’s opinion, telling 
Kuusinen that the IAH had to remain in control of the campaign if the parties chose to provide 
administrative and moral support.156 For the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, it was a 
question of guaranteeing that the campaign would continue and, if so, Münzenberg promised 
Kuusinen and Piatnitsky to bring the campaign to a conclusive end, the impressive finale being a 
“great demonstration” in Berlin.157 
                                               
154 RGASPI 538/2/27, 95-96, Letter from Münzenberg & Misiano, Berlin/Moscow, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow,  
17/7-1925. Münzenberg and Misiano informed the ECCI Secretariat of the work done to secure support from the 
Amsterdam International. According to Münzenberg, two “Amsterdamers” had contacted him merely to inform him 
that the Amsterdam International was reluctant to co-operate with the IAH on this question. For biography on 
Francesco Misiano, see Lazitch 1986, pp.319-320. 
155 RGASPI 515/1/575, 4-5, Circular letter from Manuel Gomez, AAAIL, Chicago, 2/7-1925. Gomez informed that  
the AAAIL, WPA and the Trade Union Educational League expected to use everything possible to attract the trade 
unions, the Socialist Party and any workers and peasants’ organization to support the campaign. For Manuel 
Gomez/Charles Shipman, see his autobiography, Charles Shipman, It Had to Be Revolution. Memoirs of an American 
Radical, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993. Harvey Klehr writes in the “Foreword” that the memoir “provides a 
fascinating picture of one journey of commitment and disillusion” (p.xi). 
156 RGASPI 538/2/27, 95-96, Letter from Münzenberg and Misiano, Berlin/Moscow, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow,  
17/7-1925; RGASPI 538/2/27, 97-98, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 19/7-1925. 
157 RGASPI 538/2/27, 103, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 21/7-1925; RGASPI 538/2/27,  
104, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 23/7-1925. Münzenberg promised to send a detailed 
report of the Hands off China campaign to Kuusinen. Further, Piatnitsky received an edited budget for the costs to 
print a “China Bulletin”, a publication which aimed to illustrate the progression of the campaign in China. However, it 
was another question, the internal controversy in the KPD, with its focus on the “ultra leftist” fraction (Ruth Fischer, 
Maslow and the political line of the KPD “Central” [ZK KPD]) which gained attention in the German communist 
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* 
 
The Finale of the Hands off China Campaign, Berlin, 16 August, 1925  
The Hands off China campaign culminated in the Berlin Congress on 16 August, 1925. After 
having organised public demonstrations throughout the summer, the IAH organised this congress 
at the “Herrenhaus”, leaving Münzenberg assured of the fact that the IAH apparatus had organised 
the entire event, with the “Herrenhaus” Congress bringing together representatives of the European 
trade union movement and intellectuals in support of the Chinese liberation struggle.158 However, 
it was a congress prepared at the last minute. The IAH did not begin sending out invitations to 
organisations, committees and associations to attend a congress to discuss the situation in China 
until 1 August. On the invitation, Münzenberg, together with the German socialist Georg 
Ledebour, introduced themselves as the hosts for the congress, with the Central Committee of the 
IAH as its organiser.159 
      Six hundred delegates attended the “Herrenhaus” Congress, according to a report from the 
Chief of Police in Berlin, who had taken extra notice of the presence of twelve “young Chinese”. 
Münzenberg presented different figures in a letter to Zinoviev, stating that the congress had been 
attended by almost 1,000 individuals, a third of which had been prominent intellectuals, e.g. 
theosophist Graf von Reventlow, and Münzenberg’s friend the painter Käthe Kollwitz. The 
“Herrenhaus” had been modestly decorated with flags and banners declaring “Hände weg von 
China, according to Münzenberg.160 The Berlin Chief of Police observed how Ledebour had 
guided the congress with accuracy and that the delivered speeches were “fiery” and sincere, 
primarily because the speakers had avoided criticising the German government. A number of well-
known communists had attended the event, e.g. the KPD member Wilhelm Pieck as the IRH 
delegate, whilst the ZK KPD member Fritz Heckert attended as a Profintern delegate. The 
performance of Tschang Pah Chung, a Chinese student and the KMT representative in Berlin, had 
been a euphoric demonstration, urging the crowd to understand the need to unify the workers and 
peasants in China. Ernst Meyer, a lawyer and journalist from Berlin, discussed the “relevance of 
the current struggle in China” and criticised the “ignorant bystander […] bourgeoisie press” in 
                                                                                                                                                          
movement. In a letter to Zinoviev on July 21, Münzenberg declared that he had publicly denounced the Fischer-
Maslow leadership at several party district conferences; see SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 65-66, Letter from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev in Moscow, 21/7-1925. The ECCI published a critical statement to Fischer and 
Maslow in Inprecorr on September 4 1925, aimed at “all organizations and members” of the KPD, see Degras vol.II 
1960, pp.223-227; Ben Fowkes, Communism in Germany Under the Weimar Republic, Macmillan Press London 
(1984); Weitz (1997). For Fischer’s own interpretation, see Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism – A Study in 
the Origins of the State Party (Cambridge, 1948). 
158 Münzenberg 1926, p.120. 
159 RGASPI 495/30/165, 72, Einladung zu dem Kongress ‚Hände weg von China’, Berlin, 1/8-1925. 
160 SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507 67115/123, 98-103, Abschrift aus Bericht des Pol. Präs. Berlin, 27/8-1925; RGASPI  
538/2/27, 110, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI, Moscow, 18/8-1925. The congress was an event 
characterized by its “cheerful atmosphere” according to the Berlin Chief of Police. 
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Germany. According to Meyer, the IAH had succeeded where everyone else had failed, to secure 
material support for and declare solidarity in support of the Chinese struggle.161 Chung and 
Meyer’s speeches functioned as somewhat of a prelude to Münzenberg’s performance at the 
congress. The Berlin Chief of Police wrote that Münzenberg had taken the rostrum, from where he 
delivered a fierce attack against the “bourgeois press”, accusing the Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschland (SPD) of not understanding the colonial question. In connection with the turmoil in 
China, the political ethos and pathos of the IAH had proven to be a correct attitude, in which the 
non-party character of the organisation had been emphasised to the fullest, Münzenberg argued. It 
was not a question of the IAH acting as a “leading army, acting uncritically everywhere” but rather 
of the IAH being “a proletarian institution supporting the suffering innocent and proletarian 
strugglers”. This statement in itself implied a transformation of the IAH. Münzenberg explained 
that the IAH had the ambition to become a political force to be reckoned with in the “imperialist 
nations”, and in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The international “success” of the Hands 
off China campaign was the evidence justifying the IAH’s position, Münzenberg stated. For 
example, the IAH had collected one million Gold Marks since June, four fifths of which had been 
collected in the Soviet Union, whilst over one thousand public meetings had been organised in 
Germany, Austria, France, Holland, Norway, Czechoslovakia, England and the USA. In order to 
bring the finale of the campaign to fruition, Münzenberg wanted to send an “objective” delegation 
to carry out a field study of the social situation in Beijing, consisting of well-known individuals 
from Germany, England and France.162 However, any indication of such a delegation ever leaving 
Europe and travelling to Beijing, remains unknown. Instead, the idea was (most likely) a publicity 
stunt used by Münzenberg to stir up the crowd. Ending the congress, Ledebour gave the final 
speech, declaring that the IAH’s proletarian solidarity was a “logical consequence” of the war that 
“socialism was carrying out against colonial policy”. The crowd joined in at the ceremonial end, 
urging for the realisation of world revolution before singing “The International”.163 Once the 
congress was over, Münzenberg realised that the Chinese campaign had brought to light other 
aspects apart from relief support; that the colonial issue was one containing a broad spectrum of 
ideological facets and organisational possibilities. 
 
* 
                                               
161 SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507 67115/123, 98-103, Abschrift aus Bericht des Pol. Präs. Berlin, 27/8-1925. The Berlin  
police monitored the congress to see whether any participants expressed hostile comments against the German 
government. For example, Meyer expressed concern over the fact that German business enterprises in Berlin and 
Hamburg facilitated the transport of arms on Japanese ships to China. 
162 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507 67115/123, 98-103, Abschrift aus Bericht des Pol. Präs. Berlin, 27/8-1925; RGASPI  
538/2/27, 110, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI, Moscow, 18/8-1925. Münzenberg mentioned the figure of  
one thousand to Zinoviev. 
163 SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507 67115/123, 98-103, Abschrift aus Bericht des Pol. Präs. Berlin, 27/8-1925. 
73 
 
 
“An International Anti-Colonial Congress” 
The success of the Hands off China campaign, and its climax at the “Herrenhaus” Congress, 
convinced Münzenberg that the IAH was capable of organising anti-colonial propaganda. Excited 
with the results, Münzenberg wrote to Zinoviev on 18 August, informing him of his intentions to 
expand the IAH’s colonial work’s remit. Apparently, a particular episode had aroused Münzenberg 
during the “Herrenhaus” Congress. A couple of professors from China and representatives of 
Chinese trade unions (no names mentioned) had approached Münzenberg after the congress, 
suggesting that he encourage the Central Committee of the IAH to organise “a real, all-
encompassing congress against imperialist colonial politics, in [either] Brussels or Copenhagen”. 
These representatives seemed to have been unaware that Münzenberg was the man in charge of the 
IAH; however, the idea confirmed Münzenberg's original vision, telling Zinoviev that “the idea 
makes me happy”. For Münzenberg, the “Herrenhaus” Congress was the moment which confirmed 
the IAH’s position in relation to the colonial community in Berlin and, more importantly, the 
potential of using this community as an intermediary in establishing contacts with anti-colonial 
and nationalist organisations in Beijing, Morocco, Egypt, India and other colonial countries. In 
fact, several of the delegates at the “Herrenhaus” had promised Münzenberg to send delegations 
from the colonies to this international anti-colonial congress. Thus, Münzenberg assured Zinoviev 
that the IAH had the capacity to fulfil the colonial work of the Comintern and to support the 
current line, which suggested the coming of “increased colonial wars”. Thorough preparation 
would be required to ensure that the international congress would produce a “strong political 
effect”. The political impact of the “Herrenhaus” Congress had, according to Münzenberg, proven 
the possibility of polarising the Comintern's position on the colonial question vis-a-vis the LSI, 
especially as the latter was also convening for its international congress in Marseille in August.164  
      Münzenberg’s first concern was not to construct a network with anti-colonial activists; his 
focus was on the international anti-colonial congress. Suggesting convening the event sometime in 
October or November, Münzenberg intended to use the IAH’s few existing colonial contacts, to 
spread the word about the congress, and for it to convene in either Brussels or Copenhagen, cities 
that offered the greatest opportunity to create a demonstration against “the colonial politics of the 
imperialists”. For Münzenberg, the initial challenge at this stage was to foster an understanding 
                                               
164 RGASPI 538/2/27, 108-109, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 18/8-1925. Münzenberg  
eagerly anticipated fulfilling the “request” of the ECCI Secretariat to organize propaganda against the International 
LSI congress, see SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 67, Short note from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Wuletzki, Moscow, 17/8-
1925. On 20 August, the ECCI declared in Inprecorr that “the unprecedented accentuation of the colonial and semi-
colonial liberation struggles” was a reflection of the international “political situation”; see “[Extracts] A Letter from 
the ECCI to All Organizations and Members of the German Communist Party”, Inprecorr, v, 128, 4/9-1925, p.1863, 
taken from Degras vol.II 1960, p.227. 
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amongst the disparate political camps in Germany of the IAH’s philanthropy and proletarian 
solidarity. Hence, this depended on stimulating his contacts with the German pacifist movement in 
order to gain access to the political, social and cultural layers inaccessible to the German 
communist movement. Nevertheless, Münzenberg knew that the connections between the IAH and 
the German pacifist organisation, the League for Human Rights’ (LHR), and his personal contact 
with its secretary Otto Lehmann-Russbüldt, made it possible for the IAH to introduce the LHR as 
the co-arranger for this international anti-colonial congress. Münzenberg told Zinoviev that if he 
managed to convince Lehmann-Russbüldt to support the idea, this would, in turn, provide the IAH 
with access to the LHR network of “100 prominent artists and politicians” to be used in the 
propaganda against colonialism.165 
      Whilst the LHR connection seemed promising for Münzenberg, negotiations with the 
Amsterdam International to support the campaign were not successful. The Central Committee of 
the Amsterdam International rejected the IAH’s proposal at a meeting on 18 August, according to 
Münzenberg’s “man of trust” (Vertrauensmann) in the Amsterdam International.166 Who was this 
“man of trust”? Münzenberg never disclosed the identity of this person. However, a plausible 
candidate was the trade unionist and socialist Edo Fimmen from the Netherlands, a respected 
character within the Amsterdam International. One of Münzenberg's friends, their relationship 
stretching back to the foundation of the “Auslandskomitees zur Organisierung der Arbeiterhilfe für 
die Hungernden in Ruβland” in Berlin on 13 August, 1921. As the official representative of, and 
holding the position as Secretary of the Amsterdam International, Fimmen used to travel to Berlin 
where he would also meet Münzenberg to discuss the progression of the Soviet Russian relief 
campaign. Moreover, in the summer of 1925, Fimmen regularly visited Berlin to hold lengthy 
discussions with Münzenberg on the “Russian question”. For Münzenberg, Fimmen’s contacts 
with the European trade union movement were a particularly valuable source, Gross later stated in 
her biography.167 Thus, it is likely that Fimmen was the “man of trust” Münzenberg used as his 
intermediary in conducting the negotiations with the Amsterdam International.  
      Despite this setback, Münzenberg perceived the Hands off China campaign as being a source 
of inspiration in developing the idea of organising an international anti-colonial congress. On the 
                                               
165 RGASPI 538/2/27, 108-109, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 18/8-1925. 
166 RGASPI 538/2/27, 110, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI, Moscow, 18/8-1925. Münzenberg promised to  
send information to the ECCI if the “Amsterdamers” changed their attitude on the China campaign. 
167 The trickle of correspondence between Fimmen and Münzenberg is significant in the Comintern Archive. For  
example, Fimmen told Münzenberg that he had avoided mentioning the ties of the IAH to the Comintern during his 
meetings with trade union representatives; see fol. RGASPI 538/2/24, 23-24. See Willy Buschak’s biography on 
Fimmen, Edo Fimmen. Der schöne Traum von Europa und die Globalisierung, Klartext Verlag, Essen (2002); Gross 
1967, p.129, 168-170. For Fimmen’s role and position in the European labour movement during the inter-war years 
and the response of the Amsterdam International on Profintern’s attempt to gain a foothold in the trade unions, see 
Patrick Pasture, “The Inter-war Origins of International Labour’s European Commitment (1919-1934), in 
Contemporary European History, Vol.10, Nr.2 (2001), Cambridge University Press, pp. 221-237. 
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other hand, however, Münzenberg and the IAH had to adapt themselves to existing structural 
relationships, a pre-condition strong enough to either endorse or ignore their ambition to begin the 
preparatory work. According to the table below, the IAH and its anti-colonial project was a narrow 
structure, having at its disposal only a few, limited contacts outside the communist movement. 
 
Table 2.2: The Colonial Question and Outline of Actors, 1925 
 
Source: RGASPI 538/2/27, 108-109, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 18/8-
1925 
 
Is this table representative of how the IAH conceived the anti-colonial project? So far, the anti-
colonial project of the IAH had only focused on China as the sole topic, but reactions outside this 
context indicated a shift in direction for the IAH's colonial work during the latter half of 1925. 
Münzenberg had also begun to get a clearer picture of the existing anti-colonial movements in 
Europe, actors who would be able to put forward, defend and support the IAH’s propaganda 
against “oppressive imperialist systems”. The “Herrenhaus” Congress experience had proven to 
the IAH that the colonial question was a very constructive field to pursue, which in turn prompted 
the IAH to seek closer ties and contact with the anti-colonial movement, a proposition outlined by 
Münzenberg to Zinoviev,  
The question is so important and relevant that I will do what it takes to make it possible for 
me to visit you [Zinoviev] within the next few days, and speak with you in person about this 
plan.168 
 
* 
 
Ripening of the Hands off China Campaign, September-December 1925 
Münzenberg's ambition to organise the international anti-colonial congress in October or 
November 1925 was not realised. In fact, the Hands off China campaign seems to have run out of 
steam after both the “Herrenhaus” Congress and a couple of public demonstrations in Stuttgart-
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Cannstadt and Darmstadt in Germany.169 According to Münzenberg, the major reason for this was 
that the propaganda material was out of date. In a letter to Bela Kun, a Hungarian communist and 
member of the ECCI in charge of the ECCI Agitprop Department in Moscow, Münzenberg urged 
him to revise the material and get someone to send it to IAH headquarters in Berlin.170 
      This went against Münzenberg’s expectations of keeping the campaign alive in either Germany 
or in the European IAH sections. In an attempt to do this, Münzenberg instructed the British IAH 
section to investigate whether it would be possible to get the anti-colonial movements “within the 
British empire” interested in supporting the Hands off China campaign.  Münzenberg proposed 
that the most logical step would be to stimulate the establishment of a “Pro-China-Aktion” (Pro 
China Campaign), in which the section should focus its propaganda on the colonial liberation 
struggle, instead of introducing itself as an organiser of material relief. Additionally, Münzenberg 
argued that London was the epitome of a colonial metropolis and, therefore, the most logical place 
to introduce anti-colonial campaigns, which hopefully would attract anti-colonial activists and 
nationalist organisations known to use the city as a connective centre. In a letter to the ECCI 
Secretariat, Münzenberg explained that one only had to note the large participation of colonial 
delegates who had attended the “Imperial Labour Conference” in London, an event organised by 
the International Labour Organisation (the ILO, established on the initiative of the League of 
Nations). However, much of the above depended on the need to construct an independent network, 
free of any overt connections to the Comintern or to communists known for their involvement in 
the colonial question, Roy in particular. Consequently then, Münzenberg hoped that the IAH could 
prepare and carry out the congress on its own, an ambition that relied on establishing independent 
contacts in South Africa and India, where Münzenberg mentioned Joshi, the secretary of the Indian 
Society, as being a particular valuable candidate to approach. Yet, if the Hands off China campaign 
had reached its climax, Münzenberg urged the ECCI Secretariat to endorse a new campaign, “India 
for China”, expecting the Comintern to work out “the political aspects” of the campaign.171 
      This was the essence of Münzenberg’s relationship to Comintern headquarters in Moscow, i.e. 
a division of responsibilities between “organisational” and “political” questions. For Münzenberg, 
caught up in the euphoria and potential strength of the colonial question, he believed that the 
                                               
169 SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/67115, 89-103, Reichskommissar für Überwachung der Öffentlichen Ordnung, 27/8- 
1925. 
170 RGASPI 538/2/27, 119, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Bela Kun, Moscow, 10/9-1925. Münzenberg enclosed  
posters and admission tickets for a “China event” (no date given) in Berlin, suggesting that Kun use this material as a  
source of inspiration. 
171 RGASPI 538/2/27, 123, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 12/9-1925. The  
International Labour Organisation (ILO) established in 1919 in connection with the discussions of the Versailles 
Peace Treaty negotiations. The ILO aimed to preserve the tradition, developed by the nineteenth-century labour and 
social movements, which demanded social justice and higher living standards for the working class, see C. Howard-
Ellis, The Origin, Structure & Working of the League of Nations, The Lawbook Exchange, Clark, 2003. 
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Comintern would not object to assisting in the work to provide new political material (resolutions, 
theses and propaganda material) for the China campaign. Additionally, Münzenberg also believed 
that he had the right to act independently in administering the daily routines at IAH headquarters 
in Berlin, particularly the activities of the committees, associations or campaigns established by 
the IAH. Nonetheless, Münzenberg, Misiano and the German communist Friedrich “Fritz” Platten, 
assured the ECCI Secretariat that the IAH did not intend to deviate from the sanctioned policy of 
the CPSU (B) or, for that matter, the adopted decisions of the Fifth International Comintern 
congress in 1924, as well as those from the Fifth Enlarged ECCI Plenum (21 March-April 1925). 
Moreover, the IAH begged the ECCI Secretariat to remember that the IAH was not at all involved 
in the on-going fractional dispute within the KPD.172 
 
* 
 
Closing of the Books 
The Fourteenth Party Congress of the CPSU (B) convened in Moscow on 18-31 December 1925. 
After Lenin’s death in 1924, a power vacuum had emerged within the Bolshevik elite; the congress 
therefore expected to project the appearance of a unified party, guided by discipline. However, the 
congress progressed in another direction, only mirroring the internal confusion of the party. During 
the discussion of the Comintern, the CPSU (B) urged the world party to cease its demand for the 
imminent realisation of world revolution which the leaders of the sections constantly repeated in 
their propaganda. According to the CPSU (B), the Comintern’s focus should instead be on 
assisting to solve the current crisis within the party and explaining to the communist movement the 
difficulties of building socialism in a backward country.173  
      At the Comintern, the discussion of China was carried out on a different level. For the 
Comintern, the Hands off China campaign had created a positive, political effect in both Germany 
and beyond, especially as the world party considered the coming of revolution in China as a 
critical “link in the chain of world revolution”. For the IAH, the campaign had been a success. 
                                               
172 RGASPI 538/2/27, 111-111a, Letter from Münzenberg, Misiano and Platten, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow,  
7/9-1925. For a summary of the Fifth International Comintern Congress, and the Fifth Enlarged ECCI Plenum, see 
Kahan 1990, p.21, 25. Münzenberg, Misiano and Platten suggested that Clara Zetkin act as mediator for the contacts 
with the ECCI. The fractional disputes concerned a controversy between the CPSU (B) and the KPD on the question 
of “Bolshevization”, which had its origin in the Fischer-Maslow fraction. The conflict affected the activity at 
Comintern headquarters and Münzenberg wondered, therefore, whether the ECCI Secretariat was able to sort out the 
“delay”, whilst in Germany, Münzenberg had become involved to solve the dispute between the ZK KPD and the 
Fischer-Maslow fraction. 
173 Degras vol.II 1960, pp.243-244. Manuilsky was the author of these objectives, which the ECCI sent to the national  
sections in August of 1925. In January 1926, the ECCI Agitprop Department published a complement to the above, 
stating that: “By ‘perspectives of world revolution’ we do not mean a precise or approximate prediction of the date 
when the revolution will break out in one country or another, or even in the world”, see Degras vol.II 1960, p.239. 
Taken from Inprekorr, vi, 10, 125, 14/1-1926. 
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According to the ECCI, by the end of 1925 the IAH stood on the threshold of becoming a genuine 
mass organisation, especially as the organisation had grown in size and scope due to its 
recruitment of intellectuals, artists and scientists supporting both the Bolsheviks and communism. 
Finally, the IAH’s “real task” of “winning” groups “over to Soviet Russia and the CI [Comintern]” 
was no longer a far-fetched vision and, furthermore, the IAH was the instrument through which the 
Comintern would establish “millions of large sympathising organisations”.174 Münzenberg could 
only agree, despite declaring that the IAH headquarters in Berlin was in a chaotic state. 
Nonetheless, Münzenberg promised in return to the ECCI Secretariat, that he, along with the 
German communist and secretary of the IAH Paul Scholze, and the IAH functionary from the 
Netherlands John William Kruyt,175 would do everything possible to fulfil the Comintern’s 
objectives: 
The IAH has become an indispensable part of the communist mass movement. Within the 
framework of the communist movement, the IAH has the task of acting as a cover 
organisation for the Communist International, […] to gather masses of non-party and 
independent workers’ and left-wing intellectuals and through our work draw them closer to 
the Communist International and its ideology.176 
This spurred the IAH on to continue developing its organisational activity. However, by displaying 
ideological obedience to the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters in Moscow, this statement 
proves how much the IAH was dependent upon the arbitrariness of the ECCI in continuing to 
support the organisation.177 The IAH had, in fact, become comfortable with the thought of 
involving itself more deeply in the colonial question at the end of 1925, proposing to the ECCI 
Secretariat that the organisation wanted to act as a socio-political actor in the “backward 
countries” in order to pave the way for either the establishment of communist parties, or of a 
communist movement. The Chinese question did, however, require a change in its modus 
                                               
174 Degras vol.II 1960, p.240. Taken from Inprekorr, vi, 10, 125, 14/1-1926; RGASPI 538/2/27, 114-118, Report on  
IAH [undated]; Münzenberg 1926, pp.23-25. 
175 For biography on Kruyt, see Internet: < http://www.iisg.nl/bwsa/bios/kruyt.html >. 
176 RGASPI 538/2/27, 222-227, Report from IAH, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 10/12-1925. The IAH  
considered its anti-colonial work as a precursor to establishing a communist movement in regions and countries which 
either had no communist party or a weak communist movement. At the end of 1925, therefore, the moment in time had 
arrived to formulate a strategy on how to develop its anti-colonial work. This proposition depended on getting the 
ECCI to endorse the idea and, above all, get the headquarters of the IAH operational. According to this report, IAH 
headquarters had only a minimal staff at the office, devoted to dealing with international contacts, correspondence as 
well as developing and leading the propaganda work. Its staff consisted of Münzenberg, the Dutch communist John 
William Kruyt, the German Paul Scholze, two steno typists and a house cleaner. The IAH requested that the ECCI 
Secretariat ask Clara Zetkin, who had visited IAH headquarters in December, whether they needed someone to verify 
the desolation in Berlin. 
177 Münzenberg sent a similar report to the ZK KPD on 30 December, adding that he wondered why the ZK KPD had 
avoided contact for several weeks. The IAH, IRH and the Roten Frontkämpferbund should act as a collective “block to 
support the unemployed in Germany against the SPD, argued Münzenberg and, if successful, this would attract large  
masses to join the communist movement, see SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 70-71, Report from Münzenberg in Berlin 
to Zentrale der KPD, 30/12-1925. 
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operandi, the IAH stated, insisting on a more specific agenda which would focus more on 
exposing the social situation of the Chinese workers. If endorsed by the Comintern, and if 
successful, the IAH wanted to establish a united front against oppression in China, which would 
have to include representatives from the trade unions in China as well as left-wing socialists and 
academics in Europe.178 
      In December 1925, Münzenberg finally informed Kornblum, Kuusinen and Piatnitsky that the 
Hands off China campaign had yielded good results. The campaign had confirmed contacts 
between the IAH and Kou Meng-yu, who had been appointed as the secretary of the Chinese IAH 
section in Shanghai and was Headmaster at Beijing University, and also with other scholars at 
Beijing University [no names mentioned], as well as with intellectuals in Europe and the USA. 
According to Münzenberg, the IAH’s colonial work in 1925 had “awoken interest” in social, 
cultural and political circles; however, the campaign was not yet strong enough to solidify the 
colonial question within the IAH. To strengthen this field of activity, Münzenberg advocated a 
shift in direction, referring to the societal turmoil in Syria (see further below), which had similar 
characteristics to the Chinese nationalist struggle. In December, the IAH organised a public 
demonstration in Berlin, on the direct orders of the ZK KPD, with the slogan “China in 
Revolution, the Cruelties in Syria, and the International Working Class” (China in Revolution, die 
Greuel in Syrien und die internationale Arbeiterklasse). Thus, Münzenberg required the ECCI to 
authorise the IAH to pursue the Syria question, and merge it with the political pathos of the 
Chinese campaign. This new campaign intended to follow the established patterns of the Hands off 
China campaign, i.e. sending petitions to governmental authorities, collecting signatures and 
money and organising both public demonstrations and international congresses. However, 
Münzenberg introduced a new strategy in comparison to the China campaign, suggesting building 
the Syria campaign around a committee, rather than only focusing on public demonstrations of 
solidarity.179 This strategy would serve a two-fold purpose for the IAH. Firstly, establishing the 
IAH in the Middle East and North Africa, and secondly, gaining access to the Arab and North 
African anti-colonial movement in Berlin. 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
                                               
178 RGASPI 538/2/27, 222-227, Report from IAH, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 10/12-1925. 
179 RGASPI 538/2/27, 212-214, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum, Kuusinen and Piatnitsky, Moscow, 
8/12-1925; SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 69, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 8/12-1925; 
RGASPI 538/2/27, 222-227, Report from the IAH/Münzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 10/12-1925. 
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Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, 8 December, 1925 
The foundation of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee was a rapid process. According to 
its first public communiqué, published in Münzenberg’s Welt am Abend on 16 December, the 
committee declared that the “bloody colonial wars” determined the nature of the “current 
international political scene”. The committee declared that this was a system of political 
expression, created and supported by the League of Nations in order to allow the Mandate powers 
to maintain their repressive grip on their colonial dominions. With reference to the 1919 Versailles 
Peace Treaty, the results of these negotiations had stimulated the growth of colonial disorder in the 
Arab region. Hence, a focal point of protest for the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee was 
against the rule of “the great imperialist powers” Great Britain and France in Egypt, Persia, 
Morocco, Palestine and Mesopotamia. After the end of the Great War, the Arab region was an 
unstable region, characterised by violent outbursts. The situation in Syria came to head in 1925 
with a nationalist uprising, which focused on the identity of the Syrian state rather than being a 
question of Arab nationalism. According to David K. Fieldhouse, this rebellion was “one of the 
major turning points in modern Syrian history”, one which the French military suppressed in 
1927.180 
      In comparison to the Hands off China campaign, the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee 
did not focus solely on raising material or financial relief; on the contrary, the campaign was 
overtly political in its support for the Syrian nationalist struggle. Münzenberg used his connection 
to the LHR to turn the committee into a forum for intellectuals in Germany to air their political 
discontent, particularly by signing petitions. For example, author Ernst Toller, Ledebour, the artist 
John Heartfield, the Manager of the left-wing theatre Weltbühne in Berlin Erwin Piscator and the 
well-known communist figurehead Clara Zetkin, lent their names to the committee. Additionally, 
the committee also organised a number of public demonstrations and “one large meeting” in 
                                               
180 In June 1925, the Druze population attacked the French military. The unstable situation forced the work to complete  
the first Syrian constitution to take a brief pause, whilst the French military curbed the rebellion with harsh discipline 
and control. Armed opponents, e.g. the nationalist clique the “Damascus radicals”, which had connections to the 
Shahbandar’s People’s Party and the Druze populace, defeated the French army in the initial stage  Whilst the 
rebellion had spread itself across Syria by the end of 1925, described as a “genuine nationalist rebellion”, the French 
army finally suppressed the uprising, causing extensive loss of human lives and the destruction of property, something 
the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee highlighted in its propaganda. According to the committee, several 
hundred Syrian individuals found themselves in prison, whilst the military siege of Damascus had lasted for 50 hours, 
ending with over 6,000 casualties in Syria. Another actor, the PCF, used the Syrian uprising as an opportunity to 
strengthen its network in North Africa. In connection with the Rif Revolt, the PCF established a section in Tunis which 
distributed propaganda in support of the Syrian uprising, see further in David Kenneth Fieldhouse, Western 
Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp.286-288; SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 
22/V S.U.F./95, 18a-18b, ”Gegen die Greuel in Syrien“, 1925. On the PCF branch in Tunis, see Young 2001, p.147, 
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Berlin, with active assistance from the IAH, managing to get colonial activists to deliver 
speeches.181 
      The Syria Committee was formed as the result of a joint discussion between Münzenberg, the 
ZK KPD and Manuilsky. For Münzenberg, this committee provided the IAH with an opportunity 
to enhance its colonial work, an argument which had been introduced by Manuilsky in December. 
While Manuilsky was reflecting on the general aims of the IAH, the ZK KPD instructed 
Münzenberg to organise a demonstration against the “cruelties in Syria” in Berlin in December 
1925. Despite the positive response to the China campaign, Münzenberg did not intend to set up a 
new campaign. The Syria campaign should have a committee as a representative source. This also 
corresponded with the ECCI Secretariat's demand that the IAH establish either sympathising 
committees or organisations. According to Münzenberg, the committee should be “totally separate 
in its organisation and have no connection with the IAH”, and secondly, if the committee became a 
success in Germany, the IAH intended to form similar committees in England, Switzerland and 
France. “To lead” the committee, Münzenberg nominated the “non-communist” Fritz Danziger, a 
member of the Socialist Bund in Germany, an actor who would attract the German pacifist 
movement's support for the committee. For the IAH, the Syria Committee could serve the purpose 
of paving the way for its activities in Syria, e.g. to send material relief to Syria.182 Münzenberg’s 
proposal implied a separation between the organisational capacities of the IAH and the political 
                                               
181 SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 22/V S.U.F./95, 18a-18b, “Gegen die Greuel in Syrien“, December 1925; Mario Kessler,  
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182 SAPMO-BA, ZPA I 6/3/148, 68, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI, Moscow, 8/12-1925; SAPMO-BA  
ZPA RY 22/V S.U.F./95, 18a-18b, „Gegen die Greuel in Syrien“, December 1925. The office of the Against the 
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1948, p.394; Lazitch 1986, p.296; Nollau 1961, p.160. 
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ethos of the Syria Committee. Additionally, the committee was the product of negotiations, with 
Münzenberg being the prime negotiator: Münzenberg – ZK KPD; Münzenberg – Manuilsky; 
Münzenberg – Lehmann-Russbüldt/LHR; Münzenberg – ECCI in Moscow.  
 
Table 2.3: Actors in the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, December 1925 
 
 
However, this committee was a product of the mind and, in the end, the Against the Cruelties in 
Syria Committee was not the answer to promoting the colonial question within the IAH. This was, 
in a sense, a symptom of the political and social obstacles the communist movement faced in 
establishing itself in the Middle East. According to Franz Borkenau, the Comintern's attempts to 
exercise any influence in the region was more or less futile, but why? Firstly, the communist 
parties in Syria, Palestine and Egypt were unable to establish themselves as active organisations. 
Secondly, this failure defined itself by social explanations, e.g. the communist movement could not 
compete with the religious and racial structures in the Arab countries. Thus, the Middle East and 
the Arab region seemed immune towards the attempts of the international communist movement to 
penetrate its sociological structures.183 
      The IAH’s inability to carry out any operations of material relief in Syria was a temporary 
setback. According to a report from the British Colonial Office, dated December 1926, the IAH 
assured the ECCI that it would continue its work laying the groundwork for the communist 
movement in colonial and semi-colonial countries at the beginning of 1926. Nevertheless, British 
authorities suspected that the primary purpose of both the Chinese and Syrian campaigns had been 
to unite the European left-wing movement around a common cause. Despite the claim that the 
Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee had introduced itself as a global voice, it was an entirely 
German affair striving to build on the benevolence of politically-conscious individuals, 
associations and organisations in Europe. For example, the French author Henri Barbusse, one of 
Münzenberg’s friends, had attempted to establish a branch of the committee in Paris, an effort 
which went largely unnoticed and attracted only a minimal amount of attention in France.184 
                                               
183 Borkenau 1938, p.295; Nuri El-Amin (1996). 
184 TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, REPORT on the Activities of the “League against Oppression in the Colonies, December  
1926. 
ZK KPD 
Berlin 
Manuilsky 
Moscow/Berlin 
Münzenberg 
Berlin 
ECCI 
Moscow 
Lehmann-
Russbüldt/LHR 
Berlin 
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      At the end of 1925, the IAH wanted to find a new direction for its colonial work, especially to 
make the transition from being a sponsor of campaigns/committees/associations to sponsoring a 
more organised entity. While the political message of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee 
had, again, verified the political ethos of its anti-colonial rhetoric, making it possible for the IAH 
to establish connections with social and political groups previously inaccessible to the German 
communist movement, the challenge ahead was to expand its anti-colonial project. To do so, the 
IAH had to secure an organisational platform which existed independently of the IAH. However, 
to carry out this gargantuan task, the IAH had to devote additional energy to facilitating a 
structural milieu for this organisational platform in Berlin, a project that had to find acceptance 
among the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters in Moscow. 
 
* 
 
Selling the Anti-Colonial Project  
The Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee never gained enough momentum to unify anti-
colonial movements into an organisational and political body. Münzenberg had, however, no 
intention of letting this opportunity disappear. Especially as the Chinese, Syrian and Moroccan 
campaigns (part of the Syrian campaign)185 had been successful ventures undertaken by the IAH in 
1925. Meanwhile, these campaigns had attracted the attention of the national state security 
agencies in both Germany (the Auswärtige Amt) and Great Britain (the British Colonial Office; 
CO, in London, in charge of administering, monitoring and supervising order in the British 
colonies). In 1926, the CO concluded that political movements, with a special focus on the 
colonial question, had taken advantage of the “profound dissatisfaction” that evidently existed 
amongst European intellectuals and the trade unions. Movements which, more importantly, 
capitalised on the resentment against the excessive use of military force in territories the British 
Empire perceived as being mandates.186 The IAH was also aiming to fulfil the objective introduced 
at the Fifth Enlarged ECCI Plenum, which urged the international communist movement to 
“establish contact with non-communist revolutionary organisations and to help them work out 
their programme and tactics”. However, this involved negotiations with the decision-makers at 
Comintern headquarters. For the IAH, in the beginning of January, Münzenberg had to sell the 
anti-colonial project to the Eastern Department in Moscow. Münzenberg formulated a vision 
which aimed to transform the IAH's colonial work: i.e. rather than establishing committees and 
                                               
185 The conflict between the Moroccan Rif Berber population and the Spanish and French militaries erupted in 1921  
and ended in 1927, see David H. Slavin, “The French Left and the Rif War, 1924-25: Racism and the Limits of 
Internationalism”, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp.5-32; Thomas (2008). 
186 TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, REPORT on the Activities of the “League against Oppression in the Colonies, December 
1926. 
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campaigns, to carry out the colonial work in an organised form. This vision was a moderate 
construction. However, Münzenberg’s ambition was to get the Eastern Department to consent to 
providing financial and political support. 
      Münzenberg feared that the Syria Committee would experience a similar loss of momentum as 
the one experienced by the China campaign. Contacting Müller at IAH headquarters in Moscow on 
26 January, Münzenberg explained the basic tasks for the IAH’s colonial work, matters that needed 
urgent solutions. Firstly, to re-organise the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee with the sole 
purpose of creating a separation from the IAH which, in turn, would stimulate the formation of an 
independent organisation against colonialism. Münzenberg referred to the new committee as the 
Action Committee against the Colonial Politics of the Imperialists or the Action Committee 
(“Aktionskomitee gegen die imperialistische Kolonialpolitik”), a committee which had to make a 
sharp distinction between organisational and political matters. What were the reasons for this? For 
Münzenberg, the IAH’s main objective was to keep the committee “steady in our hands”. This was 
a conclusion based on Münzenberg’s experience of the Syria Committee, which had introduced the 
socialist/pacifist Fritz Danziger as leader and had, therefore, managed to display the eager 
participation of left-wing intellectuals, socialist doctors and representatives of colonial groups in 
Berlin. The Action Committee was to continue utilising non-communist figures in leading 
positions, something that would secure the establishment of connections with the colonial 
community in Berlin. Münzenberg informed Müller, for example, about the “strong groups” from 
the Rif region, Muslim associations, the Berlin Kuomintang office, Syria, Indian Muslims, Persian 
student associations as well as active and politically-conscious individuals from India, Afghanistan 
and Korea currently in Berlin. In fact, colonial individuals were already carrying out work for the 
Syria Committee; persons who would later assume leading positions in the Action Committee, but 
only if the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters authorised this anti-colonial project, 
Münzenberg stated.187 
      To commemorate the transformation of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee into the 
Action Committee, Münzenberg wanted to orchestrate a public, yet modest colonial conference in 
Berlin in February. The Syria Committee had sent out invitations to the conference at the 
“Rathauskeller” to specifically-selected guests in January. However, Münzenberg explained to 
Müller that the event should convene in a discrete fashion, thus, the invitation did not mention 
either the “time or the agenda or the list of speakers”. In comparison to the Hands off China 
Congress in August, the preparatory work for the “Rathauskeller” Conference was an undertaking 
guided by conspiracy, with only a limited circle of people being allowed to know the initial idea of 
                                               
187 RGASPI 538/3/47, 9-13, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Müller/IAH office, Moscow, 26/1-1925 [sic, 1926]. 
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transforming the Syria Committee. Nevertheless, this was done through the service of colonial 
“specialists” in Berlin linked to the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee. The IAH had 
received “a number of addresses” for some contacts in the colonies. According to Münzenberg, 
these addresses illustrated the chance “to create a persistent connection” with anti-colonial 
activists and organisations.188  
      Yet, this vision was only a temporary one at this stage. Earlier attempts, particularly the failure 
of the ICBu as well as Roy’s undertakings in 1924, had revealed the internal and external 
difficulties in establishing functional colonial work. One of the few successful auxiliary 
organisations to carry out any colonial work in the European communist parties was the PCF, with 
its attention on the colonial disorder in North Africa in 1925 which, at the beginning of 1926, was 
still a campaign playing a key role. For the IAH, therefore, the task was to establish reliable links 
to colonial individuals, sustain the activities of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee before 
taking the step towards transformation and, above all, to confirm an organisational strength which 
did not depend on the approval of the communist parties. In comparison to the PCF and CPGB, 
both having claimed to have produced modest results, the latter claiming to be the only party that 
had existing contacts with communist parties and associations in the British colonies, the IAH’s 
colonial work was in its infancy. Nevertheless, the CPGB exaggerated its influence in the colonies, 
particularly when the so-called parties and associations in the mid-1920s consisted of loose 
structures and had at their disposal only a small membership in India, Egypt, Syria and 
Palestine.189 
      The list of names of colonial contacts was the evidence Münzenberg had striven to find, and he 
instructed Müller to present the document to the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, 
particularly to those at both the ECCI and at the Eastern Department. This document would 
confirm that the IAH was doing everything to create a vigorous anti-colonial movement in Berlin. 
What did this list contain? Firstly, the document contained the names and addresses of twenty-one 
individuals, associations, trade unions and organisations in colonial and semi-colonial countries. 
Secondly, the list was not a product of Münzenberg’s network but had instead been compiled by 
the colonial members of the Syria Committee and other contacts. Thirdly, some of the names had 
                                               
188 RGASPI 538/3/47, 9-13, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Müller/IAH office, Moscow, 26/1-1925 [1926].  
Münzenberg told Müller of the urgency of convening the colonial conference. According to Münzenberg, a rumour 
suggested that the conference had received “great attention” in the Berlin press, as well as in the English paper, the 
Morning Post, and in the Egyptian press. In 1927, the British Head Office was one of the first to evaluate the founding 
conference of the LACO, see TNA HO 144 10693, Labour Party – Industrial Department – THE LEAGUE AGAINST 
COLONIAL OPPRESSION, year: 1927. For the location of the conference (“Rathauskeller”) in Berlin, see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/4, 2-4, Protokoll der im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen Konferenz der deutschen 
Organisationen und der Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926. 
189 For the Colonial Commission of the CPGB, see Degras vol.II 1960, p.247; Callaghan 1993, p.60, 90; Derrick  
(2008). See further in Thomas (2008) for an analysis of the attitude and response of the British and French security  
services towards the activities of the communists in the countries mentioned above. 
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surfaced in connection with the Hands off China campaign in 1925, e.g. Kou Meng-yu and Joshi. 
Finally, the list was an exposé of national IAH sections, e.g. the Mexican section and the Brazilian 
IAH section in Rio de Janeiro with its secretary Paolo de Lacerda.190 The essential purpose of this 
list was partly to vindicate the IAH's growth on a global scale, partly to show to the decision-
makers in Moscow that Berlin was the most logical place to locate the centre of their anti-colonial 
project. At this stage, however, this was an undertaking that depended exclusively on the networks 
of other actors. Achmed Hassan Mattar, a Moroccan nationalist and a journalist with ties to the Rif 
region, was the link between the nationalist Klub der Zaglulisten (“Zaglulist Club”) in Berlin and 
the Syria Committee, providing addresses to candidates in Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya. 
Travelling frequently between Tangiers and Berlin, Mattar had an extensive network which he 
shared with the Syria Committee, e.g. four hundred addresses of potential anti-colonial contacts in 
Egypt and the Sudan, including the addresses of the representatives of the Egyptian nationalist 
party the Zaghlul Party Omar Tosoon and Yaur Bey, and that of the “nationalist” Ibrahim Hafis at 
the Egyptian Ministry of Finance in Cairo.191  
      This list included the address of the American Negro Labour Congress (ANLC), a forum for 
Afro-American activists but which was, in reality, a communist-initiated Negro-sympathising 
organisation, established in Chicago 1925 on direct instructions from Lovett Fort-Witheman under 
the guise of the WPA, and contrived in Moscow. According to the list, the ANLC had branches in 
the West Indies, Philippines and in West Africa. However, the reference to a so-called “Anti-
Imperialist League” in West Africa is ambiguous. One reason for suggesting the existence of such 
a “league” was the result of intelligence, compiled in a “list of 100 Negro organisations in Africa 
and the West-Indies”, which the ANLC had sent to either the Syria Committee or the IAH in the 
beginning of 1926. This may also explain why the West African anti-colonial activists, the 
journalist Casely Hayford from the Gold Coast and Samuel R. Wood, were on this list. According 
to Imanuel Geiss, the discussions on “colonial reforms” in West Africa increased during 1923-25, 
in connection with the establishment of the “National Congress of British West Africa” (the 
“Congress”). This political movement engaged Hayford and Wood, the former being one of the 
driving forces behind the foundation of the West African Students’ Union (WASU) in London in 
1925. Additionally, the “Congress” organised a congress in Bathurst, Gambia, 24 December, 1925 
                                               
190 RGASPI 538/3/47, 14, List of names [compiled by Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee], Berlin, to Müller,  
Moscow, January 1926. For Kou Meng-Yu and Joshi, see Münzenberg 1926, p.112, 131. 
191 RGASPI 538/3/47, 14, List of names [compiled by Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee], Berlin, to Müller,  
Moscow, January 1926. Manela writes that the Zaghlul Party dominated “Egyptian politics in the inter-war years”, a 
nationalist movement established by Sa’d Zaghlul, a veteran of the Egyptian political scene during the first decades of 
the twentieth century. Today described in Egypt as the “Father of the Nation”, see Manela 2007, p.9. For Gibarti’s 
evaluation of Achmed Hassan Mattar, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/5, 4-5, Report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the Eastern 
Department, Moscow, 23/2-1926; Martin 2005, pp.261-269. 
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– 10 January, 1926, which both Hayford and Wood attended. Therefore, it is logical to assume that 
the attention created by this conference earned the two of them a place on this list, categorised as 
being representatives of the West-African anti-colonial movement. If the Syria Committee ever did 
have any contact with Hayford or Wood, this would most likely have been as either channels to 
other activists or to the West African press.192 In conclusion, this list does not prove the existence 
of nor does it reveal the nature of any of the networks of either the Syria Committee or the IAH. 
On the contrary, these addresses were, in a majority of cases, the names of actors the IAH wanted 
to involve in its anti-colonial project. In addition, it was a document frequently re-edited with the 
inclusion of new names and addresses.193 For Münzenberg, this list was a vital source of 
intelligence Müller had to use in order to convince the Eastern Department to authorise the anti-
colonial project, which depended, ultimately, on Müller’s legwork in Moscow. 
 
* 
 
The Selling Scheme 
Münzenberg instructed Müller to “take a walk down” to Comintern headquarters, where he had to 
convince the decision-makers to authorise the colonial conference in Berlin. What particular tasks 
did Münzenberg give to Müller? Most importantly, Müller had to go to the Eastern Department 
and hand over Münzenberg’s letter to either Kuusinen or Roy before giving a brief report on the 
IAH’s colonial work in Berlin. This report would give the impression, firstly, that the IAH was 
following the directives of Kuusinen and Roy, which had been passed on to Münzenberg during 
his latest visit to Moscow (unknown). Secondly, Müller was to describe the scheduled colonial 
conference at the “Rathauskeller” as a constructive idea in developing the anti-colonial project, 
especially since colonial activists in the Syria Committee had spread the word about the 
conference. If Müller got the feeling that the Eastern Department seemed reluctant to sanction the 
conference, Münzenberg recommended that Müller tell Kuusinen and Roy that the IAH did not 
intend to take any further initiative until the ECCI had given its opinion on the question. However, 
                                               
192 RGASPI 538/3/47, 14, List of names [compiled by Against the Cruelties in Syria committee], Berlin, to Müller,  
Moscow, January 1926. In October, 1925, the ANLC established itself in Chicago. Its impact was, however,  minimal. 
According to George Sachs, a left-wing activist and journalist from South Africa, in his report to the Comintern on 
January of 1926: “The recent Negro Congress in America has seemingly not had any response on the African continent 
as far as South Africa is concerned”, see fol. RGASPI 495/64/49, 3-4, taken from Davidson 2003, p.143-144. Co-
founders of the ANLC were the Afro-Americans Richard B. Moore and Cyril B. Briggs, who wanted the ANLC to 
function as an instrument to unite Afro-American trade unionists and progressive intellectuals into one representative 
body, see Anthony Bogues, Caliban’s Freedom. The Early Political Thought of C. L. R. James, Pluto Press, 1997, 
p.79, 83. For Hayford, Wood, the “Congress”, and the conference in Bathurst, Gambia, see Geiss 1968, pp.173, 220-
226. Additional names on “the list” were Abd el Gader el Amin from the Khartoum province (“translator”, and 
representative of the trade union Sudan Egyptian Union) and Hassar Rusdi; Mustafa Ibrahim Bey in Brazil; Juan 
Pallot of the “Rif Committee”; Yussuf Khan, the “President of the Islamic United Recr. Club in Aden”; E. Bumkelle in 
Mombasa, Kenya; and A. Benebilla, the representative of French Somaliland in the Djibouti region. 
193 RGASPI 542/1/4, 46 [List of names], LACO, International Secretariat, Berlin, [undated] 1926. 
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if the above failed, Müller should contact Manuilsky at Comintern headquarters, introduce himself 
as “Münzenberg’s man”, and be “short in your report”. The reason why Münzenberg was focusing 
on the Eastern Department – the department in charge of colonial work at Comintern headquarters 
in Moscow – was based on the fact that the IAH needed support in the formulation of political 
directives and material, as well as with administrative assistance and finance.194 
      Whether Müller visited the Eastern Department to carry out Münzenberg’s instructions remains 
unknown. Empirical material (reports or correspondence) do not verify any of the above, aside 
from one document, which indicates that Müller seems to have managed to sell the IAH's anti-
colonial project. In an edited version of Münzenberg’s letter to Müller, signed by Müller, 
addressed to the All Union Central Council of Soviet Labour Unions (Allunionistischen Zentralrats 
der Sowjetgewerkschaften; AUCCSLU, or its Russian acronym: WZSPS) in Moscow on 6 
February, Müller requested that the AUCCSLU support the IAH’s colonial work. Whilst this 
represents only one observation, suggesting that the Eastern Department had approved of Müller’s 
presentation and endorsed Münzenberg’s idea, the conclusion is, however, that, without the 
approval of the anti-colonial project at some hierarchical level within the Comintern apparatus, 
Müller could not have sent the letter to the AUCCSLU.195 Is it possible to conclude that this 
confirmed a connection between the IAH’s colonial work and the Eastern Department? As the anti-
colonial project had been a gradual process since the beginning of 1925, who was involved to 
guide the work in Moscow, and what was the nature of these relations in both Berlin and Moscow? 
 
* 
 
Interactionism Inside the Anti-Colonial Project 
The actors in the anti-colonial project, represented by Münzenberg and the IAH, the Syria 
Committee and the Eastern Department, had to set up a functional network. Most importantly, they 
had to link together individuals in Berlin and Moscow with the departments at Comintern 
headquarters. Covering a chronological time-frame from December 1925 to February 1926, their 
efforts to do this indicate a swift interactionist process, guided by determination and commitment 
to strengthen the loose structure of the colonial work carried out by the IAH. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
194 RGASPI 538/3/47, 9-13, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Müller/IAH headquarters, Moscow, 26/1-1925. 
195 RGASPI 538/3/75, 3, Letter from the IAH Committee, Moscow, to WZSPS [AUCCSLU], Moscow, 6/2-1926. 
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Table 2.4: Interactionist Structure of the Anti-Colonial Project, December 1925 – February 
1926 
 
 
Key actors in this network were Münzenberg, Manuilsky and the ZK KPD, a structure which 
expanded over a brief period in order to include other actors, with Kurt Müller assuming a key 
position. Nevertheless, it was Louis Gibarti, the Hungarian communist and IAH functionary, 
nominated by Münzenberg as his right-hand-man on the colonial question, who took over the role 
Müller once had. A decision most likely based on the fact that the Eastern Department had 
assumed the functions previously carried out by Müller, e.g. establishing “direct contacts with 
Eastern peoples” (the nationalist Cantonese government in China and with Chinese students at the 
Kommunisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia Vostoka, [Communist University for Eastern 
Workers; KUTV] in Moscow). Thus, Gibarti was left in charge of the colonial question in Berlin. 
One of his first assignments for the Syria Committee was to complete a list of addresses of 
colonial organisations in London and to send those on the list invitations to its colonial conference 
in Berlin.196 Aside from the Eastern Department, individuals at Comintern headquarters were the 
key to developing the anti-colonial project during the initial stages, e.g. Mauno Heimo, an émigré 
communist from Finland and Kuusinen’s close associate in Moscow. Additionally, Münzenberg 
had heard a rumour implying that the Eastern Department was planning to form an “Eastern 
Commission” (Ostkommission). Therefore, Müller had to see to it that Münzenberg became 
involved in this commission.197 Nonetheless, Münzenberg must have misread the Eastern 
Department's intentions. In fact, the “Eastern Commission” only came into existence after the 
                                               
196 Any trace of such a list in the Comintern Archive remains missing. 
197 RGASPI 538/3/47, 9-13, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Müller/IAH office, Moscow, 26/1-1925. 
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colonial conference at the “Rathauskeller” in Berlin, an event which witnessed the establishment 
of the League against Colonial Oppression (LACO) on 10 February, 1926. 
 
* 
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Chapter 2. Birth  
The “Rathauskeller” Conference was the official inauguration of the anti-colonial project in Berlin. 
Convening at 6.30 pm on 10 February, 1926, the conference also witnessed the foundation of the 
League against Colonial Oppression (Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrückung; LACO). Münzenberg 
imagined that this colonial conference would see the creation of a new anti-colonial “committee”, 
based on the organisational structure of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee. However, 
the “Rathauskeller” Conference took a further step by advocating the formation a “league” instead 
of just another “committee”. Attending the conference were 43 delegates representing a cross-
section of anti-colonial activists, German left-wing organisations in Berlin and foreign delegates. 
Otto Lehmann-Russbüldt addressed the delegates before welcoming Gibarti, acting in the role as 
IAH secretary and representative of the Syria Committee, who declared that the conference 
represented an opportunity to discuss how to unify “organisations of different colonial peoples and 
the organisations on the political left in Germany”. The primary aim of the LACO was, therefore, 
to lay the foundations of an anti-colonial movement in Germany, which would focus on creating a 
forum for grandiose ideas and organising the disparate characters of the existing anti-colonial 
movements into one single movement.198 
      The aim of this chapter is to disclose and interpret the birth of the anti-colonial project that 
Münzenberg and the IAH had begun to conceptualise in 1925. Notwithstanding the success of the 
IAH’s colonial campaigns and committees in Germany, the LACO represented, in both spirit and 
flesh, the practices and mobilisation of its colonial work in 1926. Interpreted in terms of birth, this 
suggests that the IAH consciously separated itself from the anti-colonial project, partly in order to 
pave the way for another sympathising organisation, and partly to realise Münzenberg’s ambition 
of organising an international congress against colonialism and imperialism in Brussels in 1926. 
This latest endeavour had been a process which had tested the relationship between Münzenberg in 
Berlin and Comintern headquarters in Moscow when it came down to finalising the preparatory 
work for the anti-colonial congress. Most importantly, this chapter provides a prelude to the 
foundation of the LAI in February 1927, and contradicts the conclusions outlined by Gross and 
McMeekin which suggest that Münzenberg wanted to use Paris as the venue for the anti-colonial 
                                               
198 RGASPI 542/1/4, 2-4, Protokoll der im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen Konferenz der  
deutschen Organisationen und der Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926; RGASPI 542/1/4, 5-6, Anwesenheitsliste der 
im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen Konferenz der deutschen Organisationen und der 
Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926; TNA HO 144 10693, Labour Party – Industrial Department – THE LEAGUE 
AGAINST COLONIAL OPPRESSION, year: 1927. See Adam Hochschild’s Bury the Chains (2005) for a similar 
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these two meetings is that these events inspired the recipients (the attending delegates), and therefore, represent a 
symbolic value to initiate a movement around a common cause. 
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congress instead of Brussels. A proposition far removed from the actual initial idea. The primary 
aim here is to delineate why Münzenberg had determined to hold the international congress against 
colonialism and imperialism in Brussels, an idea which had sprung into his head as early as August 
1925. Brussels represented the locale and epitome of colonialism as a system of oppressive 
imperialism, with Belgium's colonial policy in the so-called Congo Free State being a mixture of 
the “realities of colonisation and the ideology of imperialism”.199 
 
The “Anwesenheitsliste” (List of Attendance) tells us who attended the “Rathauskeller” 
Conference and, furthermore, from the conference's protocol it is possible to determine the 
delegates' reactions to, for example, Gibarti and Münzenberg’s speeches. German citizens 
dominated the conference, individuals who belonged to either associations, organisations or 
parties. For example, the LHR (Lehmann-Russbüldt, Albert Cruter), KPD (Ferdinand Timps), IAH 
(Münzenberg, Fritz Weiss, and Düwell), the Socialist Bund (Ledebour), the Independent Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) and the IRH, but there were also unaffiliated individuals, 
e.g. Albert Einstein’s personal secretary, Siegfried Jakoby. Foreign delegates also attended the 
event: Teddy Johnsen of the Swedish IAH section; IAH functionaries John W. Kruyt from the 
Netherlands (who was actually living in Berlin at that moment) and Federico Bach from 
Switzerland; the Russian students Perevovnikov and Shapiro [first names unknown]; and Hans 
Baer, the TASS representative. The colonial influx at the conference was a cross-section of the 
anti-colonial movement in Berlin. For example, Virendranath Chattophadyaya (Chatto), was 
misleadingly listed as the delegate of the Communist Party of India; A. C. N. Nambiar, the 
representative of “India” – an  Indian journalist and Chatto’s personal friend; and Suraj Kishun 
from India as the delegate of the Central European Indian Association (Verein der Inder in 
Zentraleuropa). In fact, all three belonged to a clique in Berlin opposed to Roy’s vision of how to 
achieve national independence in India. The Berlin clique wanted nationalism to be the impetus to 
strengthen the anti-imperialist struggle, the proponents of which, in comparison to Roy, wanted to 
stimulate the question of class struggle in India.200 Delegates of the KMT Wang Fen Sian, V. S. 
Hsie and Richard Fischer were present, as were representatives of the Chinese student community 
                                               
199 Gross 1967, p.199; McMeekin 2003, p.196; Young 2001, p.25; Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost. A Story of  
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Report from Chatto to the ICC on his political career and life in general, Moscow, 15/10-1931. See Introduction, 
Barooah (2004), and Gupta 2006, p.38 for Chatto. A. C. N. Nambiar is introduced in the chapter Utopia Redefined, 
Part I. 
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in Berlin Koegang Tong and Chi Chiang Chad. Jahia Haschni of the Arab Student Association, 
Achmed Assadoff of the Communist Party of Persia, Mohammed Pour Reza of the Socialist Party 
of Persia and N. Tschelebi of the Islamic Academic Association represented the Middle East and 
North Africa, while Makube and Munumi represented the African continent.201 
      The “Rathauskeller” Conference was the opportunity to introduce the anti-colonial project to a 
receptive public, arranged in a modest milieu. According to Gibarti, the conference aimed to 
highlight the character of the protests against the “increasing colonising appetite” of the 
“Imperialist Grand Powers”. In relation to Gibarti’s main idea, Münzenberg registered the 
attendees’ reactions after Gibarti had concluded that the methods of the anti-colonial movement, 
e.g. the protest campaigns or the circulation of signed petitions to state governments, had had its 
day. Thus, Gibarti stated that the IAH had the ambition to create a vigorous centre for the anti-
colonial movement in Berlin, represented by the LACO. The challenge for Münzenberg was to 
outline a vision on how to realise this.202 
 
* 
 
The Münzenbergian Vision: the LACO, the Anti-Colonial Movement and the “International 
Congress” 
At the “Rathauskeller” Conference, Münzenberg expected to receive responses on three topics: the 
establishment and location of an anti-colonial movement in Berlin; getting the attending delegates 
to approve the idea of allowing the IAH to organise an international anti-colonial congress; and to 
put these objectives into practice. Münzenberg declared in his speech that everyone had to 
understand the necessity of broadening the political agenda of the Against the Cruelties in Syria 
Committee and of endorsing the formation of “a general league against colonial oppression”. 
According to Münzenberg, this was a response to the “giant global political processes” taking 
place in the Far Eastern countries, especially in China. This “general league” [LACO] aimed, 
therefore, to support the anti-colonial movement by acting as an international “information 
service” in the service of “politicians and journalists”. According to Münzenberg, the general 
functions of this league would be to distribute anti-colonial propaganda and function as a rallying 
point for anti-colonial activists around the world, which meant that contacts would need to be 
established with colonial associations and organisations in Berlin and in Europe (Paris, London, 
Amsterdam and Brussels). Thus, the LACO would be the instrument Münzenberg intended to use 
in order to connect the anti-colonial movement in Europe with activists in the colonial and semi-
                                               
201 RGASPI 542/1/4, 5-6, Anwesenheitsliste, Berliner Rathauskeller, 10/2-1926. 
202 RGASPI 542/1/4, 2-4, Protokoll der im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen Konferenz der  
deutschen Organisationen und der Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926. 
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colonial countries and, in order to do this, different methods of communication via correspondence 
and propaganda would be utilised.203 
      The ambiance of the “Rathauskeller” Conference may have inspired Münzenberg to introduce 
the LACO as a public actor, a concept that would, in turn, convince the delegates to authorise the 
IAH to organise an international anti-colonial congress. As specified in the LACO statutes 
(publicly released in August/September 1926), the LACO's primary function was to “promote 
among the widest circles an understanding of the nature of colonial policy and its effects on the 
oppressed peoples”. Nonetheless, whilst propaganda would be the key to spreading the word on 
the LACO, Münzenberg was hoping for more. By letting the LACO assume a leading role in his 
colonial work, through the “regular organising of international congresses”, its impact would be 
global, Münzenberg argued at the conference. The congresses and propaganda had to highlight 
“imperialist colonial policy”, “the struggle of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples”, “the 
importance of colonial policy in relation to the international proletariat” and introduce a strategy to 
the public on how to “support the colonial struggle”. Yet, it was the first international anti-colonial 
congress serving a higher purpose for Münzenberg. He expected the LACO to succeed in its 
endeavours which, in conjunction with the anti-colonial congress, would lead to the birth of an 
active anti-colonial movement and have an impact on all the “major power centres” in Europe, as 
well as spread itself across India, China, the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America. 
Münzenberg conceded that this vision relied on the consent of the delegates at the “Rathauskeller”, 
and declared that the IAH intended to withdraw the idea if they did not approve of the IAH being 
the formal organiser of an international congress, suggesting instead the arrangement of “an 
enlarged conference with colonial liaisons”. This was a hazardous proposition. Passing the 
decision into the hands of the delegates, everyone nonetheless “unanimously adopted” the 
approval of the LACO to function as the centre for a “permanent campaign” against colonialism, 
and authorised the IAH to organise the international congress.204 
      The “Rathauskeller” Conference did not nominate any members for the LACO Executive. On 
23 February 1926, the Executive held its inaugural meeting in Berlin and, as noted in a later report 
by the Auswärtige Amt, Fritz Danziger acted as Chairman of the LACO, along with Helene 
                                               
203 RGASPI 542/1/4, 2-4, Protokoll der im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen Konferenz der  
deutschen Organisationen und der Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926. 
204 The conference ended at 9 pm. Conference documents (the protocol and list of attendance) were sent to the Eastern  
Department, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/4, 2-4, Protokoll der im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen 
Konferenz der deutschen Organisationen und der Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926. RGASPI 542/1/4, 7, Vorläufige 
Statuten der Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrückung, Berlin, 4/6-1926. The LACO published its statutes in August or 
September 1926, according to Auswärtige Amt. The draft was completed at the LACO International Secretariat in 
Berlin on June 4 and sent to the Eastern Department in Moscow. According to its statutes, the LACO intended to 
“elucidate to the widest circles the nature of colonial politics and their effects on suppressing and the oppressed 
peoples”, organize public protest rallies against “colonial imperialism” and amass “practical relief to the needy 
people”. A copy of these statutes is filed in the LAI Collection at IISG, see 3392.1/12. 
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Stöcker, Baron von Schönaich, D. Bersius and Ledebour.205 In July, the LACO introduced the full 
membership of its Executive, intelligence that the Auswärtige Amt would later use to delineate the 
geographical spread of the organisation. 
Table 3.1: Composition of the LACO Executive, July 1926 
Fritz Danziger (Chairman) Germany 
Baron v. Schönaich Germany 
Alfons Paquet Germany 
Helene Stöcker Germany 
Georg Ledebour Germany 
Willi Münzenberg Germany 
Henri Barbusse France 
Albert Fournier France 
Henriette Roland Holst The Netherlands 
Dr. P. Berlage The Netherlands 
Professor Schelderup Norway 
Martin Andersen Nexö Denmark 
Ivar Koge Sweden 
Landova Stychowa Czechoslovakia 
Professor Nedely Czechoslovakia 
Dr. I.U. Bartoscheck Czechoslovakia 
Dr. phil. Weisskopf Czechoslovakia 
Friedrich Adler Austria 
Herman Frischauf Austria 
Maria Lazar Austria 
Dr. Lukac Austria 
Alfons Goldschmidt Mexico 
F. Liebaers Belgium 
Fritz Brupbacher Switzerland 
Bishop W. Montgomery Brown USA 
Kou Meng-yu China 
Lin Wee Min China 
George C. Hsue China 
Shapurji Saklatvala England206 
 
The political composition of the LACO Executive was a continuance of the patterns established in 
connection with the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee. Avoiding introducing itself as an 
overtly communist organisation and, especially, retaining Danziger as Chairman, the structure of 
                                               
205 RGASPI 542/1/5, 4-5, Report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/2-1926; SAPMO-BA ZPA 
R1001/6751, 4, Auswärtige Amt, eing., Berlin, 29/4-1926. 
206 SAPMO BA-ZPA R1001/6751, 6-7, LACO, Abteilung Sekr. Berlin, 16/7-1926. 
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the Syria Committee continued on in the transformed shape of the LACO. Political actors from 
Western Europe dominated the membership quota, although the Executive also displayed a 
preference for intellectuals and scholars. Aside from Münzenberg, Shapurji Saklatvala, a Member 
of Parliament (M. P.) in Great Britain and CPGB member, was one of the few communists. 
Moreover, Swiss author and Münzenberg’s friend, Fritz Brupbacher, was given a seat, whilst the 
nomination of Friedrich Adler, the LSI secretary, must have been regarded as a political victory for 
the LACO. 
      Münzenberg’s publishing house in Berlin, the Neuer Deutscher Verlag and its publications, 
most notably the Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung (A-I-Z), reported on the establishment of the LACO 
on 11 March, which also mentioned the plan to hold an international anti-colonial congress. 
According to the article “Gegen die Unterdrückung und Vergewaltigung der Kolonialvölker” 
(Against the Oppression and Rape of the Colonial Peoples), the IAH promised to assist the LACO 
in the preparation of a “colonial congress in Brussels” in the near future.207 
 
* 
 
The LACO, Comintern and Berlin  
The Comintern had to confront both external and internal challenges in 1926. The former 
concerned two episodes which questioned the capacity of the international communist movement 
to, on the one hand, initiate political collaborations and, on the other hand, capitalise on political 
opportunities. With the increased relations between the Comintern and the KMT, Stalin’s direct 
involvement in shaping the policy and strategy of the communists focused on the “rapid upsurge of 
the anti-imperialist movement” in China, according to Alexander Pantsov. However, there existed 
no sanctioned collaboration with the KMT and, as the Comintern had turned down a request from 
the KMT to become members of the “world party”, Chiang Kai-shek staged an “anti-communist 
coup” in Shanghai on 20 March, 1926.208 The second episode occurred in England when the 
British labour movement supported a general strike in the mining industry in which the IAH chose 
to get involved. Münzenberg was proud of the swift action taken to support the striking miners 
with “brotherly demonstrations of solidarity”, while others perceived the outcome differently. For 
example, Franz Borkenau stated that the strike had “swept away” three years’ of the CPGB’s work 
                                               
207 “Aus der Bewegung der Internationalen Arbeiterhilfe”, in A-I-Z, 1924 Nov. – 1927 Dez., Jahrg.IV, 11/3-1926, p.6. 
208 The KMT request was turned down during a private meeting between Voitinsky, Zinoviev and Stalin, see Pantsov  
2000, pp.89-92; “Immediate Problems of the International Communist Movement”, in Inprecorr, Vol. 6, No. 40, 13/5-
1926, pp.613-624. Voitinsky’s role was pivotal in formulating the Comintern's attitude towards the Chinese revolution, 
see for example the article “HANDS OFF CHINA: The Situation in China and the Plans of the Imperialist”, in 
Inprecorr, published on 6 May, 1926. 
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to gain a foothold in the British trade unions, especially after the British Trade Union Council 
(TUC) had refused any kind of collaboration with the communist movement.209 
      In Moscow, the Comintern was facing a re-organisation of its administrative apparatus. Also, 
due to the on-going power struggle within the CPSU (B), its rhetoric and internal communication 
became an expression of the conflict.210 Münzenberg’s correspondence to Zinoviev eased off, only 
to suddenly end in 1926, after Münzenberg had chosen Bukharin to be his new correspondent on 
important matters. However, it was with the introduction of Kuusinen’s “Solar System” theory at 
the Sixth ECCI Plenum in March (see further in Introduction), that the course of activities of the 
mass and sympathising organisations found a new direction.211 
      Münzenberg attended this plenum in Moscow, and returned to Berlin inspired by the 
Comintern’s attitude towards the mass and sympathising organisations, particularly Kuusinen’s 
statement declaring the necessity of the international communist movement to support 
“organisations against colonial atrocities and oppression of Eastern peoples”. Shortly afterwards, 
Münzenberg informed the Eastern Secretariat that the “League [LACO] is a living and active 
organisation”.212 
 
The LACO International Secretariat was located at 69 Bambergerstraβe, with Gibarti working with 
Danziger and Bach at the bureau.213 The principal aim of its work in the initial stages was to fulfil 
three objectives. Its first objective was to distribute information and propaganda about the 
foundation of the LACO in Berlin, focusing on giving the impression that the LACO and Berlin 
was the centre for the European anti-colonial movement – a proposition aimed especially towards 
“the Eastern peoples” in China and India, according to Gibarti’s statement at the inaugural meeting 
of the LACO Executive on 23 February in Berlin. Its second objective was to get the LACO to 
start constructing a transcontinental network. “The new addresses”, which Hassan Mattar had 
given to the LACO, had, as noted by Gibarti in a report to the Eastern Secretariat, provided the 
                                               
209 Münzenberg 1926, p.121; Borkenau 1938, p.280. The British communist, Jack T. Murphy, in response to the breach  
in relations between the TUC and CPGB, published the book The Political Meaning of the Great Strike in 1926, where 
he criticized the “weak and politically mislead” TUC. 
210 For the political struggle within the CPSU (B) and its effect on the Comintern, particularly Zinoviev’s fall from  
grace and removal as Chairman of the Comintern, see Degras vol.II 1960, pp.309-310, taken from Inprecorr, vi, 128, 
2208, 26/10-1926. Pantsov (2000) includes a detailed narrative on the power struggle between the Zinoviev opposition 
and the Stalin camp; see also Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.68. For an introduction to the Seventh Enlarged 
ECCI Plenum, see Degras vol.II 1960, pp.312-354 and Kahan 1990, p.26. 
211 The colonial work of the IAH was an activity administered by the Eastern Department in Moscow, where later,  
after the Sixth ECCI Plenum, there was a department addressed as the Eastern Secretariat, see Adibekov & 
Shakhnazarova 1996, pp. 66-68; “Resolution on the Development of Methods and Forms of the Organisation of 
Masses under the Influence of the Communist Parties”, in Inprecorr, Vol. 6, No. 40, 13/5-1926, pp.649-650. 
212 RGASPI 542/1/3, 1, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 22/3-1926. 
213 TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Information and analysis on the LACO, Colonial Office, London, [undated] year: 1926.  
The bureau of the German LACO section was located at No.1b Schadowstraβe. For a biography of Federico Bach, see  
Jeifets, Jeifets & Huber 2004, p.41. 
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LACO with information on potential and useful contacts in both the Sudan and Egypt. Mattar had 
also told Gibarti to consider the idea of organising a courier service to distribute LACO pamphlets 
and other propaganda material which would follow the one-way route: Berlin – Marseille – Egypt 
– the Arab region – Djibouti – Kenya. Its third and final objective was control. Gibarti promised 
the Eastern Secretariat, after having met the LACO Executive, that the LACO would remain 
“steady in our hands [the communists]”.214 
      The pièce de résistance was, however, the international congress against colonialism and 
imperialism. Whilst Münzenberg had introduced his vision at the “Rathauskeller”, Gibarti was in 
charge of co-ordinating the process in Berlin. In order to commence the preparatory work, the 
LACO International Secretariat began sending out invitations in March, a document which 
discloses the political aim of the international anti-colonial congress: 
The “League against Cruelties and Oppression in the Colonies” which unites the 
representatives of responsible bodies of the international Labour movement and those of 
cultural organisations and scientific and intellectual societies with the representatives of the 
oppressed nations all over the world, intends to summon an International Conference against 
the cruelties and oppression of the imperials’ rule in the colonies and dependencies or in 
countries threatened with a similar fate.215 
Included on the actual invitation, the political agenda declared that the LACO aimed to investigate 
“the working-conditions in the colonial lands and other countries in a semi-colonial state” and to 
create “an international protest movement against the cruelties and oppression” committed by “the 
military forces of the imperialist powers” in China, Syria and Morocco. Also, to organise 
international relief actions “in support of the most endangered nations” in dire “need of moral and 
material support”, an initiative which would unite everyone engaged in the struggle “against 
imperialism and the establishment of permanent relations between all important parties and 
political groups conducting this fight”.216 Thus, the agenda implicitly suggested a prolongation of 
the IAH’s relief operations in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, whilst the LACO’s ultimate 
ambition was to establish a common platform for the anti-colonial movement. 
      The list of addresses at the LACO International Secretariat was a crucial source. Aside from 
Mattar’s contribution towards connections with anti-colonial activists and organisations in North 
                                               
214 TNA PRO KV 2/1401, CROSS-Reference, Subject: GIBARTI, Louis Otto, 23/2-1926; RGASPI 542/1/5, 4-5,  
Report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/2-1926. 
215 SAPMO-BA, ZPA R1001/6751, 20-22, Invitation to the Brussels Congress, LACO Secretariat, Berlin, signed:  
Gibarti, to Hasrat Mohani, Berlin, 9/3-1926. Hasrat Mohani was the official representative for the All India National 
Congress (AINC) and spokesperson for Dr. Ansari in Berlin. On 28 April, the LACO sent an invitation to the secretary 
of the Khilafat Committee, Maulana Shaukat Ali Saheb, in Berlin. The Khilafat Committee had Bombay as the centre 
for its operations. 
216 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 20-22, Invitation to the Brussels Congress, LACO Secretariat, Berlin, signed:  
Gibarti, to Hasrat Mohani, Berlin, 9/3-1926. 
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Africa,217 the IAH also assisted efforts to find new contacts: Kou Meng-yu in China, the ANLC 
and AAAIL in Chicago, while Alfons Goldschmidt sent a list of addresses of potential contacts in 
Asia, Africa, Latin America and the USA to Gibarti.218 However, it was not only a question of 
gaining a foothold in colonial countries, the LACO especially wanted to establish itself in the 
“imperialist nations”. For example, in Chicago, Manuel Gomez of the AAAIL invited 
representatives of the IAH and the ANLC to discuss the idea of forming an LACO section. 
However, their sole recommendation was to establish a committee to seek out anti-colonial 
activists in the USA who would be eager to contribute money to finance the journey for a 
delegation to the anti-colonial congress. Gomez told Gibarti that there was neither the time nor the 
energy to support an LACO section.219 
      Münzenberg emphasised the use of correspondence as the most constructive method of 
creating and sustaining the LACO network.220 In March, Gibarti sent an invitation to Joshi, the 
general secretary of the All India Trade Union Council (AITUC) in Bombay, an individual 
Münzenberg considered a highly coveted character to involve in the anti-colonial congress. 
Mahbubul Hug, Joshi’s personal secretary, responded to the invitation and to Gibarti’s letter and 
promised to send a delegation to the Brussels Congress. However, Hug mentioned that one should 
not disregard the travel restrictions imposed on particular individuals in India, administered by the 
British colonial authorities.221 Another example was the invitation sent to Hasrat Mohani, a 
member of the Berlin branch of the Muslim Khalifat Committee who had also attended the 
“Rathauskeller” Conference;222 and the invitation to the Khalifat Committee branch in Alexandria, 
                                               
217 The RKÜöO uncovered the activities of Mattar in 1927. The main question was to find out why he was residing in  
Germany, above all his contacts to the anti-colonial movement and the demonstrations, organised by the IAH. On 4 
October, 1927, the Merseburg police authorities revoked Mattar’s residence permit with immediate effect. However, 
prior to this decision, Mattar had attended the Brussels Congress as part of the African delegation, acting as the 
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19, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 7/7-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 20-21, Letter from Manuel Gomez, 
AAAIL, Chicago, to Gibarti, Berlin, 24/6-1926. Gomez requested from the IAH “Central Bureau” (Zentralbüro) in 
Berlin the transfer of some money to the AAAIL. In the end, Münzenberg forwarded Gomez letter to Kornblum and 
Roy. 
220 RGASPI 542/1/3, 13-14, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 24/6-1926. 
221 RGASPI 542/1/18, 10, Letter to Gibarti, Paris/London, from AITUC Secretary Mahbubul Hug, Bombay, 8/4-1926;  
Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.234; TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, List of organisations and individuals to be invited to the 
LACO/Brussels Congress. Intercepted by the Sudanese Government, transmitted to the British Colonial Office, 24/11-
1926. The AITUC never sent a delegation to the congress as evidenced by the list of attendance in Das 
Flammenzeichen; see Gibarti (ed.) 1927. 
222 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 20-22, Invitation to the Brussels Congress, sent from LACO Secretariat, Berlin, to  
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sent through the secretaries Hajj Muhammad Jalabi and Mohammed Taraq Eminbawi in Berlin. 
According to the Khalifat Committee’s reply to Gibarti, the intention was to get the leader of the 
committee, Tassun Pascha, accompanied by a delegation, to attend the congress.223 Additionally, 
Münzenberg stated in a report to the Eastern Secretariat that the spread of information on the 
LACO had confirmed reliable contacts with the Indian Labour Union and with the Executive 
Committee of the Cantonese National Government in China.224 
      Not everyone appreciated receiving their invitation. The figurehead of the Indian National 
Congress (INC) and symbolic leader of the Indian independence movement, Mahatma Gandhi, 
also received an invitation. In his response to Gibarti on 3 April, Gandhi explained that neither he 
nor the INC could support, from a moral perspective, the LACO’s agenda. Gandhi declared that 
his methods to break the system of British colonial rule in India, which referred implicitly to the 
concepts of ahimsa (“non-violence”) and Shakti (“soul force”), did not correspond with the 
message being broadcast by the LACO. According to Gandhi, the “methods of the socialists […] 
are in an experimental phase of development”, with the supposed purpose and aim of this so-called 
anti-colonial movement bringing about “a certain fright”.225 Several responses to the invitations 
did not provide any definite answer as to whether they were planning to send any delegations to 
the congress or not. Several responses even suggested using the LACO as a channel to increase 
anti-colonial propaganda in their own country, or territory. In a letter from Kou Meng-yu to the 
LACO International Secretariat, dated 13 July, the KMT had “with the greatest pleasure” heard of 
“the creation” of the LACO, asking whether the organisation could send “circulars in English, 
German and French languages” to China for distribution amongst “the widest public”. In another 
letter, this one from Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT expressed its “profoundest gratitude and 
sympathy”, but could not guarantee to send a delegation.226  
      Propaganda was the key element for the LACO International Secretariat at this stage, however. 
Protest meetings in Berlin and across Germany were the preferred forum and, perhaps due to its 
                                                                                                                                                          
Hasrat Mohani Esq., Berlin, 9/3-1926; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 23, LACO, Berlin, to Mr. Maulana Shaukat Ali 
Saheb, Secretary of the Khilafat Committee, Bombay, 28/4-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 8, Letter from Münzenberg, 
Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 4/5-1926. See Barooah 2004, p.249, 277. 
223 Münzenberg used the correspondence addressed to the International Secretariat as a means of illustrating to the  
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters that the LAI had established contacts with colonial countries. For 
example, Zinoviev received the letter from the Khalifat Committee, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/3, 4, Answer from 
Tschelebi, Tassun Pascha’s secretary, undated; RGASPI 542/1/3, 5, Answer from Moh. Tarag Elminbawi, undated; 
RGASPI 542/1/3, 3, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, 17/4-1926. The intercepted list included Tassun 
Pascha’s address in Alexandria (he never attended the Brussels Congress, see Gibarti [ed.] 1927, p.235). 
224 RGASPI 542/1/3, 8, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 4/5-1926. 
225 RGASPI 542/1/18, 8, Letter to Gibarti, Berlin, from M K Gandhi (Ashram Sabarmati), 3/4-1926; Young 2001,  
pp.320-323. 
226 TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Letter from Kou Meng Yu, Canton, to LACO, Berlin, 13/7-1926; TNA PRO CO 323 966  
1, Letter from the Political Administration Military Council National Government, Canton, to LACO, Berlin, 26/6-
1926. Chiang Kai-shek wrongly addressed the LACO as the “League of Colonial Suppression”. Whether the letter 
ever arrived at the LACO International Secretariat is unknown. 
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infancy, to agitate against the “colonial politics” and “imperialist policy” in the Middle East, North 
Africa and China, as well as to provide information about the congress.227 Gibarti explained the 
general purpose of the meetings in an article, “Warum Kolonial-Kongress?”, published in the 
LACO theoretical organ, Der koloniale Freiheitskampf, convinced that “hundreds of mass 
meetings” against the “cruelties [and] unlawful and unconstitutional dealing of the colonising 
powers”, had managed to “stir the German people”.228 
      National security services began to notice the increase in anti-colonial propaganda in Germany. 
One of the first to react to the “initiative of different pacifist organisations” to form “a league” 
against colonial oppression was the Auswärtige Amt.229 An observation which sparked off an active 
collaboration between the Auswärtige Amt and the Reichskommissar für Überwachung der 
öffentlichen Ordnung (RKÜöO) in Berlin, in accumulating intelligence on the LACO.230 
According to the RKÜöO, the LACO was an organisation which appeared to be only broadcasting 
a pacifist agenda aimed at the anti-colonial and pacifist movements, particularly the LHR, in order 
to achieve some kind of higher purpose. The question was what kind of purpose. The Auswärtige 
Amt, however, deployed a more subtle strategy: infiltration. Building its intelligence on “reports 
from the inside”, Auswärtige Amt could analyse LACO pamphlets, leaflets and reports from 
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Dietrich (1889 – 1937), the secretary of the ZK KPD Secretariat in Berlin, notified the German ECCI delegation in 
Moscow of the “complete failure” and incapacity of the PCF to organize a colonial demonstration. According to 
Dietrich, the PCF had not made the necessary preparations, e.g. representatives from the communist parties in 
Belgium, Italy and Great Britain had not received an invitation to the conference. Thus, in order to evaluate the 
reasons for the failure, the ZK KPD Secretariat instructed the German communist, “Philipp” [?], to travel to Paris and 
carry out an investigation; see SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/34, 94, Letter from PCF, Paris, to ZK KPD, Berlin, 23/4-1926; 
SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 291-292, Report from Paul D. at ZK KPD Sekretariat, Berlin, to deutsche Vertretung 
EKKI, Moscow, 26/5-1926. For Paul Reinhold Dietrich, see Weber & Herbst 2004, pp.155-156. On November 5, 
1937, the Soviet Military Collegium sanctioned the execution of Dietrich in Leningrad. 
228 Louis Gibarti, “Warum Kolonial-Kongress?”, in Der koloniale Freiheitskampf – Mitteilungsblatt der Liga gegen  
Unterdrückung, Nr. 3, Berlin, 5/7-1926, 29-30; TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Report on the Activities of the “League 
against Oppression in the Colonies“, December 1926. The RK observed that the anti-colonial propaganda on the 
streets in Berlin had suddenly increased during 1926. In particular, a Hands off China demonstration, which the KPD 
had organised on 23 September, had taken on the character of “a big political demonstration”. The KPD and anti-
colonialism was, nevertheless a public act, the RK suspected, in order to satisfy the demands of “Russian foreign 
policy”, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/111, 8, Analysis of subversive activities and movements in Germany, 1/11-1926. 
229 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 4, Auswärtiges Amt, eing., Berlin, 29/4-1926. The information from the Auswärtige  
Amt mentioned Helene Stöcker, Freiherrn v. Schoenaich, Kapitän D. Bersius, Georg Ledebour and LACO chairman 
Fritz Danziger, as well as the address of the LACO International Secretariat in Berlin at 60 Bambergerstraβe. 
230 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 5, Reichskommissar für Überwachung der öffentlichen Ordnung, signed: A. A., an  
das Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 5/8-1926. 
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unknown informants. An example of the latter was the information from an undisclosed member 
of the German pro-colonial association, Vereinigung für deutsche Siedlung und Wanderung 
(Association for German Settlement and Emigration, a pro-colonial lobbyist association in 
Germany which demanded the retrieval of the lost colonies), who had become a member of the 
LACO for the sole purpose of assisting the Auswärtige Amt.231 British intelligence (MI5 and 
Scotland Yard) had also reacted to the LACO propaganda, especially to the argument that it was an 
organisation against colonialism and imperialism with the ambition of evolving into a global actor. 
Scotland Yard completed an analysis of the LACO in 1926, a report being forwarded to the CO in 
London. According to this analysis, British security services had to focus on detecting whether any 
British citizen was in contact with, or had any kind of associations to, groups or committees 
critical towards the British Empire’s colonial policy. As for the LACO, its global ambitions had to 
be monitored, Scotland Yard concluded. Apparently, British security services had detected 
activities with explicit links to the LACO, e.g. in China, Japan, Persia, Arabia, Syria, Indo-China, 
India, Indonesia, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, French West Africa, Madagascar, 
Liberia, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Rhodesia, French Somaliland, South Africa, USA, Mexico, 
Cuba, the West Indies, Latin America and the Philippines. However, this was a conclusion based 
on the LACO’s official publications, with Scotland Yard focusing particularly on individual 
connections to the LACO in England. For example, Saklatvala had, along with the British socialist 
and former diplomat Reginald Bridgeman, organised LACO activities. Nonetheless, Scotland Yard 
argued that the LACO “may, however, have exaggerated the extent of its ramifications”,232 
whereas the CO recommended categorising the LACO as subversive due to its communist 
connections, particularly as it was known to be “an offspring” of the IAH.233 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
231 SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/112, 119, Reichskomm. f.d. überwachung d. öffentl. Ordnung u.Nachrichtensammelstelle  
im RMI, 1/11-1926; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 10, Short note from unknown informant, Vereinigung für 
deutsche Siedlung und Wanderung, Berlin, to Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 30/9-1926. The undisclosed informant told 
Auswärtige Amt that he/she had been a LACO member for six months. 
232 TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Information on and analysis of the LACO, [December 1926] author: Lidell, Scotland  
Yard. Lidell used primarily official material, published by the LACO, to discern whether the organization had any 
contact with British colonies, e.g. the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, South Africa and the West Indies. 
233 TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Information on and analysis of the LACO, [December 1926] author: Lidell. Federico  
Bach, being the secretary of the LACO, was an indication that the LACO had a connection to the IAH, stated Lidell. 
For R. C. Lindsay at the British Embassy in Berlin, this was sufficient evidence to consider the link between these two 
organisations as valid, see TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Letter from R.C. Lindsay, British Embassy, Berlin, to Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, London, 18/11-1926. 
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En route to Brussels: Assembling the Anti-Imperialist Network  
After having established the LACO in February, Münzenberg expected Comintern headquarters to 
provide a response to his idea of holding an international anti-colonial congress in Brussels. 
However, the Comintern decided to put the question on hold until after the Sixth ECCI Plenum. 
On 19 March, the ECCI Secretariat finally discussed the question of arranging “a conference for 
the purpose of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism”, instructing Roy to act as the 
Eastern Secretariat’s representative in all contact with Münzenberg and, above all, to conduct an 
investigation before reaching a final decision on the idea. Nevertheless, the ECCI Secretariat 
wondered whether Roy would be able to achieve any results, considering that there were no 
documents on the LACO at Comintern headquarters. To solve this empirical dilemma, the ECCI 
Secretariat endorsed the establishment of the “Commission for the Examination of the Question of 
a Colonial Congress in Brussels” (CEQCCB), which had to outline the political details of the 
congress, nominating Roy as the “responsible leader”, along with the Russian B. A. Wassiljew of 
the ECCI Orgdepartment (Orgabteilung), the KPD representative Ottomar Geschke (1882 – 1957), 
“Jacob” [unknown] and John Pepper (real name: Joszef Pogany; a Hungarian communist). Given 
ten days to complete a report,234 Roy introduced the “Resolution of the CEQCCB” to the ECCI 
Secretariat on 30 March. According to this resolution, the CEQCCB recommended it as being 
“desirable” to organise an international anti-colonial congress, particularly as the event had every 
chance of succeeding where the Comintern had previously failed, i.e. in establishing contacts with 
anti-colonial activists. It was primarily a question of mobilising the “struggles of the oppressed 
colonial peoples” in the European trade unions, and to convince the “liberal bourgeois elements [in 
Europe in] the struggling colonies” to support a movement controlled by the communists. This 
resolution highlighted the following “elements” to invite to the congress: 
1. European and American labour organisations. 
2. Liberal and radical bourgeois organisations. 
3. Well-known individuals interested in the colonial question. 
4. National revolutionary organisations in the colonies. 
5. Labour organisations in the colonies. 
6. Democratic emigrant organisations in the colonies.235 
Nonetheless, the CEQCCB suspected that there was a risk in approaching and involving some of 
the groups above. However, for as long as the LACO, under the active supervision of the 
                                               
234 RGASPI 495/18/424, 28-32, Protokoll Nr.63 der Sitzung des Sekretariats des EKKI, 19/3-1926. Present at the  
meeting were Zinoviev, Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Humbert-Droz, Ercoli, Roy, Smeral, Kornblum, Pepper, Bela Kun, 
Ferdi, Karl Kilbom and Heimo. The commission was given an additional three days to complete the assignment, see 
RGASPI 495/18/425, 8, Protokoll Nr.65 der Sitzung des Sekretariats des EKKI, 29/3-1926. For Ottomar Geschke, see 
Weber & Herbst 2004, pp.242-243. Geschke was one of the “old guards” in the German communist movement. The 
son of a blacksmith, an active social democrat and, later, a Spartacist, he also joined the KPD in 1919. Geschke died of 
heart failure in East Berlin on 17 May 1957. For B. A. Wassiljew, see Huber 1994, pp.457-458. 
235 RGASPI 495/18/425, 32-33, RESOLUTION from the CEQCCB, Moscow, 30/3-1926. 
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Comintern, convinced these groups to participate with enthusiasm, this would facilitate the 
formation of “a permanent organisation ‘League against Colonial Atrocities’ or something 
similar”. This depended on Münzenberg and Gibarti fulfilling the demand to regularly send 
“copies of all letters, printed matter and other documents received from the colonies, or 
organisations and individuals connected with the revolutionary movement in the colonies” to 
Moscow. These documents were essential in order to prepare the congress from a political and 
administrative perspective in a “thorough and comprehensive” way.236 Münzenberg received the 
CEQCCB’s resolution in April. On 17 April, Münzenberg suggested to Zinoviev in a letter that the 
Brussels Congress and the LACO could prove to be the answer in realising the Comintern’s desire 
to establish contact with anti-colonial organisations and individuals.237 
      The CEQCCB was an instrument of control which aimed to supervise the activities of the 
LACO and the Brussels Congress – an organisational initiative which relied on the active 
engagement of the Eastern Secretariat, the IAH and Münzenberg, and the ZK KPD. According to 
the CEQCCB resolution, the ZK KPD had to engage itself more actively in colonial work, e.g. by 
nominating a member at the secretariat in Berlin to examine and write a report on the accumulated 
results of the LACO in Germany, and send it “within a fortnight” to the ECCI Secretariat. 
Additionally, a “confidential preparation committee”, consisting of representatives from the 
European communist parties, was to also evaluate the LACO, whereas a “propaganda and 
organisational committee” would “popularise the idea” of the Brussels Congress in left-wing 
socio-political circles in Europe.238 
 
* 
 
“What shall I do with this colonial movement?” 
Münzenberg did not appreciate the CEQCCB’s resolution. If this was their reaction to the LACO 
and the congress as a political and organisational project, Münzenberg questioned the adequacy of 
the Eastern Secretariat to send a resolution as a first type of response. For Münzenberg, the 
primary motive was to set in motion the preparatory work; however, the Eastern Secretariat's 
silence on the matter caused confusion about how to proceed. On 29 May, in a letter from the 
ECCI Secretariat to Münzenberg, the reason given for its silence was so that the CEQCCB would 
                                               
236 RGASPI 495/18/425, 32-33, RESOLUTION from the CEQCCB, Moscow, 30/3-1926. The content of the  
documents the CEQCCB had at its disposal is not known; RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from ECCI 
Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Moscow/Berlin, 29/5-1926. The modus operandi to keep the flow of information 
running from Berlin to Moscow assisted, in turn, in shaping the character of the empirical material filed in the 
Comintern Archive, i.e. extensive collections of reports, correspondence and miscellaneous material from the national 
sections as well as from the mass and sympathising organisations. 
237 RGASPI 542/1/3, 3, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 17/4-1926. 
238 RGASPI 495/18/425, 32-33, RESOLUTION from the Commission to guide the work of the colonial congress,  
Moscow, 30/3-1926. 
105 
 
have time to examine the documents from Berlin. Nonetheless, both Münzenberg and Gibarti 
stated that the incommunicado had contributed to the difficulties in establishing daily routines at 
the LACO International Secretariat and, more importantly, the LACO had not received any money 
from the Comintern. The Eastern Secretariat had to solve the financial question so that the LACO 
could pay salaries, a cost covered by the IAH.239 
      Münzenberg argued that the CEQCCB resolution questioned his authority, as did the 
involvement of the IAH in the LACO, due to the recommendation to get someone from the ZK 
KPD to assess the LACO. A far better solution, according to Münzenberg, was to send a “reliable 
Comrade” from the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow to Berlin to assess the LACO. Moreover, the 
ZK KPD Secretariat seemed completely uninterested in the activities of the LACO.240 Perhaps 
Münzenberg’s aversion towards getting the ZK KPD involved was an expression of his fear that it 
would endanger the IAH’s influence on the LACO and its colonial work in Germany. Furthermore, 
Münzenberg most likely expected to continue negotiations with the decision-makers at Comintern 
headquarters on the colonial question (the ECCI Secretariat, the Eastern Secretariat, Zinoviev and 
Roy), without the ZK KPD interfering in the discussions.241 The silence from both the ECCI 
Secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat in relation to the LACO appears to have made Münzenberg 
ponder the idea that a shift in power was imminent, which would leave the ZK KPD controlling 
and leading the colonial work through the LACO. In order to get some kind of reaction from the 
Eastern Secretariat, Münzenberg asked “what shall I do with this colonial movement?”, a 
movement which had received a lot of attention in the German bourgeois press (Die Weltbühne). 
Münzenberg expected to receive a definite answer from the ECCI and the Eastern Secretariat 
during his visit in Moscow at the end of May, and to have a “personal consultation” with Roy.242 
      The ZK KPD obeyed the CEQCCB’s instruction. Leo Flieg contacted the German ECCI 
delegation in Moscow on 13 April, expressing how difficult it was to find a “comrade” in Berlin 
                                               
239 RGASPI 542/1/3, 2, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 13/4-1926; RGASPI  
542/1/5, 4-5, Report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/2-1926. For the response from the 
ECCI Secretariat, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to 
Münzenberg, Berlin, 29/5-1926. 
240 RGASPI 542/1/3, 2, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 13/4-1926. 
241 RGASPI 542/1/3, 3, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 17/4-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 54,  
Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Department, Moscow, 17/4-1926. In the letters, Münzenberg repeated 
the request to get the Eastern Secretariat and the ECCI to send a “reliable Comrade” to Berlin. 
242 Münzenberg wondered when the Eastern Secretariat intended to send “concrete information, instructions, or  
whatever kind of wish” concerning the LACO. Furthermore, at the end of May, Münzenberg visited Moscow but was 
unable to meet Roy, who was preoccupied with “political questions” and travel arrangements, see fol. RGASPI 
542/1/3, 6, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/4-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 7, Letter 
from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 28/4-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 8, Letter from “Willi” [J. 
W. Kruyt], Berlin, Eastern Department, Moscow, 4/5-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 12, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to 
Roy, Moscow, 14/6-1926. 
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willing to assess the LACO and travel to Moscow to deliver a report to the Eastern Secretariat.243 
In response to Flieg’s information, the ECCI Secretariat wondered when the ZK KPD would 
resolve the matter. In the end, the ZK KPD instructed the German communist Ernst Schneller, to 
carry out the assignment in Berlin and then travel to Moscow.244 Perhaps Schneller’s experience of 
the Hands off China campaign was the reason given by the ZK KPD for its choice of candidate, 
someone who had some knowledge of the IAH’s colonial work. Schneller received the ZK KPD’s 
instruction to write a “brief report” on the LACO and, en route to Moscow, to study the 
“temporary” statutes of the LACO.245 
 
* 
 
The Nature and Question of the LACO 
Schneller’s appointment earned him an omnipotent position within the LACO. For Münzenberg, 
this went completely against both his vision and the work being carried out by Gibarti. The 
interaction between the LACO and the Comintern at this stage in developing the colonial work and 
the Brussels Congress needs to be looked at more closely, including such factors as suspicion and 
concealment, administrative and organisational solutions, and the question of an anti-colonial 
“pilgrimage”. This was a process which revealed the initial purpose and intentions of the LACO 
and the reason why the Comintern perceived the organisation as being a pivotal actor. 
      The Objectives: On 29 May, the ECCI Secretariat handed to Münzenberg in person in Moscow 
the confidential objectives on “the question of the League against Colonial Domination and […] 
the Colonial Congress”. According to these objectives, if the Comintern endorsed the LACO’s 
status as a permanent organisation, it had to be thoroughly “built up […] intensified and 
systematised” and, if done so properly, the LACO could be “very useful”. In comparison to the 
CEQCCB resolution’s recommendations, which suggested the “formation of a permanent 
organisation” as being “desirable”, the ECCI Secretariat expected the LACO “to act as a neutral 
intermediary between the Communist International and nationalist movements in the colonies”.246 
                                               
243 SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 249-251, Report from Leo [Flieg] ZK KPD Sekretariat, Berlin, to “deutsche Vertretung  
EKKI”, Moscow, 13/4-1926. Flieg urged the German ECCI delegation to give its fullest support to the ZK KPD 
representative once he had arrived in Moscow. 
244 SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 6, Letter from Zentralkomitee der KPD, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 27/4-1926. The ZK  
KPD told Heimo that the CEQCCB resolution had arrived in Berlin on 21 April; SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 10, Letter 
from ZK KPD, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 18/5-1926. 
245 SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 11, Note from ZK KPD, Berlin, to Ernst Schneller, Berlin, 19/5-1926. In 1927, 
Schneller argued that the ZK KPD had to bring the mass organizations in Germany under the strictest party control, 
see Christian Striefler, Kampf um die Macht, Propyläen, Berlin, 1993, p.262. 
246 RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Moscow, 29/5- 
1926. The ECCI Secretariat dissolved the CEQCCB on 30 March. In April, Roy continued to analyse the documents 
on the LACO, and involved the ZK KPD in the process. 
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      The Eastern Secretariat was the key, the ECCI Secretariat concluded. As the CEQCCB was no 
longer involved, the ECCI Secretariat endorsed the decision to establish the “Commission to 
Guide the Work of the Colonial Congress” (hereinafter: the CGWCC). This commission aimed to 
strengthen its interaction with Münzenberg, e.g. by sending “regular instructions” to him on how 
to prepare the congress. Roy acted as the leader of the commission, who, along with Schneller and 
Voitinsky (replaced by the Russian Fedor Petrov; real name: Fedor Feodorovich Raskolnikov on 
28 June, 1926), began the work of organising the congress.247 The following table delineates the 
actors and their links of communication in preparing the congress in 1926.248 
 
Table 3.2: Communication Links within the Anti-Imperialist Network, February – July 1926 
 
 
Suspicion: The CGWCC raised concerns about some of the active “elements” in the anti-colonial 
movement in Berlin. Essentially a question of control for the CGWCC, which described Berlin as 
a place overcrowded with “opportunist and provocative elements” who found the LACO 
attractive; the question was to ensure that Münzenberg did not admit any suspicious individuals 
into the core. According to a confidential letter from the ECCI Secretariat to Münzenberg on 2 
                                               
247 However, Roy was the author of the confidential directives, despite the signature “ECCI Secretariat”. Münzenberg  
knew that the “leader” of the “permanent commission [CGWCC]” had written the document; hence, this makes it 
logical to link Roy as the author of the directives, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from the 
ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Moscow, 29/5-1926. The ECCI Secretariat nominated the members of the 
commission, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/431, 1-4, Protokoll Nr. 79 der Sitzung des Sekretariats des EKKI, 28/6-1926. 
Petrov replaced Voitinsky on 28 June, for unknown reasons. One possible explanation was the strained relationship 
between the Comintern and the KMT which, in the summer of 1926 had, more or less, collapsed. Considering that 
Voitinsky, the “expert” on the Chinese question, had to devote all his attention to this question, at the same time as 
acting as the Head of the ECCI Far Eastern Bureau, he had to resign from this commission, see Pantsov, 2000, pp.93-
95, 295. Any records of the CGWCC meetings in Moscow are minimal. The only reference found informs us that a 
meeting to discuss the congress preparations was convened at Comintern headquarters in Room 54 on 1 August, see 
fol. RGASPI 542/1/3, 28, Short note from Roy, Moscow, 29/7-1926. 
248 Dotted links indicate informal contacts between some of the actors, for example, Münzenberg and Flieg. 
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July, the LACO had to “act very carefully” in its contacts with “colonial emigrant groups”, and let 
the CGWCC evaluate them in order to confirm whether they were “bona-fide” organisations and, 
more importantly, whether they should be allowed to attend the congress. Therefore, any “direct 
contact” with colonial organisations had to adhere to the following strategy in order to sort out the 
bad eggs: 
Before establishing contact with them, or inviting them to participate in the Congress, their 
reliability and representative character should be carefully determined […] Immigrant 
elements [in Berlin] might be used in the beginning to establish this contact, but to insure 
[ensure; author’s remark] that authoritative representative delegations come from the 
colonial countries, it is absolutely necessary to eliminate intermediaries.249          
This strategy was a re-conceptualisation of Roy’s opinion of the “oriental peoples resident in 
Berlin” to Münzenberg, in which he warned of the potential formation of “a fraction” aiming to 
“liberate” the movement of communist control.250 However, after reading the instruction, 
Münzenberg concluded that it was an enormous task to screen the colonial contacts of the LACO. 
In order to solve the dilemma, Münzenberg asked Roy to get Piatnitsky to send a “reliable 
Comrade” to Berlin, and for “the instructor” to guide “the work politically in close collaboration 
with the IAH (Communist Fraction)”.251 
      The “Desirable Elements” and Strategies of Concealment: Concealment ran parallel with Roy’s 
suspicion, a frame of mind which defined the preparatory work of the IAH, LACO, and the 
Eastern Secretariat. Gibarti's political vision had a broad remit, particularly as the LACO was an 
actor that would gain the attention of “desirable elements”, represented by “prominent” left-wing 
trade union and social democratic leaders, bourgeois radicals, pacifists and intellectuals. However, 
the ECCI Secretariat were of a different opinion and wanted delegates of European trade unions 
and “liberal radical elements in the imperialist countries” to dominate the congress. If any 
delegates from colonial and semi-colonial countries were to attend the event in Brussels, they 
should preferably belong to national revolutionary organisations or associations, trade unions, 
liberal democrat movements or emigrant organisations.252 
                                               
249 RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926. 
250 RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Moscow, 29/5- 
1926. Roy warned Münzenberg that some of the anti-colonial activists in Berlin whom he seemed to “deeply trust”, 
e.g. the Syrians Hashin Bey and Tarak Muntas, were of a highly suspicious character. Additionally, Roy criticized a 
conference Chatto had organized in Berlin on 30 April, at which Bey and Muntas had introduced the idea of 
establishing an independent anti-colonial committee. However, Roy seems to have based his conclusion mostly (if not 
all) on hearsay. 
251 RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926.  
Münzenberg renewed the request of getting a “reliable Comrade” to Berlin in his letters to Roy and Piatnitsky, see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/3, 18, Letter from Münzenberg to Roy in Moscow, 6/7-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 57, Letter from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 6/7-1926. 
252 RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926. The  
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      The disparate political character of the congress made the ECCI Secretariat’s position 
precarious, making it necessary for it to adopt conspiratorial methods in order to conceal and 
preserve the hidden aim of the Brussels congress. Münzenberg was instructed to form a 
“communist fraction”, which would include representatives of communist parties from the “most 
important imperialist countries”, to “influence and direct the entire work of the LACO” at the 
congress: 
The Communist Fraction should try to remain as much as possible in the background, so that 
neither the League nor the Congress is too obviously identified with the Communists.253 
This was a modus operandi which corresponded to the policy endorsed by the Sixth ECCI Plenum 
in 1926.254 The ECCI Secretariat stated that the fraction operating in Brussels had to secure “close 
and constant collaboration” between the delegates of the communist parties and colonial 
organisations, as well as influence every delegation, yet behave cautiously and conceal every trace 
leading back to the “communist fraction”. Prior to the Brussels Congress, the ECCI Secretariat 
instructed the ECCI delegation to act vigilantly, and “to organise its conferences cautiously 
without advertising them and without admitting any outsiders”. Additionally, if the delegation 
knew of any groups or individuals who displayed an inclination towards, or eagerness to discuss 
communism, the delegation had to secure “communist influence … on these elements”.255 
      A Warning from Münzenberg: The preparatory work for the Brussels Congress was, however, 
not entirely a conspiratorial process; administrative and organisational questions were equally 
relevant. According to Münzenberg, after the Comintern had decided to involve the “deutsche 
Zentrale” [ZK KPD] in the LACO, this damaged the LACO’s relations with both the ECCI and the 
Eastern Secretariat. Roy had no other option than to correct Münzenberg. As leader of the 
CGWCC, Roy stated that “in accordance with the resolution of 30 March (a copy which was sent 
to you)”, Münzenberg could not object to Schneller’s nomination as it served the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                                          
ECCI Secretariat seemed content with the “satisfactory progress” of the LACO in establishing contact with 
organisations in China and India. For Gibarti and the “desirable elements”, see TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Letter from 
LACO Secretaries L. Gibarti & F. Danziger, 17/9-1926; RGASPI 495/18/425, 32-33, RESOLUTION from the 
CEQCCB, Moscow, 30/3-1926. The CEQCCB resolution focused on the following groups: European and American 
labour organisations, liberal and radical bourgeois organisations, well-known individuals interested in the colonial 
question, national revolutionary organisations in the colonies, labour organisations in the colonies and democratic 
emigrant organisations in the colonies. 
253 RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926. 
254 The “Resolution on the Organisation and Structure of Communist Fractions in Trade Unions”, adopted at the Sixth  
ECCI Plenum, instructed fractions to “carry out active fraction work” at congresses and, further, to “convene […] 
meetings” before the event commenced, and to “guide and supervise communist work” together with a “bureau” 
which had “full political responsibility”. Additionally, members of the fraction had to follow the strictest of discipline 
and adopt a “uniform attitude”, see Degras vol.II 1960, pp.268-271, taken from Inprecorr, vi, 65, p.986, 29/4-1926. 
255 RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926;  
RGASPI 495/18/534, 41-43, Instructions to the [ECCI] delegates to the Brussels Congress, Moscow, ECCI 
Secretariat, Moscow, 4/2-1927. 
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stimulating the “collaboration and general direction of the KPD, extended through Comrade 
Schneller” in order to assist the work of Münzenberg and the LACO.256 
     Münzenberg was not, however, content with Roy’s explanation, wondering whether the 
Comintern even intended to support the preparations for the congress. Proud of the fact that the 
IAH had managed to sustain the activities of the LACO, and for as long the Eastern Secretariat 
ignored the request of a sending a “reliable Comrade”, Münzenberg warned Roy that the congress 
would most likely fail. Yet, the anti-colonial project would not slip through the IAH’s fingers. 
According to Münzenberg, if the Comintern continued to ignore his requests, the IAH intended to 
turn the congress into a genuine IAH affair, and convene the event in Berlin in September or 
October. This warning was a response to the lack of information on political, administrative and 
financial issues from the Eastern Secretariat, and Münzenberg concluded that the Comintern 
should not count on gaining access to the anti-colonial movement in Berlin, Europe and beyond.257 
This was an act of blackmail, through which Münzenberg’s quite desperate attempt to threaten 
Roy, in retrospect, only aimed to secure the Comintern’s support. Münzenberg's warning had the 
desired effect. According to the ECCI Secretariat (authored by Roy), 
The congress should not be a narrow I.A.H. Conference. It should be given a broad political 
character and called the “International Congress of Colonial People”.258 
Roy was the author of this response, which the ECCI Secretariat used to criticise Münzenberg’s 
agenda. According to the ECCI Secretariat, Münzenberg should forget the idea of staging “a 
narrow I.A.H. Conference”, and his agenda needed correction. What did Münzenberg’s agenda 
contain? Firstly, the congress should focus on the geographical spread and impact of IAH’s relief 
campaigns in colonial and semi-colonial countries. Secondly, Münzenberg wanted Fimmen, the 
British socialist George Lansbury, an unknown individual of the German left-wing movement and 
colonial delegates in Berlin to lead the congress and to present reports on the colonial liberation 
                                               
256 RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 29/5- 
1926. Münzenberg was not satisfied with Roy's explanation, and expressed doubt as to whether Schneller’s 
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Münzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 24/6-1926. 
257 RGASPI 542/1/3, 13-14, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 24/6-1926. 
258 RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926. For a  
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the meeting were Piatnitsky, Stern, Smeral, Ercoli, Kornblum, Pepper, Petrov, and Roy; RGASPI 495/18/432, 1-4, 
Protokoll Nr.80 der Sitzung des Sekretariats des EKKI, 5/7-1926. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Ercoli, 
Codovilla, Smeral, Kornblum, Roy, Gyptner, Petrov and Heimo. 
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struggle.259 However, the ECCI Secretariat’s expectations for the congress appeared to be 
somewhat different. According to the ECCI Secretariat’s “secret instruction”, the congress was a 
forum at which reports were to be given “on imperialist oppression in the colonies by 
representatives of the respective countries”; “the liberation movement in the colonies and its 
support by the working class in the imperialist countries”, having “Eddo” [sic] Fimmen and 
Lansbury delivering the speeches. The congress should also discuss the co-ordination of “the 
liberation and working class movements in the colonial countries” in order to stimulate the 
establishment of “a permanent organisation to support the liberation movement in the colonies”.260 
Apparently, the 2 July agenda was only a revised version of the agenda which had been included 
with the LACO congress invitation, which Gibarti had begun to send out in March. In September, 
the LACO Provisional Committee adopted the final version of the agenda at a meeting in Berlin: 
Proposed by the Provisional Committee to the Congress of the Oppressed Nations. 
[1.] Reports on the oppression of the imperialist powers in the colonies and other countries, 
menaced in their independence. (Speakers shall be the representatives of all oppressed 
nations.) 
[2.] The emancipation movement of the oppressed nations and its support by labour 
organisations and progressive parties in the imperialist countries. (Speakers on this point 
shall be: George Lansbury, M. P. London; Edo Fimmen, General Secretary of the 
International Transport Workers’ Federation, Amsterdam and the General Secretary of the 
LACO, Berlin. 
[3.] The co-ordination of the forces of the national emancipation movement with the forces 
of the labour movement in the colonial as well as in the imperialist countries. 
[4.] The building-up of the LACO as a great International Organisation in order to link up all 
forces combating international imperialism and to ensure the effective support of the 
emancipation fight of the oppressed nations.261 
Gibarti, Danziger, and Chatto circulated this September agenda to organisations, associations and 
individuals around the world. In some cases, e.g. in Egypt and the Sudan, British security services 
intercepted and thus prevented the invitations and agenda from reaching their final destinations. 
However, the invitations did also reach some of the recipients, e.g. Robert Minor, the member of 
the Central Executive Committee of the WPA in Chicago, did receive Gibarti’s letter. However, the 
security services did successfully manage to disrupt the LACO International Secretariat’s 
                                               
259 RGASPI 542/1/3, 13-14, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 24/6-1926. This is the first occasion  
when Münzenberg introduced the names of preferred actors to represent the political nature of the congress. 
260 RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926. 
261 RGASPI 495/18/484, 5, Agenda – Proposed by the Provisional Committee, Gibarti, September 1926. 
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correspondence. In order, therefore, to attract attention to the congress, the LACO decided to 
circulate the invitation in December 1926. This invitation itself also proved just how much the 
LACO's reputation had improved by referring to the members of the “Provisional Committee of 
the International Congress against Colonial Oppression”. This group was introduced as the official 
organisers of the congress and comprised: Mme Sun Yat-sen; Kou Meng-yu; Jawaharlal Nehru; the 
Egyptian Mohamed Hafiz Ramadan Bey; Ramon de Negri from Mexico; the German scholar 
Theodor Lessing; Goldschmidt; Münzenberg; Barbusse; the French author Fernand Buisson; 
Albert Fournier; Lansbury; the leader of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) James Maxton; 
Saklatvala; the scholar and representative of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Coloured People (NAACP) William Pickens; the pacifist and leader of the American Civil 
Liberties Union Roger Baldwin; as well as delegates of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico José 
Vasconcelos, Manuel Ugarte, Louis Casabona and César Falcon.262 This “Provisional Committee” 
was a reflection of the disparate political and cultural characters involved in the anti-colonial 
movement, with the LACO representing itself to the public as a non-party organisation. 
      “The Anti-Colonial Pilgrimage”: The Brussels Congress was an event the ECCI Secretariat 
wanted to use as a forum and channel to create an “international demonstration against colonialism 
and imperialism” against the “most important imperialist countries” in Europe. It was a question of 
stirring up interest and attention before the congress. According to Gibarti, this depended on 
“enlisting the widest possible support” in Europe amongst the “desirable elements”, and on turning 
the congress into an anti-colonial “pilgrimage” linking together believers from the labour 
movement, from colonial, cultural and relief organisations, and from both intellectuals and 
individuals. Gibarti expected that a demonstration against colonialism would tip the scale in favour 
of “centralising” the movement and provide impetus to “every anti-imperialist force” around the 
world. In fact, Gibarti argued that the IAH’s philanthropy, symbolised by the Hands off China 
campaign and the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, was evidence of the IAH’s 
constructive political work on the colonial question.263 
                                               
262 Chatto had begun to work at the LACO International Secretariat after the “Rathauskeller” Conference in February  
1926; TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Letter from the LACO Secretariat, Berlin, signed F. Danziger & L. Gibarti, to 
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263 SAPMO-BA, ZPA R 3003/ORA/1218 Sammlung 6 – Rote Hilfe, 29-30, “Der koloniale Freiheitskampf –  
Mitteilungsblatt der Liga gegen Unterdrückung“, Nr. 3, Berlin, 5/7-1926. Gibarti suggested a number of current 
political topics, e.g. China, Syria, the Rif’s rebellion in Morocco, the strike movement in the Dutch-Indies, and Egypt 
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      After the ECCI Secretariat had resolved to disclose the intentions behind the Brussels Congress 
and, especially in connection with the establishment of the CGWCC in Moscow, Münzenberg was 
able to calm down for the moment. It was now a question of when, and whether, the congress 
would be able to be convened. 
 
* 
 
Postponement 
From August 1926 till January 1927, the negotiations between Münzenberg and the decision-
makers at Comintern headquarters gained pace. For Münzenberg, the LACO International 
Secretariat had to distribute propaganda and information on the congress, increase its preparatory 
work and verify its contacts with colonial activists.264 According to Münzenberg in his article, “For 
an Colonial Conference” (Für eine Kolonialkonferenz), published in Inprecorr on 3 August: 
[…] the most important step which the League [LACO] has taken is the effort to convoke in 
the course of the present year an International Conference which shall unite the 
representatives of numerous colonial and semi-colonial countries, as well as the 
representatives of organisations in all States which are sympathetically inclined towards the 
endeavours of colonial peoples.265 
While this article served as an opportunity to draw attention to the anti-colonial congress, for 
Münzenberg, however, it also served as an opportunity to put pressure on the decision-makers in 
Moscow: Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Piatnitsky and Roy. Münzenberg explained to Roy that one of the 
reasons for going public in Inprecorr was due to the results of his negotiations with Roy, the ECCI 
and the Eastern Secretariat in June-July. Yet this article was not Münzenberg’s own product. In 
fact, Bukharin had given Münzenberg some advice on how to formulate the text and strengthen his 
argumentation.266 Münzenberg seemed to believe that, once the ECCI Secretariat had given its 
consent, and with the formation of the CGWCC, it would be possible to convene the congress in 
October or November. The ECCI Secretariat was, however, of a different opinion and, already in 
July, told Münzenberg to wait until the spring of 1927. This was a recommendation that went 
                                                                                                                                                          
as focal points to “centralise the movement”, see RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat in 
Moscow to Münzenberg in Berlin, 2/7-1926. 
264 RGASPI 542/1/3, 22, Letter from Münzenberg, Carlsbad, to Roy, Moscow, 14/7-1926. 
265 William Gillies, the “International Secretary” of the British Labour Party, used excerpts from Münzenberg’s  
Inprecorr article as the basis for an analysis of the LAI in 1927, see TNA HO 144 10693. 
266 Apparently, Münzenberg stopped sending any letters to Zinoviev in August. One logical reason is that Münzenberg  
was keenly following how the internal power struggle within the CPSU (B) was progressing over time; Gross 1967, 
p.199. Taken from Inprekorr, 3/8-1926, p.301; RGASPI 542/1/3, 35, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, 
Moscow, 24/8-1926. 
114 
 
against Münzenberg’s ambition to capitalise on the enthusiasm which organisations, committees 
and individuals had expressed towards the congress.267 
      Münzenberg knew, however, that Bukharin supported his vision of continuing the preparations 
for the congress, despite the risk of postponement and the lack of support from the ZK KPD. 
Additionally, Münzenberg seemed to have avoided informing Roy of Bukharin’s support in writing 
the Inprecorr article.268 In September, Münzenberg requested that Manuilsky and Bukharin exert 
pressure on both Roy and the CGWCC in order to change their minds about postponing the 
congress.269 On 13 September, however, Münzenberg’s enthusiasm waned after a meeting with the 
LACO Executive in Berlin. Gibarti reported on how the preparations were progressing, only to 
conclude that it was both illogical and impossible to hold the congress in October or November – 
“it is essential to prepare the Congress with the utmost care” – recommending that the LACO 
Executive endorse the decision to postpone the event. The LACO “kom.Fraktion” authorised this 
decision at its meeting on 14 September, where the members, the PCF representative, Pierre 
Sémard, Saklatvala, the KPD member Philipp Dengel and Gibarti, all questioned Münzenberg’s 
motive for rushing the process, urging him to understand that January 1927 was a far better 
option.270 The “kom.Fraktion” examined the lists of invitations, the nomination of key speakers 
and Münzenberg’s budget (which he had sent to Bukharin). According to his budget, the congress 
was estimated to cost $15,000, out of which the IAH intended to contribute $10,000 with the 
additional $5,000 coming from the Comintern.271 
 
* 
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Assembling Connections and the Pacifist Approach  
 
I merely take care of the organisational and technical preparations; the political preparation 
must, by all means, be taken care of by a responsible representative from the Comintern.    
    Münzenberg to Bukharin, 9/9-192 
 
Using Brussels as the arena for this anti-colonial congress had been an essential question for 
Münzenberg to resolve ever since August 1925. According to Gross, Münzenberg instructed 
Gibarti to visit Brussels in the autumn of 1926 and begin making enquiries with the proper 
authorities in order to see whether the congress could be convened in the colonial metropolis.272 
The reason why Münzenberg wanted to locate the congress in Brussels needs clarification. Firstly, 
the LACO hoped to capitalise on the symbolism of the city, especially its status as one of the 
leading imperialist nations in Europe after the Great War. This made it logical for the LACO, 
therefore, to use the colonial metropolis as a springboard for anti-colonial propaganda. The 
challenge was to convince the Belgian authorities to approve of the idea, a process which involved 
both ad hoc solutions and deliberate deceit, in which Gibarti assumed his role to perfection in 
order to create smoke screens concealing the covert agency of both the LACO and the Comintern. 
However, the congress in Brussels was a last minute call. On 11 November 1926, Gibarti sent a 
letter to Robert Minor in Chicago, telling him that the anti-colonial congress in Brussels would 
open on 20 January, 1927.273 However, this was not true. In fact, neither Gibarti nor the LACO had 
received permission from the Belgian authorities in November; instead, the negotiations were an 
uncertain and tedious process. 
      Gibarti initiated negotiations with Emile Vandervelde, the Belgian Foreign Minister, leader of 
the Parti Ouvrier Belge (Belgian Labour Party) and secretary of the LSI, in October. Vandervelde 
had a well-known reputation within the European left-wing political movement for his long-
standing commitment against the social effects of Belgian colonialism, particularly the 
implementation and administration of the system in the Congo Free State. Critical of the splendour 
and decorations in Brussels, on one occasion in the Belgian parliament, Vandervelde made a 
sarcastic remark about the “monumental arches which will someday be called the Arches of the 
Severed Hands”. For Münzenberg and Gibarti, one of the primary aims in approaching 
Vandervelde was to expose the LSI’s indifference and lack of commitment towards the colonial 
question. Thus, Vandervelde experienced it as “difficult to turn down” Gibarti’s proposal, 
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according to Gross. Yet, Vandervelde demanded a service in return from Gibarti. The LACO had to 
promise that the congress would not contain any derogatory statements and avoid commenting on 
Belgian colonialism, especially the social situation in Congo. Additionally, Gibarti had to send a 
detailed list, containing the names and political affiliation of every delegate to the Belgian Foreign 
Ministry, a document later passed on to the Belgian security service Sûreté. If the LACO fulfilled 
these demands, Vandervelde promised Gibarti that the LACO could use Brussels as the venue, 
placing the medieval palace Palais d’ Egmont at their disposal.274 
      Gibarti and Vandervelde concluded their negotiations in January 1927. However, prior to this, 
the uncertainty of when and whether Vandervelde would answer the request resulted in 
Münzenberg developing a strained relationship to the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters. 
This dilemma focused on determining who was responsible for completing the political, financial 
and administrative preparations. In Münzenberg's opinion, Kuusinen, Bukharin and Manuilsky had 
to organise the political agenda, Piatnitsky the budget, while Münzenberg expected to conclude the 
administrative work in collaboration with both Roy and the CGWCC. To further pressurise the 
decision-makers in Moscow, Münzenberg frequently repeated: “interest in this colonial conference 
is growing”.275 While Münzenberg and the LACO waited for Vandervelde to decide whether the 
congress would be able to convene in January or February, this went completely against the 
explicit ambition of both the ECCI and the Eastern Secretariat. On 29 December 1926, Roy 
submitted a draft resolution from the CGWCC, “Resolution on the International Congress against 
Imperialist Oppression to be held at Brussels”, to the Political Secretariat, which recommended a 
different date for the congress to the one given by Münzenberg and Gibarti. Apparently, the 
CGWCC emphasised the necessity to postpone the congress “until June 1927 in order that 
satisfactory preparations [could] be made”. On 4 January 1927, at a meeting at Comintern 
headquarters, Roy decided along with Petrov, Bukharin and the French communist Edgar Morin, 
on the advisability of postponing the congress.276 Receiving information of this decision, as 
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included in the CGWCC resolution, Münzenberg contacted Heimo – appointed as liaison for 
Münzenberg and the IAH at Comintern headquarters in December 1926 – telling him that Gibarti 
had not yet concluded the negotiations with Vandervelde. According to Münzenberg, Heimo had to 
realise that: 
One must not forget that the congress was […] suggested by us [the IAH], arranged by us 
from the very beginning, of course in agreement and by a wish from our friends over there 
[Comintern, Moscow] to organise as wide as possible in order to include bourgeoisie, petty 
bourgeoisie, left-wing labour unions and social democratic layers […] The people actually 
believe that they are leading the thing [Brussels Congress]. This belief has to be maintained 
at any cost.277 
Münzenberg wanted the Comintern to understand the necessity of maintaining this belief about the 
congress amongst “the people”, represented by the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, left-wing labour 
unions and social democratic “layers”. However, the stress of not receiving an answer from 
Vandervelde, combined with the pressure from the decision-makers in Moscow, forced 
Münzenberg to question whether the Comintern intended to support the congress at all. 
Münzenberg told the ECCI Secretariat that, during his recent visit to Moscow, in connection with 
the Seventh ECCI Plenum in November, Bukharin, Kuusinen and Piatnitsky had agreed to let the 
LACO hold the congress in February 1927. However, if postponement was the only option left, the 
ECCI Secretariat had to guarantee a couple of Münzenberg’s demands. Firstly, the ECCI 
Presidium had to propose a new date. Secondly, the Eastern Secretariat should send a “reliable 
Comrade” from Moscow to conclude preparations with Münzenberg in Berlin. This final demand 
was all about money. Münzenberg stated that Piatnitsky had to reach a decision on the budget and 
deposit $5,000 in one of his bank accounts in Berlin in order to guarantee the continuation of the 
congress preparations.278 Münzenberg contacted Piatnitsky, urging him to understand that if the 
congress was postponed ad infinitum, the Comintern had to send a “large allowance” [sum 
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unknown] to pay for the prolonged stay of the delegations in Brussels and Berlin, as well as to 
cover the preparatory work of the “kom.Fraktion”, which would have to be cancelled unless the 
money was forthcoming. This remark did the trick. Piatnitsky revised the budget and, in the case 
of postponement, granted every delegate the sum of 15 Marks per day to cover extra expenses.279 
      In the beginning of January, the Belgian Foreign Ministry approved the LACO’s application. 
Nevertheless, the LACO was well prepared. According to the December invitation from the LACO 
“Provisional Committee”: “we heartily invite you to attend the Congress convoked by them on 10th 
February 1927, in Brussels”. A bold act and, furthermore, once the decision of the Foreign 
Ministry in Belgium became a known fact, reactions were particularly harsh. How did the news of 
the date of the Brussels Congress become known? Firstly, the Colonial Office in London received 
intelligence informing them of the visit by a British communist, Andrew Rothstein, to the LACO 
International Secretariat in Berlin on 10-11 January. At this meeting, Bach mentioned that the 
Brussels Congress was “definitely fixed for February 10th”. Secondly, Münzenberg told the ECCI 
Secretariat that the protests by the Dutch and the USA governments had not influenced the 
decision of the Belgians to authorise the congress. Additionally, the Belgian authorities had 
promised Gibarti that they would neither interfere with nor harass the delegates at the first 
“International Congress against Imperialist Oppression” at the Palais d’Egmont in Brussels, 
scheduled to convene on 10 February, 1927.280 Münzenberg’s statement did not, however, 
convince the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters that it would be convenient to hold the 
congress on 10 February, especially as the question of the “desirable elements” of the political 
agenda had not yet been resolved.  
      The members of the CGWCC – Roy, Petrov and Vittorio (“Victorio”) Codovilla, a communist 
of Italian origin (who had emigrated to Argentina at an early age) – warned Münzenberg of the 
potential risk that the congress could become a showcase of “ideological confusion”. According to 
the CGWCC, the political and cultural nature of the contacts the LACO had established with the 
different organisations, associations and individuals since February 1926, was the major reason for 
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raising this concern. However, once the CGWCC understood the ramifications and potential use of 
the invited delegates, some of whom had an international reputation and could be recruits for 
communism, the criticism eased off. Jawaharlal Nehru was a typical example of this. While 
Gandhi refrained from any further contacts with Gibarti and the LACO, Nehru, on the other hand, 
told Chatto of his intention to participate in the congress. For Gibarti, this was a major political 
victory, and he urgently informed the ECCI Secretariat in a telegram, Gross writes, that Nehru 
intended to attend the congress as an accredited delegate of the Indian National Congress. Hearing 
that Nehru was planning to attend, the CGWCC relaxed its suspicious attitude.281 
      Nehru visited Europe in 1926, travelling with wife Kamila, and arrived in Berlin in December 
1926. Nehru later wrote of his impressions of Berlin in his book, An Autobiography (1936) and, in 
the context of the Brussels Congress, quickly realised the necessity of attending this international 
demonstration against colonialism and imperialism: 
I learnt there of a forthcoming Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, which was to be held in 
Brussels. The idea appealed to me, and I wrote home [to his father Motilal Nehru and the 
INC, author’s own remark], suggesting that the INC might take official part in the Brussels 
Congress.282  
However, what tipped the scale in favour of Nehru’s desire to participate in the congress was, 
primarily, a personal reason. The relationship between Nehru and Chatto’s sister, Sarojini Naidu, 
the renowned poet from India and anti-colonial activist, better known as the “Nightingale of 
India”, who had also acted as the leader of the INC for a brief period in the 1920s, was a 
contributing factor in convincing him to participate. According to Barooah, Nehru treasured his 
“friendly relations with many members of Chatto’s family in India”, which also provided him with 
access to “political exiles and radical elements from abroad” who were living in Berlin. The INC 
had to approve of Nehru’s request to attend as the accredited delegate of the organisation, which 
his father, Motilal Nehru, confirmed in a letter to Nehru, dated 30 December.283 
      This was part of the administrative puzzle Gibarti masterminded in constructing an impressive 
list of prominent delegates. Another example was the case of Casely Hayford, to whom Gibarti 
sent an invitation, along with a second letter to the West African journal, The Gold Coast Leader, 
in Sekondi. However, Gibarti seems to have been unaware of the fact that Casely Hayford was in 
England, thus it was his brother, Sydney S. Hayford, who received the letter. In his reply to 
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282 Nehru 1936, p.161. 
283 Barooah 2004, pp.248-249, 277; Motilal Nehru to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30/12-1926. Taken from Jawaharlal Nehru, A  
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Gibarti, which British security services intercepted and passed on to the CO, Sydney S. Hayford 
stated that he, along with his brother and The Gold Coast Leader”, were in “sympathy” with the 
LACO and, wondered whether Gibarti could send any additional material.284 A third example 
illustrates the attempts to spread the word on the LACO's political agenda and the Brussels 
Congress in Mexico. The LACO intended to use the strategy of the Hands off China campaign, in 
particular the collection of names of prominent German intellectuals to sign petitions, in order to 
establish a Hands off Mexico campaign in both Mexico and the USA in the autumn of 1926. 
Münzenberg informed Bukharin that the reason for this was to protest against the “imperialist 
attempts [the USA] to interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico”.285 
      The despatching of congress invitations and other documents on the Brussels Congress made 
the LACO prone to closer inspection by national security services. British security branches in 
North Africa co-ordinated their monitoring to see whether any material from the LACO was being 
circulated in the region. For example, British colonial authorities in the Sudan confiscated a 
document which included the names and addresses of organisations and individuals invited to the 
congress. From a theoretical perspective, this document depicted the transcontinental ambitions 
and magnitude of the LACO in 1926. Apparently, the LACO had invited one hundred and one 
organisations, represented by one hundred and thirty-four delegates, who either knew about the 
Brussels Congress or were planning to attend it. For the British Empire, the agenda and possible 
impact of the Brussels Congress posed a potential threat, especially if the invitations had reached 
anti-colonial activists in India (21) and Egypt (75).286 
      However, the intercepted LACO document did not disclose the actual nature of the LACO 
network. In fact, at this point in time, it was a sparsely-populated and small structure. Aside from 
its German connections and its covert liaison with the Comintern, the LACO had only succeeded 
in engaging a few individuals in Great Britain, especially the British socialist and avid anti-
colonial activist, Reginald Bridgeman. As the leader of the London-based Chinese Information 
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Bureau (CIB), which was reporting on the development and activities of the KMT in 1926, as well 
as having a web of contacts to the Chinese anti-colonial movement in England, Bridgeman’s 
network was a source coveted by the LACO. According to the Colonial Office, in a report on the 
“activities of the ‘League against Oppression in the Colonies’”, Bridgeman and Saklatvala had 
held meetings in London in November-December 1926 to discuss the necessary steps in forming a 
British LACO section. On 2 December, a meeting was held in the House of Commons in London, 
attended by representatives of the CPGB, the Labour Party and the ILP – Saklatvala, Lansbury, 
Ellen Wilkinson, J. Compton, J. J. Tinker and Ernest Thurtle, and a decision was made to establish 
a British LACO section. Aware of the risk represented by the LACO’s communist ties, Saklatvala 
recommended that Gibarti and Münzenberg treat the “Russian connection … boldly and without 
reservations”. Yet, it was through Bridgeman’s contacts, not Saklatvala, that the LACO 
International Secretariat maintained its contacts with the British section in London.287 Despite the 
existence of a section in London, which existed merely on paper for the sole purpose of sending 
delegates from a “leading imperialist nation” to Brussels, British security services suspected that 
the organisation could become a future political force to reckon with. Hence, it was of particular 
value for the security services to register any kind of evidence that indicated an increase in LACO 
activities and, in general, any anti-colonial activism in Great Britain and the colonies. Nonetheless, 
other governmental agencies in London, e.g. the British Foreign Office, concluded that, after 
examining the “composition of the [LACO] Executive”, the security services could be assured of 
“a sufficient guarantee that nothing practical will ever be accomplished by this League”.288 
      The situation in Germany was completely different. Towards the end of 1926, the LACO and 
the Brussels Congress were both topics intertwined with the anti-colonial and pacifist movements 
in Germany. The RKÜöO had observed the chronological development of the LACO and 
concluded that the organisation had intimate ties to nine pacifist organisations and associations: 
Bund der religiöse Sozialisten, Bund Entschiedener Schulreformer, Deutscher Monistenbund, 
Vereinigung der Freunde von Religion und Völkerfrieden, Deutsche Bund für Mutterschutz, 
Grossdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft, Volksbund für Geistesfreiheit, Bund freier sozialistischer 
Organisationen and the LHR. The RKÜöO did not, however, focus on the question of whether the 
LACO was a communist organisation or not. Instead, it focused on why the LHR had a connection 
to the KPD. Noting the relationship between Münzenberg and Lehmann-Russbüldt, which also 
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implied an instrumental link to IAH headquarters in Berlin, the RKÜöO increased its surveillance 
of the LHR during November 1926 – January 1927, for the purpose of verifying a link between 
these two organisations. The RKÜöO ended its investigation, completed a report in January and 
passed on the material to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior (MdI). According to this report, the 
LHR was a “revolutionary, pacifist” organisation which endorsed “extreme deviationist” 
tendencies, e.g. the abolishment of the Reichswehr and the right to refuse military conscription. 
Nevertheless, the greatest worry was the suspicion that the LHR seemed to be a channel for getting 
its members into the KPD.289 This report did not mention the connection between the LACO and 
the LHR, despite including the reference to Münzenberg as a member of the LACO Executive. 
Thus, it seems as though the RKÜöO had not been able to confirm the location of the LRH office 
in Berlin as the LHR shared the same corridor as the LACO and, according to the recollections of 
Buber-Neumann in her book, Von Potsdam Nach Moskau (1957), she asked herself “[O]ur 
neighbour fought for ‘human rights’, we for ‘anti-imperialism’. Was this not in principle the 
same?”290 
 
* 
 
The Aggravated Network       
In January 1927, Münzenberg’s relationship to the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters on 
the question of the Brussels Congress was irrational due to a number of incidents which ultimately 
aggravated the network and threw the congress preparations into confusion. At this point in time, 
some of the actors began to question the very essence of both the Brussels Congress and the anti-
colonial project, which culminated in the Comintern’s demand to postpone the event. All of the 
above was a result of the faltering administrative, financial and political preparations, a dilemma 
that weighed heavily upon Münzenberg, the IAH and the LACO. Indicative of this tense dilemma, 
the earlier trickle of correspondence between Münzenberg and Comintern headquarters suddenly 
increased dramatically during January and up until the beginning of February. According to the 
documents in the LAI and IAH fond, Münzenberg despatched twenty-three letters and telegrams to 
Heimo (17), the ECCI Secretariat (5) and Kuusinen (1), whilst Heimo and the ECCI Secretariat 
sent seven letters to Münzenberg.291 Additionally, the LACO International Secretariat looked as if 
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it was heading towards total chaos in January, an unwanted scenario, characterised by impatience, 
indecisiveness and uncertainty, which placed the final phase of preparing the “first international 
demonstration against colonialism and imperialism” in a critical situation. However, the attempted 
revolutionary uprisings in Indonesia, first in Java in November 1926 and a second attempt in 
Sumatra in January 1927, suddenly emerged as a convenient moment for the LACO to increase its 
propaganda advertising the Brussels Congress in Germany. 
 
* 
 
From Indonesia to Berlin 
The nationalist uprising in Indonesia was a violent protest against Dutch colonial rule. Organised 
and staged by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), the uprising also provided the communists 
with the opportunity to infiltrate and assume control over the Indonesian nationalist organisation, 
Sarekat Rakjat, and strengthen the opposition against the religious association, Sarekat Islam. The 
colonial disorder in Batavia in November 1926, and in Silungkang, Sumatra, in January 1927, was 
a blueprint of the kind of anti-colonial turmoil that was breaking out during the 1920s. Armed 
forces confronted the police in Batavia and managed to destroy communication devices (telephone 
exchanges and cables) before the Dutch military put an end to the chaos in December. The 
Sumatran attempt ended in a similar way, leaving 13,000 arrested and several casualties in its 
wake. In the aftermath of the disorder, a number of Indonesian communists escaped to Singapore 
in what was then the British Straits Settlement in order to re-route the “anti-Dutch activities” and 
find new recruits to the communist movement. The leader of the PKI, Tan Malaka, supervised this 
work. However, later, in October 1927, he appeared in Berlin, suspected of acting as an LAI 
“agent”, according to the RKÜöO.292  
      The idea to raise awareness of the Indonesian disorder in Germany did not emanate from the 
LACO International Secretariat. The ECCI Secretariat instructed Heimo to get Münzenberg to 
establish a proletarian solidarity campaign in support of the Javanese revolutionaries and to use the 
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LACO for this purpose. The IAH apparatus in Berlin was to provide organisational assistance and 
guarantee the carrying out of the campaign, however, the campaign was to, more importantly, 
highlight the propaganda concerning the anti-colonial congress. The LACO adopted a pacifist 
ethos for the Indonesian campaign which, according to Münzenberg, would ensure that the protests 
against the implementation of capital punishment in Java would get the LHR and German 
intellectuals to support the campaign. Using similar propaganda methods to those that had been 
developed by the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, the LACO sent a protest telegram to 
the Dutch Foreign Ministry in The Hague on 11 January.293 According to this telegram, signed by 
Gibarti, the “General Secretary of the ‘World League against Colonial Oppression’”, the LACO 
opposed the “draconian measures of oppression” in Java and Sumatra. Prominent individuals 
supported the petition, e.g. Barbusse, Georges Pioch, Emilie Chauvelon, Léon Werth, Albert 
Fournier, Maxton, Helen Crawfurd, S. O. Davies, Frances Countess of Warridge, Arthur James (A. 
J.) Cook, Lansbury, Arthur Holitscher, Goldschmidt, Alfons Paquet, Helene Stöcker, Lehmann-
Russbüldt, Pfarrer Bleier and Eduard Fuchs, the German author and communist, who had been 
involved in the covert operations of the West European Secretariat (WES) as cashier. This petition 
urged the Dutch Foreign Ministry to allow an “impartial commission” to travel to Java and 
Sumatra to conduct an investigation, this group consisting of the author Bernhard Shaw, the 
French physicist Paul Langevin as well as the explorer and philanthropist Fridtjof Nansen from 
Norway. However, nothing of the above happened and an LAI delegation left Europe to visit India 
and the Far East in 1927-28. This visit will be more closely explored in the following chapter. 
Nonetheless, for Münzenberg, the Java campaign had finally begun to erode the value of using the 
names of intellectuals and left-wing politicians, telling Heimo that “unfortunately it is so, that the 
frequent use of these signatures wears [them] out, and [they] are no longer that effective”.294 
      The Java campaign in Germany was a vehicle used to raise awareness of the Brussels 
Congress, e.g. at public meetings in Berlin. On 13 January, “at 8 o’clock” in the “Festsaal des 
Herrenhaus”, the LACO held a meeting, at which the NAACP representative, the “American 
Negro Professor” William Pickens, was introduced. Pickens delivered a speech on “Das 
Negerproblem in Nordamerika”, along with the Chinese delegate Chi Kai-chi [real name: Ch’ao-
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Ting Chi, delegate of the Association for the Spreading of Sun-Yat-Senism in America]. Both 
Gibarti and the German journalist Leo Laina used the evening as an opportunity to provide 
information about the Brussels Congress and to nominate candidates of the German LACO section 
who would attend the event: Arthur Holitscher, Ernst Toller, Lucie Peters and the secretary Hans 
Jäger.295 An undisclosed informant in the service of Auswärtige Amt, who identified 
himself/herself as a member of the pro-colonial association Vereinigung für deutsche Siedlung und 
Wanderung, also attended this meeting and sent a report on the pacifist nature of the LACO. 
According to this report, the LACO had co-operated with the Bund der Kriegsgegener und 
Kriegsverweigerer, an association suspected of nourishing communist links and, further, Pickens’ 
speech was a “lengthy and irrelevant” oration on the Negro question. At the end of the meeting, the 
informant had a private talk with Gibarti which left the unidentified informant with the impression 
that Gibarti was not a German but instead a 28-year-old Jew from Hungary.296 
      Münzenberg appreciated Pickens performance and physical presence in Berlin, especially as it 
gave him a chance to meet and hold discussions with anti-colonial activists. However, Münzenberg 
was not capable of solving every personal issue. Jimmy La Guma, a South African communist 
from Cape Town and delegate of the African National Congress (ANC), arrived either in Berlin or 
in Brussels in January, although no preparations had been made beforehand to sort out where to 
accommodate him, a question that left Münzenberg dumbfounded and unsure as to how to act.297 
The second question, characteristic of Münzenberg’s erratic behaviour during the final stages of 
the congress preparations, was his relationship to the German communist press. It did not matter 
that Münzenberg had a media empire of his own, other journals and newspapers of the communist 
press were a crucial factor in creating maximum exposure for the congress. However, Münzenberg 
argued that none of them seemed to care. The daily official organ of the KPD, Die Rote Fahne, had 
failed completely by not including a single word on the congress, according to Münzenberg. 
Accusing the editors of “sabotaging” the IAH and the LACO, Münzenberg urged Heimo to 
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instigate an impartial investigation to find out the reasons for this mistake.298 Heimo had, however, 
already advised Münzenberg on how to solve the press question, a strategy which implied a 
conscious separation from the KPD press. According to Heimo, the LACO and the IAH apparatus 
should, as a first step, use every “source possible” to spread the word about the congress. The 
second step was to let the congress “Press Bureau” (“Presse-Büro”) assess the political persuasion 
of every newspaper that had declared an intention to attend. Thus, the only thing Heimo requested 
of Münzenberg was to distribute the agenda and general information concerning the congress to 
the “bourgeoisie press and its correspondents”, material that had to “get them to believe”.299 
 
* 
 
Chaotic Preparations: Determination vis-à-vis Hesitation    
Münzenberg approached the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters differently, depending on 
whom he chose to contact. Whilst he confronted Heimo in a straightforward manner, other actors 
received a more reverent approach. On 24 January, Münzenberg sent a letter to Kuusinen, asking 
him to understand that the work with the communist mass organisations was a “very personal 
question”, especially as the work contributed to building up a strong communist movement. As an 
example of his sincere devotion to this work, Münzenberg informed Kuusinen of his idea to create 
a “giant campaign in defence of Soviet Russia” and for it to coincide with the celebration of the 
Tenth Anniversary of the Russian Revolution. This idea also fitted the political framework of both 
the LACO and the Brussels Congress.300 According to Gross, Münzenberg was aware that he was 
playing a “high game”, especially after having realised that the anti-colonial project symbolised 
more than a mere support campaign for Soviet Russian foreign policy.301 Furthermore, in January, 
Münzenberg knew that relations with Comintern headquarters were about to reach a breaking 
                                               
298 SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/361, 1-3, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo in Moscow, 17/1-1927. A copy of  
Münzenberg’s letter is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/7, 30-32. 
299 Heimo informed Münzenberg that Inprecorr intended to publish articles, short reports and release telegrams about  
the congress, a procedure carried out using the strictest sense of selection and authorization of the material before 
publication. An unknown correspondent, nominated by the chief editor of the Inprecorr in Berlin, the Hungarian 
communist and journalist Gyula Alpári (pseudonym: Julius), would be in charge of this work. Additionally, a “special 
correspondent” from TASS intended to leave Moscow and visit the congress in Brussels, where he/she planned to 
write articles, see fol. RGASPI 538/2/40, 78, Letter from Heimo, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 5/2-1927. For 
Gyula Alpári/Julius, see Lazitch 1986, pp.4-5, and Morgan, Cohen, & Flinn (eds.) (2005). 
300 The Russian campaign also involved a conflict between Münzenberg and the German author and communist, 
Eduard Fuchs, formerly the cashier of the West European Secretariat (WES). The nature of this conflict was a 
competition, i.e. Münzenberg and Fuchs competed as to who was going to be the first to establish a support campaign 
in defence of the Soviet Union. On January 27, 1927, in a letter to Olga Kamenewa, Fuchs stated that the only good 
thing Münzenberg seemed capable of doing was to construct “Potemkinesque” façades. The LACO was a suitable 
example of where Münzenberg used the colonial liberation struggle as a strategy to lead the “stupid and ignorant”, see 
further see SAPMO-BA ZPA, NY 4005/73, 33, Letter from Eduard Fuchs, Berlin, to Clara Zetkin, Moscow, 27/1-
1927; SAPMO-BA ZPA NY 4005/73, 35-37, Letter from Eduard Fuchs, Berlin, to [Olga] Kamenewa, Moscow, 27/1-
1927. For Fuchs and WES, see Vatlin (2009). 
301 RGASPI 538/2/40, 37-41, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 24/1-1927; Gross 1967, p.202. 
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point. Frustrated over the fact that the IAH apparatus had supported the LACO in preparing the 
congress, instead of the Comintern, Münzenberg questioned if and when the Comintern would 
complete the political agenda and the material (the congress theses, resolutions and manifesto). 
Münzenberg notified Heimo that the Comintern had to understand that the anti-colonial movement 
was an “independent” movement, strong enough to turn the Comintern into a bystander in 
Brussels.302 Introducing the above to Petrov and Kuusinen, Münzenberg nonetheless promised to 
get the LACO to “increase activity on all fronts” in order to finish the preparatory work. Yet, the 
Comintern had to send a “politically responsible Comrade” to Berlin to prepare the political 
material.303 Additionally, Münzenberg wanted Heimo to let him know when Bukharin and 
Kuusinen had completed these theses and resolutions.304 
      Completing the Political Preparations and the “reliable Comrade(s)”: Münzenberg believed 
that only a “reliable Comrade” from Moscow could complete the political preparations in 
Berlin.305 A demand which, in turn, set in motion a process that, with hindsight, has proven 
difficult to decipher and assess. The “reliable Comrade” arrived in Berlin in January; however, the 
person had not travelled en route from Moscow, but from London. The identity of the “reliable 
Comrade” was David Alexandrovich Petrovsky, Comintern emissary and ECCI representative in 
the CPGB in London, who in Berlin had assumed the pseudonym “Isolde” (Isolde/Petrovsky). Any 
formal decision at Comintern headquarters sanctioning Isolde/Petrovsky’s mission to Berlin 
remains unknown, e.g. there is no mention of this decision in the protocols of either the ECCI, the 
Political Secretariat or the Organisational Department. Apparently, prior to Petrovsky’s arrival in 
Berlin, he had been in London in December to give, in total “secrecy”, instruction to a CPGB 
functionary, Philip Spratt, before his departure from England to India on a Comintern mission. 
This mission involved, for example, performing organisational work in India, establishing closer 
ties to the INC, supervising the activities of the communist Bengal Workers’ and Peasants’ Party 
and publishing a pamphlet on the Indian nationalist movement.306 According to a biographical 
                                               
302 RGASPI 542/1/7, 9, (Copy) Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, January 1927. 
303 RGASPI 542/1/3, 52, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Petrov, Moscow, 24/12-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 53,  
Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 24/12-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 39-40, Letter from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 9/9-1926. 
304 RGASPI 542/1/7, 15-17, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 15/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7, 19-20,  
Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 17/1-1927. The Political Secretariat wanted Bukharin and 
Kuusinen to write the material. 
305 RGASPI 538/2/40, 20-21, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 11/1-1927. 
306 According to the known pseudonyms used by Petrovsky presented in Davidson (et al.), “Isolde” was one of his  
aliases. Furthermore, biographical accounts and documents shed some light on Petrovsky’s whereabouts during 
December 1926-January 1927, see Davidson 2003, p.xxxiv; Haithcox 1971, pp.56-57; Degras vol.II 1960, p.558; 
Worley 2002, p.60, 82; Philip Spratt, Blowing Up India. Reminiscences and Reflections of a Former Comintern 
Emissary, Calcutta, Prachi Prakashan, 1955, pp.29-30. Clemens Dutt recommended sending Spratt to India. After 
Spratt had received secret instructions from Petrovsky in London, Dutt accompanied him to Paris. Once he had arrived 
in India, Spratt published the pamphlet India and China, which resulted in his arrest in August 1927. Later Spratt 
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summary of Petrovsky compiled by MI5, Petrovsky had assumed Roy’s position at the Eastern 
Secretariat in January 1927. The reason for this was that the Political Secretariat had assigned Roy 
to travel to Hankow in China, along with Jaques Doriot (PCF), Tom Mann (CPGB), Earl Russel 
Browder (WPA and Profintern) and the Chinese communist Tan Ping-shan, as representatives of 
the International Workers’ Delegation to attend the Pan-Pacific Labour Conference in May.307 
Thus, this required an administrative change in the anti-colonial project and its network, which left 
Roy detached from the colonial work in Europe, while Münzenberg expected Heimo to find a new 
liaison on the colonial question in Moscow. Evidently, the rather swift solution was to nominate 
Petrovsky, who depended on Roy to provide advice on how to approach this assignment in Berlin. 
On 15 January, Münzenberg sent a note to Heimo and thanked him for the arrival of the “Moscow 
delegate”.308 Nonetheless, Petrovsky was not the only “reliable Comrade” active in Berlin. On the 
contrary, traces of a second person, engaged to assist the machinery of both the Comintern and the 
Brussels Congress, was someone who identified himself/herself as “Irmgard”. The identity behind 
the pseudonym “Irmgard” remains a riddle. However, the strength of the information included in 
the correspondence from both Isolde/Petrovsky and “Irmgard” makes up for this ambiguity. Most 
importantly, these accounts provide an insight into how these two actors perceived the situation in 
Berlin which, in comparison to Münzenberg’s abrasive estimations to Heimo and the ECCI 
Secretariat, depict a completely different scenario. 
      Isolde/Petrovsky described the chaos and disorder at the LACO International Secretariat to 
Roy thus: “muddled as things are, we must try […] to make the best of it”, realising that 
postponement was no longer a valid option in January. With the continuing “ignorant” attitude of 
the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, a shadow was cast over the actual successes 
achieved by the LACO, especially the success in getting Nehru to participate in the congress 
which was a political victory. “Irmgard” outlined a more negative picture, portraying the 
“machinery” as being in total chaos, having only Gibarti and one steno-typist at the secretariat, 
whereas Münzenberg had spent too much money.309 Evidently, it seems that the assistance of 
“Irmgard” and Isolde/Petrovsky was not enough. Marcel Rosenberg, the Russian Foreign Council 
representative in Berlin, stepped in to help Münzenberg examine some of the documents of the 
                                                                                                                                                          
wrote that the motive for this mission was not to act “as an expert” on the Indian question, but rather “I was chosen 
because I was unknown to the police, and my job was to be […] a messenger and reporter”. 
307 TNA PRO KV2/1433, Biographical information on Bennett/Petrovsky, 17/6-1928; RGASPI 538/2/40, 55-58, Letter  
from Heimo, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 26/1-1927. The delegation wanted to establish contacts with Chinese 
communists and radical trade-union leaders, see Lazitch 1986, p.457, and the IWD and KMT, see Pantsov 2000; 
Haithcox 1971, pp.63-64. 
308 RGASPI 538/2/40, 55-58, Letter from Heimo, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 26/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7, 27,  
Letter from Isolde/Petrovsky, Berlin, to M.N. Roy, Moscow, 17/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7, 15-17, Letter from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 15/1-1927. 
309 RGASPI 542/1/7, 27, Letter from Isolde/Petrovsky, Berlin, to M.N. Roy, Moscow, 17/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7,  
62, Letter from “Irmgard”, Berlin, to Petrov, Moscow, 28/1-1927. 
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congress, e.g. reviewing lists of invited intellectuals and preparing the publication of bulletins for 
the congress. According to Gross, while Münzenberg was enthusiastic, Rosenberg did his best to 
enforce “the Moscow line” on the congress.310 
      In the end, the services of the “reliable Comrades” were not enough to calm Münzenberg 
down. Expecting the ECCI Secretariat to send Manuilsky, who, however, had no intentions of 
leaving Moscow, Heimo did his best to placate Münzenberg by informing him of the composition 
of the ECCI delegation.311 The Japanese communist, Sen Katayama, acting as the leader of this 
delegation, together with “Wright”,312 Wassiljew, A. Semaun and CPGB member Iosif (Joseph) 
Fineberg, planned to arrive in Brussels prior to the opening.313 This clashed with Münzenberg’s 
original idea of organising a meeting with the delegation in Berlin first, yet, due to the short space 
of time, the delegation had to travel directly to Brussels. Prior to their departure from Moscow, the 
ECCI Secretariat gave the ECCI delegation confidential directives, which recommended that they 
act carefully, be cautious of “every speech”, and “work out together with the speaker the theses 
and the plan”. The principle was the following,  
[1.] Our delegation organises its conferences cautiously without advertising them and 
without admitting any outsiders. [2.] The delegation as a whole as well as its individual 
members should by no means speak officially in our name. [3.] The task of the delegation is 
to secure leadership over the work of the Congress. [4.] With this in view the delegation 
distributes [sic] amongst its members present at the congress to find the elements nearest to 
us and to exert through them, their influence on the respective delegations.314 
Why did the ECCI Secretariat give the ECCI delegation these directives, and what was their 
motive? Firstly, the congress was a forum uniting the delegates around a common cause, thus, it 
was essential that the political agenda, the resolutions and the congress manifesto embodied this 
spirit of unity. Thus, this would facilitate their motive to “convert” the anti-colonial congress into 
“a grand anti-imperialist demonstration”. The second objective was to use the congress as a venue 
at which to launch propaganda against the colonial policies of both the LSI, the Amsterdam 
International and those of the social democratic movement and, above all, to portray the 
                                               
310 Gross 1967, pp.200-202. Münzenberg used his apartment at 9a Tiergarten for his meetings with Rosenberg. 
311 RGASPI 538/2/40, 45, Short note from Münzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 25/1-1927; RGASPI  
538/2/40, 60, Information (unknown author), Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 29/1-1927. The Profintern did not 
intend to send a delegation, see fol. RGASPI 538/2/40, 60, Letter from Heimo, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 29/1-
1927. 
312 A pseudonym most likely used either by Malayan communist and British Special Branch agent in the 1930s and  
1940s, Lai Tek, or the Australian communist Tom Wright (Kheng 1992, p.26). 
313 RGASPI 495/60/115, 5-6, Minutes of the meeting of the Brussels Commission, 28/2-1927; RGASPI 495/6/5, 33- 
33b, Auszug aus dem Protokoll Nr.17 der Sitzung der Eng-Kommission des Sekr., Moscow, 8/3-1927. 
314 RGASPI 495/18/534, 41-43, Instructions to the [ECCI] delegates to the Brussels Congress, 4/2-1927. 
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international communist movement as the real supporter of the colonial struggle.315 The ECCI 
delegation were not the only actors devoted to guaranteeing communist domination of the 
congress. The so-called “Fraktionsbüro” (Fraction Bureau) would finalise the resolutions and 
theses on location in Brussels. At the end of January, the ECCI Secretariat nominated the members 
of this “Fraktionsbüro”, consisting of the ECCI representative [Petrovsky], Walter Stöcker of the 
ZK KPD, Münzenberg, an unknown PCF delegate, and the leader of the CPGB Arthur MacManus 
(1891/92 – 1927). The general plan was to combine the expertise of the ECCI delegation and the 
“Fraktionsbüro” in Brussels in order to realise the vision outlined in the CGWCC resolution: 
[T]o set up an International Committee of the League Against Imperialist Oppression, and to 
draw all political and industrial working class organisations, bourgeois radical, pacifist and 
cultural bodies, sympathising with the liberation movements in the colonies […] into the 
League.316 
By the end of January, the political material was, however, nowhere near completion. 
Consequently, Münzenberg asked whether the ECCI Secretariat could allow the IAH to work out 
the guidelines for the material, suggesting Roy, Rothstein, Doriot and Isolde/Petrovsky to assist 
with the work.317 The ECCI Secretariat paid no attention to Münzenberg’s suggestion. However, at 
the same time, Münzenberg must have known that Bukharin and Kuusinen had not written the 
theses and resolutions. Hence, the ECCI Secretariat suggested that the ECCI delegation work out 
“on the spot depending on the composition of the Congress” together with the “Fraktionsbüro”, 
drafts for the theses and resolutions.318 This answer flew in the face of Münzenberg’s expectations. 
Apparently, the congress material was an essential factor which had to be presented and examined 
at the “fractional meeting” at the Hotel du Globe in Brussels at “4 pm” on 7 February, Münzenberg 
stated. Disappointed that Comintern headquarters had been unable to finish the political material 
“despite my insistent demands”, Münzenberg nonetheless had the intention to leave Berlin on 6 
February and visit Fimmen in Amsterdam before departing for Brussels.319 However, does this 
imply that there were other actors at play, aside from the ECCI delegation and the “Fraktionsbüro”, 
in resolving this dilemma? 
                                               
315 RGASPI 495/18/534, 41-43, Instructions to the [ECCI] delegates to the Brussels Congress, 4/2-1927. 
316 RGASPI 538/2/40, 55-58, Letter from Heimo, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 26/1-1927. For the resolution, see  
fol. RGASPI 495/3/2, 55-57, RESOLUTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS AGAINST IMPERIALIST 
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131 
 
      The choice fell on Karl August Wittfogel, the renowned Sinologist and scholar at the Institute 
for Social Research at Frankfurt University, also a member of the KPD, to complete some of the 
congress resolutions. G. L. Ulmen writes that Wittfogel received an urgent telegram from the ZK 
KDP summoning him to Berlin a couple of days before the opening of the congress. Living in 
Frankfurt, Wittfogel travelled immediately to Berlin and went straight to KPD headquarters. Once 
there, a ZK KPD representative told him that his recent book, Awakening China, which focused 
partly on the Chinese national liberation movement, had been brought to the attention of 
Comintern headquarters in Moscow. Yet, the visit served a far more important purpose. Wittfogel 
received the instruction that “somebody from over there [Moscow]” wanted to meet him in Berlin, 
whose identity remained unknown to Wittfogel (a plausible candidate is Isolde/Petrovsky), 
according to Ulmen. The primary purpose of this Comintern representative meeting Wittfogel was 
to get him to write the political resolution for the Brussels Congress, especially considering both 
his knowledge of and political engagement in the Chinese national liberation struggle. Initially 
honoured by having received an assignment, the effort required to write the resolution turned, 
however, into a gruesome experience. Understanding that he was not in any position to be able to 
oppose the wishes of the Comintern representative, which would also implicitly mean opposing 
the authority of the ZK KPD, Wittfogel chose to see it as an opportunity to attend the anti-colonial 
congress, as the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt did not want to pay for his journey to 
Brussels. The Comintern representative gave Wittfogel only a few days in which to complete the 
resolution. Wittfogel contacted his friend Fritz Weiss in Berlin to help him out, only to realise that 
the task was overwhelming: 
We just could not do it […] having spent one of the most tortured intellectual episodes of my 
life, I went back to the […] great unknown man from Moscow, on Monday morning and he 
said “Where is the resolution?, and I said, “There isn’t one. I just could not do it”.320 
The Comintern representative reacted with distress. However, without showing any sign of 
irritation, the representative invited Wittfogel to accompany him to Brussels and to assist the 
“great unknown man from Moscow” in protecting the “secret material … kept in his suitcase”.321 
      The preparatory work with the political material was a confused process, characterised by 
inefficiency, which confirmed the tense relations which had emerged between Münzenberg and the 
ECCI Secretariat. In fact, the outcome of this tedious process altered the original concept of the 
congress. According to the CGWCC resolution, the congress was supposed to support the 
nationalist liberation movements in the Middle East (Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Hedjaz and 
Mesopotamia), the French colonies in North Africa, India, Indonesia, China, Latin America and 
                                               
320 Ulmen 1978, pp.83-85. Fritz Weiss was also connected to the IAH in Berlin.  
321 Ulmen 1978, p.85. 
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“all” Negro organisations. On 4 February, the ECCI Secretariat instructed the ECCI delegation to 
implement a change in focus on the congress agenda and devote attention to the establishment of 
contacts with anti-colonial activists from India, Egypt and other British colonies.322 
      The Financial Solution: Gibarti expected to turn the congress into a large gathering for anti-
colonial activists, a vision which depended on finding a solution to the financial costs of arranging 
the congress. According to Münzenberg, the total cost for the event would be $15,000, however, as 
“Irmgard” observed, the money poured right through his fingers. This did not seem to bother 
Münzenberg, demanding that Heimo secure a rapid influx of money and, if this was not 
forthcoming, he could not promise to be able to arrange the preparations properly. Münzenberg 
argued that money was the key to a successful congress, with the IAH already having supported 
the LACO financially which had drained the IAH of its finances. To approve Münzenberg's 
demand, the ECCI Secretariat granted him “a part of the sum” [unknown] on 25 January, which he 
would receive in person at the “fraction” meeting in Brussels on 7 February. This was not enough 
to satisfy Münzenberg, who told Heimo that the Comintern had to reimburse the IAH after the 
congress. On 7 February, Münzenberg declared that the congress account was still $5,000 short.323 
      Despite Heimo’s promise to Münzenberg that the budget was “in the hands” of the Political 
Secretariat, it was still, nevertheless, a matter under Piatnitsky’s jurisdiction. According to the 
document, “Ausgaben für den Brüsseler Kongress bis zum 15, Jan” (Expenses for the Brussels 
Congress until January 15), authored by Piatnitsky, this account disclosed the actual costs for the 
congress, and how Piatnitsky had meticulously calculated every cost. Estimating the cost of the 
Brussels Congress at $13,625 which, in comparison to Münzenberg’s budget estimate ($15,000), 
had reduced the budget estimate by $1,375, Piatnitzki had divided the budget into separate 
sections: expenses for delegations arriving from outside Europe; colonial delegations from within 
Europe; money to intellectuals and the staff of the LACO; and money spent by the LACO and 
Münzenberg. The delegations and individual expecting financial support for their travel expenses 
were the South African delegation (South African Labour Congress, CPSA; $1,500); Manuel 
Gomez and the “American” delegation ($2,500); the “Labour Bund” from Ceylon ($500); and the 
Sudanese delegation ($200). Piatnitsky concluded that the sum of $3,000 would cover their return 
journeys. Colonial delegations from France, the Committee in Defence of the Negro Race and its 
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representative, the Senegalese Lamine Senghor, received $750, while the Indonesian nationalist 
organisation in the Netherlands, Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI), had received $500 in January. The 
costs for the LACO staff (Münzenberg, three political secretaries, three typists and three 
translators) and ten intellectuals, amounted to $1,125. In the latter case, Piatnitsky referred to 
Helene Stöcker, Paquet, Lessing, and the scientist Friedrich Karl Lehnhoff Wyld (1871 – 1932), 
who would each receive $150 to cover travel expenses and an additional 15 Marks per day, 
dependent upon their appearance at the congress. The cost of sending telegrams, particularly those 
despatched by the “Fraktionsbüro” in Berlin prior to the opening of the congress, and to 
delegations waiting in Brussels, Paris and London, was estimated at $1,600. Administrative costs, 
e.g. the rental fee for the Palais d’Egmont ($150), printed materials and stenograms ($600), extra 
personnel and travel expenses for the LACO secretariats in Berlin and Brussels ($400), the 
despatching of telegrams from the congress “Press Bureau” ($700), were all presented in detail by 
Piatnitsky. On 26 January, the Political Secretariat endorsed Piatnitsky’s budget and Heimo 
informed Münzenberg of the final decision on “the money question”.324 
 
The chaotic preparations ended just a few days before the congress. However, the Political 
Secretariat had one final objection, asking Münzenberg if Brussels really was the most suitable 
place to hold the anti-colonial congress, suggesting Berlin, Basel, Geneva or Copenhagen instead. 
The reason why the Comintern had proposed these other locations was their fear of the 
repercussions from national security services, a factor that would most likely occur both during 
and after the anti-colonial congress in Brussels. If Münzenberg agreed to change location for the 
congress, the Political Secretariat promised to establish a protest campaign against the “Imperialist 
intrigues” of the Netherlands, USA and Belgium.325 Münzenberg responded that the idea was ill-
conceived, and told Heimo that the Brussels Congress would convene at “any cost and under any 
circumstance”.326 
      In conclusion, the table below illustrates the chronological progression (1925-27) and 
transformation of the anti-colonial project, a result of the continual negotiations between 
Münzenberg, the IAH, the LACO International Secretariat and Gibarti, with the Comintern. 
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Table 3.3: The Anti-Colonial Project, 1925 – 1927 
 
 
The international congress against colonialism and imperialism in Brussels was an idea, spurred on 
by the enthusiasm of the Hands off China campaign in Berlin in August 1925. In February 1927, 
both Münzenberg’s and the LACO’s vision was on the verge of turning into reality. The IAH 
apparatus had acted as the organisational backbone in support of the LACO in 1926, a fact which, 
according to Isolde/Petrovsky, had made Petrov in Moscow realise that the IAH “machinery” 
worked in tune with philanthropy as its guiding political principle.327 Thus, the advance of the IAH 
towards philanthropy had made it possible to approach and use the rhetoric of anti-colonialism to 
stimulate the establishment of the LACO, a politically-attractive sympathising organisation which 
had gained attention amongst widely divergent socio-political circles in Berlin and beyond. 
Despite their anti-colonial project, and their centre being in Berlin, Brussels was the critical 
stepping-stone to Münzenberg and the Comintern realising their vision of establishing a vigorous 
anti-imperialist movement.  
 
* 
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PART II 
 
Chapter 3. Demonstration  
 
Our congress requires no director […] All [political] parties and organisations, through the 
participation of their delegations and representatives, have unanimously agreed upon the 
establishment of […] a World League against Imperialism […] We are neither visionaries 
nor utopian dreamers, we know very well the limit of our strength and abilities to perform. 
Münzenberg, Brussels, 13/2-1927 
 
For the first time, the imprisoned, sacrificed and murdered peoples are united together in a 
bloc.  
Henri Barbusse, Opening Speech, 
Brussels, 10/2-1927  
 
Der Kongress der Milliarde. 
    A-I-Z, Jahrg.VI, No.9, p.8, 1927 
 
The “Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism” at the Palais d’Egmont in Brussels 
was convened on 10 February, 1927. On 13 February, after Münzenberg had declared the 
establishment of the international anti-imperialist organisation the League against Imperialism and 
for National Independence, the crowd responded with jubilant cheers, marking the euphoric end of 
the congress. The reaction of euphoria and collective joy was also captured and illustrated in the 
official protocol, Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont (hereinafter: Das Flammenzeichen), 
released in June 1927, through Münzenberg’s Neuer Deutscher Verlag.328 This title was an allusion 
to the ideological vision for the congress: the spiritual and rapturous awakening of the 
international anti-imperialist movement. Most importantly, the Brussels Congress marked the birth 
of an active movement. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the first tentative and prudent steps 
taken by the LAI in 1927. With particular reference to the milieu of the Brussels Congress, the 
“first congress against colonialism and imperialism” witnessed the culmination of Münzenberg’s 
anti-colonial project. The Brussels Congress was, above all, an international event displaying the 
consent and eager participation of individuals who wanted to discuss anti-colonialism as both a 
political phenomenon and a movement. Perceived as such, the euphoria of the congress 
underscored the LAI's necessary desire to manifest itself as a global and political actor. To realise 
                                               
328 Gibarti (ed.) 1927; SAPMO-BA ZPA I/2/5/33, 467-471, Report from Willi Münzenberg to H. Remmele in Moscow,  
10/6-1927. 
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this vision, it was necessary to form national LAI sections in the most important “imperialist 
nations” and in the colonial countries. The demonstration in Brussels was, for the organisers 
(Münzenberg, the LACO, IAH and the Comintern), the pretext on which to capitalise on the 
interactionism and collective joy displayed at the congress. The Brussels Congress answered the 
question as to why the LAI was aiming to fulfil the aim of posing as an international anti-
imperialist force and to unify the anti-colonial movement. However, this question raises the need 
to assess the Comintern's initial motive for supporting the congress. Hence, if this episode was the 
pretext on which to establish the LAI, how did the communist and non-communist delegates 
perceive the event, particularly the thematic shift from anti-colonialism to anti-imperialism? Vijay 
Prashad claims that the Brussels Congress “provided the foundation for the Third World” as it 
prepared the ground for an “experiment in intra-planetary solidarity”.329 It was undoubtedly an 
experiment guided by spontaneity and, above all, control, sharing a common understanding that 
the expectations of the delegates and, in particular, those of the Comintern had to be implemented. 
      In total, 174 delegates representing 134 organisations, associations or political parties from 34 
countries attended the Brussels Congress. Münzenberg observed in his speech on 13 February, that 
104 delegates represented the colonial countries. However, a majority of the colonial delegates 
lived in Europe, although some had travelled from the colonies to Brussels.330 Separated into two 
geographical categories which, in a sense, mirrored the political and cultural mixture of the 
congress: the first category was the “oppressing imperialist nations” and the second was the 
oppressed and colonised nations themselves. The table below further illustrates the nationalities 
and total number of delegates present in Brussels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
329 Prashad 2007, 22. 
330 RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Manuscript of Münzenberg’s speech, Brussels Congress, 14/2-1927. The printed version  
of this speech, taken from the manuscript, was later included in Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont (Gibarti 
1927, pp.215-224). Gross' depiction of the Brussels Congress relied on Das Flammenzeichen. Geiss concluded in 1968 
that the official protocol was a “rare source”, as well as Gross' narrative of the event, see Geiss 1968, pp.253-258. 
Degras included a short note on the congress (vol. II 1960, p.354). The documents on the congress (manuscripts of 
speeches, resolutions, notes, reports and other miscellaneous material) are filed in fond 542/1/69. 
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Table 4.1: Geographical Representation at the Brussels Congress, 10-13 February 1927 
 
 Source: “Bericht der Mandats-Prüfungskommission”, in Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais 
Egmont, Louis Gibarti (Hg.), Neuer Deutscher Verlag, Berlin, 1927, p.229. 
 
The delegates received a warm welcome upon arrival at the Palais d’Egmont. Provided with the 
pamphlet, Adressen an den Kongress gegen Kolonialunterdrückung und Imperialismus (Greetings 
to the Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism), which included salutations from a 
number of distinguished individuals to the congress, the delegates could read how Albert Einstein 
– nominated as LAI Honorary President at the end of the congress – stated that “in your congress, 
the solidly united endeavour of the oppressed to achieve independence takes bodily shape”, whilst 
Gandhi declared “I wish you, however, from the depths of my heart, every success in your 
deliberations”. This continued with a greeting from the French author Romain Rolland, “your 
Colonial Conference is of the highest importance”, a statement also re-phrased in the joint speech 
by Barbusse, the British delegate, S. O. Davies and André Marteaux from Belgium, delivered in 
connection with the opening ceremony. Unable to attend the first day of the congress, the elderly 
and prominent British socialist leader George Lansbury, had, nevertheless, sent a telegram en route 
to Brussels, which stated that the moment had arrived to form “a League in support of the 
oppressed and the oppressed nations”.331 
                                               
331 RGASPI 542/1/69, 97-100, Adressen an den Kongress gegen Kolonialunterdrückung und Imperialismus Brüssel,  
den 10 Februar 1927, Palais Egmont. A second version of this pamphlet also included greetings from the Indian 
nationalist leader, Gauri Shankar Misra; the secretary of the central council of the Bombay Trade Unions, S. B. 
Jhabwala; President of the Social Democratic Party in Switzerland, Ernst Reinhard; the “aged leader of the Indian 
Freedom movement”, Rustom Cama Bhikhaiji; the WPA member, Scott Nearing; leader of the Egyptian Nationalist 
 
1. China                        25 
2. India     7 
3. Indonesia    6 
4. Indo-China    6 
5. Korea     4 
6. Syria     3 
7. Persia     2 
8. Japan     1 
9. Palestine    1 
10. Africa (South Africa, North Africa, Egypt)                     10 
11. Negroes from the French Colonies    4 
12. USA & Latin America                           15 
13. England                       15 
14. France                            14 
15. Germany                       26 
16. Italy     3 
17. Austria    2 
18. Czechoslovakia     2 
19. Switzerland    2 
20. Netherlands                       11 
21. Belgium                            15 
 
   Total:               174 
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      The congress agenda was a reflection of the then current system of colonialism and 
imperialism. However, in compliance with Vandervelde’s directives from the previous year, the 
congress avoided the sensitive issue of Belgian colonialism and the situation in the Congo Free 
State. According to Das Flammenzeichen, the agenda focused on: 1. The Freedom Struggle of the 
Chinese People; 2. British Imperialism in India, Persia and Mesopotamia; 3. North American 
Imperialism and its Risks; 4. The Egyptian Liberation Struggle and the Arab People; 5. The 
African Struggle and its Liberation; 6. The Negro Freedom Struggle; 7. The Struggle for 
Indonesian Independence; 8. The Freedom Struggle of the Indo-Chinese Peoples; 9. The Struggle 
of the Korean People against Japan; 10. Italian Fascism as an Expression of Imperialism; 11. The 
Colonial Hunger of New German Imperialism; 12. The Connection of the National Revolutionary 
Movement with the Proletarian Class Struggle; 13. Tactics of the Proletarian Class Struggle and its 
Support of the Colonial Liberation Struggle; 14. The Freedom Struggle of the Oppressed Peoples 
and the Trade Unions; 15. The “Cultural Mission” of the Western People; 16. The Establishment of 
the League against Imperialism and for National Independence.332 
      Bridgeman was the accredited delegate of the British LACO Section. After the first day of the 
congress, Bridgeman returned to his room at the Hotel Metropole and wrote a letter to W. N. Ewer, 
the editor of the British left-wing paper the Daily Herald. According to Bridgeman, the event was 
“thoroughly international” and, despite “lacking in orderly arrangement”, this was “made up for in 
enthusiasm” due to the large attendance of colonial delegates.333 Jawaharlal Nehru attended the 
congress together with his wife Kamala, and experienced the congress in similar terms. Nehru was 
part of the session “British Imperialism in India, Persia and Mesopotamia”, along with the Persian 
Ahmed Assadoff (who lived in Berlin) and, afterwards, fraternised with other delegates who 
shared the same antagonism towards colonialism, e.g. individuals from Java, Indo-China, 
Palestine, Syria, Egypt, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The congress left Nehru astonished 
by the interactionism that had developed between colonial delegates, standing side-by-side with 
representatives of European labour organisations which “had been playing a leading part in 
European Labour struggles for a generation”. Nehru also remarked on the “important” attendance 
of communist delegates, who he believed acted as “representatives of trade union[s] or similar 
                                                                                                                                                          
Party, Hafiz Ramadam Bey, see IISG, see LAI Collection 3392.1/6, Adressen an den Kongress gegen 
Kolonialunterdrückung und Imperialismus, Brüssel, den 10. Februar 1927 Palais „Egmont“. For Barbusse, Davies and 
Marteaux’s joint speech, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.13-18, whilst Lansbury’s message is taken from the IISG LAI 
Collection 3392.1/8, Message from George Lansbury to the Congress (is also included in Gibarti [ed.] 1927, pp.9-12). 
332 “Inhaltsverzeichnis”, Gibarti (ed.), 1927, pp.282-284. 
333 TNA KV2/1919, Intercepted letter [MI5], R. Bridgeman, Hotel Metropole, Brussels, to W. N. Ewer (editor of the  
Daily Herald), London, 10/2-1027. Bridgeman feared that the Belgian authorities planned to close the congress due to 
its aggressive anti-colonial rhetoric. Yet, it had been a “highly successful” opening day. 
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organisations”.334 The contrasting “colourfulness” of the congress stunned Mohammad Hatta, the 
leader of the Indonesian nationalist organisation, Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI): 
However colourful and diverse the races and political colours, in purpose and aspiration, 
people, we are of one mind. Never before had the world seen such a congress gather […] For 
five days the accusations of suppressed peoples against acts of violence resounded in 
colourful variety.335 
According to Christian Albrecht Siebeck’s assessment of Hatta, Mohammad Hatta und der 
indonesische Sozialismus Staatsdenken eines Indonesischen Nationalisten (1978), the Brussels 
Congress provided Hatta with a life-long experience of the character of the European labour 
movement through which, for the first time, he met and established contact with leading figures 
such as Fimmen, Münzenberg, Ledebour and Maxton.336 
      Manuel Gomez was the unofficial leader of the USA delegation, but introduced himself in 
public as the AAAIL delegate. Later Gomez [Charles Shipman] wrote in his autobiography, It Had 
to Be Revolution, that the congress was a “star-studded affair”, and remembered the 
“entrepreneurial genius” Münzenberg who, in the service of communism, was nonetheless also a 
genuine supporter of the anti-imperialist movement. Gomez shared the rostrum with José 
Vasconcelos, Carlos Quijano of the Revolutionary Party of Venezuela and Ismael Martinez of the 
Tampico Labour Union from Mexico, giving a speech on the “robbery politics” of the USA in the 
Caribbean and Latin America. As a political manifesto, the four of them signed a collective 
declaration as a symbol of the beginning of the anti-imperialist struggle in “every American 
country” (Erklärung der Delegation aller amerikanischer Länder über die Organisierung des anti-
imperialistischen Kampfes in der amerikanisch-pazifischen Region).337 
      For Josiah Tshangana Gumede, the ANC leader and delegate, emotions ran high during the 
congress. According to Raymond van Diemel’s biography on Gumede, In Search of ‘Freedom, 
Fair Play and Justice’ (2001), the Brussels Congress gave Gumede an insight into the nature of 
                                               
334 Nehru 1936, pp.162-163. Nehru was stunned by the moral demonstration expressed by “quite a number of  
distinguished persons” the organisers had managed to invite, or who had become aware of the congress, e.g. Einstein, 
Madame Sun Yat Sen and Romain Rolland. According to Das Flammenzeichen, the Nehru's speech was an act 
“extremely well received” by the crowd, above all the statement: [the] “The Indian problem is not a purely national 
problem, but one which affects a large number of other countries directly and the whole world indirectly, in the sense 
that it directly affects the greatest and most powerful imperialism of our time”, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp. 55-60, and 
fol. RGASPI 542/1/69, 62-64, Excerpt of Nehru’s manuscript in Brussels, 1927. 
335 Mohammad Hatta, “The Brussels Congress against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression and our Foreign  
Propaganda”, in Portrait of a Patriot, Deliar Noer (ed.), The Hague, 1972, 158-164. Taken from Indonesia Merdeka, 
1927. 
336 Christian Albrecht Siebeck, Mohammad Hatta und der indonesische Sozialismus Staatsdenken eines Indonesischen  
Nationalisten, Heidelberg, 1978, 82-83. Hatta’s speech was entitled “Der Kampf um Indonesiens Unabhängigkeit”, 
focusing on the character, expression and economic “exploitation” by Dutch imperialism in Indonesia, see Gibarti 
(ed.) 1927, pp.131-142. 
337 Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.63-79, 236, 256; Shipman 1993, p.162. 
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European political engagement and ideology, an understanding which defined his perception of the 
world. Having departed from Cape Town, South Africa, by boat, Gumede travelled in the company 
of La Guma and Daniel Colraine, the delegate of the South African Trade Union Congress. 
Arriving in London, the three of them went directly to Brussels. On the journey, La Guma and 
Colraine tried to broaden Gumede’s “limited understanding of communism”, a learning process 
which continued in Brussels by meeting other African and Afro-American delegates, e.g. Richard 
B. Moore, the delegate of both the ANLC and the Universal Negro Improvement Association 
(UNIA), as well as a member of the WPA. Gumede met the Senegalese Lamine Senghor, the 
delegate of the Paris-based association Committee in Defence of the Negro Race, Max Bloncourt 
from the Antilles and delegate of the Inter-Colonial Association (section of the “old colonies and 
black peoples”) and the Haitian Carlos Deambrosis Martins, the delegate of the Haitian Patriotic 
Union. Gumede eagerly listened to Moore’s declaration at the congress, which concluded that the 
“fight against imperialism is … an incessant struggle against imperialistic ideology”. Afterwards, 
Gumede listened to Senghor and Moore as they explained the necessity of unifying the national 
liberation struggle in the colonies with the activities of the communist parties. The “Negro 
Commission”, presided over by Senghor, represented the Negro question at the congress, through 
which Moore introduced the “United Resolution on the Negro Question”. This resolution was, 
however, a replica of another resolution which had been adopted by the UNIA at the “Fifth Annual 
Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World” at Liberty Hall, New York, on August 1, 1926. For 
Gumede, the Brussels episode was a “satisfying” experience, which implied the beginning of a 
“new era for the oppressed peoples”.338 
      The euphoria at the congress also captivated the delegates from the “Imperialist nations”. 
Lansbury, after having arrived in Brussels, felt “the harmony” at the congress, and as noted in his 
article, “A Great Week-End”, published in Labour Weekly on 19 February: “we were in truth an 
international congress”. According to Lansbury, “ideal men [such as] Comrade Gibarti and Bach 
                                               
338 Raymond van Diemel, In Search of ‘Freedom, Fair Play and Justice’. Joshia Tshangana Gumede, 1867-1947: A 
Biography, see Internet: <  http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/online%20books/search-
freedom/chapter6.htm >. Josiah Tshangana Gumede, “Bericht über die Behandlung der afrikanischen Neger“, in 
Gibarti (ed.), Berlin, 1927, pp.123-126.  Gumede focused on the “500-year victimisation and oppression of the Negro 
people” in his speech. For the Negro question at the congress, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.113-130. The Negro 
resolution and composition of the “Negro Commission” was later included in Richard B. Moore, W. Burghardt Turner 
& Joyce Moore Turner (eds.), Caribbean Militant in Harlem Collected Writings 1920-1972, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992, pp.53-54, 143-144. Raymond van Diemel discussed Gumede and La 
Guma’s European and Russian experience at a conference in Moscow on September 14, 2001. For the conference 
paper, “’I have seen the new Jerusalem’: Revisiting and re-conceptualising Josiah T. Gumede and Jimmy La Guma’s 
USSR visit of 1927”, see Internet: < http://www.whatnextjournal.co.uk/Pages/History/Gumede.html > and Sechaba, 
“J. T. Gumede: ANC President 1927-1930”, December, 1982, Internet: 
< http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/people/gumede_jt.html >. The Negro resolution, as well as the resolution  
from the UNIA conference on August 1, 1926, has been located at the IISG, LAI Collection 3392.1/54, 3392.1/55. A  
copy of the UNIA resolution is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/5, 88-92 (German version). 
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… full of the Ideal of an international solidarity”, proved that this was not a movement “directed 
from Moscow”. Convinced that the congress was an act of “spontaneity”, Lansbury sincerely 
believed the LAI to be a manifestation of the internationalist message of socialism with the 
creation of “an Anti-Imperialist International”. Ellen Wilkinson, the ILP delegate and an M. P., 
shared Lansbury’s belief in the LAI, and later declared that the congress was “not some 
Machiavellian plot of the wicked Red Russians against the British Empire”.339 Buber-Neumann 
stated that the euphoria of the congress had blinded Lansbury, and left the “grand old man” 
convinced that the idea that Moscow had “initiated and directed the Brussels Congress” was 
nothing more than a rumour filled with “total nonsense”.340 
      One of the most illustrative examples of how the congress euphoria had entranced the 
delegates was the case of A. Fenner Brockway, the General Secretary of the ILP. On the opening 
day, Brockway delivered a speech on the Chinese liberation struggle and, towards the end, offered 
his hand to the Chinese delegate and representative of the Central Executive Committee of the 
KMT, Hansin Liau. As they joined their hands on the stage and raised them up in the air, the 
congress hall erupted with an enthusiastic applause. It was an act symbolising the building of a 
bridge between the oppressed and imperialist nations. However, this was not a spontaneous act. 
Brockway re-collected in his autobiography, Inside the Left, that Münzenberg had introduced the 
idea: 
“End your speech by a declaration of unity with the Chinese workers and peasants,” 
Münzenberg whispered as I stepped onto the rostrum. I did so and, as the sentences were 
uttered, a Chinese comrade [Hansin Liau] stood at my side with an outstretched hand. I took 
it – and the whole audience, black, brown, yellow and white, rose and roared its applause. 
Münzenberg was a master of such strokes of drama.341 
 
* 
 
 
                                               
339 TNA HO 144 10693, George Lansbury M. P, “A Great Week-End”, in Labour Weekly, 19/2-1927. Ellen Wilkinson,  
M. P. and ILP member, published the article “Painted Saints” in the same issue as Lansbury’s article. According to 
Wilkinson, this was “the most dramatic conference I was ever at”, praising Gibarti for his “truly remarkable organising 
skill”. The British HO used the articles to analyse the Brussels Congress. 
340 Buber-Neumann 1957, pp.97-98. 
341 Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.31-33. For Brockway and Liau’s symbolic act, see p.33. Fenner Brockway, Inside the Left.  
Thirty Years of Platform, Press, Prison and Parliament, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1942, (second impression 
1947), 167. The British delegation consisted of Reginald Bridgeman (British LACO Section), Helen Crawfurd (IAH), 
S.O. Davies (South Wales Miners’ Association), Harry Pollitt (National Minority Movement; NMM, however, off the 
record, the CPGB), M. Brown (NMM), R. W. Postgate (Plebs League), George Stokes (London Labour Union 
Council), William Brown (Secretary of the Amsterdam International). George Lansbury [Vice President of the British 
Labour Party, M. P.], Ellen Wilkinson [ILP, M. P.], John Beckett [ILP, M. P.] whilst Arthur MacManus [CPGB, and 
member of the Fraction Bureau], Herbert W. Jones, James Crossley and William Rust attended as private individuals, 
see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.238-239, 253-254. 
142 
 
The Communist Perception of the Congress 
Sen Katayama was the “representative of the Japanese labour movement” at the congress; 
however, unbeknownst to those present, he was acting as the leader of both the ECCI delegation 
and of the “Fraktionsbüro”, secretly directing the activities of both. After the congress, Katayama 
returned to Moscow and both compiled and provided Petrov with a report on the event. According 
to his report, Katayama had been impressed with Brockway and Liau’s demonstration to such a 
degree that he described the act as a “great step toward the international solidarity between the 
oppressed and oppressing nationalities”. The “harmony” of the Brussels Congress was a result of 
the collective understanding amongst the delegates on “the fight against Imperialism and for the 
National Independence” Katayama concluded.342 On 13 February, Münzenberg sent a report to the 
ECCI Secretariat immediately after his speech, in which he explained that the covert strategy of 
the “Fraktionsbüro” had greatly enhanced the work of the communists at the congress. 
Münzenberg explained that while a few “important delegates from the colonial countries”, e.g. 
Nehru, had realised that the communists were acting “behind the scenes”, they had not declared a 
single “word of hostile criticism” against the communists. Münzenberg wrote that the reason for 
this was that the delegates appreciated and expressed gratitude towards the organisers (“us”) for 
having made the effort to hold a congress against colonialism and imperialism. Whilst the Chinese 
delegation was “entirely” under “our influence”, Münzenberg described how Nehru had 
approached him at the Palais d’Egmont, wondering whether it was possible to meet “Russian 
Comrades”, e.g. the KIM delegate and communist from Georgia, Vissarion Vissarionovich (Besso) 
Lominadze (1897 – 1935).343 
      Katayama had a more subtle approach to making contact with delegates, or with entire 
delegations. By inviting the so-called “desirable elements” to an evening dinner, Katayama 
evaluated the guests closely: 
By this manner, we [got] all the responsible comrades ... acquainted with the delegates of 
importance, so that when we met at the Executive or Presidium meeting we knew each other 
and this greatly smoothed the business of the Congress.344 
After the dinner was over, and as the guests were leaving, Katayama summoned the 
“Fraktionsbüro” for a discussion on the further use of the dinner guests. Apparently, Katayama was 
                                               
342 RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, (Confidential) Report from Katayama, Moscow, to Petrov/F.F. Raskolnikov, Moscow  
24/2-1927. Katayama delivered a speech entitled ”The Struggle of the Korean People against Japan” together with the 
representative of the Korean Association in France, Kin Fa Lin, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.146-158. 
343 RGASPI 542/1/7, 89, Letter from Münzenberg, Brussels, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 13/2-1927. For the 
influence of the ECCI delegation over the Chinese delegation, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, Confidential letter 
from Katayama, Moscow, to Petrov/F.F. Raskolnikov, Moscow 24/2-1927. For Besso Lominadze, see Gross 1967, 
p.205; Buber-Neumann 1957, p.100; Chase 2002, p.485; and Lazitch 1986, pp.273-274. 
344 RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, Confidential letter from Katayama, Moscow, to Petrov/F.F. Raskolnikov, Moscow 24/2- 
1927. 
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satisfied with how the “Fraktionsbüro” had concealed its existence from all outsiders during the 
congress: 
No-one knew the existence of such a Bureau [had] been directing the congress […] 
everything […] was discussed and decided at the Small Buro [“Fraktionsbüro”] beforehand 
and carried out later by the Presidium or by a commission. Thus, the congress made the 
desired progress to a successful end.345 
The various national security services had, however, uncovered the manoeuvres of the communists 
simply by assigning agents to attend the congress. The British ambassador in Brussels, George 
Dixon Grahame, sent a report to the British Foreign Minister, Austen Chamberlain on 11 February, 
noting the dominant feature of “student elements” and that a “large number of […] representatives 
[…] seem to be foreigners resident in Belgium”. Grahame had also heard from one of his 
informants on location that a majority of the “discussions are taking place behind closed doors, 
only delegates being admitted”. Furthermore, Auswärtige Amt received intelligence from the 
German legation in Brussels which stated that “last week, a fairly strong communist-biased 
congress against the oppression of colonial peoples” had been convened in Brussels.346  
      Münzenberg wanted to capture the euphoria of the congress in print. An ambition which, most 
importantly, inspired the publication of Das Flammenzeichen, including nineteen plates depicting 
the beaconesque collective joy and passion among the delegates.347 Additionally, the European 
communist press provided space by including vivid reports and summaries on a “number of 
important and stirring speeches”, Münzenberg stated. These included, for example, Wiener 
                                               
345 RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, (Confidential) Report from Katayama, Moscow, to Comrade Petrov/F. F. Raskolnikov,  
Moscow, 24/2-1927. Das Flammenzeichen did not mention MacManus as a member of the CPGB, see further in 
CoWoPa 5, Fredrik Petersson, “Varför en liga mot imperialism? Grundandet av League against Imperialism 1927”, 
Åbo Academy, 2005, Internet: < https://www.abo.fi/student/media/7957/cowopa5petersson.pdf >. For biography on 
MacManus, see Lazitch 1986, pp.288-289; Davidson (2003); and Katayama, Lazitch 1986, pp.211-212. 
346 TNA PRO CO 323 971 1, Confidential report from George Dixon Grahame, Brussels, to Sir Austen Chamberlain,  
London, 11/2-1927. Agents from various national security services attended the congress in disguise. Nehru later 
wrote the following account of the Brussels Congress: “[…] it was viewed with some consternation by the Foreign and 
Colonial Offices of the Imperialist powers. […] probably full of international spies, many of the delegates even 
representing various secret services. We had an amusing instance of this. An American friend of mine [unknown], who 
was in Paris, had a visit from a Frenchman who belonged to the French secret service. […] When he had finished his 
enquiries he asked the American if he did not recognise him, for they had met previously. The American looked hard 
but he had to admit that he could not place him at all. The secret service agent then told him that he had met him at the 
Brussels Congress disguised as a Negro delegate, with his face, hands etc. all blacked over!”, see Nehru 1936, pp.163, 
164. For the report from the German legation in Brussels, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 36, Deutsche  
Gesandtschaft, Brüssel Inhalt: Kongress gegen koloniale Unterdrückung, to Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 15/2-1927. 
347 Das Flammenzeichen included pictures that showed a message of unity and harmony at the congress. The delegates  
crowded together during a plenary session in the “large hall”, the unity of the Indian and Chinese delegations and the 
“international” composition of the congress. Furthermore, the images presented the LAI General Council with a 
picture portraying Fimmen, Senghor and the general secretary of the KMT, Lu Chung Lin holding hands, with Nehru 
seated beside them, and Münzenberg and Katayama next to each other. Other illustrations show how Senghor clenched 
his fist in his determination to continue the anti-colonial struggle; the “establishment of relations between the English-
Chinese” brotherhood (Lansbury patted Liau on the shoulder, while Münzenberg stood in the background with a big 
smile on his face), see Gibarti (ed.) 1927. The picture of Lansbury and Liau was also used as the cover for the March 
issue of the A-I-Z (VI.Jahrgang, Nr.9, Berlin, 6/3-1927). 
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Arbeiter-Zeitung, Leipziger Volkszeitung, the Daily Herald, Le Peuple, Libre Belgique, Drapeau 
Rouge, Inprecorr and Norrskensflamman. However, the social democratic newspapers were 
discrete and cautious in their assessments, while the “bourgeois press” had at least commented on 
the congress. The A-I-Z covered the event extensively. In two separate issues, articles and 
photographs shed some light on “Der erste Kongress gegen koloniale Unterdrückung” and “Die 
unterdrückten Völker stehen auf! Fotos vom I. Internationalen Kongress gegen Imperialismus und 
Kolonialherrschaft”.348 
 
* 
 
The Grand Finale: The Shift from Anti-Colonialism to Anti-Imperialism 
The Brussels Congress built a bridge between disparate political and nationalist groups. In order to 
consolidate this unity, the election of the LAI Executive and its Honorary Presidium left the crowd 
with the impression that the moment had come to establish a dynamic movement. 
      This election had been a process preceded by Münzenberg’s speech, “Die Gründung die Liga 
gegen Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit”, the final topic on the congress agenda. 
For Münzenberg, this speech and performance was the culmination of the anti-colonial project, 
especially as it was a test of faith to see whether it was possible to form “a permanent organisation 
to secure the support of the European proletariat for the liberation movements in the colonies”. 
The fundamental aim of Münzenberg’s speech was to capitalise on the euphoria amongst the 
delegates in order to be able to declare that the moment had arrived to make the shift from anti-
colonialism to anti-imperialism. Thus, while the LACO had functioned as a vehicle in co-
ordinating and preparing the Brussels Congress, the foundation of the LAI served the purpose of 
unifying the anti-colonial movement around the question of anti-imperialism. The LACO had been 
acting as a centre of gravity for the anti-colonial movement in Berlin, focusing exclusively on the 
question of colonial oppression, a focus which had, nonetheless, as suggested here, limited the 
LACO's access to the anti-colonial movement. Thus, the Brussels Congress was the opportunity 
for Münzenberg, the IAH and the Comintern to switch the anti-colonial agenda over to focusing on 
anti-imperialism – a point which requires further clarification. While both terms involve “forms of 
                                               
348 Willi Münzenberg, “From Demonstration to Organisation”, in The Anti-Imperialist Review, Berlin, Vol.1, No.1, 
July 1928, pp.4-10. Other newspapers that included reports on the congress were the Temps, Frankfurter Zeitung, 
Berliner Tageblatt, Kölnische Zeitung and the Swedish conservative paper Nya Dagligt Allehanda. The Swedish 
communist paper, Norrskensflamman (daily organ of the Communist Party of Sweden) included reports on the 
Brussels Congress. For example, “En antiimperialistisk konferens” (An Anti-Imperialist Conference, published 
February 19), “Nationell frihet – social jämlikhet” (National Freedom – Social Equality; 22 February), “En världsliga 
bildad mot imperialismen” (The Establishment of a World League against Imperialism; 26 February). 
Norrskensflamman used the reports from Inprecorr and TASS. See also “Der erste Kongress koloniale Unterdrückung, 
in A-I-Z, VI.Jahrgang, Nr.9, Berlin, 6/3-1927; TNO PRO CO 323 971 1, Confidential report from George Dixon 
Grahame, Brussels, to Sir Austen Chamberlain, London, 11/2-1927; and “The League against Imperialism”, in Labour 
Monthly, Vol.9, No.3, March 1927, 179-184. 
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subjugation of one people by another”, the Brussels Congress agenda deliberately moved away 
from colonialism, to focus explicitly on imperialism. The anti-colonial propaganda, introduced and 
supported by the LACO, had protested, per se, against the administration of “colonial oppression” 
by the “imperialist nations” in the “periphery” (the colonial and semi-colonial countries). For the 
LAI, the intention was not to continue this form of agitation but rather to refer to anti-imperialism 
as the principal aim of its activities. By shifting its focus from the situation in the colonies, the LAI 
expected to aim its propaganda and activities towards the “centre”, i.e. the imperialist nations and 
the “grandiose projects of powers”.349 This required a strengthening of the modus operandi the 
LACO had tried to establish, particularly the formation of active national sections to support the 
work of the LAI International Secretariat. If the Brussels Congress was the momentum of the 
LACO, the “rapturous” climax of the “first congress against imperialism and for national 
independence” gave birth to the LAI, for which, according to Münzenberg, Brussels was “neither 
the end, nor the beginning of a new powerful movement”. The establishment of the LAI was an 
epochal event that “honoured to dutifully support every worker, employee, every progressive and 
anti-imperialist minded human”, not guided by prejudice of divergent social, cultural, political or 
national backgrounds, Münzenberg stated: 
Black or yellow, whether brown or white as skin colour, whether engaged for political or 
religious reasons, do hereby declare that: we have here commonly forged a powerful weapon 
against the common enemy, the equally oppressive Imperialism […] in Europe, […] Asia, in 
Africa as well as in America.350  
This “historical moment” in the history of colonialism had managed to summon delegates from the 
“imperialist nations” in Europe and the USA, having pacifists, communists, socialists and trade 
union officials seated next to each other to fulfil the principal aim of the congress: 
Today [13 February], on this afternoon, it was decided to establish the League against 
Imperialism […] The LAI […] shall invite […] organisations, parties, trade unions and 
individuals […] to lead the struggle against capitalism, imperialist rule, in support of 
national determination and national independence for every people, and for equal rights for 
every class and human […] From today, we are no more a loose conference, but the first 
international congress of the World League against Imperialism.351 
Münzenberg emphasised that the “struggle against capitalism [and] imperialist rule” was a 
demarcation and a new beginning in the history of the labour and the national liberation 
movements. In this context, Münzenberg declared that the LAI was an actor determined to 
                                               
349 Young 2001, pp.15-17. 
350 RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Transcript of Münzenberg’s speech, Brussels, 14/2-1927. 
351 RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Transcript of Münzenberg’s speech, Brussels, 14/2-1927. 
146 
 
counteract the existing social and institutional order of the world, particularly the notion that 
“Imperialism is always the one who takes home the game” (der lachende Dritte ist der 
Imperialismus). After Münzenberg ended his speech, the Palais d’Egmont exploded in a “stormy, 
continued cheering”, as noted in the official transcript of the speech, while Colraine, the South 
African delegate, and Albert Fournier, the delegate of the French LACO Section, joined 
Münzenberg on the rostrum to declare their “fullest sympathy and understanding”.352 
      The election of the LAI Honorary Presidium and the LAI Executive, was a celebration of the 
achievements of the Brussels Congress. The former included Albert Einstein, Barbusse, Mme Sun 
Yat-sen (not present) and General Lu Chung Lin of the KMT, while the latter included Lansbury as 
Chairman of the LAI Executive and Fimmen as deputy Chairman. Nehru, Liau, Senghor, 
Marteaux, Münzenberg, Ugarte and Hatta were elected members of the Executive, having Gibarti, 
Roger Baldwin and Bridgeman as substitutes. The constitution of the LAI General Council 
included an array of different political actors, e.g. Chen Kuen of the Central Council of the 
General Chinese Labour Unions, Kou Meng-yu, Katayama, Martinez, Vasconcelos, A. Alminia of 
the Philippine Association for Independence, Mohamed Hafiz Ramadan Bey, Hadj-Ahmed 
Messali of Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), Colraine, Semaun, Kin Fa Lin, Assadoff, Gomez, 
Brockway, S. O. Davies, Harry Pollitt, S. Saklatvala (not present),353 the Dutch author Henriette 
Roland-Holst, the secretary of the Belgian LACO Section Georges Gérard, the Belgian journalist 
and editor P. S. Spaak, Charles Plisnier from Belgium, the journalist and IAH representative from 
Italy Victorio Verri, Guido Miglioli of the Italian association Katholische Gewerkschaften, the 
representative of the French pacifist International Womens’ League for Peace and Freedom 
Madame Duchêne, Lessing, Ledebour, Helene Stöcker and the IAH member Professor Nejedli 
from Czechoslovakia.354     
 
* 
 
 
                                               
352 RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Transcript of Münzenberg’s speech, Brussels, 14/2-1927; Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.224-227. 
353 Saklatvala did not attend the Brussels Congress due to the fact that, from January to April 1927, he was visiting  
India, see Sehri Saklatvala [Saklatvala’s daughter], The Fifth Commandment (Miranda Press, UK, 1991), taken from 
the Internet: < http://www.maze-in.com/saklatvala/pages/17.htm >. 
354 Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.241-242. The LAI Executive Committee and the General Council was included in an  
abridged version of the Brussels Congress – Der Brüsseler Kongress gegen Imperialismus und für nationale 
Unabhängigkeit vom 10. bis 15. Februar 1927 im Palais Egmont – Brüssel (Internationale Sekretariat, Berlin, March, 
1927). Lazitch erroneously stated that Ho Chi Minh attended the Brussels Congress, which he never did. Firstly, the 
known pseudonyms used by Ho Chi Minh around this time were “Ly Thuy”/Vuong Son Nhi”/”Thau Chin” (1924-
1928) and none of the above appear in Das Flammenzeichen. Secondly, Lazitch writes that Ho Chi Minh attended the 
Brussels Congress in 1928, a statement which, in itself, is inaccurate from a chronological point of view since no LAI 
congress ever took place in Brussels in 1928. In the same context, Lazitch mentioned that Ho Chi Minh was in 
Canton, China, from December 1924 to April 1927, working as a translator at the Soviet consulate and as an assistant 
for the emissary of the Comintern, Mikhail Borodin, see Lazitch 1986, pp.175-177; Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.235. 
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Merging the Anti-Imperialist Movement 
The “Organisation Resolution” confirmed the shift from anti-colonialism to anti-imperialism, a 
document outlining the organisational foundation of the LAI. According to Section 9, the LAI 
needed to establish national secretariats/sections in countries where “imperialism raged violently”, 
institutional actors who had to function as relay stations for the movement. This involved, above 
all, the registration and provision of information to the LAI International Secretariat on the 
character and nature of imperialist policy in the home countries. Thus, this practice not only aimed 
to link together the national sections and the LAI Executive with the International Secretariat; this 
implied that the International Secretariat was both receiver of intelligence and dispatcher of 
directives back to the sections.355 Making a historical distinction between the LACO and the LAI, 
the “Organisation Resolution” declared that the former had been the forerunner for the latter, thus, 
transforming the organisational structure was the most logical step to take. This required the 
merging of existing committees, associations or colonial campaigns into the LAI. As noted in 
Section 10, which merely re-phrased the arguments introduced by Münzenberg, the following step 
was crucial: 
The General Council, the Executive and established secretariats in different countries, must 
make every effort to bring together [zusammenzufassen] and unite every existing 
organisation and committee like the Hands off China [Hände weg von China], Hands off 
Russia” [Hände weg von Russland], Committee for Syria [Against the Cruelties in Syria 
committee], Committee for Morocco [Komitee für Marokko], League against Colonial 
Oppression [LACO] and the All American Anti-Imperialist League [AAAIL] within the 
newly-created League against Imperialism.356 
The merging of these committees, associations and campaigns would place the LAI, from a 
hierarchical perspective, at the centre.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
355 “Organisationsresolution”, in Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.228. 
356 Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.228; Der Brüsseler Kongress 1927, pp.37-38. The British communist journal, Labour  
Monthly, published the “Organisationsresolution” in its March issue (1927, pp.179-185), see paragraph 11. 
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Table 4.2: Merging of the Anti-Imperialist Movement: a Theoretical Outline 
 
Source: Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.228; “Der Brüsseler Kongress gegen Imperialismus und für nationale 
Unabhängigkeit“, LAI, Berlin, February/March, 1927, pp.37-38 
 
The “Organisation Resolution” did not mention the LAI’s intimate tie to the IAH. Apparently, it 
was essential to keep the IAH separated from the LAI in order to fulfil the Comintern’s strategy of 
creating “millions of large sympathising organisations”. However, some of the actors included in 
the merging process remained independent, e.g. the AAAIL continued its activity in the USA, and 
the Hands off China campaign had proven to be a powerful institution of propaganda which was 
not dependent upon the euphoria of the LAI and the Brussels Congress. 
      The establishment of the LAI in Brussels also indicated a separation from its forerunner in 
Berlin, the IAH. This enabled the creation of an organisation capable of sustaining and performing 
independent activity, shaped by an independent political discourse predestined by its own 
ambitions and realities. This involved a separate control and administration of the political work 
and the need to get the LAI to seek its financial support from Comintern headquarters in Moscow, 
instead of depending on the services of the IAH. According to Gibarti, the LAI, as an independent 
non-party organisation, was far from being “a success”, despite the euphoria of the Brussels 
Congress; this was only the beginning of the creation of a strong movement.357 For Katayama, the 
objective was obvious: [F]inally, there remains to make the League [LAI] grow in our interest. 
[…] The Congress was successfully concluded upon the election of the new executive […].358 
 
* 
 
 
                                               
357 Louis Gibarti, “Vorwort”, in Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp. 6-7; Petersson 2007, p.14. 
358 RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, Confidential letter Katayama, Moscow, to Petrov/F. F. Raskolnikov, Moscow 24/2- 
1927. 
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Euphoria (not Utopia) 
 
Attendance at the Congress was such that it even surprised me.  
Münzenberg to the ECCI Secretariat,  
21/2-1927 
 
The euphoria of the Brussels Congress was an unexpected surprise for both Münzenberg and the 
Comintern. Richard Stites once wrote that euphoria resembles the sensation of “the good light” 
which, if applied to the Brussels Congress and the delegates, the establishment of the LAI 
provided a “feeling of relief, of collective joy, of being rewarded at long last for the patience and 
suffering of generations of humanity”. Stretching back to the “Wilsonian moment” in 1919, and 
how the Versailles Peace Treaty negotiations had totally ignored the colonial question, this 
moment in Brussels was a step forward for the anti-colonial movement on the international 
political arena, referring back here to Stites, “to realise all the beautiful dreams” of achieving 
national self-determination and independence.359 
      After the Brussels Congress, the LAI was determined not only to capitalise on the success of 
the congress but, also, to co-ordinate the organisational structure of the anti-imperialist movement 
and its network. While the functions of the LACO had merged into the LAI, its nerve centre, the 
International Secretariat, had remained intact in Berlin. Hence, the process about to take place 
served a twofold purpose: firstly, the International Secretariat had to secure a relationship with 
Comintern headquarters in Moscow and, secondly, it had to support the work to establish national 
LAI sections across the world. This monumental task focused on solving organisational, financial, 
institutional and individual questions. In all of this, the LAI did not benefit from the increased 
suspicion from its primary antagonists, i.e. the LSI and the national security services. 
 
In February-March, the LAI organised demonstrations in Berlin and across Germany, to celebrate 
and spread propaganda about the “first international congress against imperialism”. For 
Münzenberg, the “decisive success” of the Brussels Congress resided in the “strong participation 
of Chinese, Indian and […] English delegations”. According to his report to the ECCI Secretariat 
on 21 February, “we had counted […] on 100 to 120 delegates and got 180 to 200”, with the event 
realising its objective of criticising the pro-colonial movement in Germany and the colonial 
policies of both the SPD and the LSI.360 The euphoria among the delegates had, however, surprised 
Münzenberg who, in connection with the drama of the congress, invited some of the delegates to 
visit Berlin and come to a private party at his apartment. Buber-Neumann was at this party, and 
                                               
359 Stites 1989, p.39. For the Versailles Peace Treaty, see Manela (2007). 
360 RGASPI 542/1/7, 120-123, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 21/2-1927. 
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later explained that Münzenberg had made everyone aware that, due to his organising skills, the 
Brussels Congress had been a success. Additionally, the party was a chance for Münzenberg to 
continue evaluating some of the guests and to continue gathering intelligence. Münzenberg told 
the ECCI Secretariat that the bulk of material accumulated both during and after the congress had 
forced him to wonder: “what will happen now?” The decision-makers at Comintern headquarters 
had to act swiftly for the simple reason of ensuring that the LAI remained “steady in our hands” 
and, especially, in order to endorse the decision to support the creation of “a large organisation”, 
Münzenberg concluded.361 
 
* 
 
An Evening in Berlin and Demonstrations in Germany 
Babette Gross invited her sister to meet “international comrades” in Berlin. When Buber-Neumann 
arrived at the apartment Münzenberg shared with Gross, the place was crowded with a “mixture of 
multicoloured races: Negroes, Chinese and Mohammedans […] all glowing nationalists”, e.g. 
Lansbury, the artist Käthe Güssfeld, Gumede, Senghor, Gomez, Mazhar Bey El Bakri of the Syrian 
Rebels branch in Berlin (“Hauptquartier der syrischen Aufständischen”), Besso Lominadze, 
Mattar, Hansin Liau and La Guma. Stunned by the “pathos and cheerfulness” at the party, Buber-
Neumann observed how Münzenberg paid extra attention to certain guests. While the 
“cheerfulness” made Lominadze, Gomez, and El Bakri break out into singing “funny songs”, 
Gumede considered this to be offensive, telling Münzenberg that such behaviour was not 
appropriate for “genuine fighters”. To rightfully honour the achievements of the Brussels 
Congress, Gumede urged everyone to sing “The International”; an idea Münzenberg put an end to, 
by asking everyone to stop singing.362  
      The Brussels Congress had been an emotional experience for some of the delegates. Invited to 
attend a closed meeting at the International Secretariat at 48 Wilhelmstraβe (IAH headquarters in 
Berlin), once there, Gumede declared his devotion to the anti-imperialist cause in the most 
enthusiastic terms. His performance was described by Otto Schudel in an interview for the South 
                                               
361 RGASPI 542/1/7, 120-123, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 21/2-1927. If one  
reflects on the fact that the Brussels Congress ended on 14 February and that Münzenberg’s report was completed on 
21 February, this party must have taken place sometime between February 15-21. 
362 Buber-Neumann 1957, 97-107. For El Bahkri, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.253; van Diemel (2001). The German  
communist Käthe Gussfeldt worked as a translator (French and English) during the Brussels Congress. Known also as 
“Ethel Chiles”, British police arrested Gussfeldt in London in May, charged with conducting espionage in the service 
of the CPGB and of “organising workshop committees for control and supervision of the production and transport of 
war material” to China, see TNA KV2 1919, Letter from L. Gibarti to F. Brockway (copy to R. Bridgeman), 31/5-
1927; TNA KV2 1919, Letter from G.M. Liddell, New Scotland Yard, to Harker, copy, original in P.F. 38688, copies 
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African journal, Sechaba, in 1982. Schudel, an IAH functionary from Switzerland, instructed to 
work at the International Secretariat in 1927, described how: 
Josiah Tshangana Gumede and I were standing side by side. He towered over most of those 
present with his tall, powerful figure. Most of the whites he had met until then had treated 
him with contempt and that was why this Berlin meeting was so infinitely important. For the 
first time he stood as an equal among people of all races, all colours and various beliefs, 
united in brotherhood with the purpose of putting an end to the contemptible system of 
colonialism. Josiah Tshangana Gumede was so overwhelmed by this experience that his eyes 
were filled with tears. "I am so happy!" he stammered. Then he drew himself up and added: 
"I am going to fight!”.363 
Gumede appeared as a prominent figure in the LAI campaign (“Anti-Colonial Day”) in Germany 
throughout February and March, which aimed to raise awareness of the Brussels Congress. At an 
LAI rally in Hamburg on 27 February, Gumede compared the LAI with the League of Nations; 
with the important difference, however, being that the LAI was the “Völkerbund aller 
unterdrückten Nationen und Rassen”.364 This campaign started in Cologne on 20 February, where 
71 delegates, representing 28 cultural or labour organisations (several had also visited the Brussels 
Congress) gathered to discuss the potential future of the LAI. At this meeting, Nehru, Chi-Kai-Chi 
of the Canton government and Manrique from the Mexican Peasant Association [governor of 
Santa Luis de Podosa, not present at the Brussels Congress] delivered lectures on the urgent task of 
co-ordinating the links between the colonial liberation movements and the European labour 
movement. Gibarti, appearing as LAI secretary, and the French communist and secretary of the 
French LAI Section Jacques Vantadour, discussed the crucial step of establishing the LAI around 
the world. Other LAI meetings of a similar character were convened in Berlin, Dresden and Essen. 
On 29 March, Gibarti informed the ECCI Secretariat of the successful formation of local LAI 
                                               
363 Schudel was interviewed in Basle on 19 December, 1977, see Sechaba (1982). For Otto Schudel, see Huber 1994, 
pp.448-449; and the Swiss Sozialarchiv, Internet:   
< http://www.sozialarchiv.ch/Bestaende/Archive/archWeb/Ar198_18frameset.htm >. 
364 Peter Martin & Christine Alonzo (eds.), Zwischen Charleston und Stechschritt. Schwarze im Nationalsozialismus,  
Dölling und Galitz Verlag, Hamburg, 2004, p.183. This public meeting took place at the “Astoriapalast” in Barmbeck 
on 27 February, which began at 10 am, with an entry fee of 30 pfennig. Magda Hoppstock-Hut, the representative of 
the Internationalen Frauenliga für Frieden und Freiheit, delivered a report on the Brussels Congress, Wang-Chu from 
Canton introduced a discussion on the chance to defeat “Imperialism” in China and Gumede ended the meeting with a 
speech on the liberation struggle of the coloured races. Gumede left Germany as an avid devotee to the LAI and the 
anti-imperialist movement, travelling together with La Guma to the Soviet Union. In November 1927, Gumede 
belonged to a 917-strong delegation representing 40 countries and participated in the “World Congress of the Friends 
of the Soviet Union” at the Dom Soiuzov (House of the Trade Unions), in Moscow on 10-12 November, 1927. Other 
delegates in Moscow were e.g. Jawaharlal Nehru, Helene Stöcker, Rudyard Kuczynski, the painter Diego Rivera from 
Mexico, the journalist Egon Erwin Kisch from Germany and Goldschmidt. Diemel concluded that Gumede did not 
admit to being a communist, hence, this made him “especially targeted to be imprinted with the successes of the 
Russian Revolution”, above all the goal to achieve national independence. Harry Haywood, the Afro-American 
communist and student at the International Lenin School (ILS) in Moscow, stated that Gumede was a “special friend 
of us Black students”, see Diemel (2001), and “Internationale Delegationen”, in A-I-Z, Jahrg.VI, Nr. 45, Berlin, p.13. 
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branches in Hamburg, Cologne, Essen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt am Main, Remscheid, Dresden, 
Leipzig and Berlin.365 Many of the above undertakings were, however, carried out with the support 
of the IAH administrative apparatus in Berlin. For example, the headquarters of the IAH was a 
rallying point for the LAI, providing the organisation with a location where public meetings during 
the initial phase could be held.366 
      The International Secretariat, along with the Berlin LAI branch, held a series of seminars as a 
method of introducing an anti-imperialist agenda. In March, the course “Imperialism and Colonial 
Politics”, held at IAH headquarters in March, included seminars with Lehmann-Lucas [?] on the 
“Imperialist Trends in Modern Times”, while the German anti-colonial activist Martin 
Hoffmann367 discussed “Germany’s Colonial Politics before the War”. This continued with 
Münzenberg’s opinion on “Germany’s Colonial Politics and its Danger for the Working Class”, 
Hansin Liau on “The Chinese Struggle and its Meaning for the International Working Class”, 
Goldschmidt on “The Latin American Struggle” and Chatto holding a short course on “India”.368 
These seminars were a project, preceded by the launch of the LAI organ, Kolonial Revue, in 
February, a forum which aimed to discuss anti-imperialism as both a theory and practice. Released 
through the IAH’s media apparatus, the first issue of the journal included articles by Barbusse 
(“Selbstbestimmungsrecht den Kolonialvölkern”), Ledebour (“Kolonialer Umschwung”), 
Chattophadyaya (“Die historische Bedeutung des Brüsseler Kongresses für Indien”), Wittfogel 
(“Zu den Kämpfen in China”) and the Chinese S. E. Wang-King-Ky (“Das heutige China im 
Lichte der ungleichen Verträge”).369 Additionally, each member of the LAI had to sign a 
“Declaration of Membership” (Beitrittserklärung), a symbolic as well as an organisational act 
declaring the signatory's commitment to the cause. According to this “Declaration”, the members 
of the LAI had responsibilities and obligations which included, for example, the “dissemination in 
large circles of information about the character of colonial politics and its effect on the oppressed 
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peoples”.370 All of which was, nevertheless, a part of the propaganda machinery set in motion after 
the Brussels Congress. In reality, the International Secretariat had no clear direction on how to 
consolidate the LAI, nor was it appropriate to continue relying upon the assistance of the IAH. For 
Chatto, the situation was intolerable, particularly as the International Secretariat had to share an 
office with the LHR at IAH headquarters.371 
 
* 
 
The Direction of Euphoria    
 
The Amsterdam Conference marks the decisive step towards the consolidation of the 
movement to support the national liberation struggle. 
Münzenberg to the ECCI Secretariat, April 1927 
 
By March 1927, just one month after the LAI’s rapturous inception, the euphoria of the Brussels 
Congress was over. For Münzenberg, the situation had become uncomfortable, informing the 
ECCI Secretariat that the LAI consumed much of his energy and, more importantly, it had caused 
disorder in his management of the daily work at IAH headquarters. Münzenberg addressed the 
need to sort out the “inner organisation” of the LAI, i.e. the International Secretariat, and to 
establish routines – a prerequisite which would enable him to provide the LAI with advice and 
recommendations, rather than merely solving administrative questions. A crucial step in this 
direction was to establish communication links between the International Secretariat and the LAI 
Executive members. Another step was to convince Lansbury and Marteaux not to resign from the 
LAI. However, at the same time, Münzenberg questioned whether it was prudent for Chatto to 
continue negotiating with Nehru.372 The ECCI delegation refuted Münzenberg’s proposal to 
dismiss Nehru as being rash. At a meeting in Moscow on 28 February, the ECCI delegation (now 
re-named the “Brussels Commission”) wanted Hermann Remmele, the KPD representative in the 
ECCI in Moscow, to devise a plan on how to maintain contact with Nehru during his visit to 
Germany and Europe. The “Brussels Commission” perceived Nehru as a crucial intermediary in 
establishing a link between the LAI and “the prominent men in the Left Wing of the INC” as well 
as in “persuading [the INC] to act in accordance with the tactics of the Kuomintang”. Remmele 
had to consider the idea of sending a member of the “Brussels Commission” from Moscow to 
attend the KPD “Parteitag” in Essen. On location in Berlin, this representative could meet and 
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invite Nehru to the KPD Congress and there discuss the steps necessary in forming an LAI section 
in India. However, the “Brussels Commission” made the logical recommendation to summon 
Münzenberg to Moscow and get him to bring every “scrap of paper” on the congress. Aside from 
organising the “Anti-Colonial Day” in Germany, the International Secretariat reinforced the work 
distributing propaganda on the LAI to the “democratic press” and published “special literature” on 
the “methods of the Kuomintang” and on the colonial struggle in India and Egypt.373 
      The LAI Executive had not held any inaugural meeting during the Brussels Congress. 
Katayama concluded that the general consensus was to “hold it within six weeks” after the 
congress, telling the Eastern Secretariat to prepare theses, write directives and complete the 
“statutes of the LAI”.374 Thus, the manner of Katayama’s reaction implies that none of the actors, 
departments or individuals at Comintern headquarters, were prepared for the eventual success of 
the Brussels Congress. This created a scenario centred on ad hoc solutions. On 8 March, the Small 
Commission instructed Petrov to take care of the LAI Executive issue, and to use the ECCI 
representatives travelling to Essen to attend the KPD “Parteitag” as couriers to pass on documents 
for the “communist members of the [LAI] Executive” [Münzenberg and Gibarti]. This coincided 
with the information from Münzenberg to the ECCI Secretariat that the LAI Executive meeting 
would be convened in Amsterdam on 28-29 March. At this meeting, Münzenberg and Gibarti 
intended to focus on the question of how to co-ordinate relations between the International 
Secretariat and the LAI Executive, as well as on the challenge of establishing national LAI 
sections.375 
      The LAI Executive meeting tested the euphoria of the LAI. Present in Amsterdam, 
Münzenberg, Lansbury, Bridgeman, Nehru, Fimmen, Baldwin, Chatto and Hansin Liau, the 
session approved Lansbury as the Chairman of the LAI, while Fimmen, in his role as vice-deputy, 
was to also act as a contact between the LAI Executive and the International Secretariat. After the 
meeting, Münzenberg told the ECCI Secretariat in a report that the LAI was “a real organisation”, 
in which the LAI Executive appeared to represent a constructive forum in which to discuss 
organisational and political questions. In Amsterdam, the Executive members vowed to introduce 
                                               
373 RGASPI 495/60/115, 5-6, Minutes of the meeting of the Brussels Commission, 28/2-1927; RGASPI 495/6/5, 33- 
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the International Secretariat sent every resolution, thesis, speech transcript and congress manifesto to Heimo in 
Moscow, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/44, 10-11, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 21/2-1927. 
374 RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, Confidential letter from Katayama, Moscow, to Petrov/Raskolnikov, Moscow 24/2- 
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155 
 
the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement to the trade unions and political parties, as well as to 
form “important centres of the anti-imperialist movement” [national LAI sections]. The latter was 
a question related exclusively to the organising of LAI activities within the British Empire. 
According to Münzenberg, Bridgeman seemed eager to “realise [the] branching out [of the LAI] 
all over the world”.376 
      Gibarti had a different perception of how to develop the LAI, compared to Münzenberg. For 
Gibarti, the Weimar Republic was the perfect location for the centre of the international anti-
imperialist movement, particularly due to the fact that Germany had lost every colony at the 
humiliating Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919. Therefore, Gibarti argued that the LAI had “great 
freedom” to organise anti-imperialist activism out in the open in Germany, e.g. the Reichstag could 
be used to develop the parliamentary work of the organisation:  
We believe that the LAI's function is in its parliamentary work, which for the […] British 
colonies has an enormous meaning and is an inevitable necessity. We believe that this work 
has to be developed and firmly rooted by arranging information meetings about the Brussels 
Congress, […] China, Mexico and other questions.377 
The LAI had the “British colonies” as one of its key targets; however, this was a daunting 
challenge to solve. Nevertheless, according to Gibarti, since the LAI had prominent members 
involved in parliamentary circles in Great Britain, e.g. Lansbury, Wilkinson, Brockway and John 
Beckett, perhaps the colonial question could stir up some attention in the British parliament. 
Evidence of the above occurred shortly after the Brussels Congress when Lansbury and Wilkinson 
raised the question in the House of Commons in London. Gibarti informed the ECCI Secretariat 
that the “creative work” of Lansbury and Wilkinson consisted of a protest against the British 
authorities' decision not to allow Chinese citizens to enter England if they had participated at the 
Brussels Congress. In the records and protocols of the British parliament, this protest has gone 
missing, yet at the same time, British security services observed how LAI members in England 
                                               
376 RGASPI 542/1/16, 83-86, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, April, 1927. The  
British Embassy in Berlin closely followed the international aspirations which the LAI Executive had introduced in 
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Brussels Congress, see for example fol. RGASPI 542/1/17, 15, Short note from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Jules 
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“confined themselves chiefly to the putting forward of a number of questions in Parliament on 
Colonial subjects and to the holding of various Committee meetings which took place in 
Committee Rooms of the House of Commons”.378 This parliamentary approach did not confine 
itself to the British parliament; a second episode played itself out in the Swedish parliament. Carl 
Lindhagen, the mayor of Stockholm and member of the First Chamber of Parliament in 
Stockholm, Sweden, as well as being a devoted pacifist and socialist, contacted Gibarti in a letter 
dated 4 March. Lindhagen used this occasion to send his greetings to the organisers of the “first 
congress in support of the oppressed peoples”, introducing himself as a “long-standing and well-
known character” in the Swedish parliament. Lindhagen’s primary reason for contacting the LAI 
was to inform them that he had introduced the question of the “Asian awakening” in the First 
Chamber on 22 February. According to the First Chamber’s protocol, Lindhagen’s interpellation to 
get the Swedish government to react on the Far Eastern political situation was a futile exercise. 
The Chairman of the First Chamber concluded during the session that the question had no 
relevance whatsoever for the political situation in Sweden and kindly asked Lindhagen never to 
raise the question again.379 Yet, Gibarti believed that, if the LAI was aiming to support the 
parliamentary approach, this had to be co-ordinated with public demonstrations and political 
meetings outside parliamentary circles.380 
 
* 
 
The Structure of the LAI and the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” 
The vibrant mixture of nationalities in Berlin was a haven for the anti-colonial movement, a milieu 
representative of a colonial metropolis in Europe during the inter-war years. For Münzenberg, the 
colonial community in Berlin convinced him that the city was the most logical “place” to locate 
the centre of the LAI. However, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters were of a different 
opinion. The Small Commission questioned whether Berlin really could provide the International 
Secretariat with sufficient contacts. In fact, the “Organisation Resolution” adopted at the Brussels 
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Congress advocated Paris as the location for the International Secretariat. The question of settling 
the definitive location of the International Secretariat evolved into an animated dispute, which left 
Münzenberg discontent with the character of the discussions, particularly the information from 
Misiano, which claimed that the Small Commission expected Gibarti and Barbusse to lead the 
International Secretariat in Paris, an idea which caused Münzenberg to frown upon hearing it.381 
The reason behind this idea was probably that the Small Commission did not want to create an 
obvious link between the LAI and the German communist movement. A fear, grounded in the 
public attention the Brussels Congress had created, particularly the claim that the LAI was “a 
German affair” under the direct influence of the German communist movement. At the other 
extreme, however, German authorities did their best to confirm whether or not the LAI was “a 
German affair”. If so, as noted by the Auswärtige Amt, the idea of having an organisation that 
devoted itself to co-ordinating an international anti-imperialist movement, using Berlin as the 
centre for its activities, was a serious proposition. Additionally, the RKÜöO questioned “the real 
nature” of the LAI – was it a communist, radical or a pacifist organisation? In an evaluation of the 
LAI’s activities in Berlin, the RKÜöO increased its attention to confirming whether there existed 
any connection between the LAI, the Comintern and the KPD. If the organisation turned out to be 
“subversive”, controlled by the communists and harbouring desirable tendencies towards the 
colonial community in Berlin, German authorities resolved to take every step to neutralise the 
LAI, especially if the organisation circulated Bolshevik propaganda in Germany.382 
      Münzenberg was obviously against the idea to transfer the International Secretariat to Paris. 
The ECCI Secretariat had to understand that the proposition “dishonoured” and “attacked” 
Münzenberg’s capacity as an organiser. According to Münzenberg, Barbusse was a poor choice as 
secretary, particularly as he frequently suffered from poor health and lived in Paris, whereas 
Gibarti could not be trusted when left to his own devices. Why did Münzenberg oppose the idea of 
letting Gibarti lead the International Secretariat in Paris? At one point, Münzenberg told Palmiro 
Togliatti, a communist from Italy, also known as “Ercoli”, acting for a short period after the 
Brussels Congress as the political advisor for the LAI at Comintern headquarters, that Gibarti had 
to be “strictly controlled … almost every hour, every day”. Münzenberg believed that this would 
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prevent Gibarti from “instigating political rubbish”, as well as correct his poor skills as an 
organiser.383 The underlying motive for Münzenberg expressing such a harsh opinion of Gibarti is 
unknown; however, a plausible explanation is that Münzenberg's opinion had been influenced by a 
personal dispute which had flared up between the two of them in 1926 in connection with the 
discussion to postpone the Brussels Congress.384 
      Other actors were also involved in the location question. After the meeting of the LAI 
Executive in Amsterdam, Fimmen questioned why the International Secretariat had to be located 
in Berlin. Fimmen told Chatto and Nehru that Amsterdam was by far a better option from which to 
administer the LAI’s international activities, especially with its access to naval ports and, despite 
London being one of the “hearts of imperialism”, the “constant surveillance” by British security 
services would restrict the LAI from prospering. Chatto took note of Fimmen’s remarks and wrote 
a report to Münzenberg, informing him that the meeting had changed his opinion of Fimmen 
(whom Chatto had, at first, believed to be “a communist”). According to Chatto, Fimmen claimed 
not to be “afraid of any communists” and, despite the fact that the “Comintern had had their eyes 
everywhere” at the Brussels Congress and that Münzenberg had a “nose for certain things”, this 
did not imply that he was “a skilled organiser”.385 A possible explanation for Fimmen’s critique 
towards the location of the International Secretariat in Berlin, and his personal remark against 
Münzenberg, was his desire and, at the same time, his incapacity to control the development of the 
LAI.  
      Münzenberg did not intend to let this question pass by unnoticed, telling the ECCI Secretariat 
that he could approve of a “subsidiary bureau”, similar to the International Secretariat, in Paris, an 
idea the LAI Executive endorsed in August. This was the step confirming Berlin as the permanent 
base for the International Secretariat, whereas the “French LAI Bureau” in Paris (established in 
March-April 1927) had two “employees” who provided visiting representatives of the LAI and the 
Comintern with “auxiliary help”. However, in August, Gibarti concluded that the surveillance of 
the French Sûreté was preventing the bureau from doing any constructive work, and had more or 
less brought the LAI in France to a momentary standstill.386 Others have interpreted the above 
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discussion in a different fashion, characteristic of the misconceptions which prevail in the earlier 
research into the LAI and European anti-colonialism. For example, Martin Thomas’ discerning 
analysis, Empires of Intelligence, which focuses on the efforts of French and British security 
services to control colonial disorder, includes an erroneous reading of the history of the LAI. 
Thomas writes that the LAI “was not entirely under Communist control” after the Brussels 
Congress and, at the “1928 Congress in Amsterdam shifted its base […] to Paris and London” 
[author’s note: the LAI on two separate occasions held meetings with its LAI Executive in 
Amsterdam, in March 1927 and in April 1929, never any congresses].387 The causality and end 
result of the location question was, however, somewhat different. On 28 April 1928, the LAI 
Executive endorsed at its meeting in Brussels the decision to locate the International Secretariat 
“permanently” in Berlin. The reason for this was that it had become impossible to sustain any kind 
of anti-imperialist activity in Paris due to the surveillance of the French police and, as noted by 
Chatto, the cost of financing two International Secretariats was too expensive.388 
      Another serious issue was the question of finance. Gibarti observed on 29 March that, due to 
the shortage of funds at the International Secretariat, the LAI had retreated into a state of 
“vacillation”, unable to sustain or establish “large campaigns”.389 This remark from Gibarti 
indicates that the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters had not anticipated that the LAI 
would create such an impact. However, it was not up to Gibarti to solve the question of securing 
finance for the International Secretariat. This was a question under Münzenberg’s jurisdiction, so it 
was Münzenberg, along with his contacts in the ECCI, the Political Secretariat, the Eastern 
Secretariat and Piatnitsky, who began these negotiations after the Brussels Congress. First, 
however, Münzenberg expected Piatnitsky to reimburse the IAH for every cost linked exclusively 
to the congress. On 28 February, Münzenberg explained to Piatnitsky that the “business” [IAH] in 
Germany was on the threshold of collapsing due to its support of the LACO and the congress. 
Hence, in order to pay the overhead costs for the congress, Münzenberg had borrowed money from 
other communist organisations and individuals [unknown], “people” who expected to get their 
money back. According to Münzenberg, the congress had cost 49,522.04 Marks, and the sum of 
money handed over in Brussels ($4,880) was not sufficient to balance the IAH account, thus, 
Piatnitsky had to authorise an additional sum of $7,000 to cover the extra costs and loans. In 
relation to securing the activities at the International Secretariat in Berlin, Münzenberg demanded 
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“a minimum” of 5,000 Marks, per month.390 In his letter to Piatnitsky, Münzenberg enclosed a 
budget, “Unterlage zur Beurteilung der finanziellen Bedürfnisse des Sekretariats für einen Monat“, 
a document detailing the primary functions of the International Secretariat. For example, the 
expected cost to print and distribute propaganda, and to send LAI representatives from Berlin to 
visit the national LAI sections. Münzenberg concluded that a monthly allowance of 6,755 Marks 
would guarantee the existence of the International Secretariat.391 
      Piatnitsky did not send any response to Münzenberg concerning the budget. Apparently, 
Piatnitsky added this document to the pile of material the ECCI Secretariat and the Eastern 
Secretariat had begun to gather on the LAI after the Brussels Congress in order to reach a 
definitive decision on the LAI.392 In June, four months after the Brussels Congress, the Political 
Secretariat endorsed a resolution from the “ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission” (“Anti-Imperialist 
Commission”) granting the International Secretariat a monthly budget of $1,500, a sum which 
would come up for renegotiation after six months. The primary purpose and aim of this sum was to 
cover “organisational and agitative tasks”. 
      The “Anti-Imperialist Commission”, established on Piatnitsky’s direct order, assumed the 
responsibilities of former commissions connected to the anti-colonial project. Its primary 
obligation was to define political, organisational and financial guidelines for the LAI, solely for 
the purpose of assisting the Political Secretariat's decision-making process in relation to the LAI 
and its nerve centre, the International Secretariat. Petrovsky was the leader of the commission, 
working together with Jules Humbert-Droz, Smeral, Münzenberg, Pierre Semard, Petrov, Vittorio 
Codevilla, Jay Lovestone, “Besso” Lominadze, Schüller, Geschke and J. R. Campbell. The 
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outcome of discussions within the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” was pivotal for the future 
direction of the LAI. Remmele, acting as the Political Secretariat’s spokesperson, instructed 
Humbert-Droz and Petrovsky to complete and sign the LAI resolution in June, in order to provide 
the International Secretariat with renewed impetus to generate activity.393 
      The “Anti-Imperialist Commission” was the institutional actor which defined the political 
agenda of the LAI. The LAI’s first objective was to “vigorously support the Chinese revolution” 
and its second objective was to establish “an energetic struggle against the war threat and 
[Imperialist] preparations against the Soviet Union”. This agenda contradicted the original and 
“central task” of the LAI, endorsed by the Political Secretariat prior to the Brussels Congress in 
January 1927: “the creation of a permanent organisation to secure the support of the European 
proletariat for the liberation movements in the colonies”. This revised agenda suggested a more 
radical and political approach, probably inspired by the “absolutely successful demonstration” in 
Brussels. How did the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” imagine that the LAI would put this agenda 
into practice? The first step was pragmatic. The LAI had to mobilise “every proletarian force as 
well as other layers and groups […] to assist in the support of the Chinese revolution and the 
struggle against the war threat”, an initiative which would enhance the chances of establishing 
“strong relations” in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. For the “Anti-Imperialist 
Commission”, the LAI was the Comintern’s hope for success, where other attempts had failed, in 
establishing a connection to the colonial world.394 
 
* 
 
Gather All Visionaries and Utopian Dreamers 
After the Brussels Congress, a crucial element for the LAI was to find individuals eager to support, 
contribute and assist the process of establishing national sections. This was the essential idea 
behind gathering every visionary and “utopian dreamer” to join the cause. What kind of 
expressions and consequences did this process entail? While Berlin was the LAI’s focal point from 
the beginning, the ambition, however, was to form “vigorous” sections where “imperialism raged 
violently”, e.g. Great Britain, the Netherlands, India, USA and Latin America. According to 
                                               
393 RGASPI 495/60/109, 13, Letter from the ECCI Anti-imperialist Commission, Moscow, to Alfred Kurella/Agitprop,  
Moscow, 5/6-1927; RGASPI 495/7/2, 12a, Protokoll der Ständigen Kommission des EKKI, Moscow, 12/5-1927; 
RGASPI 495/3/18, 136-139, Decision by the ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission, Moscow, 15/6-1927. Piatnitsky 
ordered Smeral, Remmele, Murphy, Humbert-Droz and Kuusinen to obey this decision. 
394 RGASPI 495/3/18, 136-139, Resolution, ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission, Moscow, 15/6-1927. The Political  
Secretariat discussed the political agenda of the LAI on 8 August. The protocol was, however, filed in a 
“Sondermappe” (Special Dossier); see fol. RGASPI 495/3/22, 1-2, Protocol Nr.38, Polit-Secretariat of the ECCI, 
Moscow, 6/8-1927. Present at the meeting were Bukharin, Piatnitsky, Petrovsky, Remmele, Kreibich, Scheflo, Luhani, 
Ratt (Ostabtl.), Wurm, Macci, Kornblum, Pepper, Reesema, Schüller, Wassiljew, Neumann, de Bouque, Spencer, Reit, 
Fürnberg, Ferdi, Hies and Thibo. 
162 
 
Katayama’s observation, the LAI had to portray itself as being the successor to the LACO, 
concluding that it was “inadvisable for the time being to dissolve such organisation[s] as the 
League to Combat Colonial Oppression, Hands off China organisations”.395 Hence, the national 
sections were a crucial part of the idea to validate the creation of an international anti-imperialist 
organisation.  
      At the beginning of 1927, the so-called communist “solar system” in Germany was in a state of 
chaos. According to an analysis of the nature of the communist propaganda in Germany in January, 
carried out by two members of the ECCI Agitprop Department in Moscow (“Günther”, pseudonym 
of German communist Hans Glaubauf and “Jablonski” [identity unknown]), the result exposed a 
flawed and confused movement. “Günther”/Glaubauf and “Jablonski” stated that the relation of the 
KPD Agitprop department in Berlin to its counterpart at Comintern headquarters in Moscow was 
beyond contempt. The activities and work of the mass organisations (the IAH and the IRH) were 
inadequate, while the inherent weakness of the ZK KPD and the KPD Agitprop department did 
nothing to co-ordinate the mass organisations. Hence, the result was a scenario which damaged the 
party, having an array of actors carrying out similar work in competition with each other, and 
outmanoeuvring the propaganda of the KPD.396 The only response the ZK KPD seemed capable of 
coming up with was to impose “bureaucratic restraints” on the IAH and IRH, which contributed to 
establishing a competitive milieu leaving the mass organisations to fight amongst one another on 
the social and political arena in Germany, “Günther”/Glaubauf and “Jablonski” concluded. It was 
within this structural setting that the International Secretariat had to adapt itself after the Brussels 
Congress. It also had to comply with the Small Commission's demand that the International 
Secretariat stand in “constant liaison” with the Eastern Secretariat and with the LAI Executive's 
“kom.Fraktion”.397 
      In Berlin, the colonial microcosm consisted of individuals from India, Indonesia, China, North 
Africa, Equatorial Africa, the Arab countries and Latin America, some of whom showed an interest 
in the LAI after the Brussels Congress. For the RKÜöO, this was an unwanted scenario, causing it 
to decide to increase its monitoring of the colonial influx into the city, filing intelligence in the 
dossier “Einreiseanträge, Ausländer außer Russen” (Entry Permit, Foreigners except Russians), 
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material sent, for example, to the Auswärtige Amt on a regular basis.398 The case of a chemistry 
student from India, Khwaja Abdul Hamid (29/10-1898, Aligarh), is a good illustration of this. 
Hamid arrived in Berlin in September 1924 to conduct studies at Humboldt University and, at that 
time, was not perceived as an anti-colonial activist. However, after the Brussels Congress, the 
RKÜöO began to register Hamid’s sudden interest and engagement in the anti-colonial movement 
in Berlin, above all his contacts with Münzenberg and the IAH. The “Pension Puttfarken” in 
Berlin, Hamid’s place of residence, was, according to the RKÜöO, a “frequent meeting location 
for Indian revolutionaries” and other colonial activists, an observation which strengthened their 
suspicion that Hamid had established a connection to radical and subversive movements. 
Additionally, Hamid had most likely participated at the Brussels Congress, the RKÜöO stated. 
However, his name does not appear in Das Flammenzeichen, although Hamid could have attended 
as a guest, not as a delegate of any organisation, association or party. This kind of monitoring 
coincided with the RKÜöO’s decision to begin its surveillance of colonial associations in Berlin, 
e.g. the Indische Vereinigungen and the Islamitische Kommission für das Rifgebiet.399 
      Berlin’s political landscape determined the International Secretariat’s opportunities for 
developing itself, while the establishment of national LAI sections in Europe, India, the USA and 
Latin America all had different trajectories. In May, Gibarti informed the ECCI Secretariat of the 
first, tentative steps taken in forming national LAI sections. While the work was proceeding as 
planned, it was, however, an undertaking characterised by a lack of money: 
The International Secretariat has, since the Brussels Congress, been doing its best to 
establish branches of the LAI in different colonial and semi-colonial countries, or at least to 
interest various political organisations in the special aims and objects of the League. The 
results obtained would have been far more satisfactory and substantial if the machinery of 
the Secretariat had been developed to deal with its enormous tasks, but the lack of financial 
means and, consequently, of the necessary apparatus has constituted a very serious hindrance 
in this respect to the work of the Secretariat during the period under review, viz. February to 
May 1927.400 
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The “lack of financial means” and a poorly developed “apparatus” are, however, not the only 
reasons explaining why the task of supporting the formation of sections had become so complex. 
For example, Münzenberg argued at about the same time that the development of sections was 
“positive”.401 Hence, it is essential to include other aspects rather than, for example, seek the 
answers in the “sectarian squabbles” within the international communist movement.402 This entails 
an evaluation which includes political context, suspicion and hesitance, and how some of the 
actors were striving to capitalise on the euphoria of the Brussels Congress. In England and China, 
for example, the political context determined the framework of LAI activity, where suspicion and 
surveillance defined the formation of sections in England and the Netherlands. From the 
perspective of the “Anti-Imperialist Commission”, the LAI had every chance of establishing active 
and vigorous sections, if they followed the suggested path: 
[…] national organisations of the League must be built up on a mass basis through the 
affiliation of trade unions, trade councils, local labour parties, peasant organisations and 
individual membership as far as is possible. The Communist Parties of these countries must 
give special attention to this task. At least one leading member of the Central Committee 
should be in charge of the League work and actively participate in the Communist Fraction 
of the International Executive of the League.403   
 
* 
 
The “Provisional” Character of the British LAI Section, 1927 
The British Empire and its colonies were a coveted target for the LAI. The first step was to 
establish a section in the heart of British imperialism, London. While Bridgeman and Saklatvala 
had laid the foundation of an anti-imperialist organisation in England (LACO) prior to the Brussels 
Congress, the follow-up and consolidation proved, however, to be more of a challenge. The 
International Secretariat and the Comintern defined the LAI section in England as a “provisional” 
institution in 1927, defined by hesitancy and internal doubt. This characterisation ended in July 
1928, when a British LAI Section saw the light of day. Petrovsky remarked on the tedious process 
of establishing an LAI section during his frequent visits to London, particularly the relations 
between communist and non-communist members. Additionally, the LSI questioned why some of 
its members, e.g. Lansbury and Fenner Brockway (see further below), also expressed their 
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devotion to the LAI, a dilemma which made it difficult to find a trajectory for the British LAI 
Section. 
      Bridgeman was, from the beginning, the person who co-ordinated the work to form a section, 
receiving support from e.g. Helen Crawfurd, the IAH representative, who provided both 
administrative assistance and new contacts. Petrovsky later concluded in two reports in 1928 (4 
March and 20 April), addressed to the Eastern Secretariat, that, despite Bridgeman’s enthusiasm, it 
had been the CPGB that had sanctioned the idea to form a section. However, the CPGB 
acknowledged the fact that Bridgeman was the key that made the difference between success and 
failure: 
A report was given to the Colonial Committee [CPGB] on 21st February. Steps were taken to 
obtain publicity for the resolutions, and it was decided to approach Bridgeman with a plan of 
procedure. Harry Pollitt reported on 28.2 that he had seen Bridgeman who was ready to call 
a meeting of the British delegation in Brussels. It was decided to pressure Bridgeman into 
calling the meeting, which was to style itself as the provisional committee of the British 
Section of the League and summon a conference in London of sympathetic organisations.404 
Presented with Pollitt’s instruction, Bridgeman contacted Lansbury and Brockway asking them to 
assist in preparing the establishment of this “provisional committee”. However, a crack emerged 
when Lansbury began making enquiries in March into the LAI’s alleged communist ties. 
Bridgeman then contacted Nehru, informing him that the LAI could very well be heading towards 
an uncertain future in England if the Labour Party began questioning the LAI, something which, 
in turn, would also affect the ILP and Brockway.405 
      Bridgeman, however, had other matters on his mind than launching an investigation into the 
LAI’s communist connections, and focused instead on the first meeting of the “provisional 
committee of the British LAI Section”, which convened in the House of Commons in London on 7 
April. Delegates who had also attended the Brussels Congress met and unanimously agreed to 
form a so-called LAI “sub-committee”, the objective of which was to pave the way for the official 
establishment of a British LAI Section. To co-ordinate this work, the meeting elected Brockway as 
Chairman of the “sub-committee”, Bridgeman as secretary and Lansbury as treasurer. During the 
meeting, Münzenberg instructed Crawfurd to “draw up a list of people and representatives of 
organisations to be approached with a view to becoming associated with the League”, as well as to 
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publish LAI propaganda in “the Socialist and Communist press”, with a particular focus on calling 
for financial contributions to support this “provisional section”.406  
      Without further ado, Brockway began to contact prominent actors within the European socialist 
movement. On 8 April, Brockway sent a letter to Friedrich Adler, secretary of the LSI, to explain 
that the rumour implicitly suggesting that the communists were the actual organisers of the 
Brussels Congress “has been exaggerated”. Admitting to Adler that he had been deeply involved in 
the congress as an ILP delegate and had also been expected to lead the establishment of an LAI 
section in England, Brockway wanted some kind of consent from the LSI and, above all, to get the 
LSI involved in the LAI: 
We felt, however, that it was a mistake to leave such a representative movement in the hands 
of the communists. The nationalists and Latin American parties were represented, which 
seemed to us a reason why the Socialists should actively participate. It is already serious how 
weak the influence of the Communists is and, although we understand that they have 
financial resources not open to us, we think all legitimate opportunity should be taken of 
increasing our influence.407 
The general idea Brockway had was to affiliate the ILP with the LAI as a collective member; 
however, this required Adler’s approval. The content of Brockway’s letter attracted Adler’s 
attention, and, in his response on 13 April, he told Brockway that “the Communists, who are the 
real founders of this league”, had never shown any intention of wanting to collaborate with the LSI 
on the colonial question. Adler assured Brockway that this was not, however, a definitive answer 
to his ILP request, suggesting that Brockway wait until the next meeting of the LSI Executive in 
September 1927. However, Adler’s personal opinion on this issue revealed his attitude towards 
Brockway’s involvement in the LAI:  
[…] we would weaken our International if we were not able, in such questions of first-rate 
importance, to take action unitedly [sic] as an International. If we should come to a decision 
to take part, we must, in my view, create conditions which would give us an influence in 
such a league corresponding to the importance of our International which, with its seven 
million members, would be by far the strongest organisation to come into consideration at 
all.408 
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In the period between Brockway’s request in April and Adler’s inquisitive reply and, both prior to, 
during and after the LSI Executive meeting in September, the LSI formulated its understanding of 
the LAI. The sole reason for doing this was to be able to respond to and counteract the spread of 
the LAI within the European socialist movement, a question further discussed below. 
      The “provisional committee” came into existence about the time that British and Soviet 
diplomatic relations broke down in 1927. British security services, MI5 and the Special 
Intelligence Service (SIS), had all increased their surveillance of the communist movement due to 
the social unrest in China and the fact that both the Comintern and the Bolsheviks supported the 
KMT. This particularly involved the monitoring of the activities of suspected Soviet agents known 
to be residing in England. According to Zara Steiner, this was a result of Chamberlain yielding to 
anti-Bolshevik attitudes in the British parliament. Fuelled by intelligence gathered by the SIS, 
these documents were enough to confirm MI5’s opinion that subversive communist movements 
had gained a strong position on British soil and, on 12 May, this operation culminated in the raid 
of the Soviet Trade Delegation and the All-Russian Co-operative Society, known as the ARCOS 
raid, in London. During this raid, British authorities seized a number of documents which verified 
that the Soviet Union had an extensive network of spies in England, manoeuvred by both the 
Comintern and the CPGB. This all led to a break down in foreign relations between the Soviet 
Union and Great Britain, reaching a climax on 23 May once the British Government had 
authorised the decision to effectively deport every Soviet diplomat from British soil.409 
      While it may appear that the ARCOS raid had no practical effect on the “provisional” LAI 
section, this episode may, however, have contributed to increased doubts about the LAI being 
raised by some of the actors. Thus, to reach a consensus on the LAI’s suspected communist ties, 
Brockway contacted Gibarti in Berlin, asking him to clarify some “points raised” by the Labour 
Party and the LSI. Apologising for the “inquisitorial” questions, particularly as Brockway was 
“very happy with the all-inclusive character of this movement”, the least Gibarti could do was to 
shed some light on whether “you receive money from Russia”. This also involved making an 
account of what kind of organisations had funded the LAI after the congress, the total number of 
communist members in the LAI and the Executive Committee, and whether Gibarti was a member 
of the KPD.410 Gibarti’s answer was a typical smokescreen in order to conceal the connection 
between the LAI and the Comintern. However, British security services intercepted Gibarti's reply 
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to Brockway and were therefore able, via New Scotland Yard and MI5, to analyse some of the 
correspondence between the members. According to Gibarti, avoiding mentioning the involvement 
of the Comintern or the KPD, the International Secretariat had received money after the Brussels 
Congress from Fimmen, Goldschmidt and the American journalist Agnes Smedley (who was also 
Chatto’s partner) as well as from the KMT. On the question of whether Gibarti was a member of 
the KPD, Gibarti stated, “I am not a member of the Communist Party”. This was an obvious lie. 
According to a document in Gibarti’s personal file in the Comintern Archive, he had become a 
member of the Communist Party of Hungary in 1919 and had had his membership transferred to 
the KPD on 29 February, 1924.411 
      Brockway was, nevertheless, content with Gibarti’s explanation. However, Lansbury and the 
LSI remained suspicious. On 16 June, at a meeting of the “provisional committee” in the House of 
Commons, Lansbury resigned from the LAI, complaining of being “overburdened” with work as 
the sole reason for leaving his position as Chairman of the LAI. In the eyes of Petrovsky, 
Lansbury’s act of “self-defence” left Brockway shattered and he too was, for a brief moment, 
disillusioned about the LAI.412 This critical moment raised serious doubts about the very idea of 
establishing an LAI section in England. Hence, to save what was left of the “provisional 
committee”, Gibarti left Paris and hastened to London. Yet, the RKÜöO took note of Gibarti’s 
journey and suspected that the reason for his trip was to “exploit” the current political conflict 
between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. This was not the case, however. Apparently though, 
Gibarti’s visit caused more harm than good which, according to the “Anti-Imperialist 
Commission”, proved Gibarti’s incapability of co-operating with the CPGB to organise an anti-
imperialist congress in England during the summer of 1927.413 The step from a “provisional 
committee” to becoming a British LAI Section turned into a complex process, with ideology 
becoming the central issue in 1928. 
 
* 
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The Chinese Influx into Berlin: Hansin Liau and the Chinese National Agency 
The Chinese national liberation struggle had been a central issue at the Brussels Congress, which, 
with the attendance of a thirty-strong delegation, symbolised the anti-colonial struggle. Yet, it was 
a delegation overtly European in character, nineteen of which lived in Europe. For example, 
representatives of the KMT Executive Committee, the KMT “European Centre” in Berlin and the 
delegates from the KMT sections were living in either France, Belgium, England or the 
Netherlands. In Berlin, the Schutzpolizei noticed a sudden increase in the number of Chinese 
individuals displaying an inclination towards anti-colonialism in February, e.g. Dr. Koyang Tong 
of the Hauptverband Chinesischer Studenten in Deutschland, Sia Ting of the KMT “European 
Centre”, Y. S. Hsie of the German KMT section and Hansin Liau.414 
      Hansin Liau was the LAI’s and the International Secretariat’s key actor in maintaining the 
momentum of its Chinese propaganda. For Münzenberg, Liau’s symbolic performance at the 
Brussels Congress and his connection to the KMT, proved Liau to be a character that Münzenberg 
could place at the front to lead the Chinese work in Berlin. According to Jenö (Eugen) Varga (1879 
– 1964), a Hungarian communist and chief theoretician on economic matters at the Comintern and 
with whom Liau had worked in Berlin 1924-27 in the Statistical and Information Bureau (the 
“Varga Bureau”, sanctioned on the direct orders of the ECCI), Liau was a trustworthy “comrade”. 
In addition, after having been involved in establishing the CPCh in China, Liau travelled to 
Germany and had his membership transferred to the KPD in 1923. Perceived as being the leading 
expert on the Chinese question in Berlin, despite being connected with the dissolution of the 
“Varga Bureau” in the beginning of 1927, Liau had to find a new occupation within the German 
communist movement.415 
      In April, Münzenberg handpicked Liau to lead a centre for Chinese nationalist propaganda in 
Europe, entitled the Chinese National Agency, with covert links to the International Secretariat. 
According to an outline of this agency as presented to Petrovsky by Münzenberg on 22 April, with 
Petrovsky presenting the idea to the Small Commission in Moscow, the plan struck a chord of 
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approval. The initial aim of the agency was to “improve the telegraphic information service 
regarding China” in Europe, using Liau as its official representative. Münzenberg stated that it was 
essential to locate the agency in Berlin, especially as Germany had an “absolutely neutral” position 
in its relation to China compared to that of Great Britain. By getting Liau to pose as the official 
author of the propaganda, this would disguise the original authors of the material. According to 
Petrovsky, Liau should never write any of the propaganda, a task assigned to the Soviet news 
agency in Moscow, TASS. Hence, TASS would complete manuscripts for telegrams and other 
political propaganda and, once completed, transmit the material to Liau. What was the reason for 
doing this? Petrovsky believed that a crucial aspect of the agency was to conceal the original 
source behind the propaganda. In fact, the propaganda released through the agency should give the 
impression of working counter-clockwise, i.e. it had to appear as though the agency provided 
TASS and Inprecorr with information on China. The Berlin Chief of Police chose to pay closer 
attention to a different aspect of the Chinese National Agency which, in a sense, disclosed its 
second aim, which was to establish contact with Chinese activists in Berlin, London and Paris.416 
      Why did Münzenberg suggest the establishment of the Chinese National Agency? Political 
developments in China provide a clear answer. On 12 April 1927, the KMT staged a violent and 
bloody putsch against its former allies, the Chinese communists in Shanghai, assuming power over 
the nationalist movement and establishing the Nanking government. This episode implied a 
“qualitative change” for the Chinese anti-imperialist movement in China, as expressed by Edmund 
S. K. Fung.417 Therefore, for Münzenberg, the idea of the Chinese National Agency was a reaction 
against the KMT putsch as well as a response to the LAI’s need to re-assess its attitude towards the 
Chinese national liberation struggle. While the connection between the European communist 
movement and the KMT “European Centre” had suddenly disappeared, Liau, who had once 
belonged to the “Left” KMT (which advocated closer collaboration with the communists in 
China), appeared as the most logical person to lead the opposition. On 21 April, in an article in 
Inprecorr, Liau argued that “the treachery of Chiang Kai-shek does not come unexpectedly. This 
danger has already existed for a year […] our people and our Party [CPCh] will adopt an 
irreconcilable attitude to this treachery”.418 The Chinese National Agency was a response to this 
political change in China which had, above all, shattered any possibility of establishing an LAI 
                                               
416 RGASPI 495/30/350, 18-19, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 22/4-1927; RGASPI 495/6/5,  
70, Auszug aus dem Protokoll Nr.23 der Sitzung der Eng-Kommission des Sekretariats, Moscow, 28/4-1927. The 
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1507/67115, 213, Betrifft: Chinesische Nationalagentur, 23/5-1927. 
417 Edmund S. K. Fung, “Anti-Imperialism and the Left Guomindang”, in Modern China, Vol.11, No.1 (Jan., 1985),  
Sage Publications Inc., p.39; Pantsov (2000); Karin-Irene Eiermann, Chinesische Komintern-Delegierte in Moskau in 
den 1920er/1930er Jahren, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin, 2009, pp.53-57. 
418 Hansin Liau, Inprecorr, Vol.7, No.26, April 21, 1927, 527-528. Taken from Robert C. North & Xenia J. Eudin, M.  
N. Roy’s Mission to China, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1963, pp.66-67. 
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section in the country. The IAH representative in China, Kou Meng-yu, was no longer of any use. 
As leader of the KMT Propaganda Section, Kou Meng-yu became, after the April putsch, the 
Minister of Education in the Nanking government.419 
      On 30 April, the deliberations on the Chinese National Agency in Moscow were completed. 
Once Münzenberg had provided Petrovsky with additional material on the plan, the ECCI 
Agitprop Department began preparing the details for the agency. With Liau as leader, and with 
3,500 Marks per month (for the first three months) to cover all expenses, the editors of the 
Inprecorr in Berlin, the Hungarian communist Gyula Alpári [pseudonym: “Julius”] and “Boros” 
[identity unknown] were to supervise and control the agency, particularly Liau’s contacts with the 
“bourgeoisie press and journalists” in Berlin.420 
      An evaluation of the practical impact of the Chinese National Agency (CNA) is complex, 
particularly as Liau combined his work for this agency with the activities of the International 
Secretariat.421 However, the agency was, for a brief period, a visible actor in Berlin. The 
Ministerium des Innern (the Prussian Ministry of the Interior; MdI) noted Liau as being a “very 
active” leader of the agency; however, it was not possible to confirm whether the money came 
from a “Russian connection”.422 In the end, however, money was the central question. The agency 
found itself crippled by a constant shortage of funds and, despite minor contributions from the 
International Secretariat; it did not have enough money to cover its costs. By July, several of the 
actors began to perceive the endeavour as a failure. Bridgeman told Liau in a letter that the 
propaganda of the agency in England “had failed … The English press is almost entirely in the 
hands of the capitalists”. According to Bridgeman, the main mistake from the beginning was to 
locate the agency in Berlin, especially when the propaganda was aimed towards the British 
Empire. How could Liau keep track of the daily political scenario in England when he did not live 
in the country? Bridgeman concluded that the despatching of telegrams from Berlin to London on 
                                               
419 Historical recollections of Kou Meng-yu are scarce. According to some documents, which explain how the KMT  
prepared the putsch against the communists in China in 1926-27, his position and nomination as Minister of Education 
after the April putsch is disclosed: “Minister of Education: Dr. Kou Meng Yu. He is probably the best known of the 
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has been a member of the Political Council”, see the Internet: < http://119.97.209.45/shownews.asp?id=43673 >. 
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421 RGASPI 542/1/16, 25-32, Report on the activities LAI, Gibarti & Liau, to Petrov/F. F. Raskolnikov, Ost-Abteilung,  
Moskau, signed: 31/5-1927, despatched from Berlin, 9/6-1927. 
422 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/67115, 238, Der Preußische Minister des Innern, Berlin, an der Regierungspräsident,  
Berlin, 3/8-1927. 
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a daily basis was not enough; it was also a rather costly and inefficient operation.423 It was the 
combination of surveillance by German authorities and the lack of money which led to the Chinese 
National Agency disintegrating under its own weight. In August, in order to save whatever was 
what left, the agency merged with the International Secretariat.424 For Liau, the dissolution of the 
Chinese National Agency was not a disappointment; in fact, he believed that he was a key figure in 
both the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement, an ambition which assumed a completely 
different trajectory towards the end of 1927. 
 
* 
 
Nehru's Euphoria and Jhabwala's Loneliness  
The Brussels Congress created a reaction within the Indian national liberation movement. For 
example, it had convinced Nehru of the strength of the anti-imperialist movement in Europe. 
However, the political and social backdrop to forming an LAI section in India was completely 
different from the political milieu in Europe. The LAI appeared, therefore, to be an answer to the 
call from the anti-colonial movement in India to establish a network connecting India with Europe. 
      After the Great War, Berlin was a haven and centre for the émigré Indian nationalist 
revolutionary community in Europe. In 1921, Chatto assumed a leading position within the group 
of Indian nationalists, whilst for the Comintern, Roy was the leader expected to co-ordinate a 
connection from Europe to India. Whilst the Brussels Congress sent vibrations throughout the anti-
imperialist movement in Europe, this did not imply that in 1927 there existed any functional 
connection which the LAI could use.425 According to Nehru, the Indian community in Berlin was a 
group which primarily engaged itself in quarrels “amongst themselves”, leaving out any kind of 
coherent political discussion. Perceiving Chatto as a “very able and […] delightful” person, and 
not a “regular communist […] but communistically inclined”, Roy impressed Nehru with his 
“intellectual level”. The impact of the Brussels Congress shaped Nehru’s understanding of the 
global dominance of colonialism and its politics and, after the congress, Nehru concluded that the 
event “helped me to understand some of the problems of the colonial and dependent countries”.426 
                                               
423 RGASPI 542/1/18, 29-32, Letter from R. Bridgeman, London, to Hansin Liau, Berlin, 30/6-1927. Bridgeman stated  
that the Chinese National Agency was a valuable propaganda instrument: “[A]ll the persons and Members of 
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425 Overstreet and Windmiller 1959, p.40, 77-87; Barooah (2004). 
426 Nehru 1936, pp.151-154, 163. Nehru travelled to Moscow together with his father Motilal, where he met Roy in  
Moscow in October 1927 in connection with the celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the Bolshevik “revolution”. 
The Soviet Russian agency, the Society for Cultural Relations to Foreign Countries (VOKS), functioned as the main 
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Nevertheless, Nehru had a pragmatic and realistic understanding of the congress and made the 
distinction between the euphoria of the congress and the political reality facing the INC in India. 
For example, Nehru told Bridgeman that the LAI should not count on the INC affiliating. This 
statement was based on the dictum introduced by Gandhi, which declared that the INC did not 
look to socialism as the answer to solve the Indian independence struggle. In fact, Nehru argued 
that it could be dangerous for the INC to enter into an alliance with an organisation which was 
“professedly socialist and partly communist” and would most likely be perceived as suspicious in 
India.427 This did not, however, make Nehru conceal his enthusiasm for the Brussels Congress 
from Gandhi:  
I do not expect much from it [LAI] and indeed I am quite sure that none of the members of 
the so-called imperialist or oppressing nations will help us in the least whenever their 
interests conflict with ours. […] But I welcome all legitimate methods of getting into touch 
with other countries and peoples so that we may be able to understand their viewpoint and 
world politics generally. I do not think it is desirable […] for India to [go it alone] now or in 
the future. It is solely with a view to self-education and self-improvement that I desire 
external contacts … [and] study of other people and their ideas.428 
Nehru understood that if the INC developed a connection with the LAI, this would contribute to 
strengthening his perception of the anti-imperialist movement and, above all, expand his network 
into Europe. The INC did not, however, condone Nehru’s activities after the congress, regardless 
of Nehru’s symbolic performance at the event. Gandhi explained in a letter to Nehru: “I myself do 
not expect much from this league […] because its free activity depends upon the goodwill of the 
very powers that are partners in the exploitation of the oppressed nations”.429 Nonetheless, the 
Brussels Congress did represent a “turning-point” for Nehru, Sarvapelli Gopal writes in his 
biography of Nehru, an event which had provided him with both political awareness and practical 
experience, the latter as a result of assisting Chatto in Berlin with the preparations for the 
congress.430 The International Secretariat realised at an early stage that Nehru would not easily 
convince the INC to support the establishment of an LAI section in India. Thus, the LAI had to 
find a contact elsewhere in India. 
                                                                                                                                                          
Moscow for four days, impressed with the “capital of international communism”. After his return to India, Nehru 
published a number of “random sketches and impressions” in the literary form of a “panegyric” on the Soviet system 
in the Indian nationalist press, see Haithcox 1971, p.90. 
427 TNA PRO CO 323 971 1, Secret report on the Congress in Brussels, author: Lidell, no date, year: 1927. 
428 Letter from Nehru to Gandhi, 22/4-1927. Taken from Gopal 1975, pp.105-106. Nehru told Gibarti that the  
“international co-operation of the national movement in India opens up unlimited prospects and is likely to strengthen 
the Indian nationalists”, intelligence which Gibarti passed on to the Eastern Secretariat, fol. RGASPI 542/1/17, 24-30. 
429 Mahatma Gandhi, Nandi Hill, Mysore State, to Nehru, 25/5-1927, in Nehru, 1958, pp.54-55. Gandhi told Nehru,  
“you are on the spot and you may see an altruistic improvement in the atmosphere there which I miss altogether”. 
430 Gopal 1975, p.100. 
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      S. H. Jhabwala, the Parsi labour leader and secretary of the Bombay Central Labour Board, 
became the International Secretariat's contact in India. According to Philip Spratt, Jhabwala was “a 
queer, dreamy but energetic person who was secretary or president of fifteen or twenty unions 
round Bombay”.431 In the aftermath of the Brussels Congress, Jhabwala contacted Gibarti with the 
ambition of forming an LAI section in Bombay, introducing himself as the spokesperson for the 
Bombay labour movement, a position Jhabwala intended to use in order to write and publish 
articles on the LAI in India. This required a favour in return, however. To get the work started in 
Bombay, Gibarti should send him material about the LAI, and some financial support. Jhabwala 
explained that he only had “50 Rupees in his wallet” and, since “this poor country” was under no 
circumstances comparable to Europe, Gibarti had one choice if the LAI wanted to establish a 
section in India: the International Secretariat had to provide money.432 
      The International Secretariat did not ignore Jhabwala’s financial request. However, this 
question was part of the general discussion about how much money the LAI needed to build up an 
international organisation. For Gibarti, Jhabwala’s interest was used as a pretext to introduce him 
to the LAI Executive as “our Indian secretary” (whether Jhabwala knew this remains unknown). 
However, this does not imply that he received any money. Thus, on 30 September, 1927, Jhabwala 
sent a second request to Gibarti wondering how much money he could expect, particularly as the 
Bombay Central Labour Union was considering joining the LAI as a collective member.433 This 
question was ultimately sorted out by Münzenberg and Piatnitsky. Münzenberg sent a financial 
report to Piatnitsky, informing him that the “Bombay secretariat, Jhabwala” had required a sum of 
£100 to commence activity.434 The question is whether Jhabwala ever received any money. 
      One year later, on 19 October 1928, Jhabwala wondered when the monthly allowance of 100 
Rupees would arrive. The situation in India had worsened since 1927, caused by the increasing 
surveillance of British security services which, according to Jhabwala, had thwarted the activities 
of the LAI. The lack of money, combined with the prohibitive measures of the British colonial 
authorities, was the root of Jhabwala’s loneliness in Bombay. Jhabwala concluded in his letter to 
Chatto that the political situation in India was a constant battle against “every vindictive cynic”, 
with every parcel from the International Secretariat “seeming to disappear”.435 The British 
authorities in India systematically confiscated packages containing subversive political material, 
                                               
431 Spratt 1955, pp.36-37. Spratt met Jhabwala for the first time at the session of the All Indian Trade Union Council  
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which was a crucial source of information with which to evaluate the nature of the Indian 
nationalist movement. In February 1929, the British Head Office in London took a further step in 
refining this strategy. According to a directive to the India Office in London, it was of particular 
necessity to destabilise the relations between subversive movements in Europe and the Indian 
independence movement. Head Office recommended the confiscation of every letter, telegram and 
package sent from the LAI International Secretariat to specific individuals in India, e.g. Jhabwala. 
With this directive, the British authorities aimed to restrict the LAI’s political space; above all, to 
intercept and prohibit “literature from the LAI” and to refuse to grant “passports to Indians who 
were known to be connected with the League”.436 In 1929, Jhabwala’s connection with the LAI 
ended. Arrested in 1929, and as one of the defendants in the Meerut conspiracy trial in 1933 (see 
Utopia Redefined, Part II), Jhabwala received a sentence of four years’ “rigorous 
imprisonment”.437 The Indian question thus became a topic which continued to haunt and 
challenge the International Secretariat, much dependent upon the capacity of one person: Chatto. 
 
* 
 
“Little Help for the Starting”: the LAI in the USA and Latin America 
To organise LAI activities in the USA and Latin America was a major undertaking, carried out by 
specific individuals. The AAAIL delegate, Gomez, was one of many who had attended 
Münzenberg’s party in his apartment in Berlin and, additionally, was “one of many foreign 
fraternal delegates” at the KPD Party day in Essen. Other actors, on whose services the 
International Secretariat depended, were Julio A. Mella and the LAI functionary Federico Bach, 
who prepared the way for the establishment of LAI sections in Latin America, leaving Gomez in 
charge of the USA section. Gomez/Shipman remembered that the forerunner of the LAI section in 
the USA, the AAAIL, was “largely a matter of propaganda”, which had attracted radical liberals 
such as Pickens, Baldwin and Robert Moss Lovett, alongside well-known American communists 
such as Scott Nearing, William Z. Foster and William (“Bill”) F. Dunne.438 At the beginning of 
1927, the AAAIL existed, however, only on paper. The Brussels Congress was, therefore, the 
impetus needed to revive the American anti-imperialist movement, through the formation of an 
LAI section. A document, the “Outline for the Work of the League against Imperialism and 
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Colonial Rule and for National Independence [LAICNI] in the United States”, dated 24 February 
1927, introduced the necessary measures. The author(s) of this document remain unknown; 
however, it is logical to assume that Gomez and Münzenberg worked out the fundamental 
guidelines for the project in Berlin and, after its completion, sent the outline to Comintern 
headquarters in Moscow for further deliberation.439 What does this outline reveal, and what were 
the principal reasons for establishing an LAI section in the USA? To supervise the initial 
establishment phase, a “directing committee”, consisting of Gomez as the leader, the American 
author Baldwin, the left-wing activist Upton Sinclair, and Pickens, would assume the former 
responsibilities and contacts of the AAAIL, especially those with Latin America, resulting in the 
gradual and quiet “disappearance” of the AAAIL. The USA LAI Section was to focus its activities 
on relief campaigns, e.g. “temporary Hands off Mexico committees” were channels distributing 
the LAI’s propaganda and agenda. Through these campaigns and committees, the section would 
acquire and “secure contact and work directly with movements in US colonies”. This depended on 
solving a number of issues guaranteeing the cover and relations of the section to the Comintern. 
The “press bureau” of the section would release a theoretical journal on anti-imperialist questions, 
while other tasks involved the sending of inquisitive commissions to US colonies, developing 
parliamentary activity by attending “hearings before the US Senate and House of Representatives”, 
establishing communication links with US colonies and semi-colonies and organising public mass 
meetings, demonstrations and conferences. Without any reasonable doubt, the theoretical 
framework of the USA LAI Section was a part of the sympathising communist organisation 
strategy envisioned and supported by Münzenberg. Above all, the section had to follow the 
Comintern’s dictum to demonstrate in public its sympathy for the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet 
Union. Thus, the section's primary aim was to “build an international consciousness, […] among 
the US workers and the oppressed people’s movement” through the use of “covert” methods “with 
extreme care”, which would guarantee the “clear conception that Soviet Russia and the Comintern 
are the best friends of the oppressed peoples”. The inauguration of the USA LAI Section was held 
in New York on 14 July 1927, at “a large conference”, at which Gomez and Richard B. Moore 
introduced the fundamental principles of the paragraphs described above.440 
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      While Gomez co-ordinated LAI operations in the USA, the Cuban nationalist Julio A. Mella 
had a similar function in Mexico, initially. According to the February “Outline”, Mella was to 
supervise the formation of “a central bureau” in Mexico City, an undertaking which required 
money. Münzenberg consulted Codovilla on how much it would cost to establish the “Mexican 
secretariat” and the USA LAI Section, choosing in the end to give the former $200 and the latter 
$500.441 Just as Gomez had done, Mella had attended Münzenberg’s private party in Berlin in 
February, travelled to Moscow in March and then returned to Paris. Waiting to begin his journey 
home, Mella began to doubt the very idea and strength of the LAI as an organisation. Mella told 
Münzenberg that he wanted to organise a sympathising public rally in Paris in support of the 
Cuban anti-imperialist movement and the LAI, asking Münzenberg whether he could contribute 
with some money for “a little help for the starting”. Mella warned Münzenberg of the risk that 
“scepticism” could thwart the intentions of the LAI. Therefore, Münzenberg should deploy all 
available means and measures to sustain the vitality of the movement.442 
      Federico Bach turned out to be Münzenberg’s candidate to establish the “Mexican secretariat” 
in Mexico City. In June, Bach left Berlin for Mexico to perform this service, on Münzenberg’s 
instructions, as intermediary for both the LAI and the IAH. After arriving in Mexico, Bach 
introduced himself as a journalist for the A-I-Z with the purpose of his visit being to conduct and 
write articles on the social situation in Mexico.443 Nevertheless, this decision was also firmly 
rooted in Moscow. According to the expectations of the “Anti-Imperialist Commission”, the LAI 
should act swiftly to establish sections in Mexico and across Latin America during the summer of 
1927. On 8 July, the Political Secretariat expressed concern after having heard a report from 
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443 SAPMO-BA ZPA I/2/5/33, 467-471, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Remmele in Moscow, 10/6-1927. 
178 
 
Codevilla on the poor turnout at the LAI attempts to establish activity in Latin America.444 Bach 
had, however, only just arrived in Mexico, and was faced with an immense task from the start. 
Apparently, the contacts in Mexico had not done any preparatory work, a dilemma which 
worsened over time. In the beginning of 1928, Bach explained to Münzenberg in a letter that he 
wanted to leave Mexico, “being stuck” in a country far from home; however, without any money 
and no valid visa to enter the USA, he could not leave. In the end, Bach did not receive any money 
from Münzenberg but chose to remain in the country.445 However, the LAI’s forsaking of Bach 
was not the last attempt to establish LAI activities in Mexico. 
      Alfons Goldschmidt, described by Münzenberg as “my old brother-in-arms”, had been an avid 
follower of the IAH since 1921 and had a deep engagement in the socio-political situation of the 
Latin American countries. In comparison to the tedious experience of Bach in Mexico, 
Goldschmidt assumed the role as Münzenberg's intermediary in Mexico and assisted in the work to 
establish Münzenbergian committees and organisations. Goldschmidt lived in Mexico City where 
he worked as a lecturer in national economics at the university and, thus, had access to a broad 
academic network. However, returning to Mexico after the Brussels Congress, Goldschmidt met 
the well-known painter Diego Rivera for the first time. According to Goldschmidt, Rivera’s “new 
form of revolutionary art” left him “stunned” and, as Rivera was “on the left side” of politics, 
Goldschmidt invited him to accompany him to Moscow to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the 
Russian revolution. As a result of Goldschmidt and Rivera’s journey to Moscow, and their 
subsequent participation in the LAI General Council in Brussels (see next chapter) on 9-11 
December 1927, Rivera gained a seat on the LAI Executive.446  
      During the initial phases, the impetus and political enthusiasm to establish LAI sections in the 
USA and Latin America looked promising. However, from 1928 to 1932, the practical 
undertakings required to realise these plans took a turn for the worse, characterised by an internal 
crisis within the American communist movement as well as by personal tragedies. On 10 January 
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Heimo. The content of Codevilla’s report remains unknown. 
445 RGASPI 542/1/28, 1-2, Letter from Bach, Mexico City, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 10/1-1928. Henrick Stahr’s study  
of the discursive use of photographs in the context of the racial question, include an analysis of A-I-Z. According to 
Stahr, Bach cancelled his KPD membership and broke with the German communist movement in 1929 and remained, 
for the entirety of his life, in Mexico, Henrick Stahr, Fotojournalismus zwischen Exotismus und Rassismus. 
Darstellungen von Schwarzen und Indianern in Foto-Text-Artikeln deutscher Wochenillustrierter 1919-1939, Verlag 
Dr. Kovac, Hamburg, 2004, pp.438-439. 
446 For Münzenberg’s description of Goldschmidt, see NA SÄPO SE/RA/420640.01, Stockholms Krimavd., 6:e  
Roteln, serie FIII, 1929-1941 Rapport rörande IAH, september 1933. Goldschmidt’s meeting with Rivera is mentioned 
in Stahr 2004, p.443. The international delegation to Moscow is given in A-I-Z, Jahrgang VI (1927), No.45, Berlin, 
p.13. For Rivera’s nomination as a member of the LAI Executive, see Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus, Nr.1, International Secretariat, Berlin, 15/3-1928. 
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1929, a suspected agent of the Cuban government murdered Mella in Mexico City. The consequent 
reaction from the international anti-imperialist movement was to portray Mella as a martyr and as 
a victim of imperialist policy. On an organisational level, the internal and fractional struggles and 
expulsions within the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA, see further in Utopia Redefined, Part 
I) after the Sixth International Comintern Congress in Moscow 1928, had a serious impact on the 
USA LAI Section. Gomez was not content with the unabashed praise of Stalin in the CPUSA, 
criticising the party for its lack of understanding and, in 1932, he was forced to resign “from the 
directorship of the Anti-Imperialist Department” in New York.447 From an individual perspective, 
the original candidates destined to establish LAI sections in the USA and Latin America: Gomez, 
Bach and Mella had either been expelled, forsaken or murdered. 
 
* 
 
A Conflict of Interest in the Netherlands and Beyond…  
The LAI and the Brussels Congress also attracted attention in the Netherlands in 1927. According 
to Katayama’s evaluation after the congress, Hatta’s and Fimmen’s performances indicated a bright 
future for the LAI, particularly the services of the latter who turned the congress into “a success” 
due to his experienced and well-mannered behaviour. Thus, if the LAI and its International 
Secretariat could expose and utilise the Indonesian conflict to its fullest, this would ease the 
process of establishing an LAI section in the Netherlands.448 However, the Sociaal Demokratische 
Arbeiderspartij (SDAP) reacted against how the LAI began to develop itself in the Netherlands, 
above all, against Fimmen’s role as deputy. On 19 September, the Secretary of the SDAP, Cornelis 
Werkhoven (1887 – 1928), sent a letter to Adler in Zurich, requesting advice on what to do with 
the LAI and Fimmen and asking if the LSI could confirm whether the LAI really “was an organ of 
Moscow”. The primary reason for Werkhoven contacting Adler was that “some members of our 
party” had joined forces with Dutch communists in order to publish the official newspaper of the 
Dutch LAI Section, Recht en Vrijheid (Right and Freedom). Adler replied to Werkhoven, telling 
him merely to observe the fact that the official protocol of the Brussels Congress, Das 
Flammenzeichen, had been released through the “communist company” Neuer Deutscher Verlag in 
Berlin, which was run by the infamous German communist Münzenberg. Based on this 
information, Adler told Werkhoven to draw his own conclusions and, if he needed any additional 
                                               
447 The WPA renamed itself the CPUSA at the Sixth International Comintern Congress in 1928, Caballero 1986, p.160;  
Shipman 1993, pp.173-185. Shipman claimed that he was not bothered about his expulsion from the “Anti-Imperialist 
Department”. 
448 RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, Confidential letter from Sen Katayama, Moscow, to Comrade Petrov/Raskolnikov,  
Moscow, 24/2-1927. Fimmen's linguistic skills in English, German and French had been a useful asset at the congress, 
according to Katayama, who believed Fimmen to be “in thought and action fully on our side”. 
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information on the LAI, Adler told him that the LSI intended to go public in October with an 
analysis of the LAI in the LSI organ, Internationale Information.449 According to Adler, the 
primary aim of this analysis (further introduced and discussed below) was to disprove the LAI’s 
ideological platform and to reveal the organisation as “a Moscow-product”. Thus, the analysis 
aimed to revise the current and popular opinion of the LAI which had emerged in the European 
socialist movement and, above all, to send out a warning to every member of the LSI about the 
risk of affiliating with the LAI. In October, after the publication of the LSI’s analysis, the Dutch 
social democratic newspaper, Het Volk, stated that the LAI was an unofficial arm of “Russian 
foreign policy”. One of its most shameful acts was Fimmen’s defence of the organisation at public 
SDAP meetings; hence, Het Volk concluded that it was not the “social democrats’ task to act as 
henchmen for Russian foreign policy”.450 Münzenberg knew that the Dutch social democratic 
movement had criticised Fimmen harshly for his involvement in the LAI. However, it seems that 
Fimmen’s precarious situation was of minor relevance for Münzenberg, informing Petrovsky that 
the newspaper, Recht en Vrijheid, had reached a circulation of 2,000 issues per month in the 
Netherlands. Nonetheless, despite this newspaper’s success, the Dutch LAI Section was more or 
less a loosely-knit committee focusing on establishing propaganda campaigns against the 
harassment of Indonesian students in the Netherlands, e.g. by declaring its support for 
Perhimpunan Indonesia.451 
      In 1924, amidst the academic milieu of and radicalism amongst Indonesian anti-colonial 
activists living in the Netherlands, the PI had emerged as an outspoken voice against Dutch 
colonialism and was a group targeted by the Dutch security service for being subversive.452 For the 
Comintern, the PI was a highly coveted group on which to exert influence after the Brussels 
Congress, particularly considering Hatta’s influential position within the PI as well as being a 
member of the LAI Executive; thus, the Comintern had found its candidate. Raden Darsono, co-
founder of the PKI and member of the “Indonesian Section” at the ECCI Information Department 
in Moscow in 1927, informed the Small Commission that the secretary of the Communist Party of 
                                               
449 IISG LSI Archives 3050/29, Letter from Cornelis Werkhoven, Amsterdam, to Adler, Zurich, 19/9-1927; IISG LSI  
Archives 3050/33-35, Letter from Adler, Zurich, to Werkhoven, Amsterdam, 28/9-1927. 
450 IISG LSI Archives 3050/44-45, Het Volk, Leitartikel: Die Liga, 21.X.1927. At the top of this document, Adler had  
written: “Kolonialliga”. 
451 RGASPI 495/30/350, 27, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 23/10-1927. See Buschak (2002,  
p.134) for a brief account of Fimmen’s involvement in the LAI. 
452 Hatta was a leading actor in the Indonesian liberation movement. According to Sieback’s thesis on Hatta’s political  
career, the Indonesian nationalist movement merged in Europe by linking together student clubs, the Sarekat Islam, 
with associations such as the Muhammadiyah, Jong Islamietenbond and the Perhimpunan Indonesia, the latter 
functioning as the driving force. In connection with the aftermath of the rebellions in Java and Sumatra, the activism 
of the Indonesian nationalist movement in the Netherlands increased, including providing support for the 
establishment of the National Party of Indonesia in Indonesia which, by July 1927 was under the leadership of 
Sukarno, see Siebeck 1978, p.81. 
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Holland (CPH) Pieter Bergsma, had befriended Hatta in Brussels. According to Darsono, this 
relationship with Bergsma could be expected to convince Hatta to support the Dutch communist 
movement which, in turn, would lead to the CPH gaining access to the Indonesian student 
community. To confirm the accuracy of his statement, Darsono passed Hatta’s letter to Bergsma 
(dated 6 March) on to the Small Commission. This letter included a description of their meeting in 
Brussels and how the encounter had inspired Hatta to ponder the idea of associating the PI with the 
CPH.453 
      The Dutch security service responded, however, by thwarting any attempts by the PI to 
confirm a close relation with the CPH. By increasing its surveillance in the Netherlands and in the 
colonial dominions, the Dutch government depended, nonetheless, on the services of other foreign 
security services to gather intelligence on the PI. For example, an enquiry concerning the PI from 
the Political Intelligence Department in Amsterdam to MI5 set off a chain reaction. At the British 
consulate in Batavia, the official J. Crosby began the process of accumulating intelligence on the 
PI. Prior to providing the Dutch East Indian government in Batavia and the Dutch Political 
Intelligence Department with any material on the PI in July, Crosby sent a summary to Austen 
Chamberlain in London which concluded that the organisation was “violently nationalistic […] 
has shown to be in contact with Moscow”.454 Crosby’s report definitely contributed to making the 
Dutch security service decide to begin to register every person known to be, or suspected of being, 
a PI member in the Netherlands. For Hatta, this had drastic consequences. After Hatta had visited 
Switzerland in August, and en route to the Netherlands, travelling in the company of other fellow 
Indonesian nationalists Nazir Pamontjak, Ali Sastroamidjojo and Abdul Madjid Djojoadiningrat, 
they were all arrested by the Dutch border authorities who charged them with sponsoring a 
“prohibited organisation” which promoted “the realisation of revolution” by distributing 
“propaganda against the Dutch kingdom”. After a lengthy legal process, the verdict was handed 
down on 9 March 1928 acquitting Hatta and his fellow travellers of all charges. For the Dutch LAI 
Section, the Hatta case functioned as a mobilising factor in centralising the anti-imperialist 
movement in the Netherlands, e.g. via anti-imperialist campaigns which focused on the continued 
harassment by Dutch authorities towards the Indonesian community.455 
      It was another episode, however, which exposed the internal conflict of interest within the LAI 
and the European anti-imperialist movement in 1927-28: the adventure of the “Dutch-Indies 
                                               
453 RGASPI 495/6/44, 121, Letter from the Polit-Secretariat [signed: Raden Darsono], Moscow, to the Small  
Commission, Moscow, 6/8-1927. For Darsono, see Lazitch 1986, p.87. Darsono wrote that the Dutch police kept the 
Indonesian students in the Netherlands under constant surveillance. Bergsma’s name was not included in Das 
Flammenzeichen, fol. RGASPI 495/154/747, 1, Letter from Hatta, Den Haag, to Bergsma, Amsterdam, 6/3-1927. 
454 TNA PRO 323 971 1, Confidential report from J. Crosby, Batavia, to A. Chamberlain, London, 26/7-1927. 
455 Siebeck 1978, p.85-86. 
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Delegation” – an idea which, from the outset, aimed to get the LAI to exploit the political situation 
in Indonesia. Although the LACO had introduced the idea of sending an “impartial” delegation to 
the Dutch-Indies already in January 1927, this had proven to be impractical. However, due to the 
success of the Brussels Congress, Piatnitsky re-assessed this question in July, asking Münzenberg 
to investigate whether it was still possible to organise and send a delegation to the Dutch-Indies. 
Nevertheless, the adventure of the “Dutch-Indies Delegation” begins with a desperate letter, dated 
30 May 1930, from Saklatvala to Piatnitsky, who for the time being was in Glasgow, requesting 
assistance to solve “a very uncomfortable” situation.456 As an isolated episode, this letter is barely 
coherent. However, other documents in the Piatnitsky secretariat fond explain the background for 
Saklatvala’s desperate plea for help, a matter which originated with the “Dutch-Indies Delegation” 
and which involved the very core of the LAI network. 
      Münzenberg introduced “the question of the Dutch-Indies Delegation” to the CPH Secretary 
Louis de Visser, in July, as, according to Piatnitsky’s instructions, the issue had to be raised before 
the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne on 20-21 August, 1927.457 According to Münzenberg, the 
general idea was to send a delegation to Java and Sumatra, with each and every member of the 
delegation having to be nominated with caution and having to stay in the country for at least for 
one and half month to investigate the social outcome of the January uprising. This would, for 
example, enable them to gain an understanding of the extent of Dutch colonial oppression as well 
as provide an opportunity to establish contacts with Indonesian anti-imperialist activists.458 
      Piatnitsky expected Münzenberg to convince the LAI Executive to sanction the idea of the 
“Dutch-Indies Delegation”. Thus, after de Visser had informed Münzenberg that the CPH had 
approved the plan in general, the LAI “kom.Fraktion” (Münzenberg, Gibarti and Saklatvala) held a 
secret meeting in a left-wing bookshop in Cologne on 19 August, to sort out the details before the 
LAI Executive meeting.459 On 20 August, Münzenberg, Saklatvala and Gibarti met the other LAI 
Executive members and other functionaries: Chatto, Fimmen, Brockway, Barbusse, Nehru, Liau, 
Hatta, Marteaux, Bridgeman, Dhuni Chand from India, M. P. and member of the Labour Party 
Mardy Jones, the leader of the Dutch LAI Section and “left-wing” socialist Henri Lefèbre, the 
                                               
456 RGASPI 495/19/319, 2, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 22/8-1927; RGASPI 542/1/44,  
68-72, Letter from Saklatvala, Glasgow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 30/5-1930. 
457 RGASPI 495/19/319, 2, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 22/8-1927; Piatnitsky passed on  
Münzenberg’s letter to the Small Commission, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/319, 3, Note from [H.] Kurella, Moscow, to 
“Kleine Kommission”, Moscow, 25/8-1927. 
458 Louis de Visser guaranteed Münzenberg that the CPH had received his first plan for the Dutch-Indies delegation,  
which the CPH endorsed on 22 July, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/319, 1, Letter from Louis de Visser/C. P. Holland, 
Amsterdam, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 18/8-1927; RGASPI 495/19/319, 2, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to 
Piatnitsky, Moscow, 22/8-1927. 
459 TNA KV/1919, Secret. G.S. (S). No:2211. Extract relating to Fenner Brockway. Author: G.S.I British Army of the  
Rhine, 2/9-1927. An undisclosed informant in the service of British security services in Germany had gathered 
intelligence on this secret LAI meeting in Cologne. 
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Indonesian Abdul Manaff and Mme. Duchêne of the French-based pacifist association the 
International Womens’ League for Peace and Freedom. Gibarti introduced the primary topic for 
discussion at the meeting, i.e. the LAI and its support for the Chinese liberation struggle, a topic 
which merely satisfied the expectations of the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” in Moscow. After 
the meeting, Gibarti stated in his report to the Eastern Secretariat that the LAI aimed to focus its 
activities on the “imperialist nations”: 
It is evident, that the intensive activity of our organisation and the expressed sympathies in 
the colonial and semi-colonial countries have produced a reaction from the imperialist 
governments.460 
The “Dutch-Indies Delegation” was one of those so-called responses, which the LAI Executive 
readily endorsed. On 22 August, Münzenberg informed Piatnitsky of the composition of the 
delegation: Barbusse, Jones, Lefèbre and Goldschmidt (who for the time being was in Mexico). 
The last two members were the lawyer Gatot and the leader of the Dutch IAH section H. van 
Walree, who were both living in Amsterdam and, according to Münzenberg, belonged to “our 
circle”.461 
      The original composition of the “Dutch-Indies Delegation” never left Europe. What happened 
and what were the reasons for this? Firstly, any definite decision or discussion disclosing the 
reasons for this, e.g. from Piatnitsky, Münzenberg or the Small Commission in Moscow, remain 
unknown. Secondly, a possible explanation is that the delegation was expensive. According to the 
budget sent from Münzenberg to the CPH Secretariat in Amsterdam, the Dutch party had estimated 
the cost of sending the delegation to Java and Sumatra at $12,000 ($2,000 per delegate, covering a 
minimum of 50 days) and expected to be reimbursed later by Piatnitsky. The CPH Secretariat 
explained to Münzenberg that it was “not possible” to endorse this budget, particularly as the plan 
had been “so indistinctly” presented.462 Münzenberg’s reaction to the CPH Secretariat’s critique is 
unknown; however, it must have indicated some kind of foreclosure on the idea of sending a 
delegation to the Dutch-Indies. However, as it turned out, the central question was to secure the 
necessary visas for the members in the delegation. Petrovsky informed Münzenberg, in a letter 
dated 13 October, that the delegation could not leave Europe until the communist members had 
                                               
460 Mme Duchene acted as Lamine Senghor’s substitute, Senghor being unable to leave Paris due to illness, SAPMO- 
BA ZPA R1507/127, 107-110, 15.) Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrückung. Bezug R.No.In.Ber.Nr.121,s.44 ff., Berlin, 
15/10-1927; RGASPI 542/1/9, 69, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Bennet/Petrovsky, Moscow, 22/8-1927; 
RGASPI 542/1/17, 31-39, Manuscript, Gibarti’s report from the LAI Executive Committee, Cologne, 20-21/1927. 
461 RGASPI 495/19/319, 2, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 22/8-1927. 
462 RGASPI 495/19/319, 22, (Abschrift) Letter from the Secretariat of the CPH, Amsterdam, to Münzenberg, Berlin,  
24/9-1927. According to CPI (2009), $12,000 is equivalent to $148,000, while $2,000 is $24,700 (CPI/2009). 
Münzenberg passed on this letter from the CPH secretariat to Petrovsky, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/319, 21, Letter from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 30/9-1927. Petrovsky explained to Münzenberg that “we are not going to 
approve of a single Pfennig beyond the existing limits of the budget”, see RGASPI 495/30/367, 224, Letter from 
Bennet [Petrovsky], Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 3/10-1927. 
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received their visas.463 Ultimately, this did not happen and, as mentioned in Petrovsky’s letter, one 
member of the delegation had already left Europe. On 11 October 1927, Mardy Jones left 
Marseilles by a boat destined first for India, and then for Indonesia, where he aimed to fulfil his 
duty of conducting a social and political survey of colonial oppression. The crux of the matter was 
that neither Münzenberg, Piatnitsky nor the LAI had sanctioned Jones’ journey. Apparently, the 
explanation for and reason why Jones left Europe were the result of a breach in communications: 
The telegrams despatched to him by the League informing him that the delegation which it 
had been proposed should visit Indonesia had been abandoned had never reached him.464 
In 1930, Saklatvala faced up to the effects of Jones’ journey. In his letter to Piatnitsky, Saklatvala 
told of his resistance to electing Jones as a member of the delegation: 
It was under the advice of other Party members [Gibarti and Münzenberg], that Mardy was 
elected by the League [“kom.Fraktion”]. I was personally opposed to it, and was 
recommending W.T. Kelly [?], but I was instructed to withdraw my objection and to back up 
Mardy Jones' selection at the League’s meeting [in Cologne]. The Party idea was to secure a 
T.U. figure, and Mardy’s connection with the MFGB [Miners’ Federation of Great Britain] 
and also his position as Secretary of all the T.U. groups of MPs in the House were considered 
very valuable.465 
Evidently, the “very valuable” Jones corresponded to the “party idea” of sending a neutral 
individual to the British and Dutch colonies. Considering Jones’ position as an M.P. (Labour Party 
representative for the Pontypridd district), and his connection to the British trade union movement, 
the LAI and the CPGB expected that this would be sufficient to avoid the scrutiny of the British 
and the Dutch security services. Ultimately, this did not matter as the information on the apparent 
cancellation of the delegation by the International Secretariat and the LAI “provisional committee” 
in London, did not reach Jones in time. Most importantly, the adventure of Jones’ journey exposed 
the weak structure of the LAI. 
      Jones arrived back in England on 6 March, 1928, after a journey which had included stopovers 
in British India, Bengal, Malaya and Singapore. After arriving in Batavia, a “Dutch official” had 
confronted Jones, making enquiries about his connections to the LAI, deciding to deny him any 
                                               
463 RGASPI 495/30/367, 243, Letter from Bennet [Petrovsky], Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 13/10-1927. 
464 Reginald Bridgeman, Information Bulletin, No.2, Supplement, 15/4-1928. 
465 RGASPI, 542/1/44, 68-72, Letter from Saklatvala, Glasgow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 30/5-1930. Petrovsky later  
reported that the “provisional” British LAI committee had decided on July 26, 1927, to send Brockway and Saklatvala 
to the LAI Executive in Cologne. After the meeting, Mardy Jones received the request to travel “to Jarva [sic] as a 
British delegate on [sic] a League delegation”, see fol. RGASPI 495/100/545, 2-5, Report by Bennet/Petrovsky on the 
British LAI Section, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 20/4-1928. 
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chance of leaving the ship. Thus, Jones had no other option left than to return to England.466 
Nonetheless, Bridgeman was content with the result of Jones' journey: 
[…] Jones had attended the All-India National Congress in Madras […] Throughout his stay 
in India he had received valuable assistance from Mr. Joshi, […] Jones had met most of the 
Indian leaders including Gandhi and Ansari, […] spent a good deal of time in the Bengal 
coalfields and had been able to collect valuable information regarding coal-mining 
conditions in India. He addressed numerous public meetings, […]467  
Whilst the short-term effect of Jones’ journey was a success, ultimately, it turned into a conflict 
which lasted several years, focusing exclusively on who had funded the journey and the settling of 
debts. 
      The total cost for Jones’ journey, including travel arrangements and additional costs (clothes, 
food), came to £587. This sum also corresponds to the one Saklatvala had notified Piatnitsky about 
(£600). For Saklatvala, this was a question of who had contributed with money and, above all, who 
expected reimbursement. In September 1927, the LAI Executive had instructed the International 
Secretariat to give every delegate £500 (£300 “cash in hand” and an additional sum of £200 after 
their departure from Marseille). Saklatvala was the financial contact for Jones in London. Securing 
£300 in London, Saklatvala handed over the money to Jones. However, the money did not come 
from Saklatvala, but was a loan issued by the lawyer “Thompson” [unknown], who made 
Saklatvala liable for payment. “Thompson” had in all confidentiality advised Jones to leave 
London as quickly as possible after receiving the money. This was not the end of it as the trickle of 
money continued: 
Mardy went ahead. He took our money [underlining made by Piatnitsky, author’s remark] 
first. He bought clothes etc. and obtained his 1st class return passage and secured his 
passport. We kept […] £300 for the League. We got evasive replies. Then we got a […] letter 
that Gibarti had £250 cash at his office in Paris, and was to pay some in cash to Mardy Jones 
on his way to Marseilles. This was quite definite and unconditional. Mr. Thompson agreed to 
make a tariff £350. Mardy however refused to more without being paid first, as the League 
had shown too many changes of mind. Chattophadyaya again assured us that this was all 
quite certain. Mardy Jones then only agreed to shift if we paid him in London further cash as 
“loan”, on his note […] but that we were to be paid only when the League paid up. […] Thus 
Mr. Thompson obtained from Mardy Jones a letter of authority to collect direct from the LAI 
                                               
466 The Batavian port authorities questioned why Jones wanted to visit Java and, furthermore, it is likely that the  
British authorities in Madras, India [which had been Jones' point of departure], had informed the Dutch mandate 
authorities of Jones' arrival, see Reginald Bridgeman, Information Bulletin, No.2, Supplement, Berlin, 15/4-1928. 
467 RGASPI, 542/1/44, 68-72, Letter from Saklatvala, Glasgow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 30/5-1930; Reginald  
Bridgeman, Information Bulletin, No.2, Supplement, 15/4-1928. 
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£150 as soon as possible. Mardy had £500 cash. Subsequently he wired to Bridgeman from 
Madras before leaving for Java and obtained his other £100 from Bridgeman.468 
Thus, three actors funded Jones journey: the “Thompson loan” (£350); the LAI (£150); and 
Bridgeman (£100). The original idea was to settle the money question at the LAI General Council 
meeting in Brussels in December 1927. However, as Saklatvala handed over the affidavit 
concerning the “Thompson loan” to Chatto and Gibarti, and Bridgeman expected to receive his 
£100, Chatto suddenly turned and said that £300 of Mardy’s budget had been sent back to some of 
the [communist] parties. Saklatvala later remembered how Chatto had said that the reason for this 
was that he was “dissatisfied with Mardy Jones’s speech” in India. For Saklatvala, this was a 
disaster, especially when the “Thompson loan” had not been authorised from the beginning by “his 
client, and only on my recommendation and liability”. Thus, the money Jones had procured did, in 
fact, belong to a third party, apparently unaware of the transaction. It did not matter that Saklatvala 
urged the International Secretariat to give him the money (which they refused to do), the dilemma 
haunted him over the following years. By 1930, Saklatvala was no longer capable of brushing the 
question aside. In a letter to Piatnitsky, Saklatvala explained that it was “hopeless dealing with” the 
International Secretariat: 
I must appeal to the Comintern to enable Berlin to settle this a/c [account] with me. […] 
Berlin has still to pay £200, which is […] £50 for Bridgeman and £150 for me to repay 
somebody’s a/c. My position right now is very uncomfortable.469 
Whether or how Piatnitsky responded to Saklatvala’s desperate plea for help remains unknown. 
However, for the LAI, the Jones’ journey was a nominal propaganda victory, stating that he had 
established connections in Indonesia with the PI and Sarekat Islam.470 The LAI ignored the fact 
that Jones had never even set foot on Indonesian soil. According to the table below, the 
interactionist process of the “Dutch-Indies Delegation” only managed to send one person, Jones, 
on an adventure to British India and the Far East in 1927-1928. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
468 RGASPI, 542/1/44, 68-72, Letter from Saklatvala, Glasgow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 30/5-1930. In 1927, Gibarti  
travelled on a regular basis between Berlin and Paris. 
469 RGASPI, 542/1/44, 68-72, Letter from Saklatvala, Glasgow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 30/5-1930. 
470 Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus. Internationales Sekretariat, Nr.1, 15. März, 1928, Berlin. 
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Table 4.3: The Dutch-Indies Delegation, 1927 – 1930  
 
 
The establishment of national LAI sections, or propaganda sections (the Chinese National Agency 
in Berlin) had, towards the end of 1927/beginning of 1928, either not been successful or were 
complete failures. It had been a process influenced by external circumstances, e.g. the KMT putsch 
against the communists in China and the confirmed strained foreign relations between Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union in connection with the ARCOS raid. However, the process had also 
established the nature of the relationship between the International Secretariat in Berlin and 
Comintern headquarters in Moscow. From February to June 1927, this was a process characterised 
by both silence and a lack of money from Moscow. At the same time, the International Secretariat 
had to confront factors such as reluctance and suspicion among some of its members, which also 
affected the LAI’s chance of capitalising on the euphoria of the Brussels Congress. Once the LSI 
took action, the political understanding of the LAI faced a drastic change. 
 
* 
 
The LAI “Organism” Investigated and Experienced 
The LAI had broached the colonial question within the European labour and social democratic 
movements. Appearing on the political arena as one of the few credible actors actively criticising 
colonialism and imperialism, the LAI left the LSI initially confounded as to what to do and how to 
respond. The LAI’s success, confirmed by willing support from a number of prominent left-wing 
personalities, both during and after the Brussels Congress, proved that the colonial question was a 
potent issue. According to Fimmen, the Brussels Congress illustrated that it was “unfortunate that 
the colonial question” had not received “proper attention from the LSI and the Amsterdam 
”The Dutch-Indies 
Delegation” 
August 1927 
Münzenberg 
Berlin 
LAI Executive 
Committee 
Cologne, 21-
22/8-1927 
CPH 
Louis de Visser 
Amsterdam 
Piatnitsky 
Moscow 
Heinrich Kurella 
Moscow 
ECCI Small 
Commission 
Moscow 
S. Saklatvala 
London/Glasgow 
Mardy Jones, M. P. 
London/Pontypridd Petrovsky 
Moscow/England 
Marseilles 
British India 
Bengal 
Malaya 
Singapore 
Batavia 
Liverpool [?] 
 
“Thompson”: lawyer, 
London 
188 
 
International”.471 Hence, the only credible solution was to mobilise and unify every 
“International” in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, which would also involve 
seeking support from the Comintern and Profintern, Fimmen stated. Additionally, the Brussels 
Congress “Manifesto”, signed by Lansbury, Fimmen and the LAI Executive, described the LSI as 
an institution of ignorance: 
The national liberation movement of the Asian, African and American peoples is, in its 
scope, a world phenomenon. And now it [the movement] is – organically connected and 
united [own italics] with the freedom struggle of the proletariat of the old capitalist society – 
transforming our planet into an entirely civilised world, opening up a new chapter in world 
history, the history of mankind all over the world. […] We encourage anyone […] who does 
not live from the fruits of this oppression, who hates modern slavery and bondage […] to 
join and support us. The oppressed and enslaved peoples expect to receive support from the 
working class in the advanced countries, […]472     
By linking the organic metaphor to the colonial struggle against the “old capitalist society”, in 
which the LAI represented itself as the leader of a movement capable of transforming the world, 
this statement challenged the LSI.  If one speaks in terms of making the leap from a Gemeinschaft 
to a Gesellschaft, the LAI therefore expected to merge colonial kinship and organic ties with 
organisational heterogeneity and political competitiveness. However, this compelled the LAI to 
act, according to the analogy introduced by Gareth Morgan, as an “organism […] open to their 
environment”, an organism which had to “achieve an appropriate relation with that environment” 
in order to succeed.473  
      Meanwhile, the LSI was observing how the LAI introduced itself in the public sphere after the 
Brussels Congress. Realising at an early stage that the LAI had penetrated deep into the European 
socialist movement, the LSI understood that, in order to confront the LAI, it would need to expose 
the very structure (ideological, organisational and individual) of the LAI. On 7 October, 1927, the 
publication of the LSI’s analysis of the LAI, “Zur Geschichte der Liga gegen koloniale 
Unterdrückung” (On the History of the League against Colonial Oppression), in the Internationale 
Information, announced the LSI’s objective to expose the LAI. The release of this analysis also 
indicated that the European socialist movement intended to confront the LAI on the colonial 
question. Additionally, national security services would refer to this analysis as a source of 
information on the LAI. 
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      The release of the LSI’s analysis in October was no great sensation. While Lansbury’s 
resignation from the LAI Executive in June had given a hint of what was to come, by August, 
during the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne, Fimmen, Nehru and Brockway were questioning 
the very purpose of the organisation, accusing Gibarti of dishonest behaviour and of having 
disguised the activities of the International Secretariat. Nehru later described the LAI Executive 
meeting in Cologne as a decisive experience for him, especially in the way the episode had 
revealed the dynamics and “inner conflicts” of the “Western Labour world”, and the “aggressive 
and rather vulgar methods” of the communists and “their habit of denouncing everybody who did 
not agree with them”.474 
      The manner in which the communist members in the LAI Executive interacted with the non-
communist members did not, however, have any rational explanation. According to the “Anti-
Imperialist Commission” in Moscow, there existed a risk that the “non-communist element” in the 
LAI Executive were plotting a possible “take over” of the LAI. Thus, Münzenberg had to 
guarantee the exertion of “communist influence” by getting communists to assume “leading 
positions” in the LAI Executive, e.g. by giving the KIM a permanent seat, while the International 
Secretariat was to remain in “constant contact” with the ECCI Agitprop Department in Moscow in 
order to receive regular instructions on Comintern policy. In the latter case, this would imply 
receiving instructions on the propaganda campaign against the KMT and signal its protest against 
the collaboration between the LSI and the British Labour Party “to liquidate” the LAI.475 
 
* 
 
The LAI Detonated. The LSI and the History of the LAI 
 
The LAI is the legitimate child of the well-known German communist M.d.R [Author's note: 
Member of the Reichstag] Willi Münzenberg. 
Internationale Information, 7/10-1927 
 
The LSI’s 7 October analysis focused on the political and organisational nature of the LAI. 
Accusing the LAI of being a “sham”, the LSI argued that, in reality, there was no Executive 
representing the LAI; Münzenberg, the “spiritus rector [and] well-known German communist”, 
                                               
474 RGASPI 542/1/17, 31-39, Manuscript, Gibarti’s report from the LAI Executive Committee, Cologne, 20-21/1927;  
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475 RGASPI 495/3/18, 136-139, Resolution, ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission, Moscow, 15/6-1927. On 13 July, the  
Political Secretariat adopted the “Guidelines for a Campaign against the Amsterdam International Congress”, which 
aimed to protest against the leaders of social democracy and the socialists in Europe, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/18, 101-
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was in charge and, consequently, the LAI was “another United Front tactic of the Bolsheviks”.476 
This analysis had been an undertaking meticulously planned and organised by the LSI, under the 
direct supervision of Adler and William Gillies, the secretary of the Labour Party International 
Department in London. Its primary aim was to expose the LAI’s communist connections and, with 
any luck, create a split between the prominent socialist characters who had expressed an emotional 
engagement in the LAI, e.g. Brockway, Fimmen, Maxton, A. J. Cook, John Beckett and Wilkinson. 
For Adler, a principal motive was to question how they could defend the LAI, while at the same 
time posing as leaders of socialist parties which were members of the LSI. Brockway was an 
exceptional figure in this context. As introduced above, Brockway quickly assumed the role as the 
strongest defender of the LAI, telling Adler to understand the necessity of letting the ILP affiliate 
with the LAI. Adler was horrified by the thought that Brockway might succeed in convincing the 
ILP to affiliate with the LAI, which, in turn, would call into question the LSI’s political credibility 
as well as being a breach of its statutes: “the Parties associated with the LSI undertake not to 
affiliate with any other political International”.477 
      Brockway remained convinced that the LAI was an issue that went beyond political borders, 
and that every member in the LAI Executive had equal rights and responsibilities ignoring the 
question of political affiliations, despite Gibarti’s omnipotent influence at the International 
Secretariat in Berlin. For this reason, Brockway informed Adler of his intention to raise “the issue 
of the LAI” at the next LSI Executive meeting in Brussels in September.478 Meanwhile, Adler 
remained silent. However, with the release, on 26 August, of Brockway’s article, “The Coloured 
Peoples’ International”, in the British left-wing paper, The New Leader, Adler was left with no 
other option than to respond. The question was how to present a response to Brockway’s 
conclusion that the LSI and the Amsterdam International seemed indifferent towards the colonial 
question, and that the rumour of the “communist connections” of both the LAI and the Brussels 
Congress was nonsense. According to Brockway, the anti-colonial struggle was a topic which 
extended beyond the political sphere: 
I have attended many conferences which have been described as “International”, but only 
one of them was international, […] At the last International Socialist Conference at 
Marseilles [August 1925], there were no “coloured” representatives among the delegates. 
[…] But one international conference, in my experience, placed the whites in their proper 
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place. It was held at Brussels last February. From the platform the conference hall was a 
remarkable sight. Every race seemed to be there.479 
The question of race, as a social and cultural demarcation, convinced Brockway of the 
“international” scope and aim of the LAI. Brockway stated that the LSI’s “suspicion and even 
opposition” contradicted the inert nature and goodwill of the socialist movement in supporting a 
political actor such as the LAI: 
The whisperings of Labour officials suffering from the Communist complex have been 
supplemented by reports that Scotland Yard is keeping an eye upon the organisation and that 
one should consequently be careful before associating with it. […] Personally, I think it 
would be suicidal if Socialists refrained from any association with this movement, even if it 
had been initiated by the Communists. It has done what the Socialist International has failed 
to do – seriously begin the task of uniting the proletarian movements among the coloured 
races.480 
Brockway argued that any of the qualms he had had about the LAI had disappeared “after a very 
close and careful examination”, and were “absolutely unjustified”. The constitution of the LAI 
Executive was proof of this where, out of twelve members “only three [were] communists” and 
“they by no means exert a decisive influence”. What was the reason for Brockway going public 
and announcing his commitment to the LAI in such explicit terms?  In a letter from Gibarti to 
Brockway prior to the release of this article in The New Leader, Gibarti explains why Brockway 
acted as he did: 
We understand that once more the accusation has been put forward that our League is a 
semi-Communist organisation, financed and led by the Soviet Government or by the 
Communist International. More than once we have officially and emphatically repudiated 
these […] statements and have proved that our funds are not derived from Russian money. 
[…] However, we declare ourselves prepared to meet any representative body of the 
Socialist International, […] We have nothing to hide.481 
After the publication of this article, Brockway informed Adler that the LAI had “nothing to hide”. 
By repeating Gibarti’s words in his letter to Adler, Brockway stated that the LSI was about to 
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commit “a great mistake” if they remained “indifferent to this movement”. For Adler, both 
Brockway’s article and Gibarti’s letter were the confirmation that Adler had been waiting for, 
particularly after hearing that Brockway intended to re-route the communist tendency of the 
organisation in a more “socialist direction” and, thereby, turn the LAI into “one of the biggest 
factors in the future development of the world”.482 Adler’s reaction was one of anxiety, suspecting 
the LAI of being well on the way to usurping the ILP, and becoming a political force the LSI 
would have to combat. A logical step for Adler was to instigate an analysis of the LAI; however, 
this required empirical observation. On 30 August, Gillies contacted the Russian émigré journalist 
and member of the Menshevik Party, Rafail Abramovic, who was living in Berlin. Perceived as 
being the LSI’s expert on the “Russian question”, Gillies wondered whether Abramovic had any 
material on the LAI. Additionally, Gillies requested that Adler send back the “file on the Brussels 
Congress of the Colonial League”.483 In England, Brockway continued to declare his belief in the 
LAI in public arenas. On 16 September, The New Leader published a second article from 
Brockway, in which he concluded: “whatever the truth about the Communist initiative in creating 
the League, it had succeeded in combining the anti-Imperialist movements of the subject races and 
that it is suicidal for Socialists to remain outside a development of such immense possibilities”.484 
      Brockway was one of many focal points in Adler’s and Gillies investigation of the LAI. Their 
primary aim was to get their analysis and additional documents on the LAI prepared in time for the 
LSI Executive meeting in Brussels in September. From the end of August to the middle of 
September, Gillies carried out his work with diligence and compiled a thick dossier of material 
which revealed the “communist connection” of the LAI, documents which included, for example, 
the article by Münzenberg in Inprecorr (August 1926) – the theoretical organ of the LAI, copies of 
the Kolonial Revue, miscellaneous articles in Kölnische Zeitung and in A-I-Z, as well as the LAI’s 
circular letters. At the LSI Executive meeting in September, Gillies provided each delegate with 
copies of these documents,485 confident that this material would stimulate a discussion on the LAI. 
In comparison to Brockway’s naïve ambition to get the LSI Executive to endorse the decision to 
let the ILP affiliate with the LAI, Adler and Gillies expected the LSI Executive to both approve 
their analysis and to publish their results in the Internationale Information. Brockway attended the 
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meeting, only to realise that the LAI question and his defence of the organisation would be the 
focus of the meeting. The LSI Executive confronted Brockway, demanding him to explain why he 
deserved to remain as the ILP’s representative within the LSI. Brockway later wrote that this 
episode had been a horrible experience. The leader of the SPD Otto Wels “made a terrific attack 
[…] stormed like a mad bull”, accusing Brockway of running the errands of the KPD in organising 
anti-social democratic propaganda in Germany, whereas Gillies and Adler denounced Brockway’s 
contacts with the LAI. At the end of the session, “condemned by all”, the LSI Executive demanded 
that Brockway resign, either from the LAI or from the LSI Executive. Opposing the harsh 
statements against his persona, Brockway argued that the LSI had no colonial agenda, only to 
receive the answer that the LSI was on the verge of mobilising and “pressing forward with its 
colonial work”.486  
      After this meeting with the LSI Executive in Brussels, Gillies continued to evaluate the 
connections and patterns linking prominent non-communists members with the LAI. For example, 
Gillies provided Adler with information on Fimmen’s behaviour as an LAI member. In his letter, 
Gillies informed Adler that he had met a delegate of the Mexican Federation of Labour 
(Confederatión Regional Obrera Mexicana; CROM) in Paris, who had denied that Fimmen had 
posed as a CROM delegate at the Brussels Congress. Fimmen had acted deceitfully, particularly as 
this trade union did not want to have any kind of association with the LAI, and it was a shameful 
performance as he had not asked for permission to introduce himself as “their representative”.487 
Nevertheless, other actors chose to continue to defend the LAI. Roger Baldwin sent a letter to 
Adler on 24 September, stating that the International Secretariat would soon move to Paris, thus, 
this would be the end of “Münzenberg’s close supervision” in Berlin. Urging Adler to understand 
that the LAI not was a “Communist façade”, Baldwin explained that the anti-imperialist movement 
had “developed just as we who are not Communists had determined it should”, while the LAI 
existed and worked “above party and factional interests” in support of “colonial freedom”.488 
Perhaps Baldwin’s letter convinced Adler that the LAI had become a success amongst prominent 
left-wing personalities, as Adler contacted Gillies on 28 September, requesting him to send him a 
copy of an article which included “quotations on the Colonial League” the LSI Executive had 
discussed in Brussels. These “quotations” had originally come from an issue of the Inprecorr 
(published on 13 May 1926), which had introduced Kuusinen’s communist “solar system” theory 
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(see Introduction). After receiving the copy, Adler highlighted the following quote, the main gist of 
the LSI’s October analysis, 
[…] organisations against colonial atrocities and oppression of Eastern peoples are new 
types of sympathising mass organisations which will become more evident in many 
countries in the immediate future.489 
The LSI feared that the LAI would evolve into “a mass organisation”. Thus, for Adler and Gillies, 
their October analysis would expose the LAI as being nothing less than a front organisation in the 
service of the Comintern. 
      The publication of the LSI’s analysis on 7 October shook the very foundation and credibility of 
the LAI as a non-political actor. Once news of the LSI’s “History of the League against Colonial 
Oppression” had been made public, national security services considered this analysis to be a 
useful source. On 15 October, the RKÜöO in Berlin used the document as reference material to 
describe the LAI as a “relief organisation for Soviet Russian foreign policy and propagandist for 
Comintern’s world revolution propaganda”.490 The analysis questioned the LAI as a political actor, 
but it also initiated a process to deprive the LAI of political credibility within the European 
socialist movement. However, the communists only had themselves to blame, the LSI stated. 
Firstly, by giving Münzenberg a distinguished role on the LAI Executive had been a serious 
mistake, a crucial fact used by the LSI to categorise the organisation as being communist. The LSI 
analysis introduced an understanding that the LAI and the anti-colonial project had been under 
Münzenberg’s patronage from the beginning. While the International Secretariat was located in the 
same building as IAH headquarters in Berlin, the LAI did not disguise its similarities to other 
“Münzenbergian leagues” and to the IAH. Secondly, the LSI warned the European socialist, social 
democratic and trade union movements against getting in contact with the LAI, especially as it was 
an offspring of the IAH, created and refined in line with “Bolshevik united front manoeuvres”. The 
LAI was the creation of the policy advocated by the Comintern at the Sixth ECCI Plenum in 1926, 
the LSI argued. Hence, the European socialist movement had to begin to grasp the extent of the 
far-stretching ambitions of the communists, and to realise that the LAI was only a part of a grander 
scheme that the Comintern had conceived in order to establish a communist “solar system” under 
the pretext of exerting “communist influence on the masses”. Thirdly, Adler and Gillies exposed 
the origins of the anti-colonial project from a genealogical perspective. By linking the LAI with 
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the transformation of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee to the LACO in 1926, the LSI 
stated that the IAH’s anti-colonial project had culminated in the transformation of the movement in 
Brussels in 1927.491 
      A couple of days after the release of the LSI’s analysis, Brockway chose to resign from the LAI 
Executive. He had been planning to visit Gibarti in Paris, together with Maxton, in the beginning 
of October; however, after reading this analysis, Brockway cancelled this journey. On 11 October, 
Brockway sent his letter of resignation to Gibarti, describing how the political situation and 
critique had broken his spirit. Unable to maintain any “official connection to the League”, 
Brockway had finally taken a stand, explaining that his position on the LSI Executive was more 
valuable than retaining his LAI Executive membership. Yet, this did not imply a definitive end, 
Brockway stated, asking Gibarti to understand the difference between official and unofficial ties. 
Brockway had evidently instructed Maxton to assume the role as liaison, a decision which would 
guarantee the ILP’s continued “fullest sympathy and support” towards the LAI.492 Hence, when 
Gillies contacted Brockway on 22 October, expecting to hear some kind of public announcement 
of his resignation from the LAI Executive,493 this belief remained intact. In what way did 
Brockway assist the LAI? According to Petrovsky, prior to the LAI General Council in Brussels in 
December 1927, Brockway had wired “for money in advance” to cover the travel expenses of the 
British LAI Section back to England.494 
      The LAI and the colonial question caused an upheaval within the LSI in 1927. Yet, on the other 
hand, it also initiated a discussion on colonialism and imperialism within the LSI. The 
establishment of the LAI, and also Brockway’s criticism of the lack of any discussion on the 
colonial question, and on the question of a “coloured peoples’ international”, had certainly 
contributed to this. The LSI Executive meeting held in Brussels in September 1927 had included 
the colonial question on its agenda and resolved to establish a colonial commission to begin the 
work of examining “the colonial problem”. The primary aim of this was to get the LSI to instigate 
an independent colonial agenda. The LSI Executive instructed the commission to send 
questionnaires to every “affiliated party”, including questions aimed at discerning the political, 
social and structural effects of the colonial mandate system, but also whether there existed any 
labour movements in the colonies, as well as the question of race. The results of these 
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questionnaires would assist the commission in presenting a structural understanding of the colonial 
question to the LSI Executive in December 1927.495 
      How did the International Secretariat react to the LSI’s analysis? Initially, the International 
Secretariat chose silence. The “Anti-Imperialist Commission” in Moscow instructed the 
International Secretariat to wait until a response had been thoroughly prepared, a response, which, 
above all, should not be too overtly antagonistic and demagogic towards social democracy in order 
not to lose the support of the left-wing movement in Europe. The proper moment to deliver their 
response would be during the LAI General Council in December, the “Anti-Imperialist 
Commission” concluded.496 This was a major mistake. Hence, the LAI’s silence strengthened the 
LSI’s analysis as it rampaged through the European labour movement. At the same time, after the 
release of the LSI analysis, another explanation shed light on why the International Secretariat 
seemed unable to send the LSI an answer. Apparently, the hierarchy of relations at the International 
Secretariat in Berlin had evolved into a scene of conflict 
 
* 
 
“I am an oppressed colonial slave of the LAI!” 
Hansin Liau’s narrative portrays the International Secretariat both in a state of chaos and 
embroiled in a power struggle. With the dissolution of the Chinese National Agency in July 1927, 
and with Liau becoming a member of staff at the International Secretariat, he had expected to 
strengthen his position within the anti-imperialist movement. However, by assuming a position at 
the International Secretariat, a drastic change had occurred in Liau’s life. In January 1928, Liau 
sent a letter to Petrovsky in Moscow reminding him that “you at one time offered me your 
support”. What was the reason for Liau’s plea for help? Firstly, Liau argued that the LAI and its 
International Secretariat were futile enterprises. Secondly, Liau described how Münzenberg and 
Gibarti oppressed and harassed some of the colonial members at the bureau in Berlin, stating, “I 
am an oppressed colonial slave of the LAI!”497 His loss of faith in the LAI was a process that had 
begun when Liau had wanted to gain access to the International Secretariat’s core. However, for 
the LAI, Liau was an ideal actor to head its propaganda campaign against the “treacherous” KMT, 
an idea which Liau had, initially, willingly accepted. According to confidential instructions from 
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the ECCI Secretariat to Münzenberg in connection with the LAI General Council, the LAI was to 
use Liau in the following manner: 
At the next sitting of the Enlarged General Council of the League, the Chinese question must 
be raised. The attempt of the European reformists to support the counter-revolutionary 
bourgeoisie and Fascist trade unions in China should be met with a sharp criticism of the 
Kuomintang. Chinese delegates, particularly some of the former Kuomintang members 
[Hansin Liau, own italics], should lead this attack upon the Kuomintang.498 
The crux of the matter was that Liau perceived himself as something more than just a tool of 
propaganda. In August 1927, Liau expected Münzenberg to give him the position as “political 
secretary” at the International Secretariat, and to be in charge of the Chinese question. However, 
Münzenberg seemed reluctant to meet Liau’s request and, when Liau confronted Münzenberg, 
Münzenberg refused to answer. Liau informed Petrovsky that he was at a loss as to how to act, or 
what to say and, finally, he asked the steno-typist at the International Secretariat, the German 
communist Ella Windmüller, what was really happening at the bureau. The only recommendation 
Windmüller gave Liau was to approach Münzenberg again and, at a second meeting between the 
two men, Liau realised that he could forget the position as political secretary. Liau stated that the 
indifference of Münzenberg and Gibarti towards dealing with “personal disputes” constituted the 
very essence of the inherent problems that had emerged at the International Secretariat. Critical of 
“the unequal distribution of power”, Liau denounced Münzenberg and Gibarti’s despotic 
behaviour, which would, in the end, prevent the LAI from taking the leap “from demonstration to 
organisation”.499  
      In October, Liau felt that discipline at the International Secretariat “had completely broken 
down” and that the unified opposition of the Münzenberg and Gibarti “fraction” was a major issue. 
Codevilla visited the International Secretariat in October, telling Liau that Gibarti intended to 
“fight till the end” to curtail his ambition of becoming political secretary. Additionally, Liau 
informed Petrovsky that Münzenberg continuously harassed him by expressing “mocking 
comments” every time they met, e.g. suggesting that Liau collect “some money” for the LAI. The 
money issue was a satirical and malicious statement which Münzenberg used to degrade Liau, 
particularly as Liau had not received any salary at all from the LAI between October 1927 and 
                                               
498 RGASPI 495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST  
IMPERIALISM, 22/9-1927. Liau financed the printing of the pamphlet with his own money (105 Marks), in order to 
be able to distribute it among the delegates attending the Fourth Congress of the International Federation of Trade 
Unions in Paris in July. Expecting Münzenberg to reimburse him for the costs, Liau complained about not having 
received any money. Petrovsky received a copy of this pamphlet; see fol. RGASPI 495/30/339, 5-6, Pamphlet by 
Hansin Liau, 28/7-1927;  RGASPI 542/1/29, 4. 
499 RGASPI 495/30/350, 23-24, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 10/10-1927; RGASPI 542/1/29, 2,  
Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 13/1-1928. 
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January 1928. Thus, living on the edge with his wife, KPD member Dora Dombrowski-Liau, the 
ZK KPD granted Liau a short-term loan. This loan became due in January, but Liau had no money. 
Because of all this, at the beginning of 1928, Liau desperately wanted to find a way out of the 
LAI.500 However, is it possible to discover the reasons for Liau’s isolation at the International 
Secretariat, and why he accused Münzenberg and Gibarti of harassment? 
      The root of the dispute seems to have been focused on issues relating to re-organisation and 
political engagement. The discussion on whether to locate the International Secretariat in Berlin or 
Paris had also involved Liau’s position within the LAI. Codevilla had told Liau to consider Paris 
as an option if he wanted to find a solution to his problems in Berlin and, if he accepted this offer, 
the position as political secretary would be his. However, despite the good intentions of 
Codevilla’s proposal, Liau explained that he could barely speak a single word of French. This 
would prevent him from carrying out any kind of work and, more importantly, he dreaded the idea 
of having to share the Paris office with Gibarti. Liau had already criticised Gibarti’s frequent 
journeys between Berlin and Paris, a cost which drained the already strained LAI budget. For Liau, 
the most convenient solution was to locate Gibarti permanently, along with one steno-typist, in 
Paris, while he could assume the role as political secretary in Berlin, working together with Chatto 
to “sort out the important correspondence”, edit the Kolonial Revue and have Windmüller and one 
assistant take care of the administrative business (“store all documents”).501 It was a question of re-
organising the International Secretariat in order to increase the LAI's activism and, by doing so, 
establishing the LAI as an international organisation, Liau argued. In January 1928, Liau 
nonetheless concluded that the LAI was nothing more than a façade. One of the principal reasons 
for Liau coming to this conclusion was that none of the members at the International Secretariat 
discussed the colonial question, although Münzenberg did not allow him to take part in any 
political discussions. In November 1927, Liau was in Moscow, where he met Heimo at Comintern 
headquarters and explained to him how the core at the International Secretariat were excluding 
him, a dilemma which prevented him from doing any constructive work, just as it confirmed that 
the LAI was nothing more than a illusion. Heimo told Liau to contact Petrovsky in the future if the 
situation in Berlin worsened and, in the meantime, to continue working on the Chinese question.502 
Liau informed the ECCI Agitprop Department that the LAI could be more than a vehicle for anti-
imperialist propaganda; however, this required a new impetus: 
                                               
500 RGASPI 542/1/29, 2, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 13/1-1928. Perhaps the ZK KPD granted  
Liau a short-term loan; see fol. RGASPI 495/225/1043, 41, Anlage Nr.4 – KPD delegation of the ECCI, 10/2-1930. 
501 RGASPI 495/30/350, 23-24, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 10/10-1927; RGASPI 495/30/350,  
32, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to ECCI Agitprop Department, Moscow, November, 1927. 
502 RGASPI 495/30/350, 23-24, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 10/10-1927; RGASPI 542/1/29, 3,  
Letter from Liau, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat/Heimo, Moscow, 17/1-1928. If Liau wanted to contact Goldfarb, 
Heimo told him to use Petrovsky as a reference. 
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[…] to establish an international organisation of struggle, then the existing manner of work, 
which is only built on airy propaganda, must cease to exist. Solid work has to start, and be 
prepared to confront suspicions from different circles.503 
Liau urged the ECCI Agitprop Department to understand the necessity of reinforcing the “spirit of 
struggle” within the LAI; however, the euphoria of the Brussels Congress was a moment which 
had passed. The challenge ahead, therefore, looked insurmountable, especially as the International 
Secretariat depended more and more upon receiving directives on a regular basis from the 
Comintern, while at the same being forced to confront the effects of the LSI analysis. As if this 
were not enough, Liau concluded that the constant lack of money was due to the “minimal” budget 
endorsed by the Comintern and the fact that some of the money being handed over to Münzenberg 
in Berlin from couriers arriving from Moscow were in “bad or non-exchangeable currencies”. Liau 
could not grasp why the International Secretariat preferred this method of payment to “regular 
credit transactions”.504 
      This conflict with Münzenberg left a lasting impression on Liau’s life. Due to the intolerable 
situation in Berlin, Liau handed over two letters of resignation in January 1928, one to the ECCI 
Secretariat and the other to Münzenberg and Gibarti. Liau declared that it was impossible for him 
to remain in Berlin, promising to stay on at the International Secretariat until the ECCI had 
approved his resignation. Münzenberg did not object to Liau’s wish to leave the International 
Secretariat.505 
      In December 1928, Liau left Berlin and travelled, with his wife, to Moscow. Arriving in 
Moscow, Liau had to confront the charge from the Chinese communist émigré group in Berlin 
accusing him of condoning “deviationist policies”. However, the International Control 
Commission (the cadre department and repressive organ within the Comintern; ICC) acquitted 
Liau of this charge and, in April 1929, Liau and his wife had their KPD memberships transferred 
to the CPSU (B).506 During the investigation, the ICC nevertheless wanted to know why Liau had 
resigned from the International Secretariat. As noted in a letter from Liau to the German ECCI 
                                               
503 RGASPI 495/30/350, 32, Re-organisation of the LAI, Liau, Berlin, to ECCI Agitprop Department, November 1927  
(from the original in German). 
504 RGASPI 495/30/350, 32, Re-organisation of the LAI, Liau, Berlin, to ECCI Agitprop Department, November 1927. 
505 RGASPI 542/1/29, 3, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Heimo/ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 17/1-1928; RGASPI  
542/1/29, 4, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Münzenberg and Gibarti, Berlin, 17/1-1928. Münzenberg passed on a copy of 
Liau’s letter to the ECCI Secretariat, fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 6-7, Report from Münzenberg, Brussels, to the ECCI 
Secretariat, Moscow, 29/4-1928. 
506 The question of Liau and his political dishonesty concerned his former contact with the Berlin section of the KMT,  
a question the Chinese ECCI delegation in Moscow wanted to investigate. Fritz Heckert supported Liau in this respect, 
telling Wang Ming, the representative of the Chinese delegation in Moscow, that Liau was an honest and reliable 
individual, thus, it was an illogical act to suspect him of deviationist activities, see fol. RGASPI 495/225/1043, 42, 
Anlage Nr.7 – Letter from Heckert, Berlin, to Wang Ming, Moscow, 1930; RGASPI 495/225/1043, 40, Anlage Nr.2, 
ICC Protocol, Moscow, 13/3-1929. 
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delegation (Pieck, Heckert and “Weber”, real name: Heinrich Wiatrek), the “reasons for my 
resignation” were based on Münzenberg’s lies and behaviour. For example, Münzenberg had 
spread the false rumour that Liau had wanted to leave Berlin for the sole purpose of pursuing 
studies at the KUTV in Moscow. If the German ECCI delegation did not believe him, Liau 
suggested that they contact Codevilla or Chatto, individuals who would be able to verify the 
accuracy of his account. For Münzenberg, on the other hand, the whole ordeal with Liau was a 
burden. At a meeting with Robin Page Arnot, CPGB member and Comintern emissary, in 
Frankfurt am Main on 3 January 1929, Münzenberg asked him to finally sort out the controversy 
with Liau, a matter concerning a quarrel over “Lebensmittel” (means of life; money).507 
      The narrative on Liau introduces an in-depth understanding of the LAI in 1927. While early 
1927 had witnessed the euphoria of the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement in Brussels after 
the 10-14 February Brussels Congress, towards the end of the year, one of its fervent supporters 
experienced the organisation as a vision about to disappear. Despite the Brussels Congress having 
paved the way for the establishment of the LAI, a majority of its activities in the aftermath of the 
event only verified the difficulties encountered in trying to achieve a global influence. For 
example, the idea and practical efforts required to establish national sections and to respond to 
both the antagonism from the LSI and the increased suspicion from domestic and foreign national 
security services. Yet, the defining factor was the Comintern’s ambivalence towards reacting 
immediately upon the success of the Brussels Congress, a conundrum which created tense 
relations between the International Secretariat and the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters. 
By the time the Comintern had begun to understand the potential political and organisational 
strength of the LAI, particularly with the formation of the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” in 
Moscow in June 1927, the euphoria of the Brussels Congress had passed. Nonetheless, for the 
Comintern, the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” represented its instrument of control, essential to 
scrutinising the International Secretariat in Moscow. According to Münzenberg, the LAI had to 
create a second, forceful political demonstration in 1927; hence, the inaugural meeting of the LAI 
General Council was to be a pivotal event, aimed at correcting the feeling of insecurity that had 
begun to manifest itself within the LAI. 
 
* 
 
 
                                               
507 RGASPI 495/225/1043, 38-39, Letter from Hansin Liau and Dora Dombrowski-Liau, Moscow, “An die deutsche  
Vertretung bei EKKI, z.H. der Genossen Pieck, Heckert und Weber, Moscow, 3/2-1936; RGASPI 542/1/30, 1, 
Handwritten letter from Robin Page Arnot, Frankfurt a/M, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 3/1-1929. Arnot recommended to 
Kuusinen that the “matter can very well lie over”. 
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Chapter 4. Brussels Revisited  
 
 
Experience has demonstrated that the League can be a powerful instrument to unite the 
colonial peoples and the working classes of the imperialist countries in the struggle against 
imperialism. 
ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission, 
Moscow, 22/9-1927 
 
 The League will become a powerful organ. 
Sen Katayama, Moscow, 6/2-1928 
 
On 25 November 1927, Lamine Senghor passed away at the age of 38 in Fréjus, France. Paralysed 
by tuberculosis and suffering from a loss of speech, Senghor’s death was caused by having served 
in the French army during the Great War. An ardent defender of social rights for the black race, 
and an outspoken anti-colonial activist in France, Senghor’s demise was a severe blow to the anti-
colonial movement in France. As the leader and co-founder of La Comité de Défense de la Race 
Nègre (CDNR) and a member of the PCF, Senghor’s fiery performance at the Brussels Congress 
had given him a prominent position within the anti-imperialist movement. His performance in 
Brussels also made the French Sûreté aware of the need to rigorously monitor Senghor’s 
movements in 1927. As a member of the LAI Executive, Senghor was the spokesperson for the 
African liberation struggle, especially for the West African movement in Europe. However, in the 
summer of 1927, Senghor had resigned from the CDNR due to fractional disputes, only to 
establish, together with the French Sudanese (now Mali) activist Garan Kouyaté, the radical 
organisation Ligue de Défense de la Race Négre (League for the Defence of the Negro Race; 
LDRN).508 Senghor’s death was not, initially, given martyrdom status. However, in July 1928, 
Münzenberg wrote in the LAI’s political organ, The Anti-Imperialist Review: 
In France, the African Lamine Senghor, the brave representative of his suffering race, who 
was elected a Member of the Executive Committee of the LAI, and whose speech at the 
Congress was a passionate and mordant denunciation of French Imperialism, fell victim to 
                                               
508 Langley 1973, pp.305-306. After July 1927, Senghor was a “marked man”, bedridden by disease and prior to his  
own demise, both his father and son (Diene, 22 August 1927) had died. The LDRN organ in France, La Race Nègre, 
published on May 1928, Senghor’s obituary, which declared “un bon nègre, un sincère africain […] soldat de sa race”, 
RGASPI 542/1/10, 52-57, Summary of meeting with the LAI communist fraction, Brussels, 6/12-1927; Young 2001, 
pp.263-269; Geiss, 1968, p.241; Holger Weiss (CoWoPa6), “Glimpses of African Political Engagement in Weimar 
Germany”, Åbo Akademi; Philippe Dewitte, Les Mouvements nègres en France, 1919-1939, Paris, Harmattan (1985). 
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the rancour of the authorities. He was arrested and cast into prison, where he died a few 
months later of tuberculosis.509 
In a bizarre way, Senghor’s demise illustrated the fragile internal status within the LAI at the end 
of 1927. The LSI’s October analysis had contributed to enhancing the difficult work to solidify the 
organisational work of the LAI in Europe, e.g. by establishing active national sections, while the 
hierarchical relations at the International Secretariat and the lack of secure finances had defined its 
structural limitations. Thus, the LAI General Council in Brussels on 9-11 December 1927, would 
be a chance for the LAI, Münzenberg and the Comintern to rectify former mistakes in order to 
make the leap from demonstration to organisation.  
      The aim of this chapter is to analyse and interpret the continued endeavours of the LAI to 
secure its organisational structure. The LAI General Council in Brussels emphasised the end of 
euphoria, while at the very same moment the International Secretariat was struggling to establish 
functional patterns of organisation. Hence, the passing of euphoria made the LAI liable to begin 
answering to the protagonists (the Comintern, the national sections and the LAI Executive) for its 
actions, as well as responding to the antagonists (the national security services and the LSI). The 
LAI General Council served a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, to confirm the LAI as a 
transcontinental actor and as the leader of the anti-imperialist movement and, on the other hand, 
the International Secretariat expected that the moment had arrived to increase its control of the 
national sections, by beginning to use the LAI as a hub for anti-colonial activists in Germany, 
Europe and beyond. The LAI “kom.Fraktion” and the Comintern referred to control as being the 
overriding guiding principle behind the preparations for the LAI General Council meeting. 
Moreover, the LSI analysis had forced the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” in Moscow to concede 
that there existed a real chance of losing control over “a powerful instrument uniting the colonial 
peoples and the working classes of the imperialist countries”. This required, therefore, the 
“kom.Fraktion” to act vigilantly against the representatives of the socialist movement within the 
LAI: 
[…] the Social Democratic and Reformist leaders of the labour movements in the imperialist 
countries, together with the radical intellectual defenders of imperialism, are trying to 
sabotage the League and capture its leadership. In view of this danger, the activities of the 
                                               
509 Münzenberg 1928, pp.4-10. The British LAI Section protested against the arrests of Senghor in France. On 7 April  
1927, at a meeting of the “provisional committee” of the British LAI Section in the House of Commons in London, the 
section adopted “[A] protest against the arrest … signed by all the members and forwarded to the French government” 
due to Senghor’s arrest in Paris “on his return from the Brussels Congress on account” of his speeches”, see RGASPI 
542/1/10, 1-3, Report on the British LAI Section, London, to International Secretariat, Berlin, 7/4-1927. 
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Communist fraction inside the League must be strengthened politically and 
organisationally.510  
From a chronological and thematic perspective, this chapter depicts and analyses the evolutionary 
road travelled by the LAI prior to the Sixth International Comintern Congress (17 July 1928 – 1 
September) in Moscow. 
 
* 
 
The Road to Revisiting Brussels 
Münzenberg’s original idea was to arrange the first LAI General Council in Paris in November 
1927. The Reichskommissar in Berlin noticed how Münzenberg described this first meeting of the 
council as being more of an “enlarged anti-colonial conference” announcing the “unification of the 
anti-imperialist movement on an organisational and ideological” level, one which would link the 
LAI to “the revolutionary struggle”.511 In comparison to the improvised and hasty preparatory 
work prior to the Brussels Congress, the LAI General Council needed proper organisation. On 10 
September 1927, Münzenberg sent a list of the delegates who would be receiving an invitation to 
Petrov at the Eastern Secretariat. If “Moscow had any additional names” to add to the list, 
Münzenberg had to have the names as soon as possible.512 However, at an early stage, Münzenberg 
had to find a new location for the council after the French Sûreté denied the LAI the possibility of 
convening the event in Paris, leaving Münzenberg with a second option: Amsterdam.513 In 
October, Münzenberg met Fimmen in Amsterdam. During their discussion, Fimmen told 
Münzenberg that the Dutch government intended to refuse every visa application from “party 
comrades” planning to enter the Netherlands. The only option left for Münzenberg was to revisit 
Brussels.514 
      Münzenberg had counted on inviting 89 delegates at a total cost of $10,695, a figure that 
would cover both travel and administrative expenses. The document, “Zur Sitzung des 
Generalrates werden eingeladen”, compiled by Münzenberg and sent to Petrovsky (who passed it 
on to Piatnitsky), reveals who the invited delegates were: the LAI Honorary Presidium (Barbusse, 
                                               
510 RGASPI 495/103/155, 6-11, Direktiven für die Arbeit der LAI, Moscow, 22/9-1927 [German version]; RGASPI  
495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential, DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM, 
18/11-1927 [English version]. 
511 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/127, 109, 15. Reichskommissar: Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrückung, November 1927. 
512 RGASPI 542/1/10, 20, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Petrov, Moscow, 10/9-1927; RGASPI 542/1/10, 21-22,  
Zur Sitzung des Generalrates werden eingeladen, Münzenberg, Berlin, 10/9-1927. 
513 RGASPI 495/19/319, 9, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Petrovsky/Bennet, Moscow, 15/9-1927; RGASPI  
542/1/10, 23, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 15/9-1927. The letters from Münzenberg to 
Petrovsky and Kuusinen were identical, and arrived in Moscow on September 26. 
514 RGASPI 495/30/350, 26, Letter from Münzenberg, Amsterdam, to Bennet, Moscow, 23/10-1927. Any documents  
clarifying why Münzenberg opted for Brussels as the arena for the LAI General Council remain missing. However, it 
must have been a logical choice, suggesting that Gibarti only had to renew his contact with Emile Vandervelde. 
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Einstein, “Frau” Sun Yat-sen and Lu Chung Lin), the LAI Executive (Fimmen, Nehru, Liau, 
Senghor, Marteaux, Münzenberg, Ugarte, Hatta, Gibarti, Baldwin and Bridgeman), the General 
Council (Chen Kuen of the Central Council of the All Chinese Labour Union from Canton, Mella, 
Martinez, Katayama, Semaun, Colraine, Vasconcelos, A. Alminiana of the Verband für die 
Unabhängigkeit der Philippinen, Mohamed Hafiz Ramadan Bey, Hadj-Ahmed Messali, Kin Fa 
Lin, Assadoff, Gomez and Pollitt [for the remaining members, see footnote below]). Additional 
guests Münzenberg wanted to invite were the leader of the Tripoli-based Islamic organisation 
Senussi (in French: Sanussi) Sidi Ben Achmed, the general secretary of the Destour Party [Destour 
is the Arabic term for constitution] in Tunisia Ahmed Assafi, the chairman of the Arab Congress 
Djemal Effendi El Husseini, the representative of the India LAI Section in Bombay Jhabwala, 
Hasrat Mohani, Diego Rivera, the member of the Brazilian parliament Mauricio de Lacerda, 
Clements Kadalie of the trade union Industrial and Commercial Union in South Africa, the South 
African communist William Henry (Bill) Andrews as delegate of the South African Trade Union 
Congress and an unknown representative by the name of “Smith” from the trade union Sierra 
Leone Railway Workers’ Union.515 
      Getting everyone to attend the council was easier said than done. In October, Nehru visited 
Paris, where he frequently met up with Gibarti. At one of their rendezvous, Nehru told Gibarti that 
he could not attend the General Council because he was intending to visit Moscow, with his father 
Motilal, to witness the celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Russian revolution. After 
Moscow, Nehru expected to return to Paris (he arrived in Paris at the end of November), before 
travelling back to India. Apparently, Nehru left Marseille by boat on 2 December, in the company 
of his wife, sister and daughter, and returned to India, where he attended the INC congress at 
Madras. Nonetheless, Motilal Nehru stayed behind in Europe for an additional three months and, 
among many things, attended the LAI General Council.516 The African delegates were a challenge 
for Münzenberg. At the Brussels Congress, Richard B. Moore and the “Negro Commission” had 
sorted out the Negro question. However, and despite Senghor’s deteriorating health and frequent 
confinement in prison, the General Council had to introduce some kind of revised policy on the 
                                               
515 RGASPI 495/19/319, 10-12, Zur Sitzung des Generalrates werden eingeladen, Münzenberg, Berlin, to  
Petrovsky/Bennet, Moscow, 15/9-1927. Additional members of the LAI General Council were: Brockway, S. O. 
Davies, Saklatvala, Henriette Roland-Holst, the secretary of the Belgian LAI Section Georges Gérard, the editor P. S. 
Spaak and Charles Plisnier from Belgium, journalist Victorrio Verri (from Italy, but living in Moscow), Guido Miglioli 
from Italy, Madame Duchêne, Léon Vernochet, Albert Fournier, Theodor Lessing, Alfons Goldschmidt, Ledebour, 
“Frau” Helene Stöcker and Nejedly from Prague, Czechoslovakia. For a copy of the list (addressed to Kuusinen), see 
fol. RGASPI 542/1/10, 24-26. 
516 RGASPI 542/1/18, 59, Letter from Nehru, Paris, to Chatto, Berlin, 22/10-1927. The International Secretariat  
forwarded Nehru’s letter to Petrovsky in Moscow. Nehru later described the Moscow visit as “worthwhile”, 
particularly as the experience provided “a background” which contradicted his somewhat preconceived understanding 
of Soviet Russia and the Bolshevik regime. For Motilal Nehru, the journey was a “novel”, Nehru 1942 (1953), pp.164-
165. 
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African question, as well as begin the work of securing connections with the African continent. 
Münzenberg began the search in Moscow by contacting both the KUTV and other contacts who 
knew of African individuals who were either living in or were visiting the city. Early on, 
Münzenberg omitted “Smith”, the unknown delegate of the Sierra Leone Railway Workers’ Union, 
and replaced him with the Chairman, E. A. Richards. Richards was visiting Moscow in the 
company of a delegation in connection with the celebration of the Tenth anniversary of the Russian 
Revolution. For Münzenberg, he was a suitable candidate to send directly en route from Moscow 
to Brussels. Yet, this idea came to nothing. In November, Richards informed the International 
Secretariat that he had no chance of arriving in time for the council in Brussels. Nevertheless, 
Richards suggested a replacement: the West African Kweku Bankole Awooner-Renner (later the 
founder of the Ashanti Freedom Society in West Africa in the 1930s), who, in 1927, was pursuing 
studies at the KUTV in Moscow. Awooner-Renner had received the invitation from Richards in 
person in Moscow and asked whether the Eastern Secretariat could approve sending him to 
Brussels.517 Another example was the case of Ngyuen Ai Quoc (“Ngyuen the Patriot”, better 
known as Ho Chi Minh) and his experience of the LAI General Council. According to William J. 
Duiker’s biography, in 1927 Ngyuen Ai Quoc was on the verge of becoming an experienced 
Comintern emissary. The LAI General Council in Brussels was a rewarding event for Ngyuen Ai 
Quoc, after a tedious journey from Moscow, Berlin and Paris, arriving in Brussels only to meet and 
discuss with other anti-colonial activists, e.g. Sukarno, Soong Qingling (Sun Yat-sen’s widow) and 
Katayama.518 
      The General Council agenda focused on the LAI’s political and organisational development 
since its inception in Brussels. This included a discussion on China, India, the Arab countries, 
Indonesia, the “imperialist terror in the colonies”, the war threat [against the Soviet Union] and the 
“colonial exploitation and the labour unions in the imperialist countries”.519 A-I-Z published an 
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in Paris, see William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, Hyperion, New York, 2000, pp.148-149. 
519 The bulk of documents relating to the LAI General Council (resolutions and protocols), are located in the LAI fond,  
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account, which stated that the council was the “second Brussels Congress” (II Brüsseler 
Kongress); however, this event was not open to the public. According to the German legation in 
Brussels, the council convened “behind closed doors” in the Madeleine Haal, and the delegates 
seemed to act upon a directive not to utter a single word to the press.520 This was a strategy which 
complied with the instructions contrived by the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” directing the 
council to focus on the political situations in China, India and North Africa (Egypt), and to 
establish a consensus to protest against the social democratic movement in Europe, the LSI and the 
KMT. The “Anti-Imperialist Commission” warned the International Secretariat of the possible risk 
of having to confront “the danger of becoming an organ of reformist penetration into the colonial 
nationalist and labour movements”. Hence, to curb such a development, the International 
Secretariat needed to “act cautiously”, while still reinforcing the “basic tasks” of the LAI: 
The League must base itself on all classes and elements antagonistic to imperialism. The 
basic task of the League is to penetrate the broad democratic mass organisations in the 
colonial countries. With this purpose in mind every available means should be utilised. The 
intellectuals in the colonial countries play an important role in the anti-imperialist struggle. 
[…] Anti-imperialist propaganda must be distributed among the colonial students in Europe 
who can be used to establish contact with the nationalist revolutionary movements in their 
respective countries. In the imperialist countries the League must carry on an anti-imperialist 
campaign inside the workers’, peasants’ and democratic organisations. It must find support 
in the trade unions, co-operatives, peasant organisations, […]521     
The “Anti-Imperialist Commission” did, however, introduce a more radical approach for LAI 
activities which, in a sense, indicated a departure from its original outline. Above all, the 
suggestion to replace “leading figures in the social democratic and bourgeois radical circles in the 
imperialist countries” in the LAI with “elements [colonial students] antagonistic to imperialism” 
pointed towards a shift. If the LAI carried out the above, the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” 
believed that this would be the beginning of a “united front in the colonial countries” which, in 
                                                                                                                                                          
yet, a list of the attending delegates is missing. Further, the IISG LAI Collection contains resolutions and the agenda of 
the council (3392.1/111, Provisorische Tagesordnung der Generalratssitzung, LAI, Brüssel, December 1927). A copy 
of the agenda is also filed at SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, Provisorische Tagungsordnung [undated] 1927. 
According to the agenda, the key speakers were Fimmen, Gibarti, Mme. Sun-Yat-Sen, Motilal Nehru, the Arab Shekib 
Arslan, Scott Nearing and Barbusse. 
520 A-I-Z, 1924 Nov. – 1927 Dez., Jahrg.VI, Nr. 50, 14/12-1927, Berlin, 2. A-I-Z reported that the “conference was  
convened under different circumstances” in comparison to the “first” Brussels Congress, whereas the German legation 
in Brussels notified the Auswärtige Amt that it seemed as if the LAI was a genuine “German affair”, see SAPMO-BA 
ZPA R1001/6751, 89, Deutsche Gesandtschaft, Brüssel, an das Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 14/12-1927. 
521 RGASPI 495/103/155, 6-11, Direktiven für die Arbeit der LAI, Moscow, 22/9-1927 [German version]; RGASPI  
495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential, DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM, 
18/11-1927 [English version]. The “Anti-Imperialist Commission” defined Egypt and “the backward colonial 
countries (African colonies and some Latin-American countries)” as falling within the political boundaries of the 
LAI's “general political line”. 
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turn, would “win over” anti-colonial organisations and national revolutionary activists in the 
struggle against both colonialism and social democracy. Why did the “Anti-Imperialist 
Commission” advocate a possible purge of the LAI Executive? Evidently, this was due to a fear 
emanating from the LSI’s October analysis. Thus, the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” expected the 
General Council to protest against the LSI, and those who did not should preferably leave the LAI. 
However, this proposal also had the potential to shatter the very concept of the LAI. In the end, the 
General Council responded to the LSI’s analysis in the “Resolution of the General Council of the 
League against Imperialism on the attitude of the IInd International”. According to this resolution, 
the LAI objected to the “misleading, unjustified and untrue” analysis by the LSI, particularly as it 
violated “the principles of Socialism”, in support of the “capitalist and imperialist governments”. 
However, the endorsed resolution was serene, in comparison to the original version. The original 
version of the resolution (authored by the “Anti-Imperialist Commission”) was a verbal attack 
against the LSI, using callous terms, e.g. branding the leaders of social democracy as “agents of 
imperialism”. The endorsed resolution omitted these kinds of phrases, recommending that every 
worker and member of social democratic and socialist parties (known to be affiliated to the LSI) 
protect socialist values by becoming either individual or collective members of the LAI.522 
      The LAI General Council was a test of faith for the Comintern to see whether the LAI could 
remain “steady in our hands”. Katayama was the unofficial ECCI representative at the council. 
According to Katayama’s report to the Eastern Secretariat on 6 February 1928, the council was the 
“first gathering of importance” after the Brussels Congress to enshrine the LAI as the leader of a 
movement in support of “the colonial peoples”. Katayama seemed convinced that the communists 
were in total control over “the aim of the LAI”: 
[The LAI] aims to connect with national revolutionary parties in the colonial and semi-
colonial countries, and with fighting anti-imperialist groups in Europe and America. The 
communists shall hold the most important authoritative positions within the national sections 
of the LAI and in the International Secretariat, and a majority in the […] Executive, and 
function more or less indiscreetly.523 
                                               
522 According to the introductory note in the resolution, the LAI based their response on “the document of 7th October  
1927, published by the LSI (Second International) presenting itself as a ‘History of the League against Imperialism’” 
and denying the claim that the LAI was “nothing but a communist manoeuvre”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/13, 11, 
“Resolution of the General Council of the League against Imperialism on the attitude of the II:nd International”, LAI 
General Council, Brussels, 9-11-1927. RGASPI 495/103/155, 6-11, Direktiven für die Arbeit der LAI, Moscow, 22/9-
1927 [German version]; RGASPI 495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential, DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE 
LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM, 18/11-1927 [English version]. The pamphlet “Résolutions adoptées à la session 
du conseil général tenue à Bruxelles”, included every resolution. 
523 RGASPI 542/1/26, 18-32, “General Council of League Against Imperialism”, Sen Katayama, 6/2-1928; RGASPI  
542/1/13, 51-54, “Resolutions Entwurf”, 6/12-1927. 
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The “authoritative positions” of the communists in the LAI were kept secret from the non-
communist members. After the council, Münzenberg stated in his article, “Against Colonial 
Oppression”, published in the European communist and socialist press, that the General Council 
had focused essentially on solving “organisational questions”, rather than discussing “political 
questions”. Admitting that the teething problems associated with establishing functional and active 
national sections were proving to be far more difficult than expected, Münzenberg emphasised the 
necessity of finding a solution to this organisational problem.524 
      Roy did not attend the council; however, he summoned the “Anti-Imperialist Commission” in 
Moscow to a meeting in the “Red Corner” at Comintern headquarters to discuss the event, the LAI 
and anti-imperialist propaganda.525 Katayama observed in his report to the ECCI Secretariat that 
the LAI was “still in its formative period, although we have had two Conferences, in February and 
December 1927”. Despite the international circulation of pamphlets, resolutions and manifestos, 
the results were inadequate: 
The basis of the League is weak and not wide enough. The League is still in the state of 
preparation and planning. The League is not yet based on mass organisation and, in the 
colonial and semi-colonial countries, propaganda work has hardly been started. It must be 
improved and developed, by all possible means, into a real mass organisation. […] The 
supreme task of the LAI is to apply the theory and practics [sic] contained in the writing and 
deeds accomplished by Lenin.526 
Katayama criticised the incapacity of the International Secretariat to turn the LAI into or at least 
get the organisation to pose as a mass organisation. According to Mustafa Haikal’s analysis, the 
council was the start of a “disintegrative process” within the LAI.527 This observation partly 
explains why the Comintern pressured the LAI into carrying out the directives from Moscow, and 
partly confirms why the council served as an opportunity to see whether the communists were still 
in control of the LAI. However, the Comintern had, from the very beginning, controlled the LAI, a 
point of view overlooked by Haikal. 
      The new constitution of the LAI Executive at the council confirmed the continuing strategy of 
the Comintern to support a sympathising communist organisation. Maxton assumed Lansbury’s 
                                               
524 RGASPI 542/1/13, 1-2, Organisationsresolution, Brüsseler Tagung, 9-11 Dezember 1927. The  
“Organisationsresolution” was merely a reprint of the one introduced in Brussels on 14 February, 1927; Willi 
Münzenberg, “Mot kolonialt förtryck”, in Norrskensflamman, Luleå, 30/12-1927, 6-7. 
525 Hans Piazza referred to Roy’s report in the article “Manabendra Nath Roy. Ein alter und bewährter Soldat in  
Indiens Freiheitskampf“, in Ketzer im Kommunismus. 23 biographisches Essays, Theodor Bergmann/Mario Kessler 
(Hrsg.), VSA-Verlag Hamburg, 2000, p.206, see fol. 542/1/8, 185ff. For the meeting in the “Red Corner”, see fol. 
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 1, Short note (in French) [stamped date] 13/1-1928. 
526 RGASPI 495/18/613, 20-23, Information regarding the Press Organ of the LAI (English version), Katayama,  
submitted to the ECCI Secretariat, 24/1-1928. 
527 Haikal 1992, pp.239-252. 
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position as Chairman (Brockway had temporarily held this position during the autumn of 1927), 
and Fimmen continued as vice-deputy. Liau and Gibarti were, despite Liau’s on-going conflict 
with both Münzenberg and Gibarti, nominated as secretaries at the International Secretariat. The 
LAI Executive comprised Nehru, the delegate of the Étoile Nord-Africaine Mustapha Chedli, 
Hatta, Saklatvala, Mme. Duchêne, Münzenberg, Marteaux, Rivera, Bridgeman and Baldwin. 
According to the International Secretariat, the General Council celebrated the LAI as a 
transcontinental actor, with active sections and members in Europe, North Africa, USA, Mexico, 
India, Indonesia and China.528 
 
* 
 
An Excursus: The Chinese Question 
The “Anti-Imperialist Commission” instructed Münzenberg to address the Chinese question 
“decisively” at the General Council. The primary aim of this request was to increase the LAI’s 
contacts with “revolutionary organisations” in China, rather than depend on the benevolence of 
“bourgeois nationalist and reformist labour leaders” in China.529 According to the resolution on 
China adopted at the council, “the next urgent political task” for the LAI was to “popularise” the 
Chinese nationalist movement in Europe and the USA by strengthening the anti-imperialist 
propaganda within the labour movement. Above all, the LAI General Council had to demonstrate 
to the public that, despite the “set-backs suffered by the movement for freedom in a number of 
colonial countries, these did not provide any reason for pessimism”. The supporters of “the 
Chinese revolution” had to organise and mobilise “world-wide resistance”, regardless of the LSI’s 
“official policy”, which merely defended “imperialist intervention” in China.530 The explanation 
for the tone of this resolution was, however, the outcome of a hasty, internal discussion. 
      Prepared just in time for the opening of the General Council, the Chinese resolution was a 
result of the recent turn of events in China, i.e. the Canton [Guangzhou] insurrection in November 
1927, which had ended with the KMT’s repression of the Chinese communist movement. After the 
KMT’s putsch in April 1927, the CPCh had primarily focused its activities on organising and 
supporting peasant rebellions. According to the leaders of the CPCh, it was essential to sustain 
                                               
528 Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nr.1, 15/3-1928. 
529 RGASPI 495/103/155, 6-11, Direktiven für die Arbeit der LAI, Moscow, 22/9-1927 [German version]; RGASPI  
495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential, DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM, 
18/11-1927 [English version]. 
530 For the draft, see RGASPI 542/1/13, 51-54, “Resolution Entwurf”, December, 1927; RGASPI 542/1/13, 43-44,  
“Resolution des Exekutiv-Komitees der “Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit“, LAI, Brussels, 
General Council, 9-11/12-1927. Copies of the resolutions on China and the political resolution are filed at the IISG 
LAI Collection 3392.1/118, Political Resolution of the General Council of the LAI, Brussels Conference, 9-11/1927, 
and, 3392.1/112, Resolution of the General Council of the LAI on the Chinese Question, Brussels Conference, 9-
11/1927. 
210 
 
social unrest in “cities and villages” at any cost and, if successful, this would lead to a “general 
insurrection” and the establishment of local Soviets, an undertaking supported by the Comintern. 
In November, Heinz Neumann left Moscow with the instruction to travel to Canton and assist 
Lominadze in organising an insurrection in the “Canton commune”, a historic reference to the 
1871 Paris commune. However, the insurrection failed embarrassingly and was an extraordinarily 
violent episode and, for both Neumann and Lominadze, a personal disaster. The “Canton 
commune” lasted only three days, ending with a heavy loss of human life, leaving the Soviet 
consulate in Canton ransacked and five Soviet diplomats executed by the KMT. This conclusive 
end also marked the definitive end of diplomatic relations between the KMT and the Soviet Union, 
as well as making it more difficult for the Comintern to organise covert operations in China.531 
      For Liau, the Canton insurrection was an ideal opportunity to organise proletarian solidarity 
demonstrations in Germany and Europe; however, he soon realised that neither Münzenberg nor 
Gibarti seemed willing to publish “a single publication” on the topic. On 28 December, with the 
help of a loan conceivably issued by the ZK KPD, Liau published an official LAI protest against 
the KMT’s conduct in suppressing the insurrection.532 The China question was Liau’s source of 
inspiration, a devotion he shared with other activists of Chinese origin. Thus, one method to spread 
an opinion on what was happening in China was to send some of these activists on missions within 
Europe. For example, Liau instructed the Chinese Ch’ao-Ting Chi (see Birth) to travel to London 
and assist the British LAI Section in organising an “extensive campaign for the defence and 
support of the Chinese revolution”. For Liau, Chi was the ideal candidate due to his commitment 
to anti-colonial ideals. Nevertheless, this undertaking ended abruptly. When the ship “Stadt 
Antwerpen” docked in Dover, England on 11 January, British port authorities refused to let Chi 
enter the country.533 
                                               
531 In “compliance with a direct order from Stalin”, the communists in China staged the Canton insurrection. However,  
comparing the “Canton commune” with the socialist “Paris commune”, which lasted for only about two months 
(March to 28 May 1871) was bold, see Degras vol.II 1960, pp.414-415, and Sassoon 1996, p.12. 
532 RGASPI 542/1/29, 2, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 13/1-1928. 
533 On 14 January, Ch’ao-Ting Chi sent a letter to Liau, which provided details on the failure of the mission. Chi left  
Berlin on 10 January and boarded the boat “Stadt Antwerpen” at Oostende, final destination Dover. Arriving on 
January 11, British port authorities refused Chi permission to enter the country because his passport had a Russian 
visa. According to Chi, the port authorities turned “hostile”, subjected him to interrogation and conducted a thorough 
search of his luggage. Requested to answer whether he had any personal relations with any suspected individuals 
[unknown] in England, or whether Chi had any information about King Street in London [CPGB headquarters] and 
whether the name “Larkin” meant anything to him. According to Chi, the officers received the following statement: “I 
am a student of good standing at the Law School of the University of Chicago. As I intended to spend a few months 
studying in Great Britain and on the continent of Europe, I obtained an English visa for a whole year as well as French 
and German visas for the same period [inserted in handwriting in the document]. I left America on 15th October 1927 
and arrived in Berlin [Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont states that Chi attended the Brussels Congress, 
however] via Havre at the end of October. As some countrymen of mine intended visiting Moscow to witness the 10th 
Anniversary Celebrations I joined the group and was in Russia till 7th December. I have since been in Germany. Early 
in the present month I announced to the International Office of the LAI my intention to go to Great Britain and the 
Secretary [Liau] suggested that I should help the British League to place the true facts regarding the situation in China 
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      By the beginning of 1928, the International Secretariat seemed incapable of organising 
independent campaigns, at least in Liau’s opinion. Furthermore, on 28 June 1928, Liau’s 
scepticism was more or less confirmed when Münzenberg informed the International Secretariat at 
a meeting in Berlin that the IAH aimed to assume responsibility over the Chinese campaign. 
Münzenberg stated that the IAH was preparing to launch the relief campaign, “Aid to the Chinese 
Workers” (Hilfe für die Chinesischen Arbeiter), and expected to use both LAI and LHR networks 
to circulate propaganda. Prominent intellectuals and left-wing politicians in Germany had 
promised to both sign petitions and defend the campaign in public, Münzenberg stated. Hence, the 
campaign was a replica of the strategies developed in connection with the Hands off China 
campaign and the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee.534 
      The aftermath of the LAI General Council indicated that the LAI was suffering from 
organisational constraints. On 11 December 1927, several of the delegates left Brussels with the 
feeling that the LAI was heading towards an uncertain future.  
 
* 
 
Pre-empting the Disintegration: The Case of the British LAI Section  
The “provisional” British LAI Section faced an ideological confrontation after the LAI General 
Council. Maxton, Bridgeman and Beckett, the non-communist members, questioned the real 
motives of the LAI and its communist representatives. Furthermore, Pollitt questioned the doubts 
and the incompetence of its non-communist members: 
You people said that this was a communist manoeuvre. But for twelve months we 
communists have deliberately kept out of it in order to let you have a chance. And now, we 
and the working class can see that you have sabotaged it for twelve months, that you were 
not capable of doing anything.535 
The communist connections had taken on an overt character at the General Council, thus, the non-
communist members pondered over the available options for leaving the LAI. For Pollitt, the fear 
                                                                                                                                                          
before the British people.” Chi explained to Liau that he had managed to avoid a body search by protesting that it was 
a violation of his personal rights. However, the authorities had examined “every slip of paper”. In the end, British 
authorities decided to prohibit Chi from stepping onto British soil (paragraph “1/3g”), hearing from a police officer 
that “we do not want you in England, that’s all”, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.234; RGASPI 542/1/29, 6-7, Report by 
Ch’ao-Ting Chi to Liau, International Secretariat, Berlin, 14/1-928. Liau edited the report from Chi and included it in 
the March issue of the Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus (Berlin, Nr.1, 15/3-1928). 
534 RGASPI 542/1/27, 31, Excerpts, protocol from a meeting at the International Secretariat, Berlin, 29/6-1928;  
RGASPI 542/1/27, 29-30, Protocol, International Secretariat, Berlin, 29/6-1928. To strengthen the campaign, 
Münzenberg used the services of the Rote Front Kämpfer, the German Peace Association (“Deutschen 
Friedensgesellschaft”), the Socialist Association (“Sozialistischer Bund”) and Profintern. The campaign also 
established local branches in Hamburg, Frankfurt and Dresden. 
535 RGASPI 495/100/545, 1, “Report from Great Britain”, author: Petrovsky, London, to the Eastern Secretariat,  
Moscow, 4/3-1928. 
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and hesitancy of Maxton, Bridgeman and Beckett exposed the need to coerce them, and to 
convince the section to adhere to the CPGB’s instructions. Apparently, in 1928 the situation within 
the “provisional” British LAI Section was mirroring the political context of the British labour and 
communist movement. According to Matthew Worley, in 1927-32 the CPGB found itself 
“increasingly detached from the mainstream of the British labour movement” due to its support 
and endorsement of a political culture which focused on “revolutionary class-consciousness”.536 In 
1928, the “provisional” British LAI Section was no exception to the above. The communist 
members in the “provisional LAI committee” seem to have considered the LAI as an enigma, 
particularly from the perspective of transforming the committee into a vigorous section. On 7 July, 
1928, at the “Essex Hall” in London, the question was, in a sense, solved at the inaugural 
conference of the British LAI Section. From the beginning of 1928, right up until the “Essex Hall” 
conference in July, it had been a process whereby the communists tried to coerce but also to save 
the “provisional LAI committee” from collapsing under its own weight. 
      On 15 December 1927, the members of the “provisional LAI committee” had a meeting in 
London, at which Bridgeman spoke of “his shattered faith” in the LAI, suggesting the formation of 
an “Imperialism Committee of the ILP” in order to salvage his devotion to the anti-colonial cause. 
Petrovsky (whether or not he was present at the meeting is unknown) wrote that Saklatvala had 
told Bridgeman to wait before reaching a final decision. However, after the meeting, Saklatvala 
notified Rothstein at the CPGB Colonial Commission about what had happened. Rothstein asked 
Saklatvala whether it was necessary to re-organise the committee, then told Saklatvala to compile 
a “list of names” of suitable candidates to replace the ILP representatives.537 
      Bridgeman’s cynicism caused the CPGB to react in order to maintain control of the 
“provisional committee”. To test the “gloomy attitude” among the non-communist members, the 
committee had to establish anti-imperialist activism in London and convince the non-communist 
members to support the cause. Apparently, nothing happened in January and, on 27 February, the 
communists strode into action. Saklatvala and Pollitt accused Bridgeman, Beckett and Maxton of 
ignoring the LAI, to which they responded that the LAI was a “hopeless proposition”, referring to 
the opinion of the Labour Party, which had stated that the LAI was “very bad from the principal 
[sic] point of view and also politically”.538 This was the lowest point in the “provisional LAI 
                                               
536 Worley 2002, p.3, 194. 
537 RGASPI 495/100/545, 2-5, Report by Petrovsky on the British LAI Section, 20/4-1928. Saklatvala suggested that  
the CPGB member, Vera Crossly, should assume Bridgeman’s position as secretary. 
538 RGASPI 495/100/545, 1, Letter from Petrovsky, London, to unknown receiver, 4/3-1928. The receiver of 
Petrovsky’s letter is unclear; however, the most likely recipients must have been either the “Anti-Imperialist 
Commission”, the Eastern Secretariat or the Colonial Commission of the CPGB. 
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committee”, indicating that the LAI had reached a dead-end in Great Britain. However, Petrovsky 
emerged as the architect capable of solving the crisis. 
      In the beginning of March, Petrovsky returned to London after having attended the Ninth 
ECCI Plenum in Moscow (9-25 February, 1928). In Moscow, Petrovsky had been involved in the 
discussion of the “English question”, an experience Petrovsky most likely had on his mind when 
he attended a meeting of the “provisional LAI committee” in London in March. According to 
Petrovsky, Maxton threatened to resign as LAI Chairman, whereas Bridgeman accused Gibarti of 
“spoiling everything all the time”. The response from the communist members was fierce, and the 
“very strong attack” by Pollitt and Saklatvala had been a “very funny” scene to witness, Petrovsky 
concluded. Nevertheless, the meeting did not signal the definitive end and, before the session was 
over, Maxton, Beckett and Bridgeman requested some time to consult the ILP Executive before 
reaching a decision on how to act. A couple of days after the meeting, Maxton contacted 
Saklatvala in London and explained that the LAI had a “glorious future” in England, and promised 
to remain in the LAI along with Bridgeman and Beckett.539 What was the reason for Maxton’s, 
Beckett’s and Bridgeman’s change of heart? The most likely explanation is the realisation that if 
they left the “provisional LAI committee”, the communists would completely control the LAI’s 
work in Great Britain and, therefore, be able to influence the British anti-imperialist movement. 
      Petrovsky informed the Eastern Secretariat that the CPGB had “to be more aggressive with the 
Maxton people”. Hence, Petrovsky appointed Saklatvala as his liaison to supervise the 
“provisional LAI committee” and, if Bridgeman and Maxton chose to leave or if the Colonial 
Commission of the CPGB deleted their names, the communists had to increase their influence over 
the committee. A part of this scheme was to nominate Joan Thompson, CPGB member, to assume 
Bridgeman’s position as organiser, while getting Bridgeman to act as political secretary. Thus, at 
some level, Petrovsky still considered Bridgeman to be a valuable asset for the LAI in Great 
Britain. The nomination of Thompson as organiser was, however, of a more subtle nature. In fact, 
Emile Burns, CPGB member and secretary of the British section of the Friends of Soviet Russia as 
well as Head of the Labour Research Department (LRD) in London, had a huge influence over 
                                               
539 TNA KV2/1433, Biographical information, Bennet/Petrovsky/Goldfarb, 1928-1929. MI5 concluded that Petrovsky  
was the “leader of a group within the ECCI which favoured a closer rapprochement” with the CPGB. This concerned a 
policy shift in the CPGB, linked to the then current political situation in Great Britain. While the “bourgeois 
dictatorship” in Great Britain was no longer a “liberal” force, but rather a “reactionary” force according to the 
Comintern, the Ninth ECCI Plenum adopted a resolution which instructed the CPGB to begin to act “as an 
independent organisation” rather than seeking collaborations with the Labour Party and the Trade Union General 
Council. At the Ninth ECCI Plenum, Petrovsky was one of the central actors to discuss the “English question”, see 
Degras vol.II 1960, 427-428; RGASPI 495/100/545, 1, Letter from Petrovsky, London, to unknown receiver, 4/3-
1928. 
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Thompson and could therefore monitor the work of the “provisional LAI committee” and 
influence the political agenda via Thompson.540 
      Petrovsky’s primary aim, however, was to transform the “provisional committee” into an active 
and organised section, capable of carrying out anti-imperialist activism in Great Britain. In 
comparison to Münzenberg’s vision, Petrovsky had a different approach planned for this section. 
While Münzenberg expected the British LAI Section to focus primarily on propaganda (campaigns 
and public demonstrations), Petrovsky understood that the political realities and cultures in Great 
Britain and Germany were different. For Petrovsky, parliamentary activism was the key in a 
British context, rather than taking the movement out “onto the streets”. Yet, this did not 
underestimate the value of propaganda, especially as parliamentary activism went hand-in-hand 
with propaganda, e.g. the publication of a weekly LAI bulletin in England. The parliamentary 
approach was more than an idea. On 4 April, Saklatvala delivered a speech (prepared in advance 
by the CPGB’s Colonial Commission) in the House of Commons, a performance Petrovsky 
described as the “first big public advertisement” in England of the LAI. Shortly after the speech, 
the “provisional LAI committee” released a British LAI bulletin, enclosed in Mitteilungsblatt der 
Liga gegen Imperialismus, published by the International Secretariat. In this bulletin, Bridgeman 
explained the inherent weakness of the “provisional LAI committee”: 
The main difficulty which confronts the Committee of the British Section is that those 
associated with it can only devote a fraction of their busy lives to the work of the League. 
The members have neither time nor money, while to make the work of the League effective 
full-time work is required.541 
To celebrate the leap from a “provisional LAI committee” to becoming an LAI section, 
Münzenberg instructed Maxton and Bridgeman on how to prepare the “Essex Hall” conference in 
London.542 
                                               
540 RGASPI 495/100/545, 1, Letter from Petrovsky, London, to unknown receiver, 4/3-1928. According to Emile  
Burns' autobiography, filed in his personal file (lichnye delo) in the Comintern Archive, Burns was in charge of 
“informal group discussions of the Party fraction” at the LRD. The CPGB had infiltrated the LRD, an institution 
which, from the beginning, functioned as an independent actor in the service of the British labour movement, which in 
the 1920s, had become a centre and liaison service for the Comintern emissaries on covert missions in Great Britain. 
Located in London, the public character of the LRD was to facilitate with left-wing information and propaganda of a 
scholarly character on the socialist and labour movement, statistics and on the trade unions. According to Philip Spratt, 
the communists “penetrated” the LRD and used it as a “cover and an agency for dispensing propaganda”, see RGASPI  
495/198/11, 64-68, Autobiography, Emile Burns, 11/1-1932; Haithcox 1971, p.52; Spratt 1955, p.22. 
541 Mitteilungsblatt der Liga gegen Imperialismus. Internationales Sekretariat, Berlin, Nr.2, 21/4-1928. Supplement.  
British Section, Reginald Bridgeman, 15/4-1928; RGASPI 495/100/545, 1, Letter from Petrovsky, London, to 
unknown receiver, 4/3-1928. 
542 Maxton and Bridgeman acted as the formal organisers of the LAI conference at Essex Hall in London. However,  
Münzenberg provided Maxton with the original agenda for the event, whereas the latter received the instruction to 
make the best of the opportunity to join up “thousands of individual members”, to win “them over” to support the LAI 
and, finally, to establish a united front against imperialism together with “left-wing social democrats”, fol. RGASPI 
542/1/29, 28-29, Confidential letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Maxton, London, 6/6-1928. A copy of this letter was 
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      The organisational confusion prevalent within the LAI was not solved during the LAI General 
Council in Brussels; it merely increased or exposed existing problems. Nevertheless, Münzenberg 
believed that the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement were heading towards a brighter future, 
“due to the Brussels Conference and on the initiative of the LAI […] in numerous countries over 
the past months strong sections of the League have been formed”.543 Nevertheless, the LAI 
General Council marked the definitive end of the euphoria. 
 
* 
 
The End of Euphoria  
 
I consider the situation to be bleak. There is no energy, diplomacy or moral strength […] The 
LAI is an extremely important movement, and we must try to return to its 1927 basis […] 
The LAI, for the moment, has neither head nor feet. 
Fimmen, LAI Executive Committee, 
Brussels, 28/4-1928  
 
The International Secretariat organised a public meeting in Berlin on 16 December, 1927, at which 
Münzenberg proclaimed both the results of the LAI General Council and the LAI’s international 
expansion.544 After Fimmen had arrived back in Amsterdam after the General Council, he sent a 
letter to Münzenberg explaining that he was thinking of resigning as vice-deputy because the LAI 
was turning into “a bluff”. For Münzenberg, however, the council did not mirror Fimmen’s 
disillusion, telling Kuusinen that it was “a victory” for the communists.545 With a focus on the sine 
qua non of both the LAI and the International Secretariat, what were their obligations and 
restrictions after the General Council, and how dependent was the LAI on receiving support from 
the Comintern and the IAH? Münzenberg considered it to be obvious that the LAI was an 
independent organisation which, as a result of the Brussels Congress, was no longer under the 
jurisdiction of the IAH, and was expected to carry out activity without receiving any financial and 
administrative assistance from the IAH apparatus. The ECCI Bureau Secretariat did not, however, 
agree with Münzenberg. On 18 August 1927, the ECCI Bureau Secretariat resolved that the IAH 
                                                                                                                                                          
also filed in the CPGB fond; fol. 495/100/545, 11 [English version], 12-13 [German version]. British Head Office 
intercepted the letter, later used as empirical material in an analysis of the LAI by the British secret police in 1929 
(TNA HO 144 10693). 
543 Willi Münzenberg, “Mot kolonialt förtryck” [”Against Colonial Oppression”], in Norrskensflamman, Luleå, 30/12- 
1927, 6-7. 
544 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 88, Invitation, Report on results of LAI General Council, LAI, Berliner Sekretariat,  
9/12-1927. 
545 Taken from Haikal 1992, pp.251-252. Haikal refers to the LAI fond 542, opis 1, delo 8, but left out any reference to  
the list or the date for Fimmen’s letter. For Münzenberg’s letter to Kuusinen, Haikal referred to the IAH fond 538, opis 
2, delo 40 (neither list nor date). 
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must “energetically support” the LAI in establishing national sections. A question re-addressed by 
the ECCI Organisational Department (Orgotdel) in 1929: 
The initiative to create the organisation [LAI], its establishment and achievement at the large 
anti-imperialist Congress in February 1927 in Brussels, came from the Communist 
International and the Central Committee of the IAH.546   
The central question for the LAI in 1928 was to understand that the euphoria of the Brussels 
Congress was over. For the International Secretariat, it was all about adapting to the current 
situation, e.g. the changes in structural and individual relations, as well as adhering to Comintern 
policy. 
 
* 
 
Back in Berlin   
The LAI left the inner sanctums at IAH headquarters in Berlin in the beginning of 1928. While the 
German LAI Section found an office at 10 II Monbijouplatz, the International Secretariat had a 
bureau at 24 Friedrichstraβe. At the same time, the LAI attempted to amplify its anti-imperialist 
propaganda on the political scene in Berlin. On 20 January, the German section organised a public 
meeting at the “Sturmsaal”, at which Ledebour called out to every “sympathiser” to begin 
understanding the “ambitions and expectations” of Germany in regaining its former colonies.547 
According to the political scientist Mary J. Townsend, who had conducted a field survey of the 
political situation in Germany in 1928, the escalating propaganda of pro-colonial societies and 
associations in Germany, demanding the recovery of the lost “overseas Empire”,548 also served the 
interests of the LAI. The LAI’s agitation against Germany’s colonial desires did not pass by 
without attracting attention. Informants, working in the service of the Auswärtige Amt initially 
observed that it seemed as though the LAI was no longer an organisation of any importance, and 
                                               
546 The ECCI Bureau Secretariat put the wrong date on this document. Via the statement, which suggests that that IAH  
had “to organise agitation on a large scale in favour of the USSR […] the forthcoming X Anniversary of the October 
Revolution, to further the organisation of the ‘Friends of the New Russia’ [the Friends of Soviet Union]”, indicates 
that the resolution was a document introduced in 1927, not 1928, see fol. RGASPI 495/103/149, 13-16, Resolution on 
the question of the International Workers Relief, ECCI Bureau Secretariat, Moscow, 18/8-1928 [correct year:1927]; 
RGASPI 495/25/1255, 71, Bericht über die Tätigkeit der IAH in den letzten Jahren, [IAH.-Kommission], Moscow, 
6/2-1929. The “IAH.-Kommission” in Moscow in 1929 used this document in its analysis of the IAH, see RGASPI 
495/3/86, 54, Protokoll No.22 der Sitzung des Politsekrt. am Freitag, Moscow, 8/2-1929. 
547 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 88, Invitation, Report on results of the LAI General Council, LAI, Berliner  
Sekretariat, 9/12-1927; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 99, Information from the LAI, Berlin, 15/1-1928. The Friends 
of the Soviet Union shared the same office of the International Secretariat at 24 Friedrichstrasse in 1928, see SAPMO-
BA ZPA R 1507/67113, 112, Reichskommissar: Vermerk: Aus privater Quelle, Berlin, August 1928. 
548 Townsend 1928, p.65. Townsend wrote that “literature and propaganda in the shape of colonial histories, treatises,  
novels depicting life in Africa and in the South Seas, pamphlets replete with statistics, magazine and newspaper 
articles have literally poured from the press since 1918, telling the Germans more about their former colonies”. 
Magazines such as the Koloniale Rundschau and Kolonialdeutsche were the leading actors in developing pro-colonial 
propaganda. 
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was pretty much a shadow of its former self in Berlin. According to separate reports from two 
informants belonging to the German pro-colonial movement, one was V. Lindequist, a secretary in 
the Vereinigung für Deutsche Siedlung und Wanderung and the second, a member of the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Eingeborenenkunde [identity unknown], Auswärtige Amt had pieced together 
intelligence on the “Sturmsaal” meeting. The informant from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Eingeborenenkunde had in fact taken the assignment seriously by becoming a member of the LAI, 
and attended the “Sturmsaal” meeting on location. The following report describes the event as 
having been a bizarre experience. Having arrived at 7.30 p.m., the informant noticed that one male 
and two females were just sitting and waiting for the meeting to begin. Yet, at 8 pm, nothing had 
happened, whereupon the informant left, only to find out a couple of days afterwards that the 
meeting had later been cancelled due to poor attendance.549 Additionally, a third source notified the 
Auswärtige Amt of the International Secretariat’s plan to stage a big demonstration on 4 March at 
the Piscator-Bühne, the well-known avant-garde and leftist theatre scene in Berlin. Entitled 
“Koloniale Welt in Flammen!”, the demonstration was scheduled to include speeches from 
Goldschmidt, the author Arthur Holitscher and the journalist Armin T. Wegner, and to be a display 
of colonial culture and music, e.g. the performance of a “Persian trio” and the singing of Indian 
and Javanese melodies.550 
 
* 
 
Resignation, Renunciation and a Breach in Communications 
In the beginning of 1928, the International Secretariat introduced an organ in the service of its 
members and the LAI Executive, the Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus. A second 
publication, Pressedienst, launched around the same time, was aimed towards the left-wing press. 
The primary aim of these two publications was to introduce the LAI to a broader public. Despite 
these publications being both edited and printed in Berlin, they were, in essence, a product of the 
Eastern Secretariat and the ECCI Agitprop Department in Moscow. The International Secretariat 
                                               
549 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 98, Short note from “Vereinigung für Deutsche Siedlung U. Wanderung” an  
Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 16/1-1928; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 101, Report from “Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Eingeborenenkunde”, Berlin, to Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 3/2-1928. 
550 Münzenberg wanted the demonstration to “leave a good impact”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/28, 22, Letter from  
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Roy [Sekr. Scho./K.], Moscow, 13/2-1928. SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 102, Short note 
from “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Eingeborenenkunde”, Berlin, to Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 14/2-1928; SAPMO-BA 
ZPA R1001/6751, 103, [Poster] “Piscator-Bühne – Koloniale Welt in Flammen”, Berlin, 4/3-1928. A copy of this 
poster is located in the LAI fond fol. RGASPI 541/1/28, 23. Münzenberg enclosed this poster in his letter to Roy. 
Further, Armin T. Wegner, journalist and photographer, born in Germany in 1886, illustrated through his photos during 
the Great War the atrocities taking place in Armenian deportation camps in 1915-1916. This turned Wegner into a 
prominent spokesperson against how Ottoman Turkey treated its Armenian population and, after the Great War, 
Wegner was an engaged pacifist and anti-militarist. Wegner passed away in Rome at the age of 92 on 17 May, 1978, 
see Internet: < http://www.armenian-genocide.org/wegnerbio.html >. 
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received prepared articles for inclusion in these publications, e.g. articles on Egypt and the Middle 
East, as well as the KMT’s “white terror” in China. The official development of the LAI at the 
beginning of 1928 was a line of activity which nonetheless had to confront the complications at the 
International Secretariat, a question which challenged the internal individual and organisational 
structure in Berlin. After Liau had handed in his resignation in January, he nevertheless stayed on 
at the International Secretariat out of gratitude towards Petrovsky and the ECCI, and in February, 
Gibarti suddenly resigned from his position as secretary. 
      The Informationsbulletin stated on 15 March 1928, that Gibarti had left the LAI due to “health 
problems”, which had forced him to take “a longer vacation”.551 His sudden disappearance remains 
a mystery, however, and whether or not it was based on Münzenberg's criticism of Gibarti’s 
capabilities as a “poor organiser”, is pure speculation. Yet, Gibarti’s resignation appears to have 
been caused not by health problems but by other factors. According to Gibarti’s personal file in the 
Comintern Archive, there is not a single clue indicating the reason for his resignation. The only 
reference is that he was “assigned to conduct international missions for the IAH, for example in 
the USA”.552 One of Gibarti’s first public appearances occurred in New York on 15 June 1929, 
acting as the “representative of the International League against Imperialism” at a public rally at 
Irving Plaza which had been organised by the AAAIL.553 This suggests a time gap of over one year 
and four months. Furthermore, Gibarti’s personal file in the TNA does not provide any additional 
information about his whereabouts after February 1928, while stating, as does his file in the 
Comintern Archive, that Gibarti acted as an “international representative” of the IAH and LAI in 
the USA in 1928-29.554 The crux of the matter is to verify Gibarti’s whereabouts during this 
period. The most logical assumption is that, after Gibarti left the International Secretariat, he went 
to Moscow as a student at one of the Comintern’s educational units, e.g. the International Lenin 
School (ILS).555 Completing a political education that lasted for about one year, Gibarti became a 
                                               
551 Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, Nr.1, 15/3-1928. For the decision on Paris, see  
Mitteilungsblatt der Liga gegen Imperialismus. Internationales Sekretariat, Berlin, Nr.2, 21/4-1928. 
552 RGASPI 495/205/6048, 1, Biography on Gibarti, undated. 
553 FOIA 61-6065-60, AAAIL. 
554 On June 14, 1939, N. D. Borum, representative at the Embassy of the USA in London, sent a letter to Lidell to  
inform him about Gibarti’s career as an international communist. According to Borum, whatever Gibarti had to say 
“carries little weight”. For example, that Gibarti had resigned from the International Secretariat because the LAI was 
“under communist influence” was nothing short of utter nonsense, TNA KV2/1401. 
555 The International Lenin School (ILS) was an “instrument” of Bolshevization that existed from 1926-1938 in  
Moscow. More specifically, the ILS was as a curricular institute which, according to Cohen and Morgan, aimed to 
“produce a new stratum of leading communist party cadres, young, proletarian, disciplined and free of the taint of 
reformism” which, after the Second World War, assumed leading positions in the international communist movement. 
Famous ILS alumni were, for example, Yugoslavia’s Marshal Tito, Wladyslaw Gomulka from Poland and the General 
Secretary of East Germany, Erich Honecker, Gidon Cohen & Kevin Morgan, “Stalin’s Sausage Machine. British 
Students at the International Lenin School, 1926-37”, in Twentieth Century British History, Vol.13, No.4, 2002, 
pp.327-355. 
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fully-fledged agent in the service of the Soviet Foreign Department and acted as a Comintern 
emissary, having the USA and Europe as his operative field.556 
      The disappearance of Gibarti symbolised the uncertain road ahead for both the LAI and the 
International Secretariat in 1928. At the same time, other events were occurring which would have 
a lasting impact on the international communist movement, e.g. the Ninth ECCI Plenum held in 
Moscow in February 1928. This plenum determined the pace for the Comintern’s political and 
organisational development, and highlighted the expulsion of the Trotsky opposition from the 
CPSU (B), as well as evaluating the reports from the Chinese, English, French and trade union 
commissions.557 The focus of the plenum was a critical examination of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) and its societal and ideological implications for Soviet society, a question that suggests the 
start of the conflict between Bukharin and Stalin.558 This plenum put forward an understanding 
that the communist movement had to act carefully in its contacts with the social democratic 
movement. This, in turn, strengthened antagonism which the Comintern endorsed, urging the 
national sections to follow the “general turn to the left”. However, several of the communist 
parties, e.g. the CPGB and the PCF, did not agree with this policy.559 In conclusion, the Ninth 
ECCI Plenum signalled an imminent policy shift within the Comintern, which revealed itself in all 
its full glory at the Sixth International Comintern congress (17 July – 1 September 1928). For the 
LAI, the ideological message introduced at the Ninth ECCI Plenum did not correspond with its 
aim to sustain a united front against colonialism and imperialism.560  
      This likely Comintern policy shift was not, however, the only sign. On 16 February, 
Münzenberg sharply criticised Bukharin for the extreme indifference at Comintern headquarters in 
                                               
556 For a similar discussion on Gibarti’s presumed “role” as an agent in the service of Bolshevism and the Comintern,  
Koch writes that Gibarti was a “willing participant in espionage recruitment”, see Koch 1995, p.343 (footnote 23). 
However, and according to the empirical dilemma outlined above, any documents verifying that such was the case 
have not been found and, if any exist, the documents are most likely kept in the KGB archive in Moscow. 
557 Kahan 1990, 28. 
558 Research and scholarly interpretations of the origin of the NEP, its practical implementations and consequences for  
Soviet society, as well as the plots connected to the decision to shun the policy in 1928-29, is a topic evaluated and 
analysed in, for example, David Priestland, Stalinism and the Politcs of Mobilisation. Ideas, Power, and Terror in 
Inter-war Russia, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp.154-155, 164; Acton & Stableford, 2005, pp.149-183, 
263-264; Figes 2007, pp.86-87; Robert Himmer, “The Transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy: 
An Analysis of Stalin’s View”, in The Russian Review, vol.53, Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1994, p.516; Fitzpatrick 
(1999). 
559 According to Borkenau, the Comintern took a “leap into the abyss” after 1927, Borkenau 1938, pp.334-335. 
560 A majority of the discussions and disagreements at the plenum centred around Bukharin’s excessive belief in the  
“revolutionary potential” of the Western labour movement, and the impatience of the international communist 
movement to transform world revolution into a political reality. Furthermore, this also concerned the dilemma of 
having properly “bolshevised” national sections, whereas the isolated centre of the international communist movement 
– Comintern headquarters in Moscow – had more or less lost its contact with the national sections, the mass and 
sympathising organisations, see Degras vol.II 1960, 423-425; Nicholas N. Kozlov & Eric D. Weitz, “Reflections on 
the Origins of the ‘Third Period’: Bukharin, the Comintern and the Political Economy of Weimar Germany”, in 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol24, No.3, (Jul., 1989), Sage Publications, pp.387-410; Matthew Worley, 
“Courting Disaster? The Communist International in the Third Period”, in In Search of Revolution. International 
Communist Parties in the Third Period, Matthew Worley (ed.), London, 2004, pp.6-7; Priestland 2007, p.178. 
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Moscow, urging him initiate a re-organisation of the entire apparatus. Münzenberg emphasised the 
necessity of establishing effective administrative routines, e.g. smaller departments and of 
restoring the system which supported regular contact with the international sections. According to 
Münzenberg, the prevailing bureaucratic malpractice in Moscow had sabotaged much of his work 
in January-February, and it seemed as though the situation at Comintern headquarters was in a 
truly poor state, not even comparable to the situation of 1919.561 The International Secretariat 
sided, of course, with Münzenberg. The International Secretariat sent information to the LAI 
Executive and to the LAI’s collective and affiliated members, declaring that due to “circumstances 
beyond their control” [neglecting to mention that a breach in communications with Comintern 
headquarters in Moscow was the sole reason], it had become troublesome to carry out routine 
work, e.g. sending material and directives to the national sections.562 
      The liaison question alluded to by Münzenberg was, however, part of a challenge the entire 
European communist movement was facing in the beginning of 1928. At the Ninth ECCI Plenum, 
the Comintern resolved to improve relations between Moscow and the communist parties in 
Western Europe and, therefore, in accordance with the ECCI’s directive, endorsed the 
establishment of the West European Bureau (WEB). However, this was a process already set in 
motion on 13 April 1927, when the Political Secretariat had discussed the idea of a “foreign bureau 
of the ECCI” in a closed session in Moscow. The Political Secretariat instructed Bukharin, 
Kuusinen and Piatnitsky to work out details for “a bureau” in Western Europe, which had to 
include the aim and purpose, methods and strategy, individual composition and location of the 
bureau.563 The confidential document, “Entwurf eines Beschlusses des EKKI über die Errichtung 
eines Westeuropäischen Büros”, perhaps the result of an evaluation carried out by Bukharin, 
Kuusinen and Piatnitsky, contains the directive that the WEB should establish “urgently a contact 
(Fühlung) between the ECCI and the West European sections”, although the bureau was to be 
                                               
561 Münzenberg explained to Bukharin that his long relationship with the international communist movement and the  
Bolsheviks, stretching back to 1914, had given him an insight into how the bureaucracy and administrative structure in 
the Comintern functioned and, above all, how Moscow positioned itself in relation to the national sections, see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/25/1-2, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 16/2-1928. An erroneous interpretation 
of Münzenberg’s relation to Bukharin is introduced by Sean McMeekin in a research note (2002), published in 
Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung. According to McMeekin, “Bukharin was probably the greatest 
Münzenberg sucker” of all in the Comintern, frequently and intentionally deceived by the “Red Millionaire” 
[Münzenberg], who pushed the argument that “he never received any money from Moscow” to an extreme, see 
McMeekin 2002, pp.418-419. However, the relationship between the two of them was much more intricate than this, 
based not entirely on money, but also on hierarchical relations and structure, ambitions for power as well as historical 
ties and a commitment to the communist movement, something McMeekin ignores. 
562 Informationsbulletin der LAI, Nr. 1, 15/3-1928. 
563 Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.69; RGASPI 495/3/13, 66, 66, (Streng vertraulich!) Protokoll Nr.20 der  
geschlossene Sitzung des Polit-Sekretariats vom 13. April 1927, [Moscow]. Present at the meeting were Bukharin, 
Kuusinen, Murphy, Piatnitsky, Humbert-Droz, Maggi, Petrov, Schneller, Duncan, Zetlin and Heimo. See Fredrik 
Petersson, “Melting Down the Iceberg: the Communist International, Organisational Perspectives and Archival Issues. 
A Research Report”, CoWoPa 7, Åbo Academy, 2006. 
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located in Berlin. The second objective was to guarantee that couriers provided the ECCI with 
intelligence on the “Brüderparteien” [the national communist parties], i.e. on the day-to-day 
routines within the parties. This included whether the parties put the ECCI’s instructions and 
decisions into practice, as well as reporting any internal disputes or conflicts. This was an 
arrangement which also applied in the other direction. The WEB was the ECCI’s monitoring 
agency and relay station in Western Europe, and oversaw whether the “Brüderparteien” were 
carrying out its instructions, or neglecting to do so.564 
      In 1928, the WEB had no direct influence on the International Secretariat. Another episode 
produced a more dramatic effect: the decision of the Political Secretariat on 16 March to remove 
Roy as LAI liaison in Moscow, resulting in a breach in relations between the International 
Secretariat and Comintern headquarters. The sole reason given by the Political Secretariat was “on 
the future use of Comrade Roy, no decision”.565 For the International Secretariat, this meant the 
loss of a personal liaison at the Eastern Secretariat, thus, Münzenberg suggested that Petrovsky 
assume Roy’s position. However, Petrovsky’s commitment to the CPGB consumed all of his time 
and energy, leaving him unable to look after the LAI. It was not until June that the Political 
Secretariat found a temporary solution by nominating Heimo to “supervise the foreign activities of 
the LAI”.566 Thus, from March to June 1928, the International Secretariat had no regular contact 
with the Eastern Secretariat at Comintern headquarters. During this period, however, the decision-
makers in Moscow kept discussions on the LAI to a minimum. One of the few occasions it was 
discussed was prior to the LAI Executive meeting in Brussels on 28-29 April, as Piatnitsky and the 
Political Secretariat were preparing the details for its agenda, once the ECCI Bureau Secretariat 
had re-examined the preparations of the Brussels Congress in 1926-27.567 While the LAI General 
                                               
564 This confidential draft functioned as consultative material for the ECCI, see fol. RGASPI 499/1/33, 132,  
(Vertraulich) Entwurf eines Beschlusses des EKKI über die Errichtung eines Westeuropäischen Büros, Moscow, 
[undated] 1928 [copy]; Vatlin 2009, p.141. 
565 Roy was sick when he left Moscow in February or March. After arriving in Switzerland, Roy never returned to the  
Soviet Union. He was unable to attend the Ninth ECCI Plenum, despite having been re-elected to the ECCI Presidium 
and, as noted by Piazza, around this time the Comintern began its “demontage” of Roy, Piazza 2000, p.210, taken from 
fol. RGASPI 495/3/72, 9. 
566 Münzenberg sent Heimo a copy of the March issue of Der koloniale Freiheitskampf, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 10,  
Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo [Wi./K.], Moscow, Berlin 18/6-1928; RGASPI 542/1/28, 33-34, Der 
koloniale Freiheitskampf, Berlin, 1/3-1928. 
567 RGASPI 495/3/89, 4-5, Protocol No.23, ECCI Polit-Secretariat, Moscow, 15/2-1928. Present at the meeting were  
Lozovsky, Barbé, Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Chitarow, Bell, Ulbricht, Bela Kun, Keirowa, Furman/Purman, Manner, 
Miezkewisch, Gusev, Angaretis, Heimo, Martinov, Wurm, Wassiljew, Schubin, Wolfe, Rwal, Stassiak, Michailov, 
Krastin, Stassowa, Riess, Gerisch, Bebedova, Glaubauf, Kachan and Krastina (steno-typist). However, this resolution 
remains missing in the files at Comintern Archive. At the receiving end (most likely), Münzenberg was the recipient of 
the resolution. The examined documents in Moscow were the “Resolution on the International Congress against 
Imperialist Oppression to be held at Brussels, Adopted by the Political Secretariat of the ECCI” (5/1-1927, reviewed 4 
April); “INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DELEGATES AT THE BRUSSELS CONGRESS” (4/2-1927, reviewed 9 April); 
“Resolution of the Commission for the Examination of the Question of a Colonial Congress in Brussels” (30/3-1926, 
reviewed April 20); and a confidential letter from the ECCI Secretariat to Münzenberg (2/7-1926, reviewed April 21), 
see fol. RGASPI 495/103/154. 
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Council in Brussels in December 1927 indicated the end of euphoria, the LAI Executive meeting 
in Brussels in April, confirmed its end.  
 
* 
 
Confirming the End of Euphoria: The Return to Brussels 
The LAI Executive meeting in Brussels on 28-29 April focused on the purpose and aims of the 
LAI. With its return to Brussels, some of the Executive members chose to confront the 
organisation. Fimmen stated at the meeting, as noted in the protocol, that the LAI had “neither 
head nor feet”, an observation which, in a sense, described the end of euphoria, while the session 
highlighted the LAI’s inability to make the leap from demonstration to organisation. Even several 
of the LAI Executive members themselves were conspicuous by their absence, e.g. Nehru had 
returned to India, Rivera was living in Mexico, Baldwin was in the USA, Hatta was unable to 
attend despite his recent acquittal (see previous chapter) and Mme. Duchêne remained in France. 
Thus, only a few members were present at the meeting: Maxton, Bridgeman, Saklatvala, Fimmen, 
Marteaux, Abdul Manaff and Pamontjak (as substitutes for Hatta), Liau, Chatto and Münzenberg. 
According to Münzenberg, in his report to the ECCI Secretariat, the session resembled the 
convening of “a small office meeting”.568 
      Fimmen highlighted the question of a possible disintegration of the LAI, a fear resulting from 
the lack of tangible results. It did not matter that the Dutch LAI Section had distinguished itself in 
connection with the propaganda campaign to free Hatta; Fimmen initiated a discussion on why the 
other sections had failed. For example, in Belgium, the Sûreté had effectively prevented the 
Belgian LAI Section from taking any tentative steps. In France, the LAI section faced a different 
problem apart from the continued hostility of the French security services, Fimmen stated, 
describing how the PCF's indifference had crippled any kind of initiative. Furthermore, on the 
other side of the Channel, the incapacity of the “provisional LAI committee” in England to exploit 
British imperialism and its slogan – the “leading imperialist nation” – was nothing more than 
shameful. Fimmen accused Maxton of not succeeding in raising any awareness of the LAI within 
the British labour movement, concluding that the common worker in England did not even know 
about the LAI, despite the debacle of Lansbury’s and Brockway’s resignations in 1927. Maxton 
tried to explain that the LAI’s outlook in Great Britain looked “promising”, though Chatto 
remained unconvinced. For Chatto, Bridgeman was the key to building up a functional LAI 
section, urging him to establish connections with colonial individuals in England by focusing on 
colonial associations in London, e.g. the Workers’ Welfare League of India, the Indian Information 
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Centre and the Indian Defence League. However, before admitting them into the LAI, Bridgeman 
had to evaluate their political leanings and reliability. However, Bridgeman explained that contact 
with the Indian groups had ended in nothing; instead, they refused to have anything to do with the 
LAI due to their affiliation with the Labour Party. The political and organisational deadlock within 
the “provisional LAI committee” in London had to be broken, therefore Chatto told Maxton and 
Bridgeman to focus on finding individuals rather than seeking the membership of collective 
members (organisations and associations). According to the protocol, Fimmen had listened to the 
discussion, only to conclude that it seemed as though the LAI only had two functional sections in 
1928: the Dutch and the German. Nevertheless, Fimmen queried the validity of this statement, 
telling Münzenberg that the German section was only managing to survive due to the IAH’s 
support. For Münzenberg, the situation was far more complex, explaining to the LAI Executive 
members the reasons why the LAI had an active section in Germany: 
Two reasons explain why it was easy to establish the LAI in Germany. Germany does not 
possess any colonies, and the resistance from the government is not so strong concerning the 
work of the LAI. The development of big propaganda campaigns against the demand in 
Germany to acquire colonies is, therefore, thoroughly developed.569 
Germany’s lack of colonies as an outcome of the Versailles Peace Treaty, and the inattentiveness of 
the German security services towards an organisation such as the LAI, explained its success, not 
the IAH’s active support, Münzenberg argued. However, the LAI Executive should not forget 
Münzenberg’s expertise and experience in organising propaganda campaigns, committees, 
associations and organisations, a process initiated in Germany in 1921. Thus, Münzenberg argued, 
this had made it “easy [to] get and to direct the German worker” to participate in political 
movements. As proof of the above, the German LAI Section had sixteen branches in the country. 
In Frankfurt am Main, for example, the branch had 600 registered members under the supervision 
of “a teacher” [Karl August Wittfogel] and, in total, the LAI had about 5,000 members alone in 
Germany. The only response that Fimmen could give was that the LAI newspaper, Recht en 
Vrijheid, had had 600 subscribers before the Dutch authorities decided to ban it in the beginning of 
1928.570 
                                               
569 RGASPI 542/1/25, 6-7, Report from Münzenberg, Brussels, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 29/4-1928; RGASPI  
542/1/27, 16-28, Protocol, LAI Executive Committee meeting, Brussels (28/4-1928), sent by Münzenberg, Berlin, to 
Bukharin, Moscow, 24/5-1928. For a copy of the protocol, see LAI fond fol. 542/1/26, 38-49. 
570 The LAI had active branches in Cologne, Düsseldorf, Dresden, Leipzig and Berlin. According to Münzenberg,  
members had to fulfil two essential tasks. Firstly, organise public meetings every second week and secondly, distribute 
(under the supervision of the Berlin section) Der koloniale Freiheitskampf. In response to Münzenberg’s confident 
report, Fimmen stated that non-party individuals, socialists, anarchists and Indonesians constituted the bulk of the 
Dutch LAI Section membership. The journal, Recht und Freiheit, had a steady circulation of 600 copies and, despite 
the frequent prohibition of the journal, the LAI had a good following in seven or eight regions, RGASPI 542/1/27, 16-
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      Despite the LAI’s lack of progress, a more serious issue was the LSI’s relentless antagonism, 
Fimmen stated, informing the LAI Executive that the LSI did not intend to tone down its criticism 
of the LAI. In fact, the LSI campaign against the LAI would most likely be discussed at the LSI’s 
international congress in Brussels on 5-11 August, 1928. Maxton agreed with Fimmen, explaining 
how the LSI report had created an ideological divide within the socialist and labour movements in 
Europe, with the LAI having become more or less an ostracised political object.571 After the LAI 
Executive meeting, the information from Fimmen and Maxton on the LSI’s intentions was a task 
for the International Secretariat to solve. The question was how and whether the LAI was capable 
of responding to the LSI’s hostility. The first step was to gather intelligence on the LSI’s colonial 
policy. From an unknown source, Münzenberg knew that the LSI’s Colonial Commission had 
convened a meeting in Brussels on 2-3 June. Thus, Münzenberg drafted an article, based on the 
intelligence from his source [content unknown], “Die Beschlüsse der II Internationale gegen die 
unterdrückten Völker”, and sent it to Bukharin on 22 June, along with the request to “please use” 
and publish this article in Pravda. According to Münzenberg, the primary aim of this article was to 
accuse Adler and the LSI of their ignorance of the real purpose of the LAI: to raise awareness of 
the “revolutionary movement in colonial and semi-colonial regions” in Europe – an undertaking 
the LSI had neglected to acknowledge in connection with the establishment of the League of 
Nations in 1919.572 Yet, this article was a constituent part of Münzenberg’s propaganda machinery, 
frequently used when responding to the socialist movement. For the International Secretariat, the 
preferred strategy to disrupt the LSI’s colonial policy was of a more subtle nature. Firstly, the LAI 
could not refute that the LSI was the gravitational centre of the socialist movement in Europe and, 
secondly, if the LSI chose to include the colonial question on its agenda at its congress in August, 
the International Secretariat knew that it would attract political attention. On 29 June, during a 
meeting at the International Secretariat, Münzenberg, Chatto, Liau and Hatta decided to approach 
colonial organisations, associations and students in Berlin and London which they knew had 
received invitations to the LSI congress. Their primary aim for doing this was to influence and 
“convert” these colonial elements to act as “messengers” and to present “resolutions of protest” at 
the congress. According to the International Secretariat, these protests had to focus on the 
“cowardice of social democracy” in not supporting the LAI. For Chatto, this was a chance to 
                                                                                                                                                          
28, Protocol, LAI Executive Committee meeting, Brussels (28/4-1928), sent by Münzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, 
Moscow, 24/5-1928. 
571 RGASPI 542/1/27, 16-28, Protocol, LAI Executive Committee meeting, Brussels (28/4-1928), sent by  
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 24/5-1928. 
572 RGASPI 542/1/28, 40, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 22/6-1928; RGASPI 542/1/28, 41- 
54, Manuscript, author: Münzenberg, June, 1928. Bukharin edited the manuscript. Münzenberg believed that the LSI 
had a strategy for the colonial question, urging Fimmen to understand that the LSI “Colonial Committee” did nothing 
more than “throw sand in the eyes” of the oppressed peoples, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/29, 28-29, (Confidential) Letter 
from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Maxton, London, 6/6-1928. 
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evaluate his network to Indian nationalists in Berlin, Europe and India, contacting, for example, 
the India Association in England, Nehru and Jhabwala in Bombay, with the latter providing 
additional contacts to the workers and peasants’ movements in India. This plan revived Liau’s 
interest in the LAI; he introduced the idea of approaching radical political circles in European 
ports, preferably among seamen in Hamburg and Amsterdam, contacts which could spread the 
word about the LAI and its attitude towards the LSI congress. Additional groups the LAI should 
contact were the colonial student associations and Latin American organisations in Berlin, Liau 
concluded. Yet, how could the International Secretariat guarantee that the LSI congress would hear 
the LAI’s protests? Evidently, the International Secretariat considered it wise to infiltrate the LSI 
congress, having Chatto and Liau attend the event disguised as journalists but, “in reality”, as LAI 
representatives.573 It is unknown whether this plan was carried out; however, according to an 
RKÜöO report, Chatto was planning to travel to Brussels in August 1928 under the pseudonym 
“Hussein”.574 
      The LAI Executive meeting wanted to find a solution to two particular problems in order to 
explain the internal weakness of the LAI. Firstly, the LAI Executive had to endorse a decision 
granting the International Secretariat the right to use Berlin as its permanent base and, secondly, 
reach a decision on the political representation of the International Secretariat, hence, a decisive 
step to turn the LAI into a mass organisation. For Maxton, the logical step was to grant the 
International Secretariat a more authoritative position, stating, “I am a politician and a tactician, 
organisational and financial questions are not for me”. However, after Gibarti’s sudden resignation, 
the division of labour at the International Secretariat was in a state of chaos, as it was lacking in 
both skilled co-workers and a shortage of funds, e.g. Chatto informed those present that occasional 
contributions of money had ceased, Nehru had sent a one-off contribution and nothing more, while 
Baldwin refused to send any money as long as the International Secretariat was in a state of 
confusion and “none of the staff” in the French and British sections had any money. On 29 April, 
Münzenberg sent a request to the ECCI Secretariat, wondering why the International Secretariat 
had not received its monthly allowance of $1,500 since January 1928, concluding that if no money 
arrived, the only solution left was perhaps to liquidate the LAI.575 With reference to the political 
constitution of the International Secretariat, Münzenberg wanted to nominate “a communist and a 
non-communist” to work as political secretaries in Berlin. However, Maxton did not agree, arguing 
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that the LAI would benefit from a broader political representation, suggesting that the International 
Secretariat should include a representative of the socialists (Maxton), the trade unions (Fimmen), 
the colonial national revolutionary movement (Chatto) and the communist movement 
(Münzenberg). The LAI Executive endorsed Maxton’s proposal and approved Chatto as the new 
“International Secretary” of the LAI.576 
      The Brussels LAI Executive was Chatto’s rise to prominence. Before the meeting, Chatto sent 
a letter to Nehru, explaining how he believed that the political “future” of the LAI depended on a 
dynamic collaboration between the communist, social democratic and trade union movements in 
the imperialist countries, in order to support the colonial revolutionary movement. In May, Chatto 
contacted Nehru again, stating that the latest LAI Executive meeting had confirmed his 
assumption, proud of the fact that he was now acting as the “political secretary” of the LAI.577 For 
Münzenberg, Chatto's election was a decent choice, informing the ECCI Secretariat that he trusted 
Chatto to be capable of carrying out the duties entrusted to him. At this point in time, Münzenberg 
needed someone he could trust at the International Secretariat. Preoccupied with organising an 
anti-fascist campaign, with Barbusse and Rolland as symbolic leaders of the campaign, 
Münzenberg had neither the time nor the energy to get involved with the LAI.578 
      The determination of its political representation and Chatto’s endorsement as “International 
Secretary” did not, however, solve the LAI’s organisational gridlock. Now that the International 
Secretariat had no personal liaison at Comintern headquarters – Heimo was a temporary solution 
in June – the LAI nerve centre in Berlin could only observe how some of the sections engaged 
themselves in internal squabbles. After the Ninth ECCI Plenum, the international communist 
movement had to adapt itself to the policy direction and rhetoric of the event. For example, the 
CPH, the CPGB and the PCF were struggling to grasp the theoretical ramifications of Comintern 
policy. The internal confusion within the CPH was also affecting the Dutch LAI Section. 
According to Hatta, fractional struggles had almost consumed the section in May, a fight 
sponsored by both the CPH and the SDAP which ended in a definitive split between the 
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communist and non-communist members. Witnessing this political struggle, Hatta felt both 
dissatisfaction with and contempt towards the communist members’ behaviour, informing the 
secretary of the Dutch LAI Section, the journalist and communist Gijsbert Jasper van Munster, that 
the conflict would lead either to the dissolution of the section or turn it into a subsidiary section of 
the CPH. Thus, if the PI resigned from the LAI for “tactical reasons”, this would leave the section 
completely isolated. At the same time, Hatta left the Netherlands and moved to Locarno, 
Switzerland, in May, a decision taken after having experienced the Dutch legal system.579 
Nonetheless, and quite similar to Brockway’s commitment to the anti-imperialist movement, Hatta 
made the distinction between organisational and individual engagement. Hatta attended a meeting 
of the International Secretariat in Berlin on 29 June 1928, and explained that he expected to 
maintain contact both with the International Secretariat and with Chatto. His primary reason for 
doing this was to remain on the LAI Executive in the capacity as an individual member, not as a 
delegate of the PI.580 However, the International Secretariat was looking in a different direction at 
this point in time, expecting to secure the collective membership of the Profintern, an objective 
which tested both the credibility and the organisational strength of the LAI. 
 
* 
 
The Profintern Connection  
The International Secretariat had tried to get the Profintern to support the LAI ever since the 
Brussels Congress. In March 1927, the General Secretary of the Profintern, Solomon Abramovich 
Lozovsky, concluded that, for the time being, the Profintern had no intention of associating with 
the LAI unless the organisation corrected a few “practical measures”.581 What were these 
“practical measures”? What Lozovsky was referring to was the size and scale of the LAI; this was 
also a matter devoid of ideological connotations. Achieving the Profintern's confirmation and 
consent turned into a long, drawn-out process for the International Secretariat. On 18 June, 1928, 
Münzenberg requested that Heimo make a few enquiries at Comintern headquarters to see whether 
it would be possible to convince the Profintern to become a collective member. What was 
Münzenberg’s primary aim? In April, the LAI Executive had concluded at its meeting in Brussels 
that the LAI had very few trade unions as members, to which Maxton had suggested approaching 
“Russian organisations to affiliate”. Later, in June, Münzenberg told Maxton that this was a “wise 
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suggestion”, telling him that the process to get the Profintern to affiliate as a collective member 
had begun.582 However, at this stage, Münzenberg had only thought of initiating negotiations with 
the Profintern. A second motive for Münzenberg was money, telling Heimo that if the Profintern 
became a member, this would guarantee the LAI an annual contribution of 25,000 Roubles in 
membership fees. However, Münzenberg and the LAI had to first answer Lozovsky’s demand that 
a minimum of five “important” trade unions be affiliated as collective members of the LAI.583  
      Münzenberg had set in motion a cautious project, telling Heimo to act carefully. Firstly, Heimo 
was to consult with Petrovsky before trying to arrange any meetings with Profintern 
representatives in Moscow, suggesting that he approach the Ukrainian Grigorij Natnovic 
Melnitschansky (1886 – 1937)584 and the Russian Ya. K. Yaglom (1898 – 1939).585 In connection 
with Heimo’s enquiries, the International Secretariat started to collect the addresses of “important” 
international trade unions in Europe.586 Nevertheless, the Profintern turned down Heimo’s request 
for the simple reason that the LAI could not present any tangible contacts with trade unions, 
forcing the International Secretariat to adopt a new approach. On 20 September, Münzenberg and 
Chatto sent a letter of enquiry to the AUCCSLU (“Zentralrats der Sowjetgewerkschaften”) in 
Moscow, asking whether they would consider becoming a collective member. The AUCCSLU 
then sent on their enquiry to the Secretariat of the Profintern. To convince the AUCCSLU that the 
enquiry was a serious and sincere act, the International Secretariat introduced a “minimum of five 
big trade unions” as members of the LAI, covering a geographical representation from Cuba, West 
Africa and India (the Municipal Workers’ Union, Railway Workers’ Union and the Railway 
Administration Workers’ Union in Bombay, the Cuban Labour Association and the Santo Domingo 
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National Labour Union Association in Havana and the West-African Sierra Leone Railway 
Workers’ Union). Münzenberg and Chatto argued that if the Profintern chose to become a 
collective member, this would be a step that would strengthen the work to “build a bridge” 
between the “coloured workers and the trade unions” in the “imperialist nations”.587 On 5 October 
1928, the Profintern Presidium endorsed the decision to join the LAI as a collective member.588 
 
The establishment of a connection with the Profintern strengthened the trade union character of the 
LAI. The International Secretariat expected to use the trade union question as a topic to counteract 
the LSI’s antagonism. Thus, with a rapid influx of new members on a collective basis, the LAI was 
on the threshold of becoming a mass organisation, rather than merely an ideological defender of 
the anti-imperialist movement. However, this was a theory which had to face the hardship of 
reality. In comparison to the euphoria of 1927, 1928 had been far from a thriving period for the 
LAI. Epitomised by the LSI’s hostility and the momentary breach in communications with 
Comintern headquarters in Moscow, the International Secretariat had also lost three central actors: 
Roy, Gibarti and, in some respects, Liau. Despite the short time-frame, the first half of 1928 was a 
decisive period in that it defined the end of euphoria and exposed the LAI as being a frail 
organisation. To curb this negative trend, the International Secretariat published the first issue of 
the LAI organ, The Anti-Imperialist Review, in July 1928. This release also coincided with an 
event which had a lasting impact on the international communist movement: the ideological “turn 
to the left” at the Sixth International Congress in Moscow. Hence, “the third period” of the 
Comintern came into being. 
 
* 
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Chapter 5. Utopia Redefined, Part I 
 
It must be admitted that, up till now, not all the parties in the Communist International have 
fully grasped the decisive importance which the establishment of close, regular and 
unbroken relations with the national revolutionary movements in the colonies has in 
affording these movements active and practical help. 
Theses on the Revolutionary Movement 
in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries, 
adopted by the Sixth Comintern 
Congress, Moscow, 1/9-1928 
 
Following on from the visit of a member of the Eastern Secretariat to you, and on his 
discussion with you of the possibility of holding a conference of Western European parties 
on Colonial work, […] for the purpose of reviewing the work of the parties and putting into 
operation the decisions of the Congresses of the CI on colonial questions. 
Arnot to the Secretariat of the PCF, Paris, 
25/3-1929 
 
The Sixth International Comintern Congress in Moscow (17 July – 1 September 1928) was the 
ideological watershed for the international communist movement during the inter-war years. Four 
years after the last congress in 1924, two years late by its own statutes, leaders and delegates of 
communist parties – 515 delegates representing 58 parties – gathered at the “Palace of Labour” of 
the Soviet trade unions in Moscow. The congress was the “scene of a muted, but none the less real, 
struggle” which, according to McDermott and Agnew, functioned as the ceremonial introduction 
and celebration of “the third period”, better known as the “class-against-class” policy and referred 
to in the Comintern as “the “new line”. The congress was also the scene of visible conflicts and 
appraisals, e.g. the crystallisation of a personal conflict between Bukharin and Stalin as well as the 
public disavowal of NEP. Thus, the Comintern gave its support to the Bolshevik regime’s decision 
to take the leap into the collectivisation and industrialisation of Soviet society. 
      The Comintern's “new line” represented, firstly, an ideological panorama which corroborated 
the inherent strength of communism to act as an independent political entity, capable of existing 
detached from the influence of social democracy. Secondly, the Comintern and the national 
sections portrayed themselves as the genuine radical representatives of a working-class party. 
Bukharin conceptualised the theoretical framework of “the new line”, in which he predicted the 
coming of a global capitalist crisis. This was the essence of “the third period” during which, 
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according to Bukharin, the crisis would lead to a second wave of international revolutionary 
activity. The first wave, after the end of the Great War, had failed rather embarrassingly, despite 
the struggle of the working-class against the ruling structures of social, political and economic 
systems. The prerequisite of “the third period” depended, therefore, on the inherent strength of the 
international communist movement. However, “the new line” required the Comintern and its 
sections to apply a sterner attitude towards the social democratic and trade union movements, the 
LSI and the nationalist reformist movements, referring to the latter category as defenders of 
“Gandhism”, “Sun Yat-senism” or “Garveyism”, all of which were working in the service of 
imperialism, while brusquely categorising the former as “social fascists”. “The new line” 
witnessed the ultimate end of the “united front” strategy and, instead, the Comintern sanctioned 
and favoured the modus operandi of establishing collaborations with movements “from below”, 
i.e. the workers and peasants.589 
      The Comintern’s historiography and vocabulary throughout the period 1928-1933 constitutes 
one of its most notorious and disputed periods, displaying tendencies of isolation and sectarianism 
as well as the decline of the communist movement on a global scale. “The third period” is a topic 
covered in several studies and interpreted en masse, thus, my primary aim here is not to re-enact 
the comprehensive history of the Sixth Comintern Congress. Yet, one has to recognise and 
understand that the congress laid out a new structural setting and ideological point of departure for 
both the Comintern and the international communist movement. Additionally, the paragraphs of 
the “General Rules” adopted at the congress confirmed the end of democratic centralism. 
According to Adibekov and Shakhnazarova, these paragraphs “stressed the necessity of observing 
strict party discipline and immediately carrying out the Comintern’s decisions”. Nevertheless, the 
understanding of the Sixth Comintern Congress and its ideological implications had a perpetual 
impact within the parties. For example, the CPGB interpreted “the new line” in terms of 
consolidation “from below”; however, the practical imprint was one of frustration and chaos. 
Alternatively, for the KPD, “the new line” was the continuing and strengthening of control, which 
the Comintern apparatus administered in Moscow vis-à-vis the German communist movement. 
McDermott and Agnew suggest that in order to put the logic of “the third period” in its proper 
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tactics in 1927, and was a term first coined by Jules Humbert-Droz. The term “social fascism/fascists” became the 
political lingua franca of the Comintern after the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow in July, 1929, see Theodore Draper, 
American Communism & Soviet Russia, Transaction Publishers, 2003, p.300; McDermott & Agnew 1996, p.67, 72-73, 
77; “Programme of the Communist International Adopted at its Sixth Congress”, Protokoll, vi, 4, September 1, p.45. 
The programme for the congress was published in June, introduced by Bukharin in the opening speech at the congress, 
taken from Degras vol.II, 1960, pp.471-526. Esmonde Higgins, delegate of the CP of Australia, wrote that 515 
delegates from 55 countries had attended the congress, out of which 100 came from “outside of Europe” and 74 from 
“actual colonial countries, see fol. RGASPI 495/94/44, taken from the Internet: < 
http://epress.anu.edu.au/oul/mobile_devices/ch02s20.html >; Kozlov & Weitz 1989, p.387. 
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context, one has to assess and understand the “complex interplay of socio-economic analysis, 
internal factional struggles in the USSR, Soviet foreign policy concerns and the concrete 
experiences of the communist parties themselves”.590 The higher principle was the quest for the 
continued Bolshevization of the international communist movement. Thus, this placed both 
ideology and the structures of the communist movement in a vice, having the Comintern serve as 
an “instrument in settling tactical controversies of Russian rather than international 
significance”.591 This chapter aims to investigate and analyse the nature of colonial work within 
the communist movement in Europe. My focus will be centred mainly on the communist parties in 
Europe, for the simple purpose of establishing a deeper understanding of the complexities the LAI 
and its International Secretariat were facing while trying to pose as an ardent defender of the anti-
imperialist movement in Europe. 
      The “Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries”, 
introduced and endorsed at the congress, defined the political and organisational trajectory for the 
LAI and the communist parties in their colonial work. The author responsible for the “theses” was 
Kuusinen, who also presented the document at the congress. The primary aim of the “theses” was 
to question the earlier nature of colonial work in both the Comintern and the sections. Firstly, 
Kuusinen had reassessed the communist movement’s expectation of gaining a permanent foothold 
in China which, after the KMT putsch and the Cantonese debacle in 1927, had been dashed. Thus, 
India and its national revolutionary movement was the new target that the Comintern and the 
parties should support. Secondly, Kuusinen urged the communist parties of “the metropolitan 
countries” to establish “lively connections” with “corresponding organisations” in the colonies, a 
line of activity that up until 1928 had been inadequately followed up. However, the colonial 
“theses” was primarily the product of Stalin’s active and direct involvement. Before the congress 
convened, Kuusinen had sent extensive drafts of his “theses” to Stalin, asking for consultation and 
advice. According to Stalin’s corrections, Kuusinen had to narrow down the extensive material, 
which left the impression more of a commentary than a “theses” on the colonial question. Thus, 
Stalin instructed Kuusinen to focus on the class perspective and to apply it to typical colonies 
(India, Indonesia), semi-colonies (China, Egypt) and the dependent states (Mexico and Persia).592 
After Kuusinen had presented the “theses”, the ensuing debate at the congress exposed a split 
between the delegates on the colonial question. Wassiljew, Saklatvala and the Indian delegate 
                                               
590 “Statutes of the Communist International Adopted at its Sixth Congress”, taken from Degras vol.II 1960, pp.464- 
470; Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.69; Worley 2002, pp.1-20; Hoppe 2007, p.33; McDermott & Agnew 1996, 
p.68. 
591 Fowkes 1984, p.195. 
592 Documents on how the colonial “theses” was prepared by Kuusinen, and corrected by Stalin are filed in fol. 
RGASPI 82/2/221, 11, 119-161, 162-163. On 12 July, Stalin told Kuusinen that he was sorry for his late reply. These 
documents were given to me for my perusal by Professor Kimmo Rentola, University of Turku. 
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Sikandar S. Usmani, accused the communist parties in the “imperialist nations” of their 
indifference towards supporting the anti-colonial movement in the colonial and semi-colonial 
countries. The main question was, however, the decolonisation debate, which highlighted the 
question of whether the “metropolitan country” promoted or retarded the development of 
industrialisation in the colonies. According to Kuusinen, this was “nothing but an imperialist lie”, 
while some members of the CPGB delegation, Rothstein and Petrovsky (attending the congress as 
“Bennet”), argued that the “theses” underestimated the level of industrialisation in the colonies. 
Two members of the CPGB, Arnot and Murphy, refuted Rothstein and Petrovsky’s statement as 
nonsense. Thus, the debate produced a split in the CPGB on the colonial question. Later, in 
December 1928, according to the observations of MI5, Petrovsky was “no longer a person of much 
importance” in questions relating to Great Britain and India.593 
      The Sixth International Comintern Congress was a clash between experience and 
understanding for both the delegates present and for those who were not. The official consensus 
was that the congress had been a “formal affair” pointing out the bright future of the international 
communist movement, although several delegates had perceived the event in other terms.594 For 
example, the Catalan and Profintern delegate, Andreu Nín (1892 – 1937), concluded that the 
congress and the shift from the united front to “the third period” had been typical of the “epileptic 
zigzags” that only ended in “complete disarray” in the world party.595 Roy did not attend this 
congress. On 17 December 1928, Roy sent a letter to Arnot in which he declared, “I am an 
outcast”. However, this did not prevent him from objecting to the implications of “the new line”, 
telling Arnot “that the International has become insane”.596 The Swedish socialist Karl Kilbom 
                                               
593 “Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries Adopted by the Sixth 
Congress”, taken from Degras vol.II 1960, pp.526-547, originally published in Protokoll, vi, 4, p.154; Petrovsky was 
not re-elected as a member of the ECCI, instead, he was no longer a “person of much importance” in matters relating 
to India, MI5 stated. Yet, Petrovsky continued the secret work of the Comintern and, connected to the WEB in 1929, 
Petrovsky performed liaison and secret work in Great Britain and the USA, while in May 1929, he briefly filled in as 
the ECCI representative in the WEB in Berlin, see TNA PRO KV2/1433, Biographical information concerning 
Bennett/Petrovsky, 1928-1929; Worley 2002, p.139. 
594 Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.69; Borkenau 1936, p.336. 
595 Degras vol.II 1960, p.652; McDermott and Agnew 1996, p.86; For Andreu Nín, see Reiner Tosstorff, “Andreu Nín  
und Joaquín Maurín. Vom revolutionären Syndikalismus zum antistalinistsichen Kommunismus”, in Ketzer im 
Kommunismus, Bergmann/ Kessler (Hrsg.), VSA-Verlag Hamburg, 2000, pp.218-241. 
596 The Comintern had not yet categorised Roy as a persona non grata. Residing in Berlin, Roy began to experience  
his isolation from the movement. Writing to Arnot, Roy wrote: “You know I am entirely ignorant of what is happening 
in the Centre [Comintern; Moscow]. I had been patiently waiting for John [?]; but he could not enlighten me any more 
than others before him had done. As a matter of fact, he confessed that he himself did not know what was happening. I 
do not wish you to divulge official secrets to an outcast; but would it be very inconvenient for you to inform me as to 
the general tendency of the new policy [class against class]. For example, I have not the slightest idea where I stand 
and what am I expected to do in the future. I presume that it is not desired that I should be pushed out of things 
altogether. I cannot believe that the International has become insane. Nevertheless, when I am not told anything 
officially, very mean rumours are being spread throughout the International. And by its attitude, the International gives 
moral support to these mean intrigues against me. I know that it is very difficult to get to the root of these dirty things; 
but they injure my position just the same. I do hope you would send me a word from time to time so that I might keep 
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(1885 – 1961) was, both during and prior to the Sixth International Comintern Congress, a 
member of the Communist Party of Sweden and carried out covert missions as a Comintern agent 
in Europe. However, Kilbom did not attend the Sixth Comintern Congress due to illness. Kilbom 
was a friend of Münzenberg, and visited him in Berlin shortly after the congress had ended. 
Münzenberg asked him why he had been absent and Kilbom gave his explanation, to which 
Münzenberg replied, “so you were politically ill! That was a wise decision on your behalf, because 
now everything is coming apart in the Russian governance”.597 The Sixth International Comintern 
Congress was, above all, an ideological demonstration and a continuance of the work to re-route 
and adjust the organisational structure of the Comintern. Hence, “the new line” was the ideological 
varnish which justified why the Comintern chose to ignore former policies, strategies and 
methods, in its aim to create a world of communism. The crux of the matter was to make the 
colonial question comprehensible and even logical enough for the communist movement to be able 
to support. 
 
This chapter is part one of two consecutive parts which focus on analysing the hierarchical 
relations of the Comintern apparatus (institutions and departments). Essentially, my primary aim is 
to discern how the Comintern implemented objectives such as control, focus and the defining of 
the colonial work of both the LAI and the communist parties in Europe.598 The terms above 
demonstrate how and why the relations and functions (and dysfunctions) between the centre – 
Moscow/Comintern headquarters – and the periphery – Berlin/the International Secretariat 
assumed a new phase after the Sixth Comintern Congress. This calls for the need, firstly, to 
elucidate the character and structure of the relations between the centre and periphery and, 
secondly, to evaluate the theoretical and practical ramifications of the colonial work at Comintern 
headquarters and in the national sections. According to Kuusinen at the congress, the communist 
parties had not “fully grasped” the important task of developing and supporting its colonial work. 
                                                                                                                                                          
in touch with the general line of affairs”, RGASPI 495/215/18, 167, Letter from Roy, Berlin, to R. P. Arnot, 
Moscow/Berlin, 17/12-1928. 
597 Kilbom remembered Münzenberg fondly, describing him as a genius in questions relating to organisation and  
propaganda. According to Kilbom, Münzenberg was one of the few capable men who actually achieved something in 
the Comintern, primarily due to his ability to predict which way the political current was shifting. In 1928, and after 
the Sixth International Comintern Congress, Kilbom visited Münzenberg in Berlin, where Münzenberg told Kilbom 
his idea of establishing an independent communist party in Germany. However, Münzenberg recognised that this 
would be an impossible task to realise, see Karl Kilbom, Cirkeln slutes, Stockholm, 1955, p.109. For a biography on 
Kilbom, see Lazitch 1986, pp.214-215. 
598 Arch Getty & Naumov 2010, p.96. Despite the fact that Getty and Naumov focus on different periods, the terms  
control, focus and defining are, by their semantic nature, useful as illustrations of how the Comintern attempted to 
correct and get the colonial work operational. Additionally, Brigitte Studer suggests in her analysis on Stalinization as 
a complex system of power relations, that the “exercise of power” through hierarchical structures was, until 1936-38, 
“effected by subtler means”, see Brigitte Studer, “Stalinization: Balance Sheet of a Complex Notion”, in LaPorte, 
Morgan and Worley (eds.), 2008, p.54. 
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Thus, this was a prerequisite which forced the parties to begin supporting organisations such as the 
LAI and the LDRN. This chapter focuses, therefore, on how the Comintern scrutinised and re-
assessed the colonial work of the European communist parties. Robin Page Arnot, the CPGB 
member and Comintern emissary, was the candidate Kuusinen instructed to evaluate and direct the 
Comintern’s colonial work. This was an agreement which also worked in the other direction, i.e. 
Arnot only answered to Kuusinen. This was a process which relegated the LAI and its 
International Secretariat to the role of bystander in this chapter. The reason for this is as follows: 
the methodological analysis of the empirical material has provided an understanding as to why the 
Comintern decided in 1928 to solve the existing problem of the colonial question in the communist 
parties. It is, therefore, relevant to emphasise the contextual milieu, i.e. the ideological and 
organisational setting in which the LAI re-structured itself. Furthermore, the colonial question was 
the focal point of two separate and parallel investigations at Comintern headquarters in 1929: 
firstly, Arnot’s investigation and secondly, the preparatory work for the second international LAI 
congress, the former having a binding effect on the latter. This chapter and the one following aim 
to confirm that the machinations at Comintern headquarters in 1928-29 determined how the 
hierarchy of relations at the International Secretariat linked itself together with both the national 
LAI sections and the anti-imperialist movement, and, more importantly, with the departments and 
individuals at Comintern headquarters in Moscow. 
      The Comintern and the LAI were both facing changes as a result of the ideological impact of 
the Sixth Comintern Congress. Interpreted in terms of utopia, and if one considers Richard Stites’ 
definition of “administrative utopia”, a thematic framework focusing on those “holding power”, 
the utopian strivings to turn the LAI into a mass organisation contradicted the aims of the 
hierarchy. By this I mean the character of the discipline and rationality of the administrative 
utopia, put forward by those holding power, i.e. the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters.599 
This scenario emerged at the Sixth Comintern Congress during the debate on the role and use of 
the sympathising organisations. Münzenberg complained of “the general neglect of work in non-
party organisations” under the umbrella of both the Comintern apparatus and the communist 
parties, stating that if this ignorance continued, it was possible to see the development of political 
opportunism in these organisations. The communist parties did not seem to understand that the 
sole purpose of the sympathising organisations was to “awaken the apathetic, to build bridges to 
non-party people” reluctant to join the communist party but, at the same time, expressing their 
                                               
599 Stites 1989, pp.19, 23-24. Stephen Kotkin argued against several of Stites' contentions and his interpretation of  
Stalin’s “administrative utopia”, stating that Stites had failed to acknowledge the co-existence of genuine enthusiasm 
with widespread coercion, see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995, 
pp.15-16. 
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sympathy towards the Soviet Union, Münzenberg stated. The international communist movement 
simply had to understand that these organisations both counteracted social democratic influence 
and found recruits for communism. Münzenberg referred to the Friends of the Soviet Union, the 
Red Front Fighters and the LAI as exceptional examples of the above. However, several of the 
congress delegates merely responded that the “abundance of such subsidiary organisations” was “a 
heavy burden on small [communist] parties”.600 
 
* 
  
Adapting to Ideology, and Chatto’s Network   
Münzenberg left Moscow and the Sixth International Comintern Congress before it was over. 
However, he left with the feeling that the question of the sympathising organisations was a 
sensitive topic. This did not prevent Münzenberg from introducing the rhetoric of “the new line” at 
the meeting of the LAI Executive in Berlin on 18-19 August. How did this find its expression? 
One evident sign was that, while the former ambition of the LAI Executive had been to find a 
long-term solution to the political and organisational issues, after the Sixth Comintern Congress, 
however, these decisions ended up becoming more like short-term agreements. For example, the 
political representation at the International Secretariat, previously agreed to include a proportional 
division between the representatives of the socialist, communist, trade union and national 
revolutionary movements at the Brussels LAI Executive meeting on 28-29 April 1928, was a 
decision Münzenberg wanted to change. For Chatto, however, this made it possible for him to 
strengthen both his network and the Indian question within the LAI. 
      Saklatvala, Maxton, Mme Duchêne, Ledebour, Lessing, Münzenberg and Chatto were present 
at the LAI Executive meeting in Berlin in August. According to a report in Labour Monthly and 
the summary by the RMdI (the Reich Ministry of the Interior), this meeting revealed 
Münzenberg’s intention to adapt the new policy of the Comintern to the LAI. As noted in Labour 
Monthly, the LAI approved of the “decisions and resolution on the colonial question at the 
Congress of the Third International”, which “correspond entirely to the aims and principles” of the 
organisation on the questions of China and India. During the discussion on the LSI, a split between 
the LAI Executive members became evident, particularly with regard to the statement that the LAI 
presented itself “not [as] a section of the Comintern, or of the Communist Party” and the 
challenging of the LSI to answer for its “service to imperialism”.601 According to the RMdI, 
                                               
600 Degras vol.II 1960, p.465. 
601 “INTERNATIONAL – Executive Meeting of the League against Imperialism”, in Labour Monthly, Vol.10, Number  
10, October 1928, London, pp.634-635. After the Berlin meeting, the LAI Executive released a resolution on the LSI 
and the Comintern on the colonial question, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/27, 41-42. 
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Maxton had not approved of Münzenberg’s harsh critique of the LSI, urging him to understand that 
the LAI depended on the support of organisations which were also affiliated with the LSI. 
Münzenberg allegedly replied that any future collaboration with organisations, parties or 
associations affiliated with the LSI, would be like embarking upon the wrong political road. The 
RMdI concluded that the dispute between these two leading characters was peculiar from the point 
of view that this was the first visible proof of the communist “circle” acting in a hostile manner 
towards the socialists.602 
      This remark and his ongoing debate with Maxton irritated Münzenberg, fearing that this would 
lead to a “deep crisis” in the British LAI Section. Apparently, a rumour was circulating that both 
A. J. Cook and Ellen Wilkinson were considering leaving the LAI. Thus, Münzenberg advocated 
the use of direct diplomacy to avoid any sudden change within the section.603 Babette Gross 
received Münzenberg's instruction to leave Berlin as soon as possible, and to visit the LAI office in 
London. On 13 November, Gross had a closed meeting with Rothstein, Saklatvala, Bridgeman and 
Maxton to discuss the “political arguments” and, more importantly, to find out whether Maxton 
really was a devoted anti-imperialist. According to Münzenberg’s report to Kuusinen and Arnot, 
Gross listened to how Maxton regretted putting forward the statement that the LAI depended on 
the support of the labour movement in Europe, promising Gross that he intended to “remain at any 
cost” on the LAI Executive. Gross’ mission to London was a success for Münzenberg, and it 
averted a potential crisis within the British LAI Section.604  
      The International Secretariat organised two public events in Berlin in August. The first took 
place at the “Lehrer-Vereinshaus” on Alexanderplatz on 20 August, where Saklatvala, the anti-
colonial activist and Indian nationalist Mohammed Ali, Pen-Bei of the All Chinese Labour 
Association, the representative of the Egyptian national revolutionary movement Abd El Mansir 
and Münzenberg all delivered speeches.605 The second event was of a different nature. Saklatvala 
and Münzenberg invited members of the pacifist association, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, to 
attend a meeting at the restaurant “Rheingold” on 26 August. The only tangible result of this 
                                               
602 SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/146, 72-73, 10, Liga gegen Imperialismus und koloniale Unterdrückung, RMdI, Berlin,  
September 1928. 
603 RGASPI 542/1/25, 45-46, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 12/11-1928. 
604 RGASPI 542/1/25, 52, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen & Arnot, Moscow, 22/11-1928.  Münzenberg  
kept sending letters to Kuusinen, informing him of the suspected ideological deviation of the British LAI Section, see 
fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 55, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow [arrived in Moscow 6/12-1928]. 
With Gross back in Berlin, the crisis was at an end. 
605 Additionally, the information to the members mentioned the “obvious duty” of distributing a minimum of ten  
membership cards in “circles that might show an interest for the LAI”, SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 107, 
Information “an unsere Mitglieder“, LAI International Secretariat, Berlin, 8/8-1928. 
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meeting was that some of the delegates visited the International Secretariat, e.g. Wissa Wassef Bey 
and Mohammed Sabri from Egypt, and Carl Lindhagen.606 
 
* 
 
Chatto’s Egocentric Network: The Origins of the Anti-Imperialist Hub 
Chatto’s position as “International Political Secretary” at the International Secretariat was an 
authoritative position within the LAI. In 1928, Chatto's primary focus was to re-organise the LAI 
network with an emphasis on individual contacts, and turn the LAI into a hub for anti-imperialist 
activists in Berlin, Europe and beyond. Having experienced the tremors and temporary isolation of 
the International Secretariat during the first half of 1928, characterised by Gibarti’s sudden 
resignation and the breach in communications with Comintern headquarters in Moscow, Chatto 
began the project of turning his egocentric network into reality.607  
      Chatto’s life and career as a devoted Indian nationalist and anti-colonial activist, and as a 
national revolutionary in the service of communism, is a topic covered in Barooah and Milton 
Israel’s studies. However, these studies do not present the dynamics of Chatto’s egocentric 
network in the context of the LAI. By re-constructing Chatto’s network in 1928-29, a 
transcontinental network emerges linking together India, Berlin and Moscow. The table below 
introduces the key actors in Chatto’s network, a structure which not only exclusively focused on 
Chatto; the table shows that some of the ties went beyond his remit. These ties nevertheless 
depended on the knowledge Chatto possessed, e.g. in shaping the anti-imperialist agenda of the 
Comintern. This was a precondition which existed particularly in relation to Chatto’s relations with 
Münzenberg and Nehru, the former being the link between the International Secretariat and both 
the Comintern and the KPD, with the latter trying to mobilise the activities of the LAI in India. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
606 RGASPI 542/1/27, 34-36, Report, Münzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow 28/8-1928. Chatto, Ella Windmüller  
and Otto Schudel attended this meeting. Furthermore, Babette Gross appeared as an accredited journalist for the A-I-Z, 
whereas Lehmann-Russbüldt of the League for Human Rights delivered a speech declaring his continued support of 
the colonial independence struggle. Founded in 1887, the Inter-Parliamentary Union wanted to stimulate a discussion 
on international conflicts on a governmental level. Similar organisations and institutional actors established at the end 
of the nineteenth century were, e.g. the Institute of International Law (1873), the International Peace Bureau (1891) 
and the Nobel Committee, see Davies 1996, p.874. 
607 The above discussion draws inspiration from Barry Wellman’s evaluation of network theory, which suggests that  
“egocentric (or personal) networks” strive to avoid confusion, as well as to define structural boundaries from the 
“standpoint of focal individuals”, see Wellman 1997, p.27. 
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Table 6.1: Chatto’s Egocentric Network, 1928-29  
 
 
Chatto perfected his egocentric network in 1928-29. Some of his contacts, e.g. with Bridgeman 
and Hatta, were realised in 1928, while his connection to Lindhagen could be traced back to the 
time Chatto was living in Stockholm in 1917-21. 
      India was the main challenge for the International Secretariat in 1928. Jhabwala's loneliness 
and the surveillance of the British security services symbolised the problematic scenario of 
distributing the LAI’s propaganda, and of sending money to India. The International Secretariat 
relied therefore on the services of Comintern emissaries, e.g. from the CPGB, to carry out 
missions in India. This was an arrangement Chatto wanted to change. Nevertheless, when the 
emissaries passed through Berlin en route to India, they received additional instructions from 
Chatto. For example, the case of the British journalist and CPGB member Hugh Lester 
Hutchinson, sent on a mission to India in 1928, tells the tale of how the scheme worked in 
practice. According to Haithcox, Hutchinson left London in September 1928 and stopped over in 
Berlin, where he visited the International Secretariat and met (most likely) Chatto before 
departing. On the other hand, as Münzenberg informed Kuusinen, a British “Comrade … [was] 
sent to India”. Arriving in Bombay, Hutchinson assumed the position as editor of the left-wing 
journal New Spark – a zealous allusion to Lenin’s journal Iskra – working together with Shushani 
Nambiar (Chatto’s sister), the two of them ending up having an affair.608 
      However, Shushani Nambiar was also married to the Indian journalist, A. C. N. Nambiar, 
Chatto’s close friend and collaborator who helped him organise Indian anti-colonial propaganda in 
                                               
608 Hugh Lester Hutchinson published Conspiracy at Meerut (Allen & Unwin, London, 1935), a tale of his adventures  
in India. During Haithcox's interview with Philip Spratt, he received details about Hutchinson and Nambiar’s “love 
affair” and about Hutchinson's editorial role at the New Spark. However, to verify Spratt's information, Haithcox 
consulted the papers of the Home Department, Government of India, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 45-46, Letter from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 12/11-1928; Haithcox 1971, 54, 308 (footnotes 51 & 52). 
Chatto, 
Berlin 
A. C. N. Nambiar, 
Berlin 
Nehru, India 
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Locarno 
Bridgeman, 
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Berlin 
Comintern, 
Moscow 
“The Indian Bureau”, 
Berlin, 1929 
KPD, 
Berlin 
Jhabwala, 
Bombay 
“Independence for 
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Berlin, an undertaking which was at odds with Roy’s work to unify the Indian nationalist 
movement in the city. In May 1923, Chatto provided both his sister and her husband with 
assistance to leave London and move to Berlin and, in February 1926, Nambiar attended the 
“Rathauskeller” conference, as well as the Brussels Congress in 1927.609 Aside from his personal 
connection and contact with Chatto, working as a correspondent for the pro-nationalist agency 
Free Press of India and a member of the All India Congress Committee (AICC), Nambiar also had 
an independent network “ready to respond to the instructions of AICC officials”.610 As Chatto was 
also the brother of the renowned poet Sarojini Naidu, Chatto agreed to act as protector and advisor 
for her son, M. J. S. Naidu. The Indian connections at the International Secretariat became evident 
in the summer of 1928, with the visit of the former leader of the INC, Srinivasa Iyengar, to Berlin. 
Prior to this, Iyengar had been in England, where he both attended and delivered a speech at the 
inaugural conference of the British LAI Section in London. In Berlin, Iyengar met Chatto, Sarojini 
Naidu and her son at the International Secretariat. The RKÜöO registered these meetings and 
suspected that the aim of Iyengar’s visit in Berlin was to meet Bolshevik officials at the Soviet 
consulate. For Sarojini Naidu, the purpose of her stopover in Berlin during the summer of 1928 
was to see whether her son was coping with his studies at Humboldt University, but also to work 
with her brother Chatto at the International Secretariat, the RKÜöO concluded.611 
      The major achievement of Chatto and Nambiar was the establishment of the “Berlin Indian 
Students’ Information Bureau” (the “Indian Bureau”) in Berlin in February 1929. The “Indian 
Bureau” was a sub-section of the International Secretariat, a result of the interactionism between 
Chatto, Nambiar and Nehru, the latter having convinced the INC to give its moral consent and 
provide financial support to the LAI. In fact, the “Indian Bureau” had a historic tie to “The Indian 
News Service and Information Bureau” which Chatto had established after having been deported 
from Sweden in 1921 and ending up in Berlin. In 1929, the primary aim of the “Indian Bureau” 
was to recruit Indian anti-colonial activists and students in Berlin. One year later, on 5 November 
1930, Chatto sent a report to the Eastern Secretariat entitled “Courses for Colonial Students in 
Berlin”, a document Piatnitsky also consulted, which included a description of the purpose and 
aim of the “Indian Bureau”: 
                                               
609 Nambiar and Chatto had, for example, organised propaganda against British imperialism by publishing papers: the  
anti-colonial Indo-German Commercial Review and its successor, the Industrial and Trade Review for India, in 1923-
24, publications which also competed with Roy’s pro-nationalist publication, Vanguard, in Berlin, see Barooah 2004, 
pp.189-190. 
610 Israel 1994, p.260. 
611 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/67113, 112, Reichskommissar: Vermerk: Aus privater Quelle, Berlin, August, 1928. In the  
summer of 1928, Iyengar visited Moscow and met Stalin; however, whether he attended the Sixth International 
Comintern Congress is not known, see Overstreet & Windmiller 1956, pp.112-113. Sarojini Naidu was a 
“distinguished female member” of the INC; see Haithcox, 1971, p.54. The above is also introduced and discussed in 
the article, Fredrik Petersson, “Hub of the Anti-Imperialist Movement: The League against Imperialism and Berlin, 
1925 – 33”, in Interventions: International Journal of Post-Colonial Studies (Taylor & Francis, 2013). 
242 
 
In connection with the Indian students’ work we would like to draw special attention to the 
importance of the Indian Bureau which was created in February 1929 by the National 
Congress at Chatto’s suggestion and placed by the Congress under the control of Nambiar 
and Chatto. We have found it extremely useful as a centre for recruiting students, for finding 
out the best and most reliable among them [added by hand], to take up the question of 
sending literature [added by hand] and also for obtaining journals, books and other literature 
on India, which are not directly available without payment by the League.612  
The “Indian Bureau” advocated a radical approach towards British imperialism and the Indian 
question, which resonated with Chatto’s vision of constructing a viable channel for anti-imperialist 
activism. For Nehru, the bureau represented a channel through which to improve relations with 
both the LAI and with the anti-imperialist movement in Europe. In 1928, after Nehru had returned 
to India, politically invigorated after his experience of the Brussels Congress and the nature of the 
anti-colonial movement in Europe, Nehru assumed the role as the “leading advocate of […] 
international connections for India’s freedom fighters” in India. Hence, the LAI and Chatto were 
decisive links to radical, nationalist and anti-colonial movements in the West for Nehru. In October 
1928, Nehru and Iyengar formed the anti-colonial association, Independence for India League, in 
India; an organisational initiative which evidently made Chatto “particularly happy” as it was more 
or less a blueprint of the anti-imperialist agenda supported by the LAI. However, at the end of the 
day, Nehru also had an independent agenda, according to which he aimed to use the LAI for his 
own purposes. For example, the LAI’s transcontinental network was a perfect vehicle to use and 
with which to “participate in orchestrated letter-writing campaigns to change views among 
Congressmen [INC representatives in India and Great Britain] as well as outsiders in the direction 
of a further radicalisation of the movement”.613 For a short period, the Independence for India 
League was one of the few existing LAI channels into India. However, in India, some people 
perceived the association as a hostile actor and, therefore, chose to ignore it entirely. According to 
Motilal Nehru, as noted in a letter to theosophist Annie Besant in India, “I have no fear of this 
group” and it would “be easy to dispose of their colourable imitations by simply leaving them to 
stew in their own juice”.614 
      Chatto’s connections in Europe were of an intimate nature. As Hatta had decided to establish a 
more personal relation to the International Secretariat in 1928, Chatto acted as his contact and 
                                               
612 To avoid any linguistic misinterpretation from German to English, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, Courses for  
Colonial Students in Berlin, author: Chatto, Berlin, 5/11-1930. For the original, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 38-42, 
Kurse für koloniale Studenten in Berlin, Chatto, Berlin, Piatnitsky [?], Moscow, 5/11-1930. The date stamped on the 
document: “6.NOV.1930”, informs us of the date of its arrival at Comintern headquarters in Moscow. 
613 Israel 1994, p.256-259; Barooah 2004, p.259. 
614 Letter from Motilal Nehru, Allahabad, to Annie Besant, Adyar, Madras, 30/9-1928, in Nehru 1958, pp.63-67. 
243 
 
receiver of intelligence on the PI, once Hatta had resigned from the Dutch LAI Section in June 
1928. However, this did not imply that he chose to ignore the development of the section in the 
Netherlands, informing Chatto, for example, of how the “fanatical” behaviour of the CPH had 
destroyed the section.615 Hatta also performed a service for Chatto by recruiting anti-colonial 
activists in the Netherlands who seemed open to influence and suited to receiving political 
education. According to Münzenberg, commenting on 20 January 1929 to Kuusinen on Hatta’s 
efforts in finding candidates, Hatta “is very close to us”.616 A particular case further illustrates this 
collaboration between Chatto and Hatta. When Hatta notified Chatto of his intentions to resign as 
leader of the PI in January 1929, the candidate selected to assume the leadership, an Indonesian 
law student at the University of Leiden, Abdullah Sukur, had to receive an in-depth education on 
the colonial question under the tutelage of the LAI in Berlin. According to Hatta, Chatto should 
accept the “still young” Sukur to come to Berlin and receive a thorough education: 
I judge it necessary that he comes to Berlin to undergo a “practice school” in our bureau. I 
hope to send him on the 10th of October. Because he cannot expende [sic] more than Mk. 100 
(60 Gulden) per month, please let me know as soon as possible, if this sum is sufficient for 
living in Berlin. Can you find a cheap but rather good boarding-house for him […] on 
payment of Mk. 85 a 90 per month?617     
Hence, this case suggests that the International Secretariat was functioning both as a hub and as an 
educational centre for inexperienced anti-colonial activists in Berlin and beyond. 
 
* 
    
The Indian Debacle and the LAI's Turning Point 
Chatto’s egocentric network represented one of the LAI’s transcontinental communication links 
outside Germany. However, through the attempts and manoeuvres of the Comintern emissaries, the 
LAI made an effort to establish itself in India at the end of 1928: at the annual INC conference in 
Calcutta. Scheduled to convene in December, Nehru sent a request in October to the International 
Secretariat asking Chatto to send “a fraternal delegate” to the conference.618 Nehru’s letter arrived 
                                               
615 Members of the Dutch LAI Section and the PI had a meeting in Amsterdam on 19 November, to discuss the  
conflict, see RGASPI 542/1/29, 77, Letter from Hatta, The Hague, to Chatto, Berlin, 27/9-1928; RGASPI 542/1/29, 
83. 
616 RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 20/1-1929. 
617 Whether Sukur ever travelled to Berlin to undergo “political training” is unknown. Rudolf Mrázek’s study, Sjahrir.  
Politics and Exile in Indonesia (SEAP Publications, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1994, p.66), indicates that Sukur 
became “duly elected” as the leader of the PI in 1929. However, Mrázek does not mention that Hatta wanted to resign 
from the PI, a point of view Hatta had introduced to Chatto in 1928, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/29, 77, Letter from Hatta, 
The Hague, to Chatto, Berlin, 27/9-1928. 
618 Nehru wondered whether the International Secretariat would have the courtesy to “convey” the invitation to every  
organisation “affiliated or associated” to the LAI, RGASPI 542/1/29, 78, Letter from Nehru to the International 
Secretariat, Berlin, 9/10-1928. 
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in Berlin on 11 November (perhaps due to the interception of the British security services in 
India), thus, Münzenberg asked Chatto for advice on how to proceed, while Kuusinen was 
assigned to find a candidate in Moscow to travel to Calcutta as a representative of the LAI. 
Münzenberg made it clear that he simply did not have the time or energy to find a candidate in 
Berlin, as he was mainly preoccupied with the ZK KPD and with the Friends of the Soviet 
Union.619 
      In Moscow, Kuusinen instructed the WPA member Jack W. Johnstone, who had also attended 
the Sixth International Comintern Congress, to travel to India as the LAI representative and to 
deliver “a programme speech” at the INC conference. After the mission, Johnstone had to send a 
report to the Eastern Secretariat, with a focus on the INC’s attitude vis-à-vis the LAI.620  
      From the outset, Johnstone’s mission to India turned into a disaster. On 22 November, 
Johnstone arrived in Calcutta only to have the local police strictly monitor his whereabouts in the 
city. Nevertheless, Johnstone managed to attend and deliver his speech at the INC conference on 
18-20 December in Jharia, Bihar. However, after having given his speech, the police arrested 
Johnstone outside the conference hall and placed him in custody. After having been incarcerated 
for sixteen days in an Indian prison, British colonial authorities put Johnstone on a British ship 
destined for Genoa, Italy. The farce continued when the ship docked in Genoa, where Italian port 
authorities arrested Johnstone. Johnstone’s tragedy and ordeal nevertheless provided the LAI with 
renewed impetus to organise a propaganda campaign against the legal systems of both the British 
and Italian authorities. According to Pressedienst, Johnstone’s “strange imprisonment” was a 
symptom of the oppressive techniques the “imperialist nations” repeatedly put into practice against 
both the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement. In the USA, the AAAIL organised public 
meetings in both New York and Washington, while representatives of the British LAI Section 
introduced a discussion on Johnstone’s arrest in the House of Commons. Once Italian authorities 
had released Johnstone from prison, he travelled back to Moscow where, in 1931, he assumed a 
position at the ECCI Caribbean Bureau.621  
                                               
619 RGASPI 542/1/25, 45-46, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 12/11-1928. 
620 The reason why Kuusinen delegated Robin Page Arnot the task of nominating the LAI representative was a logical  
decision, particularly since Arnot worked at the “II. Sektion” at the Eastern Secretariat, a sub-department in charge of 
the India question at Comintern headquarters, see fol. RGASPI 495/6/16, 30, Vorschlag an das Polit-Sekretariat für die 
Zusammensetzung der Länder-Sekretariat, Moscow, September, 1928. For a biography of Jack W. Johnstone, see 
Jeifets, Jeifets, & Huber (eds.) 2004, p.160; RGASPI 542/1/25, 78-79, Confidential letter to Münzenberg from R Page 
Arnot in Moscow, 20/12-1928; TNA KV2/1783, Intercepted letter, Arnot to Spratt, 1929. 
621 Spratt met Johnstone in India and told him “what an opportunity you have got to make a name for yourself in the  
International”, see Spratt 1955, p.41; Pressedienst, Nr. 4, 7/2-1929; Haithcox 1971, p.106. Paul Crough, the secretary 
of the New York Section of the AAAIL, feared that Johnstone would face execution after his arrest in India. This was 
the impetus to establish “a mass protest movement” in the USA, represented by the AAAIL, the International Labour 
Defence, Trade Union Educational League and the ANCL. Moreover, this support campaign also provided an 
opportunity to broadcast propaganda against the war threat and in defence of the Soviet Union, see fol. RGASPI 
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The debacle of Johnstone’s mission to India reflects the problems the LAI was facing in its efforts 
to establish itself in India. This episode was also somewhat of a watershed for the LAI as an 
international actor on the public, political scene. For Münzenberg, Johnstone’s adventure only 
confirmed the fear that the LAI was unable to establish itself as an organisation in the colonial and 
semi-colonial countries. Despite contacts with organisations and individuals in Egypt, Palestine, 
both North and South Africa and Latin America, Münzenberg informed Kuusinen that these 
contacts were of an insufficient character as long as the LAI could not carry out the simplest of 
anti-imperialist activity, e.g. either distribute anti-imperialist propaganda or organise public 
meetings. Thus, the International Secretariat could only become efficient and productive if its 
work focused more on securing contacts with individuals rather than organisations in the 
colonies.622 Münzenberg’s conclusion was a confirmation of Chatto’s 1928 vision, i.e. of turning 
the LAI into a hub and educational centre for the anti-imperialist movement, an insight spurred on 
by the meagre results of Johnstone’s misadventure, as well as the fiasco of having sent Mardy 
Jones as a “one-man” delegation to the Dutch-Indies in 1927. These two missions further 
complicated the LAI’s efforts to establish itself outside Europe. 
  
* 
 
The Reversed Trojan Horse 
 
So the League faces a new period, the second period, a period not of demonstration and 
betrayal on the part of certain elements, but the second period must be an organised, 
systematic campaign against imperialism. […] the League must have a strong workers’ and 
peasants’ basis, a strong trade union basis. We must draw wide masses into the League. […] 
in the second phase of the second period of the League we must be for MILITANT 
STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM. 
    James W. Ford, Cologne, 16/1-1929 
 
The Comintern’s “new line” had a reversed Trojan horse effect within the LAI, characterised by 
political rhetoric which rejected political associations with both non-communist individuals and 
organisations. According to the mythology of the Trojan horse, a strategy aimed at infiltrating the 
                                                                                                                                                          
515/1/1840, 1, Letter from Paul Crough, secretary in New York, to all branches of the AAAIL, organisers and 
affiliated organisations, 3/1-1929. 
622 RGASPI 542/1/25, 45-46, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 12/11-1928. Chatto was in  
regular contact with La Guma in South Africa, and the ECCI South American Secretariat in Buenos Aires. 
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bastion of the enemy from within, for the LAI, the Comintern’s policy change questioned its 
agenda and very existence.623 In Cologne, at the meeting of the LAI Executive on 15-16 January 
1929, the reversed Trojan Horse scenario emerged as a political reality within the LAI. In the 
words of the Profintern delegate and WPA member James W. Ford (1893 – 1957), who at the 
meeting told the LAI Executive that the LAI was facing “a new period” of radicalism and needed, 
therefore, to reinforce its struggle against the “betrayal on the part of certain elements”, his 
statement nevertheless indicated a split. According to Ford, the LAI had to make the leap from 
demonstration to militancy.624 Ford's aggressive rhetoric was particularly aimed at the British trade 
unionist and general secretary of the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) A. J. Cook, as 
well as Maxton, accusing both of them of harbouring reformist tendencies – “Cookism and 
Maxtonism”. In Ford’s report to the ECCI Negro Bureau, he concluded that: 
It is clear, however, that the League is dominated by the reformists. In the future, if we are to 
pursue and carry out our new line, especially at the World Congress of the League we must 
begin immediately to mobilise our forces and bring large masses of workers and peasants, 
especially of the colonies, who are under our influence, into this congress. We must begin 
immediately to prepare organisationally and ideologically.625  
Ford’s conclusion was a re-phrasing of the Comintern’s “new line”, an observation which also 
served the purpose of affirming the correctness of Kuusinen’s colonial “theses”. By defining Cook 
and Maxton as defenders of a reformist policy, “Cookism and Maxtonism”, this also stigmatised 
them as political degenerates, an act which indicated the beginning of a split between the different 
political camps within the LAI. However, Ford had only adopted the Comintern's lingua franca 
and endorsed political discourse, which sponsored verbal attacks against “reformists” as justifiable 
political targets.626 For Münzenberg, the LAI Executive meeting had been a “delightful” event 
                                               
623 The Trojan Horse metaphor is not a bold suggestion I must argue. Historian David McKnight uses this analogy in  
his study of the origins of the Cold War, especially in the context of when the Comintern introduced its Popular Front 
policy in 1935, see David McKnight, Espionage and the Roots of the Cold War. The Conspiratorial Heritage, Frank 
Cass Publishers, New York, 2002, pp.153-154. 
624 RGASPI 495/155/70, 74-76, Copy of speech, delivered by J. W. Ford at the meeting of the EC of the LAI in  
Cologne, ECCI Negro Bureau, Moscow, 16/1-1929. In April 1932, Ford concluded in his autobiography (filed in his 
personal file in the Comintern Archive) that he “formally entered the revolutionary movement in 1925” by joining the 
ANLC in Chicago. At the Fourth International Profintern Congress in Moscow in 1928, Ford was “elected as a 
member of the Executive Bureau and charged with developing the work of the Negro Bureau of the RILU”, see fol. 
RGASPI 495/261/6747, 67-71. See Weiss (2011) on Ford’s work to prepare the “First International Conference of 
Negro Workers”. For a biography on Ford, see Jeifets, Jeifets, & Huber (eds.), 2004, p.113. 
625 RGASPI 495/155/70, 62-68, Report from J. W. Ford to the ECCI, Moscow, January, 1929. For A. J. Cook, see  
Ralph H. Desmarais & John Saville, Dictionary of Labour Biography, Volume III, Bellamy & Saville (eds.), 
Macmillan Press, London, 1976, pp.38-49. 
626 According to Kuusinen’s colonial “theses”: “the formation of any kind of bloc between the communist party and  
the national-reformist opposition must be rejected; this does not exclude temporary agreements and the co-ordination 
of activities in particular anti-imperialist actions [underlining by author], provided that the activities of the bourgeois 
opposition can be utilized to develop the mass movement, […] Of course, in this work the communists must at the 
same time carry on the most relentless ideological and political struggle against bourgeois nationalism and against the 
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where the communists for the first time had been in the majority. In his report to Kuusinen, 
Münzenberg described how the LAI Executive meeting had almost functioned as a means of 
delineating an ideological divide between the communist and non-communist members on the LAI 
Executive. Furthermore, according the analysis by LaPorte and Morgan of the Stalinist leadership 
cult, which is comparable to the context outlined above, the communist strategy and behavioural 
scheme followed the logic of “a little like ‘war communism’ in its fantasy of a tabula rasa on 
which a revolutionary party or society could be established”.627 Therefore, Cook and Maxton 
represented the enemy, in the flesh, the main opponents against the communists in the rush to 
secure domination over particular issues, which, in the case of the LAI, was the trade union 
question. Additionally, the LAI meeting in Cologne also witnessed how the International 
Secretariat celebrated both the recent affiliation of the Profintern as collective members and having 
had a Profintern delegation attend its session. This Profintern delegation was the result of 
Münzenberg’s having requested that Kuusinen see whether it would be possible to send a “large 
Profintern delegation” to Cologne, which would put the trade union question at the top of the 
agenda.628 Kuusinen presented this request to the Political Secretariat, which endorsed the decision 
to instruct the Profintern Executive Committee to prepare a theoretical guideline on the 
“precarious” trade union question and to provide the LAI “kom.Fraktion” with this material prior 
to the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne.629 
 
* 
 
The Litmus Test: the LAI Executive Meeting in Cologne 15-16 January 1929  
The LAI Executive meeting in Cologne, which would expose the LAI as a fragile organisation, 
was the prelude to the second international LAI congress (later known as the Frankfurt Congress). 
Attending the meeting off the record, Robin Page Arnot observed how the colonial question as a 
                                                                                                                                                          
slightest signs of its influence inside the labour movement”, see “Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial 
and Semi-Colonial Countries Adopted by the Sixth Comintern Congress”, taken from Degras vol.II, 1960, p.541. 
627 RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 20/1-1929; Norman LaPorte &  
Kevin Morgan, “’Kings among their subjects’? Ernst Thälmann, Harry Pollitt and the Leadership Cult as 
Stalinization”, LaPorte, Morgan & Worley (eds.) 2008, p.138. 
628 RGASPI 542/1/25, 45-46, Letter from Münzenberg to Kuusinen in Moscow, 12/11-1928. On October 17,  
Münzenberg stated in a letter to Heimo that the International Secretariat had invited trade unions in England, Norway, 
Finland and Egypt. However, in order to define a strategy on the trade union question at the LAI Executive meeting, 
Münzenberg wanted to hold a “closed pre-conference” meeting with representatives from British, French, German, 
Belgian and Italian communist parties. The initial idea had been to convene the LAI Executive in either Brussels or in 
Paris on 1-2 December; however, Münzenberg’s commitments to the ZK KPD, and the Friends of the Soviet Union 
delayed the meeting for “at least one month”, opting finally for Cologne, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/61, 246, Letter from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 17/10-1928; TNA HO 144 10693, Secret report, analysis of the LAI by MI5, 
year: 1929. 
629 The Political Secretariat instructed the International Secretariat to avoid holding the LAI Executive meeting on the  
same date as the Tenth Party Day of the CPGB (19 January 1929, Bermondsey), RGASPI 495/3/61, 90a-91, Protocol 
Nr.9, Polit-Secretariat of the ECCI, 26/10-1928. 
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topic was being treated by the socialist and communist movements in Europe, an experience which 
confirmed the need to carry out a vigorous investigation of the European communist parties’ 
colonial work. Additionally, Fimmen, Mme Duchêne, Cook, S. O. Davies, Maxton, Bridgeman, 
Alex Gossip, the secretary of the LAI bureau in London and Arnot’s wife Olive Budden, 
Saklatvala, Pollitt, the leader of the Arab National Congress Suri, the Chinese Ju Fei, Hatta, 
Goldschmidt, Chatto, Münzenberg, Arnot and the Profintern delegation (Melnitschansky, KPD 
member Fritz Heckert and Ford) had arrived in Cologne to attend the LAI Executive meeting.630 
For the British LAI Section, the LAI Executive meeting was a tedious episode. In Arnot’s report to 
Kuusinen, the journey from London to Cologne had confirmed for the members of the section the 
authorities’ “increasingly antagonistic attitude towards the Liga [LAI]”, as Maxton, Bridgeman 
and Saklatvala were “held up by Belgian police” en route to Cologne. Once the session had ended, 
and travelling back to London after having docked in Dover, a “special commissar” of the British 
port authorities subjected Budden to a thorough interrogation, asking her about her connections 
with the LAI.631 
      The Cologne meeting followed a logic determined by the communists. Münzenberg opened the 
session, declaring that he was proud of the “proletarian participation” which the Profintern 
represented: 
The Executive Committee of the LAI sincerely salutes the representatives of the Profintern, 
present at this meeting of the LAI Executive. The Executive Committee considers the 
collective affiliation of the Profintern with the LAI as a step [illegible] start for the 
development of the anti-imperialist movement in the world.632  
Münzenberg also outlined the LAI’s ideological direction since the Brussels Congress. Firstly, the 
LAI had managed to establish a firm organisational structure and, secondly, the LAI was no longer 
a forum for intellectuals, in fact the LAI was a representative for proletarian organisations and 
trade unions.633 This argument was a reference to the agenda for the session which, according to 
Arnot’s notes, focused on the “relation of the anti-imperialist League to the trade unions on an 
international scale and in semi-colonial and colonial countries”, the “position of the liberation 
struggle and position of trade unions in the Arab countries especially in Palestine”, the “suggestion 
of an Anti-Imperialist World Congress in Summer 1929”, “India, Afghanistan” and the anti-
                                               
630 Rivera, Nehru, Baldwin, Chedli and Marteaux did not attend the meeting due to geographical or other reasons, see  
fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 20/1-1929. 
631 RGASPI 542/1/32, 18, Letter from R. P. Arnot, Cologne, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 16/1-1929. For the British LAI  
delegation, see TNA HO 144 10693, Secret report, analysis of the LAI, MI5, year: 1929; Internet:  
< http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1929/jan/31/customs-examination-papers-and-documents >; 
Pressedienst, Internationales Sekretariats, Berlin, Nr.4, 7/2-1929, p.1. 
632 RGASPI 542/1/32, 3, Begrüssungsadresse für die russische Delegation [Profintern] an der EK-Sitzung der LAI in  
Köln, 14/1-1929. 
633 SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/151, 125-129, Liga gegen Imperialismus und koloniale Unterdrückung, 1929. 
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imperialist “Youth”. This agenda also proved to both the RK and the RKÜöO the necessity of 
continuing to monitor the activities of the LAI in Germany.634 
      The trade union question was the ideological litmus test for the LAI. “The whole thing […] 
was a clash with the reformists”, according to Ford, which had established a fear among “our 
comrades” that the non-communists “were looking for an opportunity to withdraw from the 
League”.635 Ford took charge of the discussion, while Maxton refused to provide any response to 
the accusation of being a “reformist”. However, Cook urged the LAI Executive to “be realistic as 
well as Marxist”, suggesting the constructive option to “link the trade unions with the LAI”, an 
initiative guided by “the spirit of internationalism”. In fact, Cook believed that the attendance of 
“Russian comrades” in Cologne was evidence that it was possible to unify “Communists and 
reformists … under one objective”: to turn the LAI into “a real international organisation”. The 
communists rejected Cook’s argument with contempt. Pollitt accused Cook of not having any 
“faith in the masses”, concluding that the LAI faced the challenge of “harnessing” the trade 
unions, as well as developing a “consistent leadership” within the LAI Executive capable of 
carrying out LAI resolutions in practice.636 Melnitschansky continued by categorising every word 
from Cook as “the purest nonsense”, demanding that the LAI Executive understand that the “class 
struggle” was the only method at hand to prevent war. Yet, Melnitschansky gave an assurance that 
the Profintern had no intention of turning the LAI into a “Red International”. Heckert developed 
Melnitschansky’s argument and concluded that the LAI had to increase its propaganda with a 
focus on the “overthrow of Imperialism and the liberation of the colonial peoples”. MI5 observed 
in a secret report that the discussions had gotten out of hand at the meeting, whereupon 
Münzenberg had had to step in and end the intense debate by explaining that the LAI was neither a 
communist, socialist nor a social democratic movement, participation based solely on one’s 
support for its political agenda.637 Münzenberg’s argument was, however, a contradiction. 
                                               
634 RGASPI 542/1/32, 14, Agenda, Cologne, 15-16/1-1929 [compiled and sent by R. P. Arnot to Kuusinen]; SAPMO- 
BA ZPA R1507/151, 125-129, Liga gegen Imperialismus und koloniale Unterdrückung, 1929. According to the 
Reichskommissar, the development of the anti-imperialist movement in Latin America had also been  discussed at the 
LAI Executive meeting, based on a report from the “Professor”, Alfons Goldschmidt, who had recently arrived in 
Germany after a trip to Latin America. Goldschmidt also published the impressions of his journey in A-I-Z and 
Weltbühne. The RK included an assessment of how Goldschmidt's activities in Mexico had been a topic of interest. In 
reference to a published article [unknown source and author], the RK realised that some people perceived 
Goldschmidt as an “agent voyageur” in Mexico and an avid supporter of Bolshevism. Hence, the RK suspected that 
Goldschmidt’s Latin American journey was a mission sanctioned by the Comintern. 
635 RGASPI 495/155/70, 62-68, Report from J. W. Ford to the ECCI, Moscow, January 1929. This report has been  
found in fond 534/3/450, 53-59, Report on Trip in Interest of the Work of the International Trade Union Committee of  
Negro Workers of the RILU and the Negro Bureau of the Comintern and the Meeting of the Executive Committee of  
the League Against Imperialism (Ford) [January 1929; written 14.2.29?]. 
636 RGASPI 542/1/32, 19-21, Report (R. P. Arnot) on trade union question, Cologne, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 15/1-1929. 
637 TNA HO 144 10693, Secret report, analysis of the LAI by MI5, year: 1929; RGASPI 495/155/70, 62-68, Report  
from J. W. Ford to the ECCI, Moscow, January, 1929. Münzenberg argued that the British LAI Section was “very 
apathetic”; however, if the section followed the “example of the Mexican comrades [who had established] 30 
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According to its adopted resolution on the trade union question at the session “Die 
Gewerkschaften und die Liga gegen Imperialismus”, the LAI urged every trade union in Europe to 
understand that the “daily struggle” against imperialism was in essence based on “class character”. 
Also, that “class-aware” trade unions’ should establish connections with similar revolutionary 
organisations in the colonies, a step which would “preserve” the independence of the anti-
imperialist movement in order to avoid any influence of “national and bourgeoisie parties”.638 
      Convinced that the trade union debate had produced no negative impact on the LAI, 
Münzenberg told Kuusinen that the Cologne meeting seemed to have strengthened the belief 
amongst the “bourgeoisie and social democratic circles” within the LAI that the organisation was a 
non-party organisation, rather than “a section of the Comintern”. Accordingly, Münzenberg 
explained how Bridgeman and Maxton had fallen for the illusion that the LAI Executive was a 
forum for “open political” discussions,639 while branding Cook, “the Englishman”, to be no longer 
of “any use”, telling Kuusinen that other candidates might as well assist in the work to establish 
LAI sections in India, the Arab region and other colonial countries. Fimmen, however, experienced 
the Cologne meeting as a disappointment, particularly the behaviour of the Profintern delegation, 
which led to him telling Münzenberg that he was considering resigning from his position as vice-
deputy. However, if Fimmen continued down this path, Arnot told Kuusinen, the LAI would have 
to launch a political campaign against Fimmen.640  
      After Cook had returned to England, disturbed by the callous atmosphere of the Cologne 
meeting and suffering from poor health, he had to confront an investigation initiated by the 
MFGB. In June 1929, Labour Monthly published the article, “Cook’s Break with the 
Revolutionary Working Class”, accusing Cook of treachery. This article included a statement from 
Cook, responding to the critique as being “false” and misrepresentative of “my actions and 
opinions”, explaining how he did not understand how the communists interpreted the message of 
socialism. In conclusion, Cook stated, “Comradeship means something higher and nobler than the 
example set by the British Communist Party in their campaign of personalities, hate, vilification 
and destruction”.641 
                                                                                                                                                          
organisations of the League”, this would alter the level of anti-imperialist activism in the British Empire, rather than 
just having a movement located exclusively in London, see RGASPI 542/1/32, 22, Report of the EC of the LAI, 
Tuesday Session/Latin America. 
638 SCA CL Collection, volume 130, “Resolution, Köln. Die Gewerkschaften und die Liga gegen Imperialismus“, 15- 
16/1-1929. 
639 RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 20/1-1929. Pressedienst  
published the LAI's resolutions on India, the Arab region and Youth on 7 February, see Pressedienst, Nr. 4, 7/2-1929. 
640 RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Report from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 20/1-1929. For Arnot’s idea, see  
fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Letter/report, probably written and signed by Willi Münzenberg, Berlin 20/1-1929; 
RGASPI 542/1/30, 5-7, Handwritten letter from R. Page Arnot to Otto Kuusinen in Moscow, 29/1-1929. Arnot told 
Kuusinen to contact the International Secretariat if he wanted a copy of A. J. Cook’s speech in Cologne. 
641 A. J. Cook, “Cook’s Break with the Revolutionary Working Class”, in Labour Monthly, Volume 11, June 1929,  
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Deceit as a Strategy of Control: From London to Moscow, Berlin and Back Again… 
The trade union question had an immediate political effect on the LAI. Most importantly, the 
International Secretariat had to reinforce its control over the British LAI Section. Bridgeman was 
nevertheless enthusiastic and, after arriving back in London, he published an article on both the 
LAI and the trade union question in the British socialist paper, the Manchester Guardian. 
However, this article caused irritation and was not appreciated. According to Arnot, neither the 
British LAI Section nor the Colonial Commission of the CPGB had sanctioned Bridgeman to 
publish this article, and Arnot accused Bridgeman of having caused “considerable trouble”, which 
had infuriated him. One reason for Arnot’s irritation was that Bridgeman had stated that if the 
British trade unions followed the example set by the LAI, they would be making a “big concession 
to the Russians”. In an attempt to coerce Bridgeman and Cook, Arnot summoned them to a 
meeting in London on 21 January, only to hear that neither of them appreciated the “obvious” 
communist dominance within the LAI. Arnot decided to inform Münzenberg of this attitude, which 
constituted a threat in the “fight against imperialism”, and that Bridgeman’s “misinterpretation” 
required correction.642 Pollitt sided, of course, with Arnot in this case, telling Münzenberg that the 
Colonial Commission of the CPGB had decided not to publish the trade union resolution, 
recommending that the International Secretariat act swiftly in order to put an end to Bridgeman’s 
“wrongful report” by sending him “the correct version” of the trade union resolution.643 The crux 
of this matter being that, at this point in time, no “correct version” of the trade union resolution 
even existed. 
      On 8 February, the Political Secretariat in Moscow evaluated the results of both the LAI 
Executive meeting and the trade union question, deciding to correct Bridgeman at all costs and 
resolving to use the International Secretariat as the key to finding a solution to this problem, 
preferably by releasing its “correct version”. However, the International Secretariat could not act 
before the “speedy publication of Comrade Melnitschansky’s speech at the Plenum of the League 
in Great Britain, the USSR and other countries” had created some kind of political impact. The 
Political Secretariat's scheme was an idea characterised by intentional deceit from the very 
beginning, in which it had to appear as though Bridgeman and the British LAI Section had 
                                                                                                                                                          
Number 6, pp.342-348. The LAI Executive resolved at its next meeting (Amsterdam, 13-14 April 1929) to remove 
Cook from the agenda of the second international LAI congress, explaining, “representatives of affiliated organisations 
should have first place and, since Cook was present in January only by virtue of his personal position which he has 
since abandoned...”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/32, 49-51. For the investigation against Cook, see Desmarais & Saville 
vol.III 1976, p.44. Cook passed away on 2 November, 1931. 
642 RGASPI 542/1/30, 8, Letter from Arnot, London, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 28/1-1929; RGASPI 542/1/30, 5-7,  
[Handwritten] letter from R. Page Arnot, London, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 29/1-1929. 
643 RGASPI 542/1/30, 9, Letter from Pollitt, London, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 29/1- 1929. 
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received the correct version of the trade union resolution from the International Secretariat, while 
this was an idea contrived by the Political Secretariat. Münzenberg attended the meeting in 
Moscow on 8 February and was, therefore, aware of the Political Secretariat’s intentions, and he, 
along with Melnitschansky, Tom Bell and Petrovsky as leader, was instructed to write a declaration 
that had to avoid using “reformist expressions”.644 On 16 February, the Political Secretariat 
endorsed the “correct version”, “Resolution über die Tagung der Exekutive der antiimperialistische 
Liga”, instructing the International Secretariat to publish the resolution, and to send a personal 
copy to Bridgeman, with an emphasis on the following statement: 
The Executive Committee of the League is guided in its work by the decision of the 
Inaugural Congress of the League (February 1927) which clearly formulated the general line 
of struggle against imperialism and colonial oppression and the method of active aid to the 
defence of the revolutionary movement in the colonial, semi-colonial and subordinate 
countries […] The work of the League has been crowned with success in the sense that the 
trade union organisations of a number of countries, including the Trade Union Federations of 
the USSR [Profintern] and India, have joined the League. […] The League will consider it 
its duty to criticise and expose the activity of the trade union organisations directed in overt 
or covert form towards the support of imperialist plunder and colonial oppression […] The 
League will be most critical and will advance the most determined demands in relation to the 
unions belonging to the League.645 
Accordingly, Bridgeman had to believe that the original aim and purpose of the LAI remained 
firm, i.e. to be a supporter of the struggle against imperialism and colonial oppression, although 
this now also entailed the obligation to criticise and expose the opponents and supporters of the 
“imperialist system”.646 For the LAI, the trade union question and the ensuing debate in Cologne 
exposed the fragile non-political character of the LAI, confirming a split between the communist 
and non-communist members.  
 
* 
 
 
                                               
644 RGASPI 495/3/89, 365, Protocol, Polit-Secretariat, Moscow, 8/2-1929. For a copy of this protocol, see fol.  
RGASPI 495/20/722, 45-46. Melnitschansky’s article, “Die Kölner Tagung der Exekutive der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus“, was published in Inprecorr (Nr.6, 9.Jahrgang, 18/1-1929), see fol. RGASPI 495/3/86, 184. Present at 
the meeting were: Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Bennet/Petrovsky, Münzenberg, Bell, Pollitt, Gusev, Chitarow, Heller, 
Melnitschansky, Figatner, Gerich and Heimo; RGASPI 495/3/86, 174, Vorschläge des Genossen Petrovsky [Bennet], 
Moscow, 8/2-1929. 
645 RGASPI 495/3/86, 168-169, (Confidential) Statement regarding LAI Cologne meeting, Moscow, [endorsed 16/2- 
1929]. For a copy of this statement, see fol. RGASPI 495/20/722, 47-48, however, this version does not mention the 
date of adoption of the document. 
646 RGASPI 542/1/30, 18, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 27/2-1929. It is unknown when  
Bridgeman received this statement from the International Secretariat. 
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The Arnot Connection: Evaluation of the Colonial Work and the “Colonial Conference” 
In the presentation of his colonial “theses” at the Sixth International Comintern Congress, 
Kuusinen stated that the communist parties’ colonial work was “one of the weakest sides of 
Comintern activity”. From the Comintern’s inception in 1919, up until 1928, the communist 
parties had either chosen to ignore their colonial work completely or considered it to be a complete 
waste of time, despite the formation of colonial commissions as sub-departments within the 
parties, e.g. the Colonial Commission of the CPGB and the Colonial Committee of the PCF. 
According to Kuusinen, the parties’ endeavours to establish connections with colonial countries 
were insufficient, especially in countries which had no “strong communist party”. Thus, the parties 
in “the imperialist countries” – Europe and the USA – had to support the establishment of 
communist parties in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.647 Yet, this demand was both a 
contradiction and a utopian vision, particularly as it gave the parties the momentous task of 
fulfilling the objectives of the colonial “theses”. According to the biased Outline History of the 
Communist International, the relationship between the colonial question and the communist 
movement in Europe was one characterised by contradiction in 1928:  
[…] the theses of the Sixth Congress on the colonial question contained several erroneous 
and contradictory propositions on the questions of the strategy and tactics of the national 
liberation struggle […] The Congress required the communist parties of the imperialist 
countries [author’s italics] to establish close, regular and constant contacts with the 
revolutionary movement in the colonies in order to give this movement active support and 
practical assistance.648 
Apparently, the communist parties were puzzled about how to support, or even understand, the 
nature of the colonial question. Towards the end of 1928, the decision-makers at Comintern 
headquarters strode into action to find some kind of direction for the colonial work in Western 
Europe, focusing on the close examination of colonial work in the parties and the sympathising 
organisations (the LAI and the LDRN). In December, Arnot received an instruction from 
Kuusinen, endorsed by the Small Commission, to visit the Western European parties in order to 
gather intelligence on their colonial work, an objective which culminated in the effort to organise a 
“Colonial Conference” in the spring of 1929.  
 
After the Sixth Comintern Congress, the Comintern apparatus in Moscow was facing a re-
organisation of its organisational structure. For the International Secretariat, this implied a new set 
                                               
647 “The Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries Adopted by the Sixth  
Comintern Congress”, taken from Degras vol.II 1960, pp.526, 537-547. 
648 Sobolev (ed.) 1971, p.286. 
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of liaisons for the LAI at Comintern headquarters. On 24 September 1928, the Small Commission 
endorsed the decision to appoint Kuusinen as the LAI liaison, charging him to “revise the practical 
connections” (administrative and political support) of the organisation.649 Arnot had assumed 
Petrovsky’s position after the congress which, in practice, entailed sorting out the practical details 
of the colonial work, as well as taking over Heimo’s temporary position as LAI administrator. The 
re-organisation of the Comintern apparatus had been a process initiated on the direct instruction of 
the Political Secretariat in September, focusing primarily on establishing eight “Länder-
Sekretariats” (Regional Secretariats) with the aim of strengthening contacts with and 
communicating directives to the communist parties. This re-organisation completely re-shuffled 
the structure of existing secretariats. For example, the Eastern Secretariat went from being one 
section to becoming three sections, having Kuusinen, Mif, Joel Schubin, the Chinese Chü Chiu-pai 
(“Strakhov”) and Arnot acting as secretaries. The “II. Sektion” focused primarily on the Indian 
question, according to the Political Secretariat, a section that Arnot found himself located in.650 For 
Münzenberg, it was a question of securing a personal liaison at Comintern headquarters to 
administer the LAI question. In December, Kuusinen appointed Arnot as Münzenberg’s contact, 
who “in confidentiality” informed Münzenberg that he had replaced Petrovsky as “correspondent” 
[liaison]. Taking the initiative to discuss the LAI with other actors in Moscow, Arnot contacted the 
Profintern Presidium in December and explained that the LAI was planning to introduce a new 
political direction at the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne in January 1929. This would mean 
developing its propaganda against the war threat, distributing propaganda on the colonial policy of 
the Comintern and establishing contacts with trade unions in both Europe and the colonial and 
semi-colonial countries.651 However, this was a vision formulated by Arnot which the LAI and its 
Executive Committee had not endorsed.  
      Despite Arnot’s authoritative position within the CPGB, perceived as an ardent defender of 
“the new line”, the Central Committee of the CPGB did not appreciate his appointment at the 
headquarters of the Comintern in Moscow. The CPGB was, however, not in a position to either 
                                               
649 Heimo and Piatnitsky were delegated to act as liaisons for the IAH at Comintern headquarters, see fol. RGASPI  
495/6/16, 28-29, Protokoll Nr.7 der Sitzung der Engeren Kommission, Moscow, 24/9-1928. Present at the meeting 
were Piatnitsky, Remmele, Kuusinen, Heimo and Henrikowski. 
650 RGASPI 495/6/16, 30, Vorschlag an das Polit-Sekretariat für die Zusammensetzung der Länder-Sekretariat,  
Moscow, September, 1928. Heimo co-ordinated the re-organisation of the secretariats, an undertaking which proved 
difficult, forcing Heimo to concede in December to the Small Commission – “ENGKOM” – that the complex 
bureaucracy of the apparatus was an impeding factor which delayed the process, see fol. RGASPI 495/6/45, 28, Letter 
from Heimo to the members of ENGKOM, 19/12-1928. For the “Länder Sekretariats, see further in Adibekov & 
Shakhnazarova (1996, p.68). 
651 RGASPI 542/1/25, 78-79, (Confidential) Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 20/12-1928. On  
December 10, Arnot completed the draft of this letter (in English). Realising that Münzenberg had limited English 
skills, Arnot translated the document into German and apologised for his “bad German” (Entschuldigung bitte meine 
schlechte deutsch. R.P.A.). For the English version, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 71-72; RGASPI 495/154/364, 44, Draft 
of letter from Arnot, Moscow, to the Presidium of the Profintern and AUCTU, December 1928. 
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protest or interfere in a routine involving the “interchange of personnel between headquarters and 
national sections”. According to the historian Andrew Thorpe, Arnot remained in Moscow for 
about one year, where he both attended and participated in ECCI and Profintern meetings.652 
However, Arnot achieved more than just attending meetings in Moscow; in fact, he assumed a 
leading position in the colonial work of the communist parties in Europe and became involved in 
solving the fractional struggle of the CPUSA in 1929. 
      Arnot’s position as a secretary at the Eastern Secretariat provided him with authority while he 
was evaluating the colonial work of the communist parties in Europe. The LAI and its 
International Secretariat were key factors in this process, which makes it logical to suggest that the 
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Vyacheslav Molotov and 
Piatnitsky, referred to the LAI as the sympathising organisation best suited to adopting the 
ideological implications of “the new line” in 1929. This also determined the hierarchy of relations 
between Kuusinen, Arnot and other leading individuals at Comintern headquarters in their 
discussions of the LAI, although the LAI still had to fulfil the Comintern’s instructions. This 
proposition still depended on the communist parties in Europe both supporting and being willing 
to carry out their colonial work in a routine fashion. In the beginning of 1929, the Comintern 
finally realised that its system of sending instructions from Moscow to the parties was insufficient, 
and demanded an improvement in their colonial work. On 1 January 1929, the ECCI 
Organisational Department (Orgotdel) introduced a “Plan of Work” which stated that one of the 
“most important tasks” for the parties was to conduct “organisational work among foreign 
workers, especially among the workers from the colonial and semi-colonial countries”.653 This was 
a response to the lack of interest from the parties in carrying out any of the above in 1928. Thus, in 
order to evaluate the “organisational work” of the parties in implementing colonial work as a daily 
routine, the Small Commission instructed Arnot on 29 December 1928 to “visit the Western 
European parties in order to discuss their colonial work and the advisability of holding a 
conference thereon”.654 On 30 December, Arnot left Moscow. 
  
* 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
652 For Arnot’s nomination, and a discussion on why foreign communists had to work in Moscow, see Andrew Thorpe,  
“Comintern ‘Control’ of the Communist Party of Great Britain”, in The English Historical Review, Vol.113, No.452 
(Jun.1998), Oxford University Press, p.645. 
653 RGASPI 495/25/129, 39-43, Plan of work of the Organisational Department, December-February 1929, 1/1-1929. 
654 RGASPI 495/154/406, 1-2, Proposed Colonial Conference of Western European Parties, 4/3-1929. 
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Inspection of the Anti-Imperialist Movement and the LAI’s Colonial Work in Europe 
Arnot’s mission to Europe was an intense experience, taking place in different settings and cities: 
Frankfurt am Main, Cologne, London, Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam. In mid-February, Arnot 
returned to Moscow.655 
Table 6.2 : Robin Page Arnot’s European Journey, 20/12-1928 – 10-11/2-1929 
 
 
Arnot travelled directly to Germany from Moscow. On 3 January, Arnot met with Münzenberg in 
Frankfurt am Main to discuss “Liga questions”: the second international LAI congress and the idea 
of organising a “Colonial Conference”. Reporting in “all haste” to Kuusinen, Arnot wrote that 
Münzenberg seemed worried about holding a colonial conference.656 The reasons why became 
obvious after Arnot had witnessed the discussions at the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne in 
January, an experience which made Arnot realise that the colonial question was a far more 
complex issue than expected and, furthermore, a matter suggesting that the LAI was an isolated 
entity in the European communist movement. 
      London: Arnot left Germany in order to attend the Tenth Party Congress of the CPGB in 
London on 19-22 January. According to Arnot, it was a “good congress judging by the spirit 
displayed by the delegates”, where he had managed to convince the Central Committee of the 
CPGB to accept “without demand the proposes [proposals] of the Comintern”. Yet, it seemed as 
though the leadership in the CPGB had trouble understanding the ramifications of “the new line”, 
Arnot argued. However, at one of the Central Committee’s sessions, Arnot stated that there existed 
no other option than to “carry out the task of [the] ideological strengthening of the Party”. In 
                                               
655 Arnot told Kuusinen: “this week I leave for Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam: but I do not expect to be finished with  
these parties until about the 8th. So that if I were to stay for the 10th-11th C.C. meeting it would not mean a further 
delay of more than two or three days. But if you wish me to return, and not to wait for C.C., will you please telegraph 
to that effect?”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 5-7, Handwritten letter from R. Page Arnot to Otto Kuusinen in Moscow, 
29/1-1929. 
656 RGASPI 542/1/30, 1, [Handwritten] letter from Robin Page Arnot, Frankfurt a/M to, Kuusinen, Moscow, 3/1-1929. 
Moscow  
December 1928 – 
February 1929 
 
Frankfurt 
am Main 
3/1-1929 
 
Meeting 
with 
Münzenberg 
 
Cologne 
15-16/1-1929 
 
London 
29/1 
Meeting with 
Colonial 
Commission 
CPGB 
 
Paris 
5/2 
Meeting 
with PCF 
Secretariat 
 
Brussels 
(unknown) 
Amsterdam: 
departure  
10-11/2 [?] 
LAI 
Executive 
Meeting 
 
Letter from Arnot to 
Münzenberg, 20/12-1929 
ECCI Small Commission, 
29/12-1928 
257 
 
Arnot’s report to Kuusinen, this was based on the fact that the party must be patient and “take 
some time and much vigilance to weed out the Rightist tendencies that have shown themselves” 
after “the errors of the past years”. The report more or less summarised the CPGB’s teething 
problems in adjusting itself to “the new line”, while, according to Matthew Worley, the policy 
change “plunged [the CPGB] … into a period of communist civil war” lasting from September to 
December 1929. Aside from coercing the Central Committee into implementing the “new line”, 
the second reason for Arnot attending the congress was to observe how the party discussed the 
colonial question. Apparently, “on the last day” some delegates raised the question in a passing 
fashion, forcing Arnot to concede that the CPGB’s capacity to carry out colonial work was in a 
poor state. While visiting London, Arnot also observed how the LAI section was nothing more 
than a “mere committee”, which had to improve its work in establishing connections with 
proletarian organisations and colonial residents. In reference to the earlier prominent position of 
the intellectuals within the LAI, Arnot considered that this was no longer “an important question”, 
but, if the opportunity presented itself, “they are [to be] utilised” in the service of the LAI.657 
      Paris: Arnot’s next stopover was Paris. Compared to the situation within both the CPGB and 
the British LAI Section, Arnot realised that the state of the colonial work in the PCF was even 
worse off. While the Colonial Commission of the CPGB and the British LAI Section had at least 
some contact with anti-colonial activists, in Paris the LAI section had no relations with the party, 
described by Arnot as being a “very sore point”. Arriving in Paris, Arnot faced the covert and 
secretive milieu of the French communist movement due to the surveillance of the Sûreté. 
However, on 5 February, Arnot managed to meet the secretary of the PCF Secretariat, Pierre 
Semard, for a brief evaluation of its colonial work and the relations between the party and the anti-
imperialist organisations in France (the LAI and the LDRN). Semard described how the repressive 
situation in Paris had made it “difficult” to carry out any colonial work on a regular basis. In fact, 
Semard’s brief assessment is similar to the experiences of Ngyuen Ai Quoc/Ho Chi Minh during 
his Paris sojourn, working for the PCF in 1928. The PCF had an indolent attitude towards its 
colonial work, as William Duiker writes in his biography of Ho Chi Minh, a dilemma proven by 
the fact that the PCF’s colonial work existed only “on paper” and not in reality. Despite the 
Colonial Commission of the PCF having authorised “a budget for colonial operations”, no money 
was at anyone’s disposal to develop such operations when “the box [money] was empty” 
Quoc/Minh observed. Thus, Quoc/Minh requested that the Eastern Secretariat instigate an 
                                               
657 According to Arnot, the CPGB should continue to carry out the “task of ideological strengthening of the Party”, a  
process that “will […] take some time and much vigilance to weed out the right way tendencies”. An observation, 
which corresponds with Matthew Worley’s conclusion, the CPGB, was around this time “plagued by internal conflict 
and […] political stupefaction”, RGASPI 542/1/30, 5-7, Handwritten letter from R. Page Arnot to Otto Kuusinen in 
Moscow, 29/1-1929; Worley, 2002, p.116. 
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investigation to evaluate why the PCF seemed to have no money to organise colonial work in 
France, as well as demand the Colonial Commission of the PCF to “submit reports” to “other 
comrades on its operations and plans”. This narrative is comparable to Arnot’s experience of the 
situation in Paris, which also convinced him of the necessity to organise a “Colonial Conference”. 
Writing from Paris, Arnot told Kuusinen that “the following points became clear, one of which 
demands a rather speedy decision … the Party [must] be in favour of such a Conference on 
Colonial questions”.658 Arnot left Europe convinced that Kuusinen had been correct in his 
assessment that colonial work was one of the Comintern’s weakest points. Therefore, the “Colonial 
Conference” would be the solution to finding a new course for the European communist parties’ 
colonial work. However, what was the purpose of this “Colonial Conference”? 
 
* 
 
The “Report on the Parties” 
In Moscow, Arnot began the work of analysing the intelligence from his journey; writing down his 
impressions in his brief “Report on the Parties”; a document which not only contained a number of 
opinions introduced in his letters to Kuusinen but which also described the deterioration of the 
colonial work in the communist parties in Europe. The initial purpose of this report was to guide 
the decision-making process of the Political Secretariat to endorse the “Colonial Conference”. 
      According to this report, the parties in France, Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands 
shared the stigma of not being able to carry out the simplest of tasks, e.g. finding colonial contacts, 
and “at the moment not much is being done”. The shortcomings of the Belgian and Dutch parties 
were the result of having no reliable connections with their colonies, the Congo Free State and 
Indonesia, where intra-party problems had brought the relations with the LAI to a standstill. The 
PCF only had a functional contact with the colonies, via the Étolie Nord-Africaine in North Africa. 
Hence, Arnot conceded that the impact of Senghor’s death in 1927 had been a decisive blow to the 
anti-colonial network in both France and beyond. As a solution to the conundrum in France, Arnot 
expected the recently established ECCI Negro Bureau in Moscow to assist the PCF in “re-
commencing work amongst the Negroes” and “Negro sailors” in the ports of Paris, Havre, 
Marseilles and Bordeaux, as well as in establishing connections with the “still almost unexplored” 
Equatorial Africa.659 
                                               
658 RGASPI 542/1/30, 10-16, [Handwritten] letter from Arnot, Paris, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 5/2-1929 (someone had 
removed Kuusinen’s name at the top of the letter with a pair of scissors, yet on the second page, Kuusinen is 
mentioned as the recipient). For Ho Chi Minh, see Duiker 2000, pp.148-150, quotes taken from fol. RGASPI 
495/154/556 (no list). Doriot acted as Ho Chi Minh’s PCF contact. 
659 RGASPI 495/154/364, 52-54, Report on the Parties, Arnot, February, 1929. The Political Secretariat endorsed the  
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      The CPGB’s colonial work was an inefficient and unproductive line of activity, Arnot 
concluded, suggesting that the CPGB pay attention to the global spread of the British Empire. For 
the CPGB, the party should divide its perception of the world into four sections: India; the “so-
called White Dominions” [the national minority movements] in Europe, Egypt and the Near East 
[the Middle East]; Africa and the Caribbean “Crown Colonies”; and the semi-colonial countries in 
Latin America and China. This was an idea of grandiose proportions, Arnot realised, observing, 
“that with an extremely small party, only a tithe of this has been covered in any manner 
whatsoever”. However, despite the breadth of the issue, the party should avoid using London, one 
of “the shipping centres of the world”, as a connective centre in which to develop colonial work. 
The CPGB also had to confront the problem of having minimal contacts to important “auxiliary 
bodies in England”, e.g. the LAI and the LRD and to “all kinds of associations of colonial races in 
London and […] Christian and philanthropic [sic] agencies”.660 The primary aim of Arnot’s 
“Report on the Parties” was, however, not to introduce a solution to the current problem of 
colonial work; it served only as a document clearly defining the issue in preparation for the 
“Colonial Conference”. 
 
* 
 
The Concept of the “Colonial Conference”   
The “Report on the Parties” introduced a ruthless criticism of the incompetence of the Western 
European communist parties. For Arnot, the “Colonial Conference” represented the only available 
option to solving the crisis. In turn, this required that the Eastern Secretariat narrow down the 
concept of the conference before even being able to introduce the idea to the Political Secretariat. 
What was the concept of the conference and how did Arnot intend to mobilise the Comintern 
apparatus in order to bring the conference into being? This is essentially a question of chronology, 
i.e. the “Colonial Conference” was a continual process following the logic and pressure of time, a 
factor which ultimately determined its outcome. According to the chronology of the “Colonial 
Conference”, the timing of this conference coincided with two events in July 1929: the Tenth 
ECCI Plenum in Moscow and the second international LAI congress: 
Decision of the Small Commission regarding Arnot  29 December, 1928 
Arnot’s Mission to Europe    January-February 
“Report on the Parties”    February 
Proposal/Outline of Conference   4 March  
                                                                                                                                                          
formation of a “Negro Bureau” at the Eastern Secretariat on 12 December, 1928. The Eastern Secretariat expected 
“five comrades to begin with” to represent the bureau, which “later [should be] enlarged through comrades from 
Negro countries”, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/637, 151-152, On the Session of the Polit-Secretariat of the ECCI, 
Moscow, 10/12-1928. 
660 RGASPI 495/154/364, 52-54, Report on the Parties, Arnot, February, 1929. 
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Endorsed by the Political Secretariat   14 March  
First meeting of the “Commission on Colonial Conference”  19 March  
Budget     20 March  
Letters to communist parties   25 March  
The “Magyar Thesis”    29 March  
Second Meeting of the “Commission on Colonial Conference” 29 April  
Decision to Postpone    25 May  
The Tenth ECCI Plenum    3-19 July  
The Second International Congress against Imperialism and  
Colonialism, Frankfurt am Main    21-27 July  
   
Arnot relied first and foremost on the assistance of the Eastern Secretariat to organise this 
“Colonial Conference”. During the initial stages of the preparatory work, the LAI was also to be 
involved in the conference. However, while the LAI expected to begin preparing for the second 
international congress at the beginning of 1929, the idea of holding the “Colonial Conference” was 
mooted at the same point in time, one suggestion having been made that the two events were the 
same. On the contrary, such a proposition does not hold any water, particularly as the “Colonial 
Conference” had an authoritative position over the second LAI Congress. Is it possible to 
determine when the preparations for the “Colonial Conference” did commence; what does the 
process tell us about the Comintern’s colonial work; and, finally, did the conference ever convene? 
On 4 March, the Eastern Secretariat presented to the Political Secretariat its fundamental concept 
of the “Colonial Conference”:  
The Colonial Conference should have as its purpose the putting into operation of the 
decisions of the CI on colonial questions, more especially by means of a closer co-ordination 
of all colonial activities.661   
This required Arnot to co-ordinate individuals and departments at Comintern headquarters in 
Moscow to get involved in the “Colonial Conference”. The table below focuses on the structure of 
this preparatory work and presents the actors involved in the “Colonial Conference”: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
661 RGASPI 495/154/406, 1-2, [Eastern Secretariat] Proposed Colonial Conference of Western European Parties, 4/3- 
1929. 
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Table 6.3: Structure and Actors in the “Colonial Conference”, March-June 1929 
   
 
The Political Secretariat’s consent was the key for Arnot and the Eastern Secretariat. After 
completing his general impressions of the communist parties in his “Report on the Parties”, Arnot 
passed on the principal aim of the “Colonial Conference” to the Political Secretariat. The 
conference had to focus on getting the parties to “report on past work” and be an “examination of 
difficulties” while pondering “future tasks and practical steps in their realisation”. Yet, the road to 
bringing the conference to fruition was one obstructed by structural constraints. Firstly, Arnot 
reflected on the fact that the parties did not seem to know how to find colonial contacts in their 
home countries, a defect the parties also neglected to inform the Comintern about. This pattern of 
ignorance had established a mentality that made it difficult to send documents, minutes and either 
legal or illegal leaflets on the colonial question. Secondly, the communist parties should therefore 
accept the active service of colonial students who were pursuing studies at the KUTV in Moscow, 
primarily to develop their theoretical and practical work on the colonial question in Europe. In 
conclusion, Arnot stated that the “Colonial Conference” represented a perfect opportunity to 
discuss the possibility of linking colonial work with the anti-war movement. Hence, the “Colonial 
Conference” should comprise a representative picture of the Comintern:  
The composition of the Conference should be such as to ensure the presence of political 
bureau members, specialists in colonial work and colonials. On the other hand, it must be as 
small a conference as possible for obvious reasons. Representatives from the WEB and the 
Liga should also be present. The location, it is suggested, should be either Berlin or Köln 
[Cologne, author’s remark] and the time should, if possible, be the middle of April.662 
                                               
662 RGASPI 495/154/406, 1-2, Proposed Colonial Conference of Western European Parties, [Eastern Secretariat],  
Moscow, 4/3-1929; RGASPI 542/1/30, 10-16, [Handwritten] Letter from Arnot, Paris, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 5/2- 
1929. 
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Arnot 
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Arnot 
Arthur Ewert 
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Obuhov 
Alex Bittelman, 
May 22 
Communist Parties in 
Europe: 
Holland 
Belgium 
Great Britain 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Portugal 
WEB 
KIM 
OMS 
LAI 
ECCI Negro Bureau 
Eastern Secretariat 
“Colonial 
Conference” 
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262 
 
On 14 March, the Political Secretariat endorsed Arnot’s proposal. However, on 19 March, the 
Eastern Secretariat declared the need to postpone the conference until the “beginning of May”, and 
for it to convene in Berlin. The primary reason given was to ensure that delegates from the 
communist parties, special representatives of the Comintern, the KIM, the LAI, the WEB, the 
OMS and of the ECCI Negro Bureau, as well as “technical workers” would be able to make it to 
the conference.663 From a broader perspective, the “Colonial Conference” was to involve a range 
of actors and would, therefore, be an event highlighting the hierarchy of relations within the 
Comintern structure as well as questioning the idea of the Comintern purely as a monolithic body. 
      In order to devote attention to the preparation of the conference, the Political Secretariat 
endorsed the establishment of the “Commission Appointed to Prepare Conference on Colonial 
Work of Western European Parties”, also referred to as the “Eastern Secretariat Commission on 
Colonial Conference” (“Commission on Colonial Conference”). Arnot acted as the leader of this 
commission, working together with Kuusinen’s deputy at the Eastern Secretariat, the Hungarian 
communist Ludwig Magyar, as well as with the German communist Arthur Ewert, Freyer [first 
name unknown], the émigré communist from Finland and functionary at Comintern headquarters 
Niilo Virtanen and the KIM delegate Obuhov. On 19 March, the commission held its inaugural 
meeting in Moscow in order to start considering which of the European communist parties to 
invite. At the end of the meeting, the “Commission on Colonial Conference” resolved to wait until 
the reports from the parties had arrived in Moscow, documents which were expected to arrive by 
31 March. The members of the “Commission on Colonial Conference” were in charge of separate 
questions. Administrative questions and the budget were under Virtanen’s and Ewert’s jurisdiction, 
the latter also being responsible for evaluating the incoming reports from the parties; Freyer 
prepared the “Agitprop” material; while Obuhov examined the colonial work in the communist 
youth movement. According to Virtanen’s “estimated budget”, completed on 20 March and passed 
on to the Small Commission, the cost of the “Colonial Conference” would come to $1,956, which 
included the travel arrangements and “living costs” for the delegates in Berlin, as well as salaries 
for the “technical workers”, the hire of the conference room and “other expenses”. The Small 
Commission nevertheless concluded that the budget was too high, instructing Arnot and Ewert to 
revise the costs, which they did, reducing the overall cost by $718, ending with a final estimated 
cost of at $1,238.664 Even though preparations were already under way in Moscow, the reports 
                                               
663 Although the Political Secretariat had “approved in principle” of the conference, the “Commission on Colonial  
Conference” and Arnot had to complete “Draft Proposals outlining the work of the Conference already submitted to 
the Eastern Secretariat” which both elaborated on and was “put in the shape of a proposal to go before the Political 
Secretariat for decision”. The anticipated number of delegates at the conference was thirty-one, RGASPI 495/18/670, 
3-5, [copy] Proposal from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 19/3-1929. 
664 Arnot and Freyer evaluated the CPGB, Virtanen (the PCF), Ducrot (the Communist Party of Belgium), and Resema  
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from the parties had not yet arrived in Moscow. When sending out the conference invitations to the 
parties, Arnot took advantage of the opportunity to remind the parties to provide the Eastern 
Secretariat with the reports on their colonial work: 
Following the visit of a member of the Eastern Secretariat [Arnot] to you and his discussion 
with you of the possibility of holding a conference of Western European parties on Colonial 
work, it has now been decided to hold such a conference […] Reports of parties, not only on 
work since the VIth Congress but on all sections of work on all colonial territories hitherto 
not dealt with. […] With regard to this report, we have already sent a telegram asking that 
the report which was already discussed with the vice-chairman of the Eastern Secretariat 
[Ludwig Magyar] should be despatched to us by 31 March. […] If you can suggest other 
items which should come up for discussion, please put them into your report, or indicate 
where they should go on the Agenda outlined above. […] The conference should not last 
more than three days, but its shortness will depend exactly on the extent to which all 
participants prepare beforehand.665 
This was an obligation the “Commission on Colonial Conference” expected the communist parties 
to fulfil. In Moscow, however, Arnot was relying on Magyar’s theoretical expertise to adapt “the 
new line” to the conference.  
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
(the CPH), RGASPI 495/18/670, 1-2, Minutes of “Commission on Colonial Conference”, Moscow, 19/3-1929.; 
RGASPI 495/18/670, 1-2, Minutes of “Commission on Colonial Conference”, Moscow, 19/3-1929; RGASPI 
495/18/670, 14, Estimated budget for [Colonial] Conference from Virtanen to the Small Commission, Moscow, 20/3-
1929; RGASPI 495/18/670, 23, Revised budget for conference, Moscow, April/May. 
665 RGASPI 495/18/670, 30-32, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Communist Party of Italy, Rome, 25/3-1929. 
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The “Magyar Thesis” 
 
It is very difficult to organise the practical work in the colonies […] the ECCI is mainly 
dependent in the field of practical work and application of instructions […] on the activities, 
initiative and steady growth of the Communist Parties in the corresponding imperialist 
countries […] must bring about proper collaboration with other colonial organisations such 
as the Anti-Imperialist League. 
Ludwig Magyar, “The Organisation of 
the Colonial Work of the European 
Communist Parties”, 29/3-1929 
 
Arnot realised that the “Colonial Conference” was lacking in its ideological approach. On 19 
March, the “Commission on Colonial Conference” concluded that it was essential to formulate 
“lines of political information”, hence, to get the “thesis … prepared by comrade Magyar”. 
Addressed here as “the Magyar thesis”, Magyar completed his work on 29 March, its full title 
being “The Organisation of the Colonial Work of the European Communist Parties”, which was 
more or less a testimony of how a leading official at Comintern headquarters interpreted the 
colonial work among the national sections after the Sixth Comintern Congress. Magyar argued that 
the ignorance and apparent failure of the communist parties in Europe to conduct any kind of 
colonial work deserved critique. Additionally, Arnot observed how “the Magyar thesis” could also 
guide the ideological preparations for the second LAI congress. 
      Aside from Arnot’s “Report on the Parties”, “the Magyar thesis” was the first critical survey of 
colonial work after the Sixth Comintern Congress, which also served the purpose of confirming 
the substance of Kuusinen’s colonial and semi-colonial theses. Apparently, Magyar referred 
explicitly to Kuusinen, concluding that: 
The most important tasks of the Communist Parties of the imperialist countries with regard 
to the colonial question is: first the establishment of a direct contact between the Communist 
Parties and the revolutionary trade union organisations […] The relationships existing up to 
now between the Communist Parties and the revolutionary movement in the respective 
colonial countries cannot be considered […] as satisfactory. […] not all of the Parties of the 
CI have so far grasped the great significance of regular close connections with the 
revolutionary movements in the colonies for the active immediate practical support of these 
movements. Only to the extent that the Communist Parties in the imperialist countries 
actually support the revolutionary movement […] assist the struggle of [the] colonial 
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countries against imperialism, can their position with regard to the colonial question be 
accepted as truly Bolshevik. This is the criterion for their revolutionary activity in general.666   
According to Magyar, the communist parties had not acted in a “truly Bolshevik” manner by 
having failed to establish any “direct contact” with colonial “revolutionary trade union 
organisations”. This breach in communist discipline warranted coercion, Magyar stated. Magyar 
had distinguished five fields of activity which the parties had to implement in their colonial work, 
the first two being to organise a liaison system to distribute political literature from Europe to the 
colonies and to ensure that correspondence from Europe arrived in the hands of revolutionary 
parties, associations, organisations and individuals in the colonies. In addition, members of 
European communist parties should accept their duty to travel to the colonies, acting as 
“emigrants” and not as “representatives” or “emissaries” of the Comintern. Once on location, the 
“emigrants” should blend in with the everyday life of the workers and carry out manual labour in 
order to establish contacts with political activists at the grass root level. The fourth field of activity 
focused on getting the parties to establish contacts with sailors, workers, soldiers and students 
from colonial countries, people living in the “big cities of the capitalist countries” and known to be 
eagerly wanting to get involved in colonial work. Once contact was an established fact, the 
communists then had to “penetrate into the ranks” of the colonial communities in the metropolitan 
cities with the sole purpose of exerting “Communist influence […] among them”. Magyar 
concluded that this final question focused on the failure of the central committees in the 
communist parties to organise “routine colonial work”, a crucial question for the Comintern, which 
the parties had to cease ignoring. Magyar questioned why the European parties could not find any 
anti-colonial activists, thus intimating that the parties had to begin giving “much more attention to 
the activity, composition and structure of the colonial commission than it has done up to the 
present time”. While the colonial commission in the parties was a sub-department, primarily 
assigned to lead and develop colonial work, Magyar observed how the lack of education and 
incapacity to organise even internal discussions on the colonial question were evidence of the low 
level of academia in these so-called commissions. The only solution at hand for Magyar was to 
recommend a “ceaseless activity in the organisational field”, with the colonial commission being 
the centre of gravity for the parties in developing their colonial work. For example, in order to 
gather intelligence to facilitate the decision-making process of its central committee: 
The colonial commissions in the various Parties shall be in touch with each other, arrange 
small conferences now and then for the co-ordination and further development of the work, 
                                               
666 RGASPI 495/18/670, 22, Confidential report from Arnot, Moscow, to Magyar, Moscow, 28/4-1929; RGASPI  
495/18/670, 49-55, Confidential resolution: THE ORGANISATION OF THE COLONIAL WORK OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, author: Ludwig Magyar, Moscow, 29/3-1929. 
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etc.; furthermore, they must bring about proper collaboration with other colonial 
organisations such as the Anti-Imperialist League, etc.667 
The administrative utopia, as formulated by Magyar, left him also contemplating that the initial 
purpose of the colonial commissions, to gather intelligence, was nothing but a farce, meaning, “the 
information received up till now [at Comintern headquarters] amounts to absolutely nothing”. For 
Magyar, money was a part of the solution, suggesting that “the strengthening of the work of the 
colonial commissions calls for still greater financial means” in order to counter the ignorance 
within the parties. 
      From a broader perspective, Magyar’s criticism is supported by other explanations. After the 
Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, the international communist movement had to confront a series 
of serious developments. For example, the CPGB encountered intra-party struggles, while the 
CPSUSA was on the verge of devouring itself due to fractional struggles (see further below), thus, 
the insecure situation also affected the preparatory work for the “Colonial Conference”, with the 
lack of party reports largely contributing to bringing the work to a halt. The parties had received 
the instruction to complete and send in their reports by 31 March; however, on 26 April, Arnot had 
only received one report from the CPH. Apparently annoyed by their neglect and continued 
indifference, Arnot informed some of the individuals involved in preparing the LAI congress in 
Moscow, e.g. Pyotr Kitaigorodsky, “Strakhov”/Chü Chiu-pai, the French communist Henri Barbé 
and the Russian Joel Schubin about the parties’ malpractice.668 Yet, at the same time, Arnot told the 
members of the “Commission on Colonial Conference” to expect the arrival of these reports: 
No Party except the Dutch Party had sent any reports in spite of repeated telegrams, but 
reports are now expected from the British Party within a few days and from the French Party 
later.669 
“The Magyar thesis” was not primarily an ideological guideline for colonial work, but instead 
aimed to introduce a concept on how to re-construct the methods used by the parties, e.g. by 
gathering intelligence on the anti-colonial movement. Magyar argued that the gathering of 
information was an essential part of the colonial work, one which had to run smoothly in order to 
assist the decision-making process at Comintern headquarters in Moscow. However, Magyar 
conceded that “the third period” had increased the “white terror” against the international 
communist movement on a global scale, forcing the Comintern and its sections to organise every 
                                               
667 RGASPI 495/18/670, 49-55, Confidential resolution: THE ORGANISATION OF THE COLONIAL WORK OF  
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, author: Ludwig Magyar, 29/3-1929. 
668 See fol. RGASPI 495/18/670, 82-90, 29/4-1929. 
669 For the CPH report, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/670, 93-94, Report from the Communist Party of Holland/Colonial  
Commission, Amsterdam, to Arnot, Moscow, 26/4-1929. Members of the Colonial Commission of the CPH were van 
Munster, de Visser, de Vries, Bergsma and Bykstra. Any record of how Arnot reacted remains unknown; see fol. 
RGASPI 495/18/670, 27-28, Minutes, second meeting of Commission on Colonial Conference, Moscow, 29/4-1929. 
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campaign in “a very vigorous manner”. Hence, the liaison service of the OMS was not, therefore, 
enough to salvage the situation in the European communist parties which, according to Magyar, 
mirrored the widespread indolence in the parties towards colonial work:  
With regard to the establishment of [colonial] connections there is a false conception 
prevalent in our Parties. It is generally considered that it is the duty of the centralised OMS 
apparatus to establish connections everywhere and to take care of the sending of material. 
This is entirely false. The Parties must change their attitude with regard to this and discover 
for themselves ways to forward material to comrades in the colonies.670 
Magyar’s criticism focused on the parties' organisational inability not only to send out the political 
material and instructions to their “comrades in the colonies” but also to organise travel 
arrangements for party members to visit the colonies. It was not up to the OMS to supervise this 
line of activity; in fact, Magyar considered that it was the duty of each party to supervise this with 
vigilance in order to avoid the “censorship, probation and hostility” of the national security 
services. This organisational weakness and, in some cases, the lack of organisational work, had 
made the parties dependent on receiving directives from the Comintern, as well as counting on the 
OMS to organise every detail pertaining to colonial work. Thus, “the Magyar thesis” strove to lay 
the foundation for “routine colonial work” by getting the parties to “form an independent field of 
work”. The critical essence of this organisational incapacity in the communist parties in Europe 
since the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 lay in: 
The carrying out of the other tasks laid down in the colonial theses [Sixth International 
Comintern Congress 1928] with regard to the support of the struggle of the colonial peoples 
against imperialism (mobilisation of the broad masses of workers in the capitalist countries 
against the capitalist colonial regime, struggle against the colonial policy of the Social 
Democracy) form, so to say, a part of the general daily work of our Parties.671  
According to Magyar, in order to salvage a dire situation, the parties had to act in a “vigorous 
manner” and, with the “greatest exactness, care and system of individual attention and personal 
treatment”, carry out “colonial routine work”. This would thereby contribute to strengthening the 
current guiding principle within the communist movement of mobilising the “broad masses” in the 
struggle against social democracy.672 Arnot nonetheless perceived “the Magyar thesis” as an 
                                               
670 RGASPI 495/18/670, 49-55, Confidential resolution: THE ORGANISATION OF THE COLONIAL WORK OF  
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, author: Ludwig Magyar, 29/3-1929. 
671 RGASPI 495/18/670, 49-55, Confidential resolution: THE ORGANISATION OF THE COLONIAL WORK OF  
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, author: Ludwig Magyar, 29/3-1929. 
672 Arnot appreciated Magyar’s critique of the European communist parties, and the formulations on how to alter and  
develop the colonial work, telling Magyar to rework the political interpretation on the colonial and semi-colonial 
countries, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/670, 49-55, Confidential resolution: THE ORGANISATION OF THE COLONIAL 
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ideological document which facilitated the preparatory work of the “Colonial Conference”. 
Moreover, the document also reflects the ideological belief, strength, commitment and obedience 
within the international communist movement towards interpreting the Comintern’s “new line”. 
 
* 
 
An Uncertain Road Ahead  
Preparations for the “Colonial Conference” ran parallel with the preparations for the second LAI 
congress in Moscow. Arnot was forced to separate these two events from each other, particularly 
as he was involved in both. During the initial preparatory stage of the “Colonial Conference”, 
Arnot considered it to be crucial to get Münzenberg to attend the conference as the LAI’s 
representative. For some reason, however, in March Arnot decided to delete both the LAI and 
Münzenberg from its agenda – but why? Is it possible that Arnot and the decision-makers in 
Moscow deliberately kept the LAI and Münzenberg out of the conference? 
      The decision to omit the LAI was a practical one. Included initially as one of the delegations at 
the conference, in March, according to the budget, the “Commission on Colonial Conference” had 
chosen to delete the LAI.673 Yet, this decision was not motivated by a need to cut expenses, rather, 
as noted by Arnot to the “Commission on Colonial Conference” on 29 April, one of the primary 
aims of the “Colonial Conference” was to discuss the “relations” between the delegates of the 
European communist parties “and the Anti-imperialist League and other bodies”. Therefore, the 
conference was an event which had to be convened without Münzenberg’s direct involvement. It 
was also a question of time and place. At the second meeting of the “Commission on Colonial 
Conference” in Moscow on 29 April, Arnot concluded that it was unrealistic to hold the conference 
in Berlin “for not more than 6/7 days in the beginning of May”, recommending to postpone the 
event until “June 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11”. The reason for this was two-fold: firstly, to prepare “all 
materials therefore to be ready by the 20th May”, and secondly, Arnot had requested that Kuusinen 
nominate candidates for the conference.674 The crux of the matter was that the parties were still 
refusing to send in their reports to Arnot and, with reference to the direct involvement of the LAI, 
he knew that the “Colonial Conference” was a relevant factor in the “important preparation for the 
Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League”.675 This explains why Arnot intentionally concealed the 
purpose of the “Colonial Conference” from Münzenberg. In May, however, after the sudden 
                                                                                                                                                          
WORK OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, author: Ludwig Magyar, 29/3-1929; RGASPI 495/18/670, 
22, Confidential report from Eastern Secretariat/Arnot, to Magyar, April-May, 1929. 
673 RGASPI 495/18/670, 3-5, [copy] Proposal from Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 19/3-1929; RGASPI 495/18/670, 14,  
Estimated budget for [Colonial] Conference from Virtanen to the Small Commission, Moscow, 20/3-1929. 
674 RGASPI 495/18/670, 27-28, Minutes, second meeting of the Commission on Colonial Conference, Moscow, 29/4- 
1929. 
675 RGASPI 495/18/670, 101, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the CC of CPGB, London, 25/5-1929. 
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disappearance of Arnot from Moscow, the preparatory work for the “Colonial Conference” was 
given a new direction. 
 
* 
 
Arnot's Mysterious Disappearance  
On 18 May, Arnot requested that Virtanen “ask Comrade Kuusinen” to assign Alexander 
Bittelman, a CPUSA member and functionary at the ECCI Anglo-American Secretariat in Moscow 
in 1929, as LAI liaison in Moscow for the International Secretariat in order to detach him from 
“his natural pre-occupation with America” and to convince him to busy himself with “Liga 
questions”.676 The reason why Arnot suddenly resigned from his positions as both LAI liaison and 
leader of the “Commission on Colonial Conference” is, initially, ambiguous. Without telling 
Virtanen why he had decided to abandon his work with the LAI, what was the effect of Arnot’s 
non-appearance at the conference? Arnot’s letter to Virtanen is the last trace of his involvement 
with the “Colonial Conference”, and the mystery of Arnot reveals an intricate narrative focusing 
on both the causes and consequences of the fractional struggle within the CPUSA in 1929. 
      The CPUSA was a party which, like other communist parties, found itself confused by the 
policy shift of the Comintern's “new line”, the result of which was the radicalisation of the CPUSA 
once the party had unconditionally celebrated Stalin as the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union. 
The impact of “the new line” on relations between the CPUSA and the Comintern is a question 
which has been meticulously evaluated ever since the opening of the Comintern Archive. For 
example, Randi Storch’s study of the Chicago foreign communist locale in 1928-35 partly supports 
the Weberian and Draperian “centre and periphery” paradigm, which concludes that Stalinism 
“did matter to the American communist movement” to such an extent that CPUSA members were 
required to “follow party policy”.677 Throughout the 1920s, the American communist movement 
had been the scene of continued “factional wars fought out within its own ranks” which, in 1929, 
were finally sorted out once the CPUSA was “better able to fulfil the goals laid down for it by the 
Comintern”.678 However, how was Arnot involved in this conflict? As noted in a letter from Arnot 
to “Max” [Petrovsky's pseudonym] on 14 May, the internal conflict within the CPUSA tested 
whether the party was capable of sorting out its internal crisis: 
                                               
676 RGASPI 542/1/30, 44-45, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Virtanen, Moscow, 18/5-1929. 
677 Randi Storch, “Chicago’s Foreign Language-Speaking Communists 1928-35”, in Bolshevism, Stalinism and the  
Comintern, Laporte, Morgan & Worley (eds.), Palgrave MacMillan, Houndmills, 2008, pp.264-265. 
678 Klehr, Haynes, & Firsov 1995, p.72. 
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[…] the tasks of the American Party [CPUSA] had been to mobilise against the danger of the 
Right and to liquidate factionalism; that these two tasks were bound up together and that 
they had failed; that the factional leaders were responsible.679 
In fact, the solution to the problems of the CPUSA had never been in the hands of the CPUSA 
“factional leaders”, rather, it was a matter under the jurisdiction of the “American Commission” in 
Moscow. According to Edward P. Johanningsmeier’s biography of the CPUSA leader William Z. 
Foster, the “specially-organised ‘American Commission’” served only one purpose in 1929: to find 
a solution to the internal crisis within the CPUSA. The fractional struggle focused essentially on 
the alleged failure of the CPUSA leaders, particularly Jay Lovestone, to conform to “the new line”, 
as well as Lovestone’s support for Bukharin. In this respect, the Political Secretariat perceived 
Foster as a more suitable candidate to both lead the party and to curb the turbulence within the 
CPUSA leadership and, therefore, endorsed the establishment of the “American Commission” to 
sort out the fractional struggle. By summoning the CPUSA leadership (Foster, Lovestone, Bertram 
D. Wolfe and Bittelman) to Moscow, and once on location in the “Red capital”, the “American 
Commission”, with the active participation of Stalin, decided to settle this matter with their 
American comrades. Stalin assumed a leading role in guiding the discussions with the “American 
Commission”, asking questions and demanding answers. According to Arnot, who attended the 
conclusive meeting of the “American Commission”, Stalin even questioned whether the American 
leadership understood what it meant to be a communist: 
Stalin then said that he regarded Wolfe’s [suggestion] as shameful. That a fundamental 
question, which even a party candidate could answer, had been put to them: will you accept 
the discipline of the CI and carry it through? He [Stalin] said: I would be offended if I were 
asked such a question and if you [Wolfe] here cannot answer it, I wonder what sort of 
Communist you are.680 
The “American Commission” was as an instrument of coercion. One outcome of this final meeting 
was that the Comintern sanctioned the decision to remove Lovestone from the leadership, 
Lovestone later assuming the role as the symbolic representative of the “Rightist Opposition” 
                                               
679 RGASPI 495/18/740, 32-33, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to “Max”/Petrovsky, Moscow, 14/5-1929. 
680 Edward P. Johanningsmeier, Forging American Communism. The Life of William Z. Foster, Princeton University  
Press, Princeton, 1994, p.245-247. Johanningsmeier’s depiction of the “American Commission” is taken from Theodor 
Draper’s American Communism and Soviet Russia (2003), Max Eastman’s Love and Revolution: My Journey Through 
an Epoch (New York, Random House, 1964), Benjamin Gitlow, The Whole of Their Lives (C. Scribner’s Sons, New 
York, 1948) and Harry Haywood, Black Bolshevik (Chicago, Liberator Press, 1978). For Arnot’s letter to Petrovsky, 
see fol. RGASPI 495/18/740, 32-33, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to “Max”/Petrovsky, Moscow, 14/5-1929. Kuusinen, 
Bela Kun, Wolfe, Molotov, Gitlow, Pepper, Stalin, Arnot and Ford attended the final meeting of the “American 
Commission”. The debates of the “American Commission” had affected the members of the CPUSA members who 
were working at Comintern headquarters in Moscow, e.g. Arnot wrote that they had “reduced Williams to a shadow of 
his former self, Violet to a jibbering [sic] scarecrow and the other stenographer (Kathleen), though with a lighter task, 
has already been in bed for several days”. 
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within the party, which the Comintern would refer to as the “Lovestoneites”.681 How did this 
CPUSA factional struggle affect the Comintern? Arnot observed how the “American question” had 
paralysed the Comintern apparatus in Moscow in 1929: “[T]he impossibility of getting [sic] 
discussions is due entirely to this American business, which is taking up everybody’s time”.682 
Thus, while the controversy nearly consumed the top strata of the CPUSA, the conflict also left the 
organisational structure of the Comintern in disarray. 
      What role did Arnot play in all of this? While it may seem as though Arnot’s decision to resign 
from his LAI and “Colonial Conference” duties was a rash and illogical step, he was, however, not 
in a position to decline the authority of the ECCI Standing Commission and Piatnitsky. On 15 
May, Piatnitsky instructed the ECCI Standing Commission to give Arnot “confidential and full 
powers” to conduct “work in the CPUSA as the plenipotentiary representative of the ECCI with all 
rights as set out in Section 22 of the C.I. statutes (See Section 22 of the C.I. statutes as adopted at 
the VIth World Congress of the C. I.) Moscow 15th May 1929”. For Arnot, this meant leaving 
Moscow as soon as possible and travelling to the USA and, once on location, enforcing “the new 
line” on the CPUSA as ECCI plenipotentiary, responsible only to the ECCI, not to the Central 
Committee of the CPUSA.683 Later, in 1937, Arnot recalled his mission to the USA in his 
“Autobiographical Note”: 
In May 1929 following on Presidium ECCI went to USA as representative of Comintern 
with responsibility for carrying out of struggle against Lovestone and Cannon groups (Right 
opportunists and “Left” Trotskyists) on basis of C. I. decisions. Returned to United Kingdom 
December 1929, participated in December Congress CPGB at which Right opportunist 
majority routed.684 
                                               
681 For Lovestone and “Lovestoneites” see Mari Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, & Dan Georgakas (eds.), Encyclopedia of the  
American Left, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1992, pp.435-437, Lazitch 1986, pp.277-278. 
682 RGASPI 495/18/740, 32-33, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to “Max”/Petrovsky, Moscow, 14/5-1929. 
683 Arnot’s mission was administered via the ECCI Presidium and the ECCI Standing Commission, see fol. RGASPI  
495/7/9, 62, Short note re. Arnot, Piatnitsky, Moscow, 15/5-1929. Section 22 in the statutes, adopted at the Sixth 
Comintern congress in 1928, reads: “The ECCI and its presidium have the right to send representatives to the various 
sections of the Communist International. Such representatives receive their instructions from the ECCI and are 
responsible to it for their activities. The plenipotentiaries of the ECCI have the right to participate in meetings of the 
central party bodies as well as of the local organisations of the sections to which they are sent. They may, however, act 
in opposition to the central committee of the given section at congresses and conferences of that section, if the policy 
of the central committee in question diverges from the instructions of the ECCI. Representatives of the ECCI are 
obliged in particular to supervise the execution of the decisions of the world congresses and of the ECCI. The ECCI 
and its presidium also have the right to send instructors to the sections of the Communist International. The powers 
and duties of instructors are determined by the ECCI, to whom the instructors are responsible”, see “General Rules”, 
taken from Degras vol.II, p.469. 
684 The whereabouts of Arnot after having been nominated as ECCI plenipotentiary have remained unclear up until the  
present day. For example, Worley writes that Arnot’s “commitments to the Comintern” in 1929 prevented him from 
participating actively in the Central Committee of the CPGB. Johanningsmeier concludes on the arrival of “a 
Comintern agent” (“G. William”) in the USA in October 1929, who assisted with “the reorganisation of the Party in 
the wake of Lovestone’s expulsion”. However, whether “G. Williams” and Arnot were one and the same, remains 
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With Arnot’s disappearance, the International Secretariat received a new liaison at Comintern 
headquarters: Alexander Bittelman. On 22 May, Bittelman informed Münzenberg in a letter that, “I 
have been placed in charge of the League work in place of Page. I shall identify myself as the 
comrade who, along with Page, worked with you in Amsterdam”.685 For Bittelman, this 
appointment meant that he no longer had any authority to get involved with the “American work” 
and, according to the ECCI Standing Commission, this prohibited Bittelman from uttering a single 
word to his “American comrades” on his current work with the LAI. This assignment nevertheless 
granted Bittelman access further up the hierarchical structure of the Comintern, e.g. attending 
meetings of the ECCI Presidium and of the Political Secretariat to provide information about the 
LAI and the “Colonial Conference”.686  
 
* 
 
Uncertainty Confirmed 
The mystery of Arnot’s sudden resignations does, in a sense, characterise the ambiguous nature of 
the “Colonial Conference”. While Arnot and the Eastern Secretariat had been the gravitational 
centre for the conference preparations in Moscow, Bittelman never managed to assume the same 
authority over the project that Arnot had had. Hence, the undertakings to realise the “Colonial 
Conference” only ended in unresolved illusions. Firstly, the communist parties did not send their 
colonial work reports (aside from the CPH) in to the Eastern Secretariat, a fact which contributed 
to the postponement of the Berlin conference till June. Secondly, the preparatory work was 
becoming a difficult project to see through. On 25 May, the “Commission on Colonial 
Conference” despatched a confidential letter both to the communist parties and to the leader of the 
WEB in Berlin “Felix” (Manuilsky’s pseudonym), informing them of the decision to postpone the 
conference yet again. This time the conference was set for July and would to be convened in 
connection with the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow (3-19 July), a suitable occasion at which to 
discuss the colonial work, as well as to settle the question of the LAI and its second international 
congress: 
As the colonial conference is to serve as an important preparation for the Congress of the 
Anti-Imperialist League, it has been decided to postpone it once more, and to hold it just 
before the Congress of the League [LAI], i.e. about the middle of July. In this connection, we 
remind you that we are still minus a report on the colonial work of your Party and proposals 
                                                                                                                                                          
unknown, see fol. RGASPI 495/198/13, 158-161, Autobiographical Note, author: R. P. Arnot, Moscow, 19/10-1937; 
Worley 2002, p.134, 140-142, 151 (footnote 95); Johanningsmeier 1994, p.247. 
685 RGASPI 542/1/30, 47, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 22/5-1929. 
686 RGASPI 495/7/9, 96-98, Protokoll N.45 der Sitzung der ständigen Kommission des Sekrt. des EKKI, Moscow, 1/6- 
1929. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Barbé, Garlandi, Lebedewa, Heimo, Kirsanova and Wassiljew. 
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in regard to the conference. We beg of you to let us have your reports and proposals not later 
than the [Tenth] Plenum of the ECCI. This will give us an opportunity to discuss them with 
your representative during the Plenum.687 
The idea to hold the “Colonial Conference” during the Tenth ECCI Plenum seemed to be an 
obvious solution to the problem of finding a date. However, did the “Colonial Conference” 
convene during the ECCI plenum in July? According to the documents relating to the plenum – 
protocols, transcripts and theses, there is no trace of any “Colonial Conference” nor, for that 
matter, is there any discussion of either the colonial question or of the LAI. Yet, a number of actors 
involved in the preparatory work of the “Colonial Conference” were present at the plenum, e.g. 
Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Josefowitsch, Ford and Bittelman.688 The Tenth ECCI Plenum is 
a pivotal episode further discussed in the following chapter. However, it is worth noting at this 
stage that several of the delegates who had attended this plenum left Moscow immediately after it 
had ended on 19 July, and travelled directly to Frankfurt am Main to attend the “Second 
International Congress against Colonialism and Imperialism”, which convened on 21 July, 1929.  
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
687 The Eastern Secretariat informed “Felix”/Manuilsky in Berlin that this letter had also been sent to the PCF and CP  
Belgium, see RGASPI 495/18/670, 100, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to WEB and “Felix” 
[Manuilsky], Berlin, 25/5-1929; RGASPI 495/18/670, 101, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the Central 
Committee of the CPGB, London, 25/5-1929. 
688 The documents on the Tenth ECCI Plenum are filed in fond and opis RGASPI 495/168, see fol. RGASPI  
495/168/151, 1-8, Lists of participants, 10th ECCI Plenum, Moscow, 3-19/7-1929. 
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Chapter 6. Utopia Redefined, Part II 
 
 
When do you think the Congress should be held? Not, as one thinks in Spring, but later 
towards the end of Summer.  
    Robin Page Arnot to Münzenberg,  
10/12-1928 
 
The date set for the Congress (21-31 July) is approved. The question whether this gathering 
should be a Congress or Conference shall be decided depending upon Comrade 
Münzenberg’s ability to give more detailed information on the representation of the various 
countries. 
    Political Secretariat to Münzenberg,  
    8/2-1929   
   
The LAI had not managed to transcend from the stage of demonstration to organisation after the 
Brussels Congress in February 1927. In July 1928, Münzenberg concluded that the LAI’s impact 
and results had, at best, been moderate, however, this did not prevent him from wanting to create 
an international anti-imperialist “echo” during the “Second International Congress against 
Colonialism and Imperialism” in 1929.689 According to the LAI “Statutes”, the “governing body of 
the League shall be the International Congress, which shall meet biennially”; hence, this demanded 
that the International Secretariat begin the preparatory work for the congress in the beginning of 
1929. The question was, however, whether the LAI was capable of convening such a congress. The 
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters were receptive to the above and, as Arnot told 
Münzenberg in December 1928, much depended on the “attitude of the League of the Indian 
nationalists” [Nehru and Iyengar’s Independence for India League], the African National Congress 
(ANC) and the trade unions.690 However, Arnot had not given Münzenberg the entire picture: the 
LAI congress also depended upon the will and authority of the Political Secretariat. For 
Münzenberg, the second LAI congress had to follow his “own agenda”, yet, this was a scenario the 
Comintern chose to confront Münzenberg with.691 
      This chapter shares the same overarching theme as the one introduced in the previous chapter: 
to analyse the ideas and undertakings of the Comintern to organise, structure and control the 
colonial question. While the former chapter focused on the interactionist process of the “Colonial 
                                               
689 Münzenberg 1928, pp.4-10. 
690 RGASPI 542/1/31, 1-6, Statutes. League against Imperialism and for National Independence, International  
Secretariat, Berlin, 1927; RGASPI 542/1/25, 71-72, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 10/12-1928. 
691 RGASPI 542/1/30, 1, [Handwritten] Letter from Arnot, Frankfurt a/M, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 3/1-1929. 
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Conference”, this chapter focuses on how the Comintern prepared the “Second International 
Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism”. Initially scheduled to convene in Paris, the 
International Secretariat was forced, by external causes, to re-schedule and relocate the July 
congress to the Zoological Gardens in Frankfurt am Main, where it opened on 21 July and ended 
on 27 July. The main question to answer is how and why the decision-makers at Comintern 
headquarters expected to create their own version of an anti-imperialist utopia? The fundamental 
difference between the expectations of the “Colonial Conference” and the LAI Congress was that 
the former strove to correct the failure among the European communist parties to carry out any 
colonial work, while the latter expected to fulfil the visions of the LAI and its International 
Secretariat, i.e. to make the leap from demonstration to becoming an international mass 
organisation. However, this had the reverse effect on the LAI and, instead, the second LAI 
congress announced the increase in and exertion of control over the International Secretariat by the 
Comintern. In fact, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters resolved to steer the 
preparations for the LAI Congress in a completely different direction than the one envisioned by 
the International Secretariat. The process in itself contained elements of anticipation and 
expectation as well as of coercion and isolation. The aim of the following narrative is two-fold: 
firstly, to re-construct and introduce the authoritative leaders, functionaries and departments in 
Moscow involved in preparing the congress and, secondly, to discuss and evaluate the methods 
and strategies used by the Comintern in relation to this event. Above all, the discussion will be 
focused on why the Comintern decided to strengthen its control over the International Secretariat 
during this “third period”. In conclusion, a detailed study of the Frankfurt Congress and its 
proceedings will analyse how the LAI was forced to undergo a change at its second international 
congress in 1929. 
 
The preparatory work for the congress was commenced at the same time in 1929 as the 
international communist movement was facing and dealing with considerable internal turbulence.  
As described in the previous chapter, the CPUSA fractional struggle was preoccupying the 
Comintern apparatus, and consumed much of the political and administrative strength at 
Comintern headquarters in Moscow. The conflict was a part of the ideological confusion which 
had evolved after the Sixth Comintern Congress, which had left both the communist parties and 
the mass and sympathising organisations feeling confused about how to act. For the LAI, with its 
ties to a communist movement that was subjecting itself to a new and more radicalised political 
discourse, colonial work was an issue which faced harsh scrutiny in 1929, especially in connection 
with Arnot’s investigation. Additionally, a series of other incidents and episodes placed extra 
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burdens upon the shoulders of an already troubled international communist movement. In 1928, 
the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Union had resolved to put an end to the NEP policy, thus, in 
1929; the Soviet state was rushing towards the realisation of a rapid industrialisation and 
collectivisation of its society. The economic drive of the first Five-Year-Plan (1928 – 1932) 
resulted in drastic societal consequences, characterised by widespread famine and a large-scale 
repression of its population. This was a vision supported by ideological conviction and moral 
impetus, endorsed by the Soviet top strata, with the Soviet state authorising and carrying out the 
persecution of specific social groups within the Soviet Union; e.g. the wealthy peasant class 
(kulaks) was labelled as enemies of the state. The milieu of antagonism was also looking inwards, 
with Bukharin’s end as an influential ideological actor within the CPSU (B) and the Comintern in 
1929 being a typical example.692  
      In Germany, the scandal of the “Wittorf Affair” in September 1928, exposed internal cracks 
within the KPD, including accusations of corruption and fractional struggle, matters which put the 
spotlight on the party leader, Ernst Thälmann. However, this “affair” did not cause any clear 
disruption in the relations between the KPD and the CPSU (B). According to Bert Hoppe, this 
affair signified the start of a stricter control by the Comintern apparatus over the ZK KPD, 
particularly once Stalin had decided to give Thälmann his personal support. The second episode 
was the May Day celebration in Berlin 1929, better known as “Berlin’s Bloody May” (Berliner 
Blutmai), a violent commotion for all to see on the streets of Berlin, which sent tremors throughout 
the German communist movement after 31 people were killed in the riots and 1,200 confined to 
prison.693 May Day was an event traditionally arranged under the patronage of the German trade 
unions and the SPD, which the KPD had chosen to support; however, in 1929, the political context 
in Germany had assumed a different character. According to the principles of “the new line”, as 
noted in the instructions from the ECCI to the KPD, the party was to organise an independent 
demonstration on 1 May: “this year the proletarian vanguard will have to break through the 
barbed-wire barriers which the bourgeoisie have erected to prevent the May Day celebrations. […] 
the social democrats are doing everything to stop the workers from pouring into the streets on May 
Day […] this year [is] one with the task of organising the struggle on the streets”.694 On 1 May, the 
Berlin police responded to the KPD’s demonstration with brute force, ending in increased 
                                               
692 The rush towards industrialization and collectivization in the Soviet Union and Bukharin’s fall from grace is  
Outlined in, e.g. Acton & Stableford 2005, pp.263-329. Priestland’s analysis (2007) illustrates the mobilization of 
Soviet society to correspond with the expectations meted out by Stalin and his cohorts, while Fitzpatrick’s (1999) 
narrative provides an understanding of everyday life in Soviet society and Paul Hagenloh’s detailed study, Stalin’s 
Police. Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926-1941 (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, 
2009) focuses on the repressive measures carried out by Soviet state authorities. 
693 Hoppe 2007, pp.31-33, 141-146. 
694 Prior to the May Day celebrations, the Berlin police had adopted a decree prohibiting the organising of public  
communist meetings. The motive for this was to restrict and avoid public disturbances, Degras vol.III 1965, p.26. 
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antagonism from the communists. The leader of the WEB in Berlin, “Felix”/Manuilsky, published 
a public protest on 5 May, “Aufruf des Westeuropäischen Büros der Kommunistischen 
Internationale zu den Berliner Ereignissen”, a document re-edited and published in Inprecorr on 7 
July.695 “Berliner Blutmai” did not, however, stop the KPD from convening its Twelfth Party 
Congress in the working-class district of Wedding in Berlin on 5-10 May. In fact, this KPD 
congress was the final legal meeting of its kind during the Weimar years. At the congress, the KPD 
declared its solidarity with the Soviet Union and with Stalin’s leadership. Gross later wrote that 
Münzenberg had delivered a speech in salute of Stalin as the undisputed and ardent defender of 
socialism, stating how the KPD expected to follow “as one together with French communists, the 
English communists, with the Russian revolution, […] in its support of Stalin’s leadership”.696 
      For Münzenberg, 1929 was a hectic year, characterised by an increased workload and 
continued antagonism from the SPD. The second international LAI congress was one of many 
projects on Münzenberg’s agenda, with other events, e.g. the “Anti-Fascist Congress”, being 
political projects of a similar magnitude, in which Münzenberg collaborated together with the 
WEB and Manuilsky in Berlin. Before this congress, for “conspiratorial reasons” (aus 
konspirativen Gründen) the organisers circulated a rumour that the congress would be convened in 
Brussels, not in Berlin. The primary aim for doing this was to cause confusion amongst the 
European national security services and within the socialist movement. According to the report of 
the ECCI Information Department in Moscow, completed after the congress on 25 April, those 
attending the “Anti-Fascist Congress” included 234 communists, 13 social democrats, 225 trade 
unionists, 4 anarchists and 55 non-party individuals.697 The German social democratic movement 
nevertheless tried to curtail Münzenberg’s enthusiasm, particularly the SPD leader Eugene Präger, 
who accused the “Münzenberg Konzern” of using dubious methods to conceal the LAI’s true 
nature as a centre for communist activities, with Münzenberg’s LAI contacts being an obvious 
                                               
695 RGASPI 499/1/14, 1-3, Aufruf des Westeuropäischen Büros der Kommunistischen Internationale zu den Berliner  
Ereignissen, Brüssel, den 5 Mai 1929, WEB Büro der Kommunistischen Internationale; Degras vol.III 1965, 23-27. 
On July 7, Inprecorr (No.22, p.473) published a manifesto, signed by the WEB, in response to the bloody May Day 
demonstrations. The WEB declared its “Solidarity with the German Workers” and accused the “social democratic 
Chief of Police”, Karl Zörgiebel, of having sanctioned the use of violence against the demonstration: “For several 
days, police gangs made brutal attacks on the working class population, they opened fire on houses without the least 
provocation, armoured motorcars endangered the streets, they used their rifles against the wives and mothers of the 
workers standing on the balconies, they pursued passers-by and brutally ill-treated them. The modern achievements of 
military technique; armoured cars, aeroplanes, searchlights were brought into play to restore law and order in the 
rebellious districts. This was the revenge of the Berlin social democrats for the loss of workers’ votes at the recent 
factory council elections”. For the quote above, see fol. RGASPI 499/1/18, 13-15 (copy of the article). 
696 Gross 1967, p.220; Degras vol. III 1965, p.28. 
697 Count Michael Karolyi, Fritz Heckert and Ledebour delivered speeches at this congress. After the congress,  
Münzenberg observed that the event had been a demonstration of how syndicalist, anarchist, social democratic, 
pacifist, democratic groups and left-wing radicals could unite into an anti-fascist movement, fol. RGASPI 495/33/203, 
107, Informationsabteilung des EKKI, Bericht Nr.812, Moscow, 25/4-1929; RGASPI 495/33/203, 131-178, Report on 
the Anti-Fascist Congress in Berlin, Information Department of the ECCI, 27/4-1929; Degras vol.III 1965, p.23, 26. 
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example of this. Präger’s criticism was an expression of the SPD-organised anti-communist 
campaign in 1929, referred to as “Gegen die Kommunisten” (Against the Communists) and 
“Gegen Moskau” (Against Moscow), which strove to disrupt the KPD’s political arena in 
Germany. Münzenberg chose to give Präger an explanation, declaring that his position within the 
LAI was in the role of a “secretary”, not as a representative for the IAH, but rather as a 
representative of the KPD in his capacity as M.d.R [Mitglied des Reichstag]. In conclusion, the 
LAI Executive had complete control over the organisation.698 
      It was the political impact and longevity of the Meerut Conspiracy Trial in India, however, 
which became the centrepiece of LAI propaganda in 1929, particularly for the British LAI Section. 
The Meerut trial was the result of the British colonial authorities in India deciding to arrest thirty-
one leaders of the Indian labour movement in March, charged with conspiracy against the King. 
This trial would assume both a symbolic and a huge role in developing the activities for the anti-
imperialist movement in both Europe and India. According to Milton Israel, the Meerut trial 
resembled a remedial response by the British mandate in the Indian Raj to “obtain maximum 
propaganda advantage for its anti-communist, anti-terrorist campaign” with the arrest of well-
known left-wing activists, communists, trade unionists and members of the INC. What was the 
background leading up to these arrests? The cotton mill industry in India was experiencing an 
extensive and protracted strike which had lasted about six months. In March 1929, the Millowners’ 
Association in Bombay and Calcutta had no other option than to appeal to the British government 
“to rid them of the nuisance” caused by the strike.699 Once news of the arrests had begun to 
circulate, Bridgeman contacted Münzenberg on 20 March, to inform him that the British LAI 
Section had addressed the question at a special session in London, with a decision having been 
made to publish a public protest in “the press” against the British authorities in India. Additionally, 
in India, Nehru contacted Chatto as well as Bridgeman with the request to see whether it would be 
possible to organise solidarity demonstrations in the German and British trade unions in support of 
their fellow Indian colleagues.700 Münzenberg passed on this intelligence from Bridgeman to 
Kuusinen, promising that the LAI aimed to establish “a large campaign” in Europe “in support of 
the arrested”. Once the Eastern Secretariat had approved the idea and co-ordinated the details of 
                                               
698 Willi Münzenberg, “Unser Konzern I“, in Der Rote Aufbau, II. Jahrg., Berlin, Juli 1929, pp.97-107; Gross 1967,  
p.211; TNA PRO KV2/772, Secret information regarding W. Münzenberg, 25/9-1929. 
699 Israel 1994, p.261; Spratt 1955, pp.47-58; John Saville, “The Meerut Trial, 1929-1933, in Dictionary of Labour  
Biography. Volume VII, Bellamy & Saville (eds.) Macmillan Press, London, 1984, pp.84-90. Spratt was one of the 
arrested. 
700 RGASPI 542/1/33, 6, (“Übersetzung”) Letter from R. Bridgeman, London, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 23/3-1929. For  
Nehru’s letter to Chatto (June 20, 1929), see Israel (1994, p.261). According to Nehru, the “Meerut Conspiracy Trial” 
forced the British populace to recognise the extent of the LAI’s influence in India, but the LAI propaganda had also 
“frightened away the timid folk of the TUC”. For Nehru, the Meerut trial was a case that offered an opportunity to 
develop contacts with and use the LAI to create anti-colonial propaganda, contacting, for example, Bridgeman to 
suggest the organisation of solidarity demonstrations in London to declare its support for the Indian workers’. 
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the campaign with the International Secretariat, Münzenberg expected to locate the centre for the 
Meerut conspiracy trial campaign in London, under the leadership of Maxton and Bridgeman. In 
Germany, the International Secretariat intended to collect signatures from prominent left-wing 
intellectuals in support of the campaign.701 The socio-political setting at the beginning of 1929, 
right up until the opening of the second LAI congress in July, was not comparable to the situation 
in 1926-27 and, most importantly of all; the road to the Frankfurt Congress began and ended in 
Moscow. 
 
* 
 
Mobilising the Structure: Institutional and Individual Actors  
The concept of the second LAI congress evolved around three particular factors: time, location and 
the invention of a strategy to maintain control. On 8 February, the Political Secretariat held a 
meeting to discuss when the LAI congress should convene, proposing to Münzenberg, who was 
attending the meeting in Moscow, that 21-31 July was a possible date.702 Vague directives and 
opinions on behalf of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters during the initial phase of 
preparing the LAI Congress, contributed to the characterization of the second LAI congress as “a 
work in progress”. Thus, it is of the utmost relevance to delineate a series of chronological events 
linked to the organisation of this congress: 
Enquiry from Arnot to Münzenberg   10 December 1928 
Letter from Arnot to Kuusinen   16 January 1929 
Approval of the Political Secretariat   8 February 1929 
Meeting of the “Eastern Secretariat Commission of the LAI” 30 March 1929 
First meeting of the “Commission on the LAI”  3 May 1929 
Second meeting of the “Commission on the LAI”  22 May 1929 
Meeting of the “Sub-committee”   5 June 1929 
Third (extended) meeting of the “Commission on the LAI” 18 June 1929  
Meeting of the ECCI Standing Commission  6 July 1929 
Tenth ECCI Plenum, Moscow   3-19 July 1929 
Meeting of the LAI Executive, Frankfurt am Main  20 July 1929 
Second International Congress Against Imperialism  
and Colonial Oppression, Frankfurt am Main  21-28 July 1929 
 
The dates above represent the chronological structure of the congress, also indicating that the 
preparatory work was not a static process, but rather an interactionist process focused on 
                                               
701 On March 20, the British LAI Section decided to release a manifesto demanding that every British labour  
organisation express sympathy for the Meerut prisoners, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 25-26, Letter from Münzenberg, 
Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 25/3-1929. 
702 RGASPI 495/3/89, 365, Protocol from a meeting of the Polit-Secretariat of the ECCI, Moscow, 8/2-1929. Present 
at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Petrovsky, Münzenberg, Bell, Pollitt, Gusev, Chitarow, Heller, 
Melnitschansky, Figatner, Gerich and Heimo. For a copy of the protocol (English translation), see fol. RGASPI 
495/20/722, 45-46. 
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developing correlating relationships. From here, we need to discover how and when the actors, 
individuals and departments at Comintern headquarters became involved in the preparations for 
the LAI congress, with a number of different commissions being established on the initiative of the 
Political Secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow. The organisational procedure followed 
its own inherent logic, determined by the hierarchies of relations within the Comintern apparatus, 
an evaluation which focused on discerning the direction of the communications links (decisions, 
directives and assignments) within the structure. Additionally, this also discloses the 
interactionism, relations and authority between the actors from top to bottom and from bottom to 
top during the preparation of the second LAI congress.703 Below are two tables which illustrate the 
links and ties in this process. The first table, “The Second LAI Congress: Institutional Actors”, 
focuses on the hierarchical relations between various commissions and some of the secretariats 
within the Comintern, while the second table, “The Nerve Centre: The ‘Commission on the LAI’ 
and the ‘Sub-Committee’”, focuses its attention on the individual members within the 
commissions. The tables also mention the duration of the commissions (as far as it has been 
possible to do so), with arrows defining the direction of the links of communication from a 
hierarchical perspective. For example, the “Sub-Committee” had an authoritative position over the 
“Commission on the LAI”, however, the “Sub-Committee” had to carry out the directives of the 
Political Secretariat or the Small Commission. Dotted lines denote either an unverified tie, e.g. the 
link between the Political Secretariat and the “Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission”, or a 
process of transformation, e.g. the “Eastern Secretariat Commission on the LAI” and the 
“Commission on the LAI”, 
 
Table 7.1: The Frankfurt Congress – Institutional Actors in Moscow, 30/3-27/6-1929 
 
                                               
703 The empirical sources, documents filed in a dossier in the fond “Raznye komissii IKKI” (ECCI Temporary  
Commissions), consisting of protocols, drafts of resolutions and correspondence, illustrate every step of the political 
and organisational preparations and, above all, the fact that the preparatory work was an undertaking contrived, 
administered and put into practice at Comintern headquarters. 
Political 
Secretariat 
”Commission on the 
LAI”  
(3/5 – July, 1929) 
Eastern 
Secretariat 
”Editorial 
Commission” 
(3/5- 28/6-1929) 
”Sub-committee” 
(3/5 – 5/6-1929) 
”Molotov-
Gusev-Kuusinen 
Commission”  
(? – May, 1929) 
ECCI VKP 
(B) [?] 
”LAI Political 
Commission” 
(5/4 – 14/4-1929) 
”Eastern Secretariat 
Commission on the 
LAI” (30/3-1929) 
”Preparing 
Commission” 
(8/2 – 15/2-
1929) 
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In total, six commissions and one committee assisted with the work of planning and preparing the 
LAI congress, at various stages along the way.704 The “Commission on the LAI”, despite being 
located lower down in the hierarchy, was the operative centre in the direction of the administrative 
and political work, e.g. the gathering of intelligence, the co-ordination of those responsible for 
completing the agenda and resolutions for the congress, and the budget. A dotted line between the 
“Eastern Secretariat Commission on the LAI” and the “Commission on the LAI” suggests a 
transformation, at some stage, between these two commissions. On 3 May, the Eastern Secretariat 
received an instruction from the Political Secretariat to establish the “Commission on the LAI” to 
direct the preparatory work of the congress, while the “Eastern Secretariat Commission on the 
LAI” was to function as a consultative, temporary commission laying down the theoretical 
foundation for the event in March 1929. The “Commission on the LAI” had Arnot as leader, 
working together with Kuusinen, Wassiljew, the German communist Arthur Ewert, the functionary 
of the CPSU (B) Yuriy Petrovich Figatner (1889-1937)705 and the Profintern delegate Josefovitsch. 
The “Sub-Committee” represented an authoritative organ over the “Commission on the LAI”, as 
well as functioning as its communicative link to the Political Secretariat. The primary function of 
the “Sub-Committee” was to assess and discuss the work carried out by both the “Commission on 
the LAI” and the “Editorial Commission”.706 The members of this committee were authoritative 
actors within the Comintern apparatus: Piatnitsky, Arnot (re-assigned in May), Melnitschansky, the 
Profintern delegate, Johnson, and Bittelman (as Arnot’s replacement).707 
      Secrecy still surrounds the “Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission”. On 3 January 1929, 
Arnot told Münzenberg to get in contact with “the commission” in Moscow if he wanted 
additional information on its attitude towards the LAI congress. The question is, however, whether 
Arnot was referring here to the “Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen” commission. The fact that the 
“Commission on the LAI” did not exist at this time does suggest that he was referring either to the 
“Eastern Secretariat Commission on the LAI” or to the “Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission”. 
Additionally, on May 9, Arnot mentioned the “Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission” in a letter 
to “Max” [Petrovsky], telling him that the “commission is nearly at an end”.708 However, it is also 
possible that this commission was devoting itself to solving the fractional struggle of the CPUSA; 
                                               
704 The analysis of the protocols of the “Commission on the LAI”, the Small Commission, the Standing Commission  
and the Political Secretariat discloses the hierarchical position of the individuals, located either in commissions or 
committees. 
705 “Figatner, Yuriy Petrovich”, in Schulz, Urban & Lebed (eds.), 1972, p.165. 
706 The “Commission on the LAI” knew of the “Sub-Committee”, although it is plausible to assume that the committee  
did not inform the commission of their discussions. Furthermore, the “Editorial Commission” was a sub-section of the 
“Commission on the LAI”; see fol. RGASPI 495/60/134a, 37, Minutes of the organisation sub-committee for the 
preparation of the LAI congress, Moscow, 5/6-1929. 
707 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of meeting of Commission of the LAI, Moscow, 3/5-1929. 
708 RGASPI 542/1/30, 1, (Handwritten) Letter from Robin Page Arnot, Frankfurt a/M, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 3/1- 
1929; RGASPI 542/1/30, 40, Note from R.P. Arnot, Moscow, to “Max”/Petrovsky, Moscow, 9/5-1929. 
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yet, at the same time, it is also possible that Molotov, Gusev and Kuusinen were assisting in 
formulating the ideological strategy of the LAI Congress as well as that of the “Colonial 
Conference”. The “Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission” probably had information on the 
status of the colonial work within the communist movement in 1929, especially if one considers 
the intimate collaboration between Arnot and Kuusinen, thus, this does suggest the following 
assumption: that the “Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission” was the link to Stalin on matters 
relating to the LAI and its second congress, particularly if one takes into account the fact that 
Molotov had an informal, yet authoritative position within the Comintern in 1929, acting incognito 
as the Chairman of the Comintern after the Sixth Comintern Congress, later described as “Stalin’s 
lieutenant” within the ECCI. Moreover, Sergei Ivanovich Gusev (1874 – 1933, known pseudonym: 
Travin), was the representative of the RCP (B) [CPSU (B)] within the ECCI.709 Thus, whether or 
not the “Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission” ever discussed or assisted in the process of 
preparing the LAI Congress, it is logical to suggest that this commission was the communicative 
channel to Stalin on LAI matters. 
      The “Preparatory Commission” existed for only a week. According to the Political Secretariat's 
instructions, the primary purpose of this commission was to evaluate the ideological tendency 
within the LAI, determine the geographical spread of the organisation in order to decide upon 
“tasks, necessary measures that need to be taken in preparing the congress, date of congress, 
resolutions and so forth”.710 Kuusinen acted as leader who, together with Münzenberg, Petrovsky, 
Lozovsky, the KIM representative Rafael Moiseevich Khitarov, Gusev, Piatnitsky and Josefovitsch 
assessed the nature of the LAI.711 Furthermore, the “LAI Political Commission” was a 
plenipotentiary constellation which aimed “to enforce” the Political Secretariat’s dictates on the 
non-communist members of the LAI Executive, especially on the question of the congress agenda. 
Arnot was the leader of this commission, assisted by Münzenberg, Bittelman, Melnitschansky as 
well as the Polish communist and Profintern representative Vitkovsky (real name: Adam Landy-
Witkowski; 1891 – 1937).712 
                                               
709 For Gusev, see Lazitch 1986, pp.160-161. For Molotov’s role in the Comintern, see Rosenfeldt 2009, p.203 and  
Derek Watson, Molotov. A Biography, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, p.86. Molotov became a member of the 
ECCI in 1926. 
710 RGASPI 495/3/86, 54, Protokoll No.22 der Sitzung des Politsekrt. am Freitag, Moscow, 8/2-1929. Present at the  
meeting were:  Barbé, Chitarow, Ulbricht, Kuusinen, Piatnitsky, Humbert-Droz, Lozovsky, Gusev, Ewert, Bela Kun, 
Kolarev, Moirova, Schubin, Heimo, Wassiljew, Wurm, Martinov, Mif, Münzenberg, Misiano, Stasova and Wolfe. 
711 “Khitarov, Rafail Moiseyevich (1901 – ?)” in Schulz, Urban & Andrew I. Lebed (eds.) 1972, p.269. Ralph Talcott  
Fisher, Jr.'s study of the Komsomol states that Khitarov was a stern believer in enforcing the policy of “class against 
class” in 1929. For example, Khitarov “completely renovated” the KIM leadership in Germany, and had publicly 
renounced Trotsky and the United Opposition in 1928-29, Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr., Pattern for Soviet Youth. A Study of 
the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p.177. 
712 RGASPI 495/20/722, 26-27, Preparations for the Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League meeting in Moscow,  
Polit. Secretariat, 5/4-1929. 
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      Despite its short existence, the “Commission on the LAI” nevertheless faced a frequent 
interchange of its members, relying extensively on instructions from the “Sub-Committee”, 
comprising Arnot, Bittelman, Khitarov, Figatner, Johnson, Piatnitsky, the representative of the 
Russian “International Secretariat for Work Among Women” Varvara Akimovna Moirova and the 
Mexican communist leader Manuel Diaz Ramirez.713 
 
Table 7.2: The Nerve Centre: The “Commission on the LAI” and the “Sub-Committee” 
 
 
Twenty-eight individuals at the headquarters of the Comintern were, at some stage, involved in 
preparing the LAI congress, an organisational structure focusing on factors such as obedience, 
dependency and the flexibility of the Comintern apparatus. For the Comintern, the second LAI 
congress was a pivotal event for the colonial issue within the international communist movement. 
The question is how and why did this come to be so? Furthermore, under what pretext did the 
commissions in Moscow develop a strategy to control the congress, and why did the decision-
makers deliberately endorse turning the LAI congress into a scene of political controversy? 
                                               
713 “Moyrova, Varvara Akimovna (1890 – 1951)”, in Schulz, Urban & Lebed (eds.) 1972, pp.397-398. 
“Eastern Secretariat 
Commission on the 
LAI” 
30/3-1929 
“Commission on the 
LAI” 
3/5 – July 1929 
Meeting, Moscow, 
30/3-1929 
Arnot 
Ewert 
Figatner 
Kuusinen 
Wassiljew 
Josefovitch  
Nomination & First 
meeting, Moscow, 
3/5-1929: 
Arnot 
Figatner 
Bittelman 
Khitarov 
Johnson 
Piatnitsky 
Moirova 
Ramirez 
(Absent): 
Barbé 
Strakhov/Chü Chiu-
pai 
Williams 
Second Meeting, 
Moscow, 22/5 
Bittelman 
Kuusinen 
Piatnitsky 
Moirova 
Manuilsky 
Lozovsky 
Bela Kun 
Schubin 
Melnitschansky 
Strakhov/Chü 
Chiu-pai 
Kitaigorodsky 
Freyer 
Mif 
“Sub-
committee”, 
3/5-5/6-1929 
Piatnitsky 
Arnot 
Bittelman 
Melnitschansky 
Johnson 
Omitted: 
Ewert 
Wassiljew 
Josefovitch 
Omitted: 
Arnot 
Figatner 
Johnson  
Williams 
Barbé 
Khitarov 
Omitted: 
Arnot 
Last Conference, 
Moscow, 18/6 
Bittelman 
Ramirez 
Piatnitsky 
Moirova 
Manuilsky 
Schubin 
Melnitschansky 
Kitaigorodsky 
Freyer 
Mif 
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      At the International Secretariat in Berlin, the political and administrative space had become a 
place of restriction as a result of the increased Comintern control, particularly in relation to getting 
involved in preparations for the congress. Yet, in the beginning of 1929, before the preparatory 
work had even started in Moscow, the Eastern Secretariat still had no idea of the size and scope of 
either the LAI or its transcontinental network. 
 
* 
 
Theoretical Ramifications and Practical Implications  
The Political Secretariat wanted Münzenberg “to provide more detailed information on the 
representation [of the LAI] in various countries”. This intelligence was behind the decision to 
grant the LAI permission to convene either a large congress or a smaller conference. At the 
meeting on 8 February, Petrovsky nonetheless objected to the idea of arranging a LAI congress on 
21-30 July, suggesting putting everything on hold ad infinitum in order to gain time to analyse the 
character of the global anti-imperialist movement, as well as the organisational spread of the 
LAI.714 For Münzenberg, the instruction from the Political Secretariat meant that there was a need 
to establish a clear understanding of the LAI’s transcontinental contacts. 
      Münzenberg returned to Berlin after completing the work with the “Preparatory Commission” 
in Moscow and, together with Chatto, examined a document listing the affiliated or associated 
organisations which the International Secretariat had drawn up in December 1928.715 Rather 
quickly Münzenberg and Chatto realised that the document was not representative nor, for that 
matter, was it adequate to meet the expectations of either the Eastern Secretariat or the Political 
Secretariat, particularly as the document did not include any contacts with national revolutionary 
trade unions in the colonies. Thus, by mid-February, they had completed a new document, “Kurze 
Übersicht über die Tätigkeit des Internationalen Sekretariats, der Sektionen und angeschlossenen 
Sektionen” (A Short Outline of the Activity of the International Secretariat, the Sections and 
Affiliated Members) depicting the entire scope of the LAI and its transcontinental network. 
According to Münzenberg and Chatto, the Eastern Secretariat should approach the report from a 
quantitative perspective, bearing in mind that the LAI by now had 204 “affiliated, associated and 
sympathising organisations” as members.716 This report arrived in Moscow in March, and was the 
                                               
714 RGASPI 495/20/722, 22, Protocol from a meeting with the Political Secretariat of the ECCI, Moscow, 8/2-1929;  
For Petrovsky’s point of view, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/86, 174, Vorschläge des Genossen Petrovsky, Moscow, 8/2-
1929; RGASPI 495/18/740, 4, An den Genossen Münzenberg: Die Beschlüsse über Kolliga lauten, Moscow, Political 
Secretariat, February, 1929. 
715 RGASPI 542/1/26, 99-102, Liga gegen Imperialismus. Angeschlossene und sympathisierende Organisationen,  
December, 1928; RGASPI 542/1/26, 74-87. 
716 In December 1928, the International Secretariat completed the first draft of the list, see RGASPI 542/1/26, 99-102.  
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fundamental source which shaped the basic structure of the congress. From Münzenberg’s 
perspective, the report was a statement expressly urging the decision-makers in Moscow to 
understand that the International Secretariat nourished the ambition to organise an impressive anti-
imperialist congress. Hence, this required the Comintern to be willing to provide financial support, 
Münzenberg concluded. In the “temporary budget”, compiled by Münzenberg and despatched to 
Kuusinen on 18 March, Münzenberg expected the Comintern to finance the travel expenses for 
colonial delegations, the printing of congress material and to fund public LAI meetings in Europe 
and USA prior to the congress. Additional costs were administrative costs (food, printed material, 
telegrams, opening ceremony and unforeseen expenses) and the establishment of an administrative 
apparatus (interpreters, press agency, congress secretariat and protocol bureau) in connection with 
the congress.717 
      The report drawn up by Münzenberg and Chatto indicates that the LAI had connections with 
organisations and individuals around the world: India, Goa, Ceylon, the British Mandate in 
Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Persia, Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, North Africa, South Africa, 
Mexico, the Caribbean, Latin and South America, USA, Great Britain, France, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Soviet Russia and Switzerland. With reference to China, the LAI had not 
succeeded in establishing any activity; however, its contacts with India looked far more promising. 
The connection between Chatto and Nehru was a channel into the INC, while the Independence for 
India League, as well as the communist Workers’ and Peasants’ Party, were distributing LAI 
propaganda in India. LAI contacts with the Indonesian liberation movement went primarily 
through Hatta and the PI in Europe; however, the International Secretariat had also provided 
financial support to print a Malaysian version of the LAI newsletter, Pressedienst, in the Dutch 
Indies in 1929. The LAI had few but “stable relations” in the Middle East and North Africa, e.g. 
Soubri, the leader of the socialist-biased Arab National Congress, had attended the LAI Executive 
meeting in Cologne in January, and intended to send a delegation to the congress. Chedli, the 
leader of the Étoile Nord-Africaine, was an “active representative” of the LAI in North Africa. 
However, the International Secretariat was awaiting some kind of response from the Egyptian 
nationalist organisation, Wafd, to its invitation to affiliate with the LAI. Gumede and the ANC 
maintained steady relations with the International Secretariat after the Brussels Congress and, 
across the Atlantic, LAI connections in Latin America were essentially focused on Mexico, relying 
on the capacity of three people: Federico Bach, Rivera, and the leader of the Mexican nationalist 
                                                                                                                                                          
The revised version was finished in February 1929, see IISG, 3392.1 LAI Collection, p.128, Affiliated, Associated and 
Sympathising Organisations. While the introduction in these documents is the same, the February version included 
more organisations. 
717 RGASPI 542/1/30, 21, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 18/3-1929; RGASPI 542/1/30, 22- 
23, Provisorisches Budget Antiimperialistischer Weltkongress, March, 1929. 
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army Augustino Sandino. In “the leading imperialist countries” in Europe (France and Great 
Britain) and the USA, the LAI sections acted as liaison centres for the anti-imperialist movement 
while, at the same time, co-ordinating and developing propaganda against imperialism. In the 
USA, from December 1928 till January 1929, the LAI section organised public rallies in New 
York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland and Washington, with a focus on a number of issues, e.g. Johnstone’s 
arrest in India and Italy (see previous chapter), the “treatment of 1,400 banana workers’ in 
Columbia, the “imperialist co-operation” of the USA and Great Britain in Latin America, the 
“Nicaragua-Politics” of the USA and the murder of Julio A. Mella in Mexico. In Europe, the 
French LAI Section was a source of trouble for the International Secretariat, a result of the severe 
surveillance by the Sûreté.718 Pressedienst introduced additional LAI contacts on 26 March, 1929, 
e.g. the Philippine Workers’ Party, Philippine Peasants’ Association, the leader of the National 
Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association in Great Britain Alex Gossip, the War Veterans’ 
International, the Teachers’ International (“Bildungsarbeiter”) and the Religious Socialist 
Association, while the Sportintern was planning to send a delegation to the congress.719 On 29 
December 1928, Münzenberg and Chatto contacted the Secretariat of the Sportintern in Moscow, 
requesting “a big delegation […] we expect a minimum of 10 men”. On 20 February 1929, the 
ECCI Standing Commission endorsed this request.720 Sportintern was only one of many mass and 
sympathising organisations Münzenberg wanted to invite to the congress, along with the Friends 
of Soviet Russia, the IAH, Profintern, the KIM and the Krestintern.721 The reason for involving 
these organisations was also to enable Münzenberg to use their networks. For example, 
Münzenberg wondered whether the general secretary of the Krestintern, Kornblum, would 
consider sending a delegation and, more importantly, be willing to spread the word on the LAI and 
its congress through the Krestintern network.722  
                                               
718 RGASPI 542/1/29, 65-71, Kurze Übersicht über die Tätigkeit des Internationalen Sekretariats der Sektionen und  
angeschlossenen Sektionen, Berlin, February, 1929. 
719 On 26 March, Pressedienst included the advertisement for the congress (in German): “Die Vorbereitungen zum  
antiimperialistischen Weltkongress (Anko). Welch großes Interesse für den Weltkongress, der im Juli in Paris 
stattfinden soll, vorhanden ist, beweisen die Anmeldungen der verschiedenen Organisationen, die bereits vorliegen. 
Sowohl aus den Kolonien wie auch aus den imperialistischen Ländern laufen Berichte von Versammlungen ein, in 
denen die Sendung von Delegierten beraten wurde. In letzter Zeit meldeten sich zur Teilnahme am Kongress folgende 
Organisationen an: Philippinische Arbeiter-Partei, Philippinischer Bauernverband, Möbelarbeiterverband 
Großbritanniens (N.A.F.T.A.), Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner, Internationale der Bildungsarbeiter, Rote 
Sportinternationale und der Verband der religiösen Sozialisten“, Pressedienst, Berlin, Nr. 12, 26/3-1929. 
720 RGASPI 495/7/6, 82, (Copie-Abschrift) Letter from Münzenberg and Chatto, Berlin, to Sportintern Secretariat,  
Moscow, 29/12-1928; RGASPI 495/7/6, 60-62, Protokoll No.30 der ständigen Kommission des Politsekrt. des. EKKI, 
Moscow, 20/2-1929. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Ulbricht, Bell, Heimo, Kachan, Barbé, Lebedewa, 
Kirsanova and Michael E. Kreps. 
721 RGASPI 542/1/30, 22-23, Provisorisches Budget Antiimperialistischer Weltkongress, March 1929. 
722 Münzenberg wanted Kornblum to confirm that he had received the congress invitation and whether the Krestintern  
would be able to send a “large delegation” to the congress, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 1, Letter from Münzenberg, 
Berlin, to Kornblum, the Krestintern secretariat, Moscow, 27/2-1929; RGASPI 535/1/212, 3, Letter from Münzenberg, 
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      LAI connections with both North Africa and South Africa were strong in comparison to the 
weak, almost non-existent contacts with organisations and individuals in Equatorial Africa. In an 
effort to solve this dilemma, Münzenberg instructed Olive Budden at the British LAI Section in 
London in February to listen to Arnot’s advice on the African question as he had “entered into 
communication with […] representatives from West Africa”. Hence, it was crucial for the LAI to 
continue its work to ensure that the West African contacts attended the congress.723 
      By mid-April, the International Secretariat had a list of 250 delegates from different social, 
political and cultural organisations in Europe and the USA who were planning to attend the 
congress. Delegates from the colonies and semi-colonies, e.g. ten delegates from India, fifteen 
Indonesians, ten Latin American delegates and fifteen delegates from Negro organisations had 
declared an intention to visit the congress. On 25 April, Pressedienst stated: 
The Second World Congress of the LAI will become the largest anti-imperialist 
demonstration ever […] to manifest the genuine front struggle, uniting revolutionary 
workers’ organisations in the capitalist countries with national revolutionary movements in 
the colonial and semi-colonial world […] To expose the need to fight against Imperialism, 
and connect the national revolutionary struggle […] to establish a strong national 
revolutionary movement.724 
The LAI’s transcontinental network was the result of individual connections administered at the 
International Secretariat, an undertaking under Chatto’s supervision. However, shortly after 
Münzenberg’s return from Moscow in February, Chatto informed Münzenberg that he would not 
be able to carry out the work demanded of him due to poor health, offering to resign as 
“International political secretary”, a request Münzenberg nevertheless turned down. Yet, in 
February, Chatto left Germany in order to recover his strength, travelling to Brussels where he 
remained for a couple of months. What was the reason for Chatto’s health problems and his sudden 
distress? These were essentially of a personal nature as, after Chatto had separated from his 
fiancée Agnes Smedley in 1928 and she had left for China in January 1929, Chatto suffered a 
nervous breakdown. Another factor contributing to Chatto’s distress was the constant surveillance 
by the Schutzpolizei in Berlin. British security services had also sent a request to German 
authorities to monitor Chatto’s activities in Berlin. Hence, this surveillance had forced Chatto to 
                                                                                                                                                          
Berlin to the Krestintern secretariat, Moscow, 21/3-1929; RGASPI 535/1/212, 6-7, Letter from Willi Münzenberg to 
Kornblum of the Krestintern in Moscow, 17/4-1929. 
723 TNA KV2/1783, (Intercepted) Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Budden, London, February 1929. Olive Budden  
was married to Robin Page Arnot; see Nigel West, MASK: MI5's Penetration of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 
Routledge, London, 2005, p.95. 
724 Pressedienst, “Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus“, Nr.13, 18/4-1929; Pressedienst, Nr.  
15, 25/4-1929. Arnot also included a reference to 250 delegates in his report on the LAI Executive meeting in 
Amsterdam, see fol. RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of Commission of the LAI meeting, Moscow, 
3/5-1929. 
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move to new lodgings in Berlin on a regular basis. On 23 January 1929, Chatto described his 
living conditions in a letter to Nehru: 
My health has been causing me some anxiety […] There are also a number of private 
difficulties of long standing with which I have to contend, and the fact that my position in 
Berlin was desperate […] I am now living under my own name, but find that this causes me 
innumerable difficulties with Governments. The French have now refused to give me a 
visa.725   
After Chatto had left Berlin, A. C. N. Nambiar assumed authority over the co-ordination and 
supervision of the activities of the “Indian Bureau” (see previous chapter). Chatto’s brief sojourn 
in Brussels lasted until the end of March, after which he returned to Berlin;726 however, he had to 
hide in a clandestine way in order to avoid the attention of the police. 
      Chatto’s temporary resignation caused confusion. As Münzenberg suspected that Chatto would 
be unable to carry out any work for the International Secretariat for an indefinite amount of time, 
the Political Secretariat had to appoint a suitable replacement, e.g. Bittelman, Emile Burns “or 
another candidate”. On 27 February, Münzenberg informed Kuusinen that Burns was the best 
candidate to assume Chatto’s position. Apparently, Münzenberg had met Burns at the International 
Secretariat in February and had asked him whether he would consider assisting the LAI in Berlin. 
For Münzenberg, Burns’ linguistic skills had convinced him that he was the most appropriate 
person, particularly as Burns spoke and read German, French, English and Russian fluently. 
Münzenberg nevertheless suggested, in order to appease the Central Committee of the CPGB, that 
Kuusinen should send a letter giving the impression that Münzenberg had not “simply stolen” 
Burns. In fact, Kuusinen should instruct the CPGB Secretariat in London that Burns’ “temporary” 
mission in Berlin was to assist the LAI with the preparation of its second congress.727 
 
* 
 
 
 
                                               
725 RGASPI 542/1/30, 18, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 27/2-1929; Barooah 2003, p.254,  
278, see footnote 38. This letter from Chatto to Nehru is located at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New 
Delhi, India. 
726 According to Israel, Chatto suspected the British Government of pressuring the Belgian authorities to expel him  
from the country, Israel 1994, p.260. 
727 RGASPI 542/1/30, 18, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 27/2-1929. The Colonial  
Commission of the CPGB approved the request to send Burns (together with his wife Eleanor) to Berlin to work at the 
International Secretariat on April 15. However, with Burns temporarily gone, the CPGB had to “strengthen [the] 
London Committee of the LAI”, nominating Nora Thomas from Hackney to act as secretary in the London office, see 
RGASPI 495/18/670, 97-98. In November 1932, Burns wrote his “Biography” (filed in his personal file in the 
Comintern Archive): “Germany (Berlin) in 1929, as one of the secretaries of the League against Imperialism (helping 
to organise the Frankfurt Congress of the League)”, see fol. RGASPI 495/198/11, 64-68, Biography of Emile Burns, 
author: Emile Burns, 11/1-1932. 
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The “Provisional Agenda”: Coercion and Staging the Plot  
 
We were similarly successful with other changes. I will now take the Agenda point by point 
and show what the alterations are. 
Arnot to the “Commission on the LAI”, 
Moscow, 3/5-1929 
 
Although Münzenberg had sent the list of LAI-affiliated organisations to the Eastern Secretariat, 
the preparatory work in Moscow was still up in the air. In the beginning of March, the only 
confirmed question was the date of the congress. For the International Secretariat, beginning the 
work of sending out information as well as propaganda about the congress was now top priority. 
Hence, the International Secretariat took the decision, under Münzenberg’s supervision, to 
circulate a “provisional agenda”, an unsanctioned initiative which resulted in the Eastern 
Secretariat accusing Münzenberg of negligence. Firstly, Münzenberg should have consulted the 
Eastern Secretariat prior to releasing the agenda and, secondly, the circulation of a “provisional 
agenda” was an ill-conceived act. Apparently, the release of the agenda placed the preparatory 
work under the authority of the Eastern Secretariat and, later, the “Commission on the LAI”. It was 
a question of control and coercion, with the decision-makers in Moscow striving to correct any 
behaviour which contradicted the intentions of the Comintern. This episode of the “provisional 
agenda” indicates that Comintern headquarters categorised its relation with the International 
Secretariat as secondary, with the release of the agenda precipitating the need to curtail any future, 
independent activity of the LAI apparatus in Berlin prior to the LAI congress. Why was this 
“provisional agenda” such a controversy? 
      The idea of a “provisional agenda” had been on the table since 1928. On 14 April 1928, the 
LAI Executive had endorsed the International Secretariat's proposal to locate the second LAI 
congress in Paris. Nevertheless, the International Secretariat had waited until September to release 
a circular letter728 informing the national sections and affiliated members (organisations, 
committees, individual members and sympathising friends [Freunde]) of this decision. The crux of 
the matter was that neither the Eastern Secretariat nor the Political Secretariat had approved the 
idea of locating the congress in Paris. When Münzenberg left Moscow in February 1929, the only 
thing he knew for certain was the date for the congress, while waiting to get the preparatory work 
under way. For the International Secretariat, the preparations had to commence at once in February 
and, aside from completing the list of affiliated organisations in Berlin, Chatto assisted 
                                               
728 RGASPI 542/1/27, 16-28, Protokoll der Sitzung des Exekutiv Komitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus am 28 April  
1928 nachmittags 2.30 in Brüssel; IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/66, An alle nationale Sektionen der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus, International Secretariat, Berlin, September, 1928. 
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Münzenberg in writing and beginning to send out invitations to the congress along with the 
“provisional agenda”. For example, the invitation and agenda reached both Kornblum, the KPD 
representative in the ECCI Walter Ulbricht, and the delegates of the Chinese Labour Association 
(Chinesischen Gewerkschaftsbundes) in Moscow.729 The leader of the West African Farmers’ 
Union (WAFU) in the Gold Coast I. K. Mensah, the South African nationalist organisation 
Lekhotla la Bafo (Sesotho for “Council of Commoners”) and its general secretary Maphutseng 
Lefela, as well as Carl Lindhagen also received invitations.730 By addressing the agenda as 
“provisional”, Münzenberg and Chatto had nevertheless acted with caution. Yet in the end, this 
was not enough to curb the irritated reaction amongst the decision-makers at Comintern 
headquarters in Moscow. Realising that the International Secretariat had circulated a “provisional 
agenda”, the “Eastern Secretariat Commission on the LAI” suspected that this operation had been 
entirely planned by Münzenberg, requesting that the Political Secretariat “reprimand Comrade 
Münzenburg [sic]”: 
[…] he sent out without previous consultation an agenda which opens up considerable 
political dangers, especially the preponderance of speakers of an anti-Communist colour 
(Cook, Dr. Pickens, etc.): and to warn him that any further instance of indiscipline will be 
more severely dealt with.731 
The public release of this “provisional agenda” literally infuriated the Eastern Secretariat, which 
stated that Münzenberg had shown poor political judgement in acting without permission. The 
Political Secretariat observed how the agenda, in general, exposed an “anti-communist colour”, 
thus, Münzenberg had deserved the personal warning. In April, at a meeting of the LAI Executive 
                                               
729 SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/185, 10, Short note from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Ulbricht, Hotel Lux/Moscow, 14/3-1929.  
Ulbricht was the KPD representative in the ECCI from December 1928 to December 1929; see Mario Frank, Walter 
Ulbricht. Eine deutsche Biographie, Siedler Verlag, Berlin, 2001, p.78; RGASPI 535/1/212, 1, Letter from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum/Krestintern, Moscow, 27/2-1929; RGASPI 542/1/33, 5, Letter from Münzenberg, 
Berlin, to the Sekretariat des Chinesischen Gewerkschaftsbundes, Moscow, 21/3-1929. 
730 RGASPI 535/1/208, 15-16, [Original] letter from the West African Farmers' Union/Mensah to The International  
Secretariat, League Against Imperialism, 24, Friedrichstrasse, Berlin SW 48, 20/3-1929. For a brief description of 
Lekhotla la Bafo, see Davidson et al. (2003). Mensah’s letter was, however, not the response the International 
Secretariat had expected, particularly his enquiry as to whether request the LAI could provide him with contacts to 
European individuals and organisations: “We shall therefore be glad if you [International Secretariat] will put us in 
touch with some influential individuals or group of European Gentlemen who are interested in the African and have 
his welfare at heart so that we may negotiate a possible understanding”, For Lindhagen's invitation, see SCA CL 
Collection volume 131. The document, “Provisional Agenda”, is located in the IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/68, 
Einladung zur Teilnahme am 2. Anti-Imperialistischen Weltkongress der Liga gegen Imperialismus in der Zeit vom 20. 
Juli bis 31. Juli 1929 in Paris. 
731 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 28, Protocol der Ostsekretariatskommission zur anti-imperialistischen Liga, 30/3-1929.  
Present at the meeting were Arnot as leader, Ewert, Figatner, Kuusinen, Wassiljew and Josefowitsch. The copy of the 
protocol in RGASPI 495/20/722, 26-27 (“Preparations for the Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League, meeting in 
Moscow, Polit. Secretariat, 5/4-1929”) states that the Political Secretariat endorsed its decision on 5 April. 
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in Amsterdam, Arnot gave the warning to Münzenberg, convincing him to agree to revise the 
agenda with “unanimity on almost all points”.732 
      The Eastern Secretariat feared that the LAI congress could evolve into a political 
demonstration outside the direct control of the Comintern. Thus, what had the “provisional 
agenda” proposed which had caused the Eastern Secretariat to react with such anger? Arnot stated 
that the agenda made it possible for non-communist elements to “break out” in unwanted political 
demonstrations, which would necessitate the presence of a “number of reporters who are 
Communists or party sympathisers” to meticulously observe the atmosphere at the congress “in 
view of the possibility of a sharp struggle at the Congress”. Hence, Arnot suggested enacting a 
coup at the congress, more specifically to turn the event into a demonstration in support of the 
“struggle of the workers and peasants” in India and China, as well as getting delegates from trade 
unions and colonial revolutionary organisations to dominate the proceedings.733 In comparison to 
the agenda of the 1927 Brussels Congress, this “provisional agenda” also revealed that the 
International Secretariat wanted to re-enact the Brussels Congress, i.e. by nominating well-known 
non-communist leaders to introduce the key speeches. For example, the Chairman of the LAI, 
Maxton, should, together with Barbusse, open the congress and lead the introductory ceremony, 
while individuals such as Pickens, Baldwin and Rivera would all have leading roles. This 
“provisional agenda” also included a minimum number of communist delegates, competing with 
socialists, social democrats and nationalists to chair the topics. For example, Melnitschansky 
would share the trade union question with A. J. Cook and the delegate of the South African Trade 
Union Congress William H. Andrews.734 Hence, by even including Cook on the agenda, the 
International Secretariat had committed a serious mistake, particularly considering the dispute in 
connection with the trade union debate at the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne back in January. 
                                               
732 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 28, Protocol der Ostsekretariatskommission zur anti-imperialistischen Liga, 30/3-1929. For  
the English version, see fol. RGASPI 495/20/722, 26-27 (which has, however, deleted the names). On 2 April, Arnot 
edited this protocol and sent it to the Political Secretariat; RGASPI 542/1/32, 49-51, Confidential report by R. P. 
Arnot, re. LAI Executive in Amsterdam, 13-14/4-1929. 
733 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 28, Protocol der Ostsekretariatskommission zur anti-imperialistischen Liga, 30/3-1929. 
734 The “provisional” agenda included the following topics and speakers (in parenthesis): 1. “The Unification of all  
Anti-Imperialist Groups and Organisations in the League against Imperialism” (Barbusse, Maxton); 2. “The All-India 
National Congress, the All-India Trade Union Congress and their Role in the National-Revolutionary Struggle” (no 
suggested speaker); 3. “The Nanking Government, the Kuomintang and their Attitude to the Anti-Imperialist 
Movement in China” (Madame Sun Yat-sen); 4. “The Latest Stage of the National-Revolutionary Struggle in 
Indochina, Indonesia and the Philippines” (no suggested speaker); 5. “The Necessity of a Joint Struggle of all Arabian 
Countries against Imperialism” (no suggested speaker); 6. “The Struggle of the Persian People against Imperialist 
Aggression” (no suggested speaker); 7. “The Struggle for the Emancipation of the Negroes in Africa and America” 
(Professor W. Pickens); 8. “The Struggle of Latin-America against British and North American Imperialisms” (Roger 
Baldwin & Diego Rivera); 9. “The Tasks of the Trade Unions in the Struggle against Imperialism” (A. J. Cook, 
Melnitschansky, W. H. Andrews); 10. “The Social, Political and Economic Situation of Women in the Colonial and 
Semi-Colonial Countries” (Madame Duchene, Helene Stöcker); 11. “Two Years of the League against Imperialism, 
being a political and organisational report of the activity of the League” (Willi Münzenberg); 12, “Organisational 
Questions”; 13. “Miscellaneous”, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 42-42b, Invitation to the Second Anti-Imperialist World 
Congress (English version), February, 1929. For the German version, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 4-5b. 
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While the decision-makers had been waiting to begin the preparatory work for the LAI congress in 
Moscow, the release of this “provisional agenda” precipitated a reaction to enforce “the new line” 
on the LAI and the congress. In fact, the Comintern did not intend to turn the event into a euphoric 
demonstration, like the one held in Brussels in 1927. 
      The Political Secretariat consequently sanctioned the decision to establish the “LAI Political 
Commission”, appointing Arnot as its leader, a commission which aimed to fulfil two special 
purposes: on the one hand, to prepare ideological guidelines for the LAI Executive meeting in 
Amsterdam on 13-14 April and, on the other hand, to correct the damage done in connection with 
the publication of the “provisional agenda”. The “LAI Political Commission” met for the first time 
in Berlin, prior to departing for Amsterdam. In Berlin, Arnot told Münzenberg of the necessity to 
revise the agenda, especially with a focus on “the struggle of the workers and peasants in the 
Indian revolution”. Thus, this demanded the nomination of “speakers from the Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Party” capable of responding to Nehru should he choose to attend the congress. The 
congress would also be a perfect opportunity, according to Arnot, to protest against the KMT and 
to denounce the LSI as an “Imperialist ally”.735 
      In Amsterdam, only a few LAI Executive members managed to attend the meeting. According 
to Arnot, the session included Chatto, Bridgeman, Saklatvala, Hatta, Fimmen, Münzenberg, 
Bridgeman, Vitkovsky and Melnitschansky. Prior to the meeting, Münzenberg realised that he 
needed Fimmen’s moral support to carry out the directives given to him by Arnot, and he asked 
Fimmen to make the necessary changes to the agenda, a decision Arnot later described as having 
been wise as it had meant that a debate on the revised agenda had been avoided.736 Yet, the 
communists dominated the meeting in Amsterdam and, therefore, Fimmen’s performance was 
merely a symbolic act. Apparently, the small print of the congress details and the agenda were 
issues settled once the LAI Executive meeting was over, when the “LAI Political Commission” 
gathered for a final session, to discuss the work of solving the political, administrative and budget 
issues for the congress. Arnot returned to Moscow and, on 3 May, during the “Commission on the 
LAI”'s inaugural meeting, Arnot delivered a “general report” on the Amsterdam meeting.737 From 
Arnot’s perspective, what did he expect of this second LAI congress and, furthermore, is it 
possible to discern how the Comintern perceived the non-communist members in the LAI 
Executive after this “provisional agenda” episode? 
                                               
735 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 28, Protocol der Ostsekretariatskommission zur anti-imperialistischen Liga, 30/3-1929. 
736 RGASPI 542/1/32, 49-51, Confidential report by R. P. Arnot, re. LAI Executive in Amsterdam, 13-14/4-1929,  
Moscow (3/5-1929). 
737 RGASPI 542/1/32, 49-51, Confidential report by R. P. Arnot, re. LAI Executive in Amsterdam, 13-14/4-1929,  
Moscow (3/5-1929); RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of Commission of the LAI meeting, Moscow, 
3/5-1929. 
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      The revision of the agenda complied with the political discourse of the class perspective. 
According to Arnot, the ideological demonstration of both the LAI and the congress was the 
unification of the anti-imperialist movement under the slogan “the World Situation, the War 
Danger and the Struggle Against Imperialism”. Thus, other pivotal questions on the agenda, e.g. 
China, India, USA, and the political attitude of the LAI vis-à-vis the social democratic movement, 
the LSI and the “Imperialist nations” suddenly became secondary political objectives. Arnot 
expected the congress to provide an overview of both the LAI’s political progression and the anti-
imperialist movement since 1927, solely for the reason of making it known that the difference 
between the LAI that came into existence in February 1927 and the one appearing in “mid-1929” 
was “truly enormous”. Thus, the report on the “World Situation and the War Danger” was a 
statement “only a Communist” could give, Arnot argued. This also meant that other candidates in 
Moscow, or in Europe, had to be found to assume the positions held by non-communists in the 
“provisional agenda”. During this process, Arnot and the “Commission on the LAI” chose to 
evaluate several of the non-communist speakers. For example, it was “hard to delete Baldwin, bad 
though he is”, whereas it was essential to “strike out” Pickens as the leader of the session on “The 
Struggle for the Emancipation of the Negroes in Africa and America” and to get “Ford (Profintern) 
and Laguma (SA)” as replacements.738 Pickens was a sensitive case. William Patterson 
(pseudonym: “Wilson”), a member of the CPUSA, visited Moscow in 1929 and became the person 
who advised how the communists should approach Pickens at the congress. Working for the ECCI 
Negro Bureau, Patterson composed a draft of a letter, originally addressed to the International 
Secretariat but, in the end, passed on to Arnot in April. According to the draft, Patterson argued: 
We [the ECCI Negro Bureau] sincerely believe that the League has no desire to be 
represented by an agent of a vacillating reformist conciliatory organisation. Yet we are aware 
that you have probably obligated yourselves to use Mr. Pickens.739 
As noted above, the International Secretariat never received this letter. The question is why not. 
Evidently, Arnot or someone else at Comintern headquarters had classified the draft as “Sekretno” 
                                               
738 Arnot, Bittelman and Vitkovsky stated that Münzenberg was the most suitable candidate to deliver the speech on  
the “world situation”, a proposition which Münzenberg did not appreciate. Thus, as a temporary solution, Arnot 
included Münzenberg’s name on the agenda to function as a “visible comrade”, which would give him a chance to find 
and suggest another candidate to the Political Secretariat. On June 18, at the final meeting of the “Commission on the 
LAI” in Moscow, the decision was taken to nominate Pollitt as Münzenberg’s replacement, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/32, 
49-51, Confidential report by R. P. Arnot, re. LAI Executive in Amsterdam, 13-14/4-1929, Moscow (3/5-1929), see 
fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 16-18, Protokoll der Kommission zur Vorbereitung des Kongresses der Antiimperialistischen 
Liga, Moscow, 18/6-1929. 
739 RGASPI 495/18/664, 1-3, Draft letter to the LAI by comrade Wilson (W. Patterson), Moscow, 25/3-1929.  
According to information in Patterson’s personal file in the Comintern Archive, Patterson: “carried on agitational work 
[…] in Germany after the II Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League in Frankfurt 1930 [sic], spoke at mass 
demonstrations in Berlin, August 1930, with our brother German Party”, RGASPI 495/261/3072, 101-102, Strictly 
Confidential. William Lorenzo Patterson, Moscow, 16/4-1932. 
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(Secret) and, furthermore, Arnot had perhaps decided that the content was not suitable for 
Münzenberg to read. Patterson’s draft was instead used for another purpose – to get “one of our 
strongest Negro comrades” to be “allotted an equal amount of time” as Pickens, having Ford 
assume a leading role in the Negro question at the congress.740  
      For Arnot, the removal of Cook from the agenda was a clear-cut case, informing the 
“Commission on the LAI” that the LAI Executive in Amsterdam “was charged to remove A.J. 
Cook if possible from the Agenda”. In Amsterdam, Arnot declared that “representatives of 
affiliated organisations should have first priority and since Cook had been present in January only 
by virtue of his personal position which he has since abandoned, there was no difficulty” in 
removing him from the agenda. However, Arnot was merely carrying out the directives issued by 
the Political Secretariat, meaning that for the “Commission on the LAI”, the question of 
appointing Melnitschansky, the French communist Gaston Monmousseau, the KPD member 
Heckert, and the English non-communist trade unionist Gossip to assume leadership over the trade 
union question had not been a difficult decision to make.741 In order to emphasise the domination 
of the communists, the “Commission on the LAI” nominated Rajani Palme Dutt to introduce the 
session on the Indian independence struggle in India (“Struggle for the Independence of India”) 
and the Chinese communist Strakhov/Chü Chiu-pai, to deliver the keynote speech on China and 
the KMT (“The Chinese Revolution: Struggle Against Imperialism and the Nan-King 
Government”). This was a question of organisation for the “Commission on the LAI”, meaning 
that every communist at the congress had to ensure that no delegates created any disturbance 
during the congress proceedings. Thus, the communist delegates nominated in the congress 
presidium had to evaluate anyone who expressed a wish to give a speech, or who wanted to 
comment on the speeches.742 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
740 RGASPI 495/18/664, 1-3, Draft letter to the LAI by comrade Wilson (W. Patterson), Moscow, 25/3-1929. 
741 RGASPI 542/1/32, 49-51, Confidential report by R. P. Arnot, re. LAI Executive in Amsterdam, 13-14/4-1929,  
Moscow (3/5-1929). 
742 RGASPI 535/1/212, 16-18, (Confidential) Protocol, “Commission on the LAI”, Moscow, 18/6-1929. The delegates  
were given a document that explained the “Standing Orders” of the congress [see the fourth topic]: “1. The time 
allowed for each main speech is 45 minutes. 2. The time allowed for Commission Reports is 20 minutes. 3. The time 
allowed for participants in the discussion is 10 minutes. 4. Delegates wishing to speak in the discussion must inform 
the Presidium of the Congress of their wish in writing [italics by the author]. 5. Where points of Order are concerned, 
one speaker may speak in favour and one speaker against”, IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/73, Standing Orders, 
Frankfurt am Main, July 1929. 
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Consolidation Models 
With the inauguration of the “Commission on the LAI” on 3 May, as well as having attended the 
LAI Executive meeting in Amsterdam in April, Arnot expected to get preparations under way. 
However, the conundrum was that there existed no organisational or ideological model on which to 
consolidate a structure for the congress, e.g. there was no congress budget, no resolutions and no 
definite agreement on the composition of the delegations. An extra problem was that the 
International Secretariat was becoming more and more excluded from what was happening in 
Moscow.  
      In May, Münzenberg began to question why nothing was happening in Moscow, requesting 
Kuusinen to get the Eastern Secretariat to send “a reliable Comrade” to Berlin to assist the 
International Secretariat with the administrative work of the congress, e.g. travel arrangements and 
finding accommodation for the delegations in Paris. Yet, as long as there was no decision on the 
congress budget, Münzenberg felt that the International Secretariat’s hands were tied. Hence, it 
was impossible to be certain that the LAI would reimburse the delegations travelling from Mexico 
and the Philippines for their journey to Europe.743 According to Münzenberg’s “temporary budget” 
presented on 18 March, the congress would cost $20,000, an amount divided between three 
parties: the LAI ($5,000), the IAH ($5,000) and the Comintern ($10,000).744 
      This “temporary budget” was one of many documents which Kuusinen, Piatnitsky and Arnot 
consulted in order to reach a decision on the final budget. With regard to Münzenberg’s 
“temporary budget”, Kuusinen chose not to respond.745 However, Münzenberg also had other 
preoccupations, and from 17 April until 4 May he was in Erfurt, Münzenberg’s electoral district, 
carrying out work for the KPD. Yet, when Münzenberg returned to Berlin, he had not still heard a 
word about what was happening with the congress preparations at Comintern headquarters. What 
was it that made Münzenberg react? Apparently, after the LAI Executive meeting in Amsterdam, 
Münzenberg contacted Kuusinen and Arnot, asking how the congress preparations were 
                                               
743 The “reliable Comrade” would send congress invitations and focus on establishing contacts with “delegations” in  
East Asia: Indochina, Japan, Mongolia, Indonesia and Korea. Münzenberg expected the “comrade” to leave Moscow 
when the person was “able to come”. In a letter to Kornblum, Münzenberg presented a shrewd plan, in which the LAI 
would consider financing the journey for some of the peasant delegations to the congress, but that the Krestintern had 
to pay for their return, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 31-33, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, Kuusinen, Moscow, 17/4-
1929; RGASPI 535/1/212, 6-7, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum, Krestintern, Moscow, 17/4-1929. 
744 RGASPI 542/1/30, 21, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 18/3-1929. This “temporary  
budget” illustrates the international scope of the LAI congress, based on Münzenberg’s perspective. The representation 
of national and regional delegations originating from 32 countries, was calculated to cost 51,520 Marks. Münzenberg 
used the German Mark as the preferred currency in the budget to allocate the cost between telegrams (1,500 Marks), 
the printing of a congress “Bulletin” in English, German, French, Spanish and Arabic (5,000 Marks), administrative 
costs (14,000 Marks) and “apparat” (translators, Press agency, congress bureau/secretariat, 9,080 Marks), see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/30, 22-23, Provisorisches Budget Antiimperialistischer Weltkongress, Münzenberg, Berlin, to 
Kuusinen, Moscow, 18/3-1929. 
745 Kuusinen was, at this moment, deeply engaged in solving the fractional struggle within the CPUSA, as well as  
observing how the Meerut trial campaign was progressing in Europe. 
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proceeding. While awaiting some kind of response, Münzenberg explained to Kuusinen that the 
International Secretariat had retreated into a state of muted activity. To test Kuusinen, Münzenberg 
threatened to tell the International Secretariat to stop its preparatory work for the congress, but also 
that, as long as the Comintern did not provide the LAI with any proper funding, Münzenberg could 
not guarantee that the delegation from South Africa would attend the event.746 
      On 3 May, the “Commission on the LAI” discussed the budget, deciding to pass the issue on to 
the “Sub-Committee”. However, Arnot realised that Münzenberg had to be calmed down, and on 9 
May Arnot sent him a letter reassuring him that the “Commission on the LAI” was working on 
sorting out every detail for the congress in Moscow: 
It was not until yesterday that we were able to have a commission [meeting] and full report 
of the happenings three weeks ago [LAI Executive meeting, Amsterdam, 13-14 April]. The 
lines we agreed upon have been accepted in general; more details have yet to be worked out 
in several cases. I hope this week, along with comrade Piatnitsky, that we shall get the points 
carried through.747 
The information was as misleading as Arnot had intended it to be. Thus, Arnot avoided telling 
Münzenberg that the issue was far more complex than he had described. Working together with 
Bittelman to organise the budget for the congress, Arnot had in fact already passed the proposed 
costs for the event on to Piatnitsky before he informed Münzenberg that: 
Yesterday before you [Piatnitsky] came in, comrade Bittelman and myself reported on the 
budget question, which we were charged to examine and report upon. We reported that we 
had made very considerable alterations [to] the budget, cutting out the European expenses 
but, on the other hand, adding certain colonial expenses, in order to ensure the largest 
possible number of delegates [from] the colonial countries.748 
Arnot’s motive for not giving Münzenberg the whole picture was a question of control, especially 
with regard to the difficult process of reaching a decision on the budget.749 Furthermore, after 
Arnot’s resignation, Bittelman had assumed the role as LAI liaison, and on 22 May he notified 
Münzenberg that “the amount requested had been approved in principle”. However, Bittelman 
stated that Piatnitsky had concluded that it would be enough for “our Firm” [the Comintern] to 
                                               
746 Münzenberg questioned whether Kuusinen had really understood how serious the situation in Berlin was,  
explaining that he could write a “whole novel” based on the complaints, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 37, Letter from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 4/5-1929. 
747 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of meeting of Commission of the LAI, Moscow, 3/5-1929;  
RGASPI 542/1/30, 41, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 9/5-1929. 
748 RGASPI 495/18/670, 103, (Strictly confidential) Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 9/5-1929.  
Arnot reduced the budget by 8%. These documents are most likely located in the files on Piatnitsky (75 % of which 
remain closed to research). The content of the documents were: “World Congress Budget as revised”, “Remarks on 
Congress Budget”, “League Normal Budget”, “League Proposed Budget” and “Details of Delegations to World 
Congress”. 
749 RGASPI 542/1/30, 44-45, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Virtanen, Moscow, 18/5-1929. 
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contribute $5,000, while Münzenberg had to secure the additional sum of $15,000. For example, 
Münzenberg could either use the LAI and the IAH’s financial contacts or contact the Profintern 
and the IRH. Münzenberg did not approve of the endorsed budget, concluding that $5,000 was not 
enough to secure the travel arrangements for the colonial delegations. However, Bittelman had 
anticipated Münzenberg’s displeasure and therefore suggested that the International Secretariat 
organise a fund to raise money. In June, the International Secretariat set up the “Fond für 
Kolonialdelegationen” (Fund for the Colonial Delegations), calling for financial contributions in 
support of the delegations travelling to the congress.750 Whether the initiative ever managed to 
raise any money, remains unknown.  
 
* 
 
Resolving the Anti-Imperialist Agenda: The Congress Resolutions 
The resolutions for the LAI congress epitomise the Comintern’s ideological attitude towards the 
colonial question. In contrast to the rush to complete the resolutions before the Brussels Congress 
in February 1927, the completion of the resolutions for the second LAI congress was a cautious 
and meticulous process in Moscow. For example, Arnot had instructed the authors to keep the 
resolutions “as short as possible” and to get the documents completed by 25 May.751 Most 
importantly, these resolutions were the key to correcting the mistakes in the “provisional agenda”. 
On 3 May, Arnot laid down the principle guidelines for the resolutions in the document, 
“Confidential Decision on Resolutions for the second LAI congress, Annexe (b)”, an account 
which illustrates the political goals of the congress, based on the Comintern’s “new line”. 
According to Arnot, the following eligible candidates, who were then currently either living in or 
visiting Moscow, were to write the congress resolutions: Freyer and Schubin (“The Struggle for 
the Independence of India”), Pavel Mif and Strakhov/Chü Chiu-pai (“The Chinese Revolution: 
The Struggle against Imperialism and the Nanking Government”), Pyotr Kitaigorodsky (“The need 
for a common struggle in Egypt, Syria and other Arabic countries of the Near East against 
Imperialism”), Johnson and Bittelman (“The Latest Stage of the National Revolutionary struggle 
in Indo-China, Indonesia and the Philippines”), Arnot (“The Struggle for the Emancipation of the 
Negroes in Africa and America special resolution or sections of this resolution should deal with 
East Africa and South Africa”), the ECCI Latin-American Secretariat (“The Struggle of Latin 
                                               
750 Bittelman promised Münzenberg to send the “monthly payment for June […] immediately”, see fol. RGASPI 
542/1/30, 47, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 22/5-1929. 535/1/212, 10, Short note from 
Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum/Krestintern, Moscow, 25/5-1929; Pressedienst des zweiten antiimperialistischen 
Weltkongresses, Nr. 1, 1/6-1929. 
751 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of meeting of Commission of the LAI, 3/5-1929. Barbé,  
Strakhov/Chü Chiu-pai, and Williams were not present at the meeting. 
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America against British and North American Imperialism”), Melnitschansky and Lozovsky (“The 
Tasks of the Trade Union in the Struggle against Imperialism”), Moirova (“The Social, Political 
and Economic Situation of Women in the Colonial and Semi-Colonial countries”), Freyer and 
Krestintern (“The Struggle for the Emancipation of the Peasant Masses”), Khitarov (“the Youth 
Resolution”) and, finally, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Bela Kun, Arnot, Bittelman and Khitarov (“the 
General Political Resolution”).752  
      A careful approach from a political perspective was also required when drawing up these 
resolutions. Arnot knew that some of these topics would be likely to cause controversy at the 
congress, e.g., the possible “debate […] between the INC representatives […] young Nehru if he 
comes”, and the delegate of the Indian Workers’ and Peasants’ Party, Rajani Palme Dutt. Thus, 
before Freyer and Schubin began writing their resolution on India, Arnot told them to keep in mind 
a possible controversy at the congress.753 The completion of the resolutions also indicates that the 
preparatory work was a “work in progress”, in which actors such as Arnot or Bittelman had to 
improvise along the way to reach some kind of conclusion. However, for Arnot, the crucial issue to 
solve was ensuring that well-known communist leaders, e.g. Palme Dutt and Pollitt, would appear 
as leading figures to guarantee the political aims of the congress, an objective Bittelman also 
strove to effect. On 19 June, Bittelman sent instructions to Burns in Berlin to contact Dutt and 
Pollitt “preferably by telephone”, in order to receive confirmation that they would be attending the 
congress. If they showed any sign of reluctance, Burns merely had to tell them both that the 
transcripts for the speeches had already been prepared.754 
      The African question – the “emancipation of the Negroes” – had been a long series of zigzags 
before reaching its conclusion. At first, Arnot instructed Ford and Harry Haywood to write “an 
account of the situation in Africa especially since the VI Congress”, with a “separate section on 
South Africa and Kenya”.755 However, Arnot had expected to write the congress resolution on 
Africa, while utilising the “account” by Ford and Haywood as “political information” at the 
                                               
752 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 35, Confidential decision on resolutions for the second LAI congress, Annexe (b), 3/5-1929.  
A copy of this same list (in German) does not disclose the connection between the nominations and the “Commission 
on the LAI”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/32, 47-48, Anhang (B) Vertraulich, Beschluss, author: Arnot, April/May, 1929. If 
Arnot was thinking of the “Colonial Conference” in this context is mere speculation, however, it corresponds with the 
fact that the “Commission on Colonial Conference” expected “all materials to be ready by the 20th of May”, see fol. 
RGASPI 495/18/670, 27-28, Minutes, second meeting of Commission on Colonial Conference, Moscow, 29/4-1929. 
753 Schubin knew the Comintern's position on India. On 25 March, Inprecorr published an article by Schubin which  
included criticism of the AIWPP Conference in Calcutta, and of Roy, see Harkishan Singh Surjeet, History of the 
Communist Movement in India, Leftword Books, 2005, p.143. 
754 RGASPI 542/1/30, 75, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow to Burns/International Secretariat, Berlin, 19/6-1929.  
Bittelman expected to arrive in Berlin ten days prior to the congress, and instructed Pollitt and Dutt to be in Berlin 
“one week prior to the opening of the congress”. 
755 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 35, Confidential decision on resolutions for the second LAI congress, Annexe (b), 3/5-1929;  
RGASPI 495/18/670, 78, Confidential letter from Arnot/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ford, Moscow, 29/4-1929; 
RGASPI 495/18/670, 79, Confidential letter from Arnot/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Haywood, Moscow, 29/4-
1929. 
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“Colonial Conference”. This all changed once Arnot received the instruction to act as the ECCI 
plenipotentiary in the CPUSA in May and, as he had not yet completed his Africa resolution, the 
only available material on Africa at Comintern headquarters was the account by Ford and 
Haywood. Moreover, when Arnot left the “Commission on Colonial Conference”, the “African 
question” disappeared from the agenda altogether. To complete the resolution on Africa, then, the 
“Commission on the LAI” let the ECCI Negro Bureau (Patterson and Haywood) write and edit a 
new “Negro resolution”. On 27 May, Haywood and Patterson completed a first version, “The 
Negro World Question and the Negro Question in different countries of Africa and America” and, 
once Ford had edited the material, they passed on the final version to the “Commission on the 
LAI” on 29 May.756 
      The “Tasks of the Trade Union in the Struggle against Imperialism” proved to be a prolonged 
process. Arnot assigned Melnitschansky and Lozovsky to write the resolution but, and considering 
the aftermath of the trade union debate at the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne on 15-16 January 
1929, the Political Secretariat was aware of the risk that the trade union question might cause a 
crisis at the congress. Once Melnitschansky and Lozovsky had finished their first version, the 
Political Secretariat reviewed the draft, only to conclude that some “false parts” still needed 
correction. The reason for this was that the Political Secretariat wanted to avoid, as far as possible, 
any criticism of the LSI. Apparently, this was a question of establishing a political image around 
the LAI, which focused on getting the organisation to cultivate more intimate relations with the 
trade union movement and to assume the position as the leader of an “aggressive struggle against 
imperialism”. Hence, the trade union resolution had to make it clear that the LAI would not 
tolerate any hostility from either the LSI or the reformist trade unions.757 Bittelman carried out the 
task of correcting the draft, and on 28 June, the Political Secretariat endorsed the resolution.758 
 
* 
                                               
756 RGASPI 495/155/67, 15, Minutes of meeting of the ECCI Negro Bureau, Moscow, 27/5-1929; RGASPI 495/1/67,  
16, Minutes of meeting of the ECCI Negro Bureau, Moscow, 29/5-1929. The draft resolution is filed in fol. RGASPI 
495/155/72, 40-58. 
757 RGASPI 542/1/31, 32, Message from the Political Secretariat, Moscow, to Bittelman, Moscow, 25/6-1929;  
RGASPI 495/20/722, 43-44, Resolution – Trade Unions and the LAI, 27/6-1929 (authors: Melnitschansky and 
Lozovsky); RGASPI 495/20/722, 22, Protocol, meeting of the ECCI Political Secretariat, Moscow, 8/2-1929. For a 
copy of the note from the Political Secretariat to Bittelman on 25 June, see fol. 495/20/722, 18. 
758 RGASPI 495/3/111, 1a, Protokoll Nr.40 der Sitzung des Politsekr. des EKKI, 28/6-1929. Members of the Political  
Secretariat who attended this meeting were Ulbricht, Barbé, “Garlandi” (real name: Ruggero Grieco, communist from 
Italy), Piatnitsky, Lozovsky, Chitarow, “Strakhov”/Chü Chiu-pai and Bell. Münzenberg also attended this meeting of 
the Political Secretariat, where he heard Bittelman explain the basic purpose and outline of the resolutions. After the 
meeting, the protocol was filed in a “Sondermappe” (Special Dossier). However, on closer reading of “Protokoll 
Nr.40”, it states that the focal point for the Political Secretariat was the trade union resolution. Additionally, the dossier 
contains the resolutions of the ECCI Negro Bureau (French versions): “PROJET DE RESOLUTION SUR LA 
QUESTION NEGRE-INTERNATIONALE” (25/6-1929), and “LES COLONIES ANGLAISES – Afrique Occidentale 
anglaise (Sierra Leone, Côte d´Or, Gambie et Nigeria”) (26/6-1929). 
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Deciphering the Nature of the Anti-Imperialist Movement: The Congress Delegations 
The International Secretariat wanted the second LAI congress to become an impressive anti-
imperialist demonstration which would provide renewed impetus to unifying the anti-imperialist 
movement. In September 1928, the International Secretariat appealed to the following national 
sections to attend the congress: England, France, Holland, and Germany, the AAAIL, the Latin 
American LAI sections in Argentine, Columbia, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Puerto 
Rico, San Salvador, Santo Domingo and Uruguay. In reference to the affiliated organisations and 
collective members, the International Secretariat requested the attendance of the INC, the PI, the 
Socialist Party of Persia, Etoilé Nord-Africaine, Confederacion Obrera National Dominicana in 
Santo Domingo, the IAH, Bildungsarbeiter Internationale, the International Womens’ League for 
Peace and Freedom, Internationale der Kriegsopfer and the International Anti-Militarist 
Bureau.759 For Münzenberg, the congress represented an opportunity to summon the “old guard” 
of the LAI – the left-wing intellectuals: Emil Ludwig, Ernst Toller, Arthur Holitscher, Alfons 
Paquet, Lehmann-Russbüldt, Lessing, Alfons Goldschmidt and the representative of the socialist 
organisation the Freethinkers’ Angelica Balabanov.760 Yet, Balabanov's appearance at the congress 
was a sensitive issue. Bittelman informed Münzenberg that “comrades” Kuusinen, Piatnitsky, 
Manuilsky, Magyar and Mif had stated that Balabanov would bring “harm” to the congress.761 
      The “Commission on the LAI” both supervised and authorised whom to accredit as delegates 
to the congress. After the meetings of the “LAI Political Commission” in April, Münzenberg 
requested that Kuusinen, Arnot and Ford assume full responsibility for the “important and urgent” 
task of co-ordinating the composition of the delegations in Moscow. What was the primary reason 
for Münzenberg making such a request? Without Chatto at the International Secretariat, 
Münzenberg had lost access to a majority of the LAI’s colonial contacts both in Berlin and beyond, 
particularly those with the Indian community. Thus, it was up to Arnot to begin the work of co-
ordinating the delegations in Moscow. For example, Arnot could tell the delegate of the San 
Francisco-based Hindustan Ghadr Party Rattan Singh, who was in Moscow in 1929, to function as 
the leader of the Indian delegation.762 Despite the existence of the “Indian Bureau”, during 
Chatto’s temporary withdrawal from the International Secretariat in March and while Chatto 
remained in hiding in Berlin in April and May, Münzenberg did not mention the bureau in any of 
his correspondence to either Kuusinen, Arnot or Bittelman. Thus, it appears that A. C. N. 
                                               
759 IISG LAI Collection 3392.1, 66, An alle nationalen Sektion der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Internationale  
Sekretariat, Berlin, September 1928. 
760 SCA CL Collection, volume 131, Letter from Münzenberg & Chatto, Berlin, to Lindhagen, Stockholm, 3/6-1929. 
761 RGASPI 542/1/30, 72, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 11/6-1929. 
762 RGASPI 542/1/30, 31-33, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 17/4-1929. 
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Nambiar’s control over the “Indian Bureau” created, for the time being, a separation from the 
International Secretariat, leaving Münzenberg without any contacts to the Indian anti-colonial 
movement at all. According to Bittelman, the efforts to co-ordinate the “desired” Indian delegation 
in Moscow had become a complicated process. The International Secretariat had, therefore, to 
“utilise all the connections you have to secure delegates” from worker and peasant organisations in 
India and, if not, Bittelman stated that there was a plausible risk that the congress would 
“collapse”.763 Münzenberg, on the other hand, realised that it seemed as though the LAI had lost 
every connection with India, as well as with Indian anti-colonial activists in Europe.764 Yet, 
Chatto’s temporary resignation from the International Secretariat was not the only reason for this. 
The restrictions and surveillance put into effect by the British security services in India, sanctioned 
and administered from London, also contributed to hampering the International Secretariat’s 
connections to India in 1929. According to the minutes of the British Home Office in London on 
29 February 1929, the India Office had to use every measure to prevent known members of the 
LAI in India from travelling to Europe by denying passports. Thus, the Home Office anticipated 
that this sufficient step would put an end to LAI activities in India which, in turn, would help to 
prevent the organisation turning into a “very nasty thing”.765  
      At the end of May, Chatto assumed his position as “International political secretary” and 
attempted to mend the LAI’s contacts with Indian activists. An opportunity arose at the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) conference in Geneva on 1-15 June, an event attended 
by representatives from several Indian organisations e.g. the renowned leader Joshi of the Indian 
Trade Union Council (ITUC). For Münzenberg, this conference represented an opportunity to 
“secure the colonial character” of the LAI congress, admitting to Bittelman that it seemed as 
though the ILO had succeeded where the LAI had failed. Hence, Münzenberg explained that the 
ILO had invited leaders from trade unions in Europe, e.g. the Amsterdam International, to discuss 
the colonial question with delegates from the colonies. The conference also posed a threat to the 
LAI’s ambitions, Münzenberg stated, forcing the International Secretariat to act to disrupt a 
possible collaboration between the Amsterdam International and Joshi, a development which 
would be a “long-term political blow” for the LAI. The International Secretariat first contacted 
Nehru and Bridgeman, calling for the rapid establishment of a protest campaign aimed against the 
                                               
763 RGASPI 542/1/30, 47, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 22/5-1929. 
764 Münzenberg informed Kornblum of the positive contacts the LAI had with the Philippines, e.g. the peasant  
organisation the Confederation of Philippine Peasants. Further, Pressedienst stated that the “Fourth Peasants’ 
Congress” in Manila on May 1, an event attended by 30,000 workers and peasants, had declared its “solidarity with 
and greeted” the LAI, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 10, Short note from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum/Krestintern, 
Moscow, 25/5-1929. 
765 The Home Office recommended that individuals, suspected or confirmed as members of the LAI, should have the  
following stamp in their passports: “Not valid for India” and be prevented from undertaking “Empire-wide” travel, 
TNA HO 144 10693, Minutes (Home Office), 27/2-1929. 
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Amsterdam International in both India and England. Additionally, Münzenberg wanted to see 
whether it was possible for the LAI to invite and send both Joshi and the Indian delegation on a 
tour of the Soviet Union and Moscow in particular, before proceeding directly to the LAI congress. 
However, Bittelman explained that it would not be “advisable” to invite Joshi to Moscow for 
political reasons.766 
      Fimmen had notified the International Secretariat of his intention to attend the ILO conference, 
thus Chatto wondered whether he could function unofficially as an LAI representative at the event. 
Furthermore, the International Secretariat knew that the ILO was intending to address the question 
of forced labour at the conference. Towards the end of May, the International Secretariat 
completed and released the pamphlet Memorandum on Forced Labour, which portrayed the LAI 
as a political force within the anti-imperialist movement. A closer scrutiny of the pamphlet 
nevertheless reveals the difficulties the LAI were experiencing in adapting “the new line” of the 
Comintern, and in ignoring the rhetoric of the united front strategy: 
The League against Imperialism, which stands for the united action of organised workers in 
imperialist countries with colonial workers in the struggle against international capitalism, 
calls upon all working class representatives of the ILO Conference to reject absolutely all 
proposals for the regulation of forced labour, […] These abuses will never be abolished 
through the agencies of capitalism. Only the determined action of working class 
organisations in imperialist countries, fighting side by side with the workers of all countries 
and all races, can remove this danger from the standards of international labour.767  
The primary aim of this pamphlet was to circulate it among the delegates at the ILO conference, an 
objective that required the services of an individual linked to the International Secretariat. 
Münzenberg and Chatto assigned this mission to Otto Schudel, the functionary at the LAI bureau 
in Berlin, instructing him to travel to Geneva and use Fimmen’s contacts to gain access to the 
conference and to its delegates.768 
      For Schudel and the International Secretariat, his mission to Geneva was a moderate success; 
however, he did manage to inform both journalists and some of the delegates about the LAI and its 
second congress. After arriving in Geneva, Schudel met Fimmen and told him that he wanted to 
                                               
766 RGASPI 542/1/30, 56, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Bittelman, Moscow, 6/6-1929; RGASPI 542/1/30, 72,  
Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 11/6-1929. 
767 W. Münzenberg, V. Chattophadyaya, E. Burns, “Memorandum on Forced Labour”, International Secretariat, Berlin,  
1/6-1929. For the pamphlet, see IISG LAI Collection 3392.1, p.129. 
768 The mission to Geneva was a rushed affair for Schudel. On 30 May, Schudel received a note informing  him that  
Münzenberg and Chatto wanted to meet him at the Bahnhof in Berlin. On the platform, the two of them instructed 
Schudel on the mission before he set off straight away by train to Geneva. According to Chatto, Schudel had circulated 
the pamphlet at the ILO conference among “workers’ delegates and the press”, where the latter had used it as reference 
material to discuss forced labour, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/31, 26-27, Report by Chatto, the ILO Conference/Geneva, 
Berlin, June, 1929. 
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organise a meeting with Joshi and the Indian delegation. Fimmen managed to convince Joshi to 
meet “a representative of the LAI”, informing Schudel not to expect too much. As Fimmen had 
implicitly suggested, once Schudel had told Joshi to consider the option of attending the LAI 
congress and encouraging the ITUC to join the LAI, Joshi's reaction was one of irritation. Schudel 
informed Chatto that Joshi had stated that the ITUC would never “affiliate either to Amsterdam or 
to Moscow” and, “if the communists” continued to pressure him, he intended to resign from the 
ITUC and form “a rival organisation” in opposition against the communists. Additionally, Joshi 
said that the LAI should not count on Nehru’s appearance at the LAI congress, as he did not intend 
to leave India.769 Once Bittelman learnt of Joshi’s chauvinistic opinion of the LAI, he instructed 
Münzenberg to ensure that the money sent to India by the LAI in support of the workers’ 
movement did not fall “into the hands […] of Joshi and his crowd”.770 
      Yet, what Joshi had told Schudel merely confirmed the existing hostility within the socialist 
movement towards the LAI. At the ILO conference, there was a widespread antagonism towards 
the LAI amongst the delegates. Some of the delegates told Fimmen that the LAI was as an 
“instrument of M. [Moscow], financed and controlled by the communists”, functioning solely to 
convince the “oppressed races to be […] used by the communist movement”.771 Moreover, on 20 
July, prior to the opening of the LAI congress, the LSI published its second analysis of the LAI, 
“The ‘League Against Imperialism’ and the Labour and Socialist International”, in International 
Information. In connection with the release of this analysis, for example, Adler contacted 
Brockway to inform him that the LSI was paying attention to the still existent link between the ILP 
and LAI, particularly to Maxton’s role.772 The LSI’s second analysis had been carefully planned by 
Adler to be published just prior to the opening of the LAI congress on 21 July, warning every 
member of the LSI not to participate in the event. Nevertheless, the LSI had neither the authority 
nor the capacity to prohibit individuals from visiting the LAI congress, observing how Maxton 
would assume a decisive role in the coming event: 
For Münzenberg and the Communists especially this participation of Maxton in the Congress 
is of the highest strategical value. Under the presidency of Maxton the purely Bolshevist 
                                               
769 Fimmen realised that if he did not manage to arrange a meeting with Joshi, Schudel would do whatever it took to  
set up a meeting of his own. Schudel’s letter was addressed as “Briefe Nr.2”, the whereabouts of “Briefe Nr.1” remain 
unknown, RGASPI 542/1/30, 60-63, Briefe Nr.2/ Schudel, Geneva, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 2/6-1929; 
RGASPI 542/1/31, 26-27, Report by Chatto, the ILO Conference/Geneva, Berlin, June, 1929. 
770 RGASPI 542/1/30, 56, 72, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 11/6-1929. Bittelman referred  
to a strike in the metal industry in India, whereas Münzenberg had previously enquired as to whether the Profintern 
intended to provide the Indian workers’ with money. Apparently, the Profintern seemed unwilling to do so; therefore, 
Münzenberg asked Kuusinen for advice on what to do, concluding that if the Profintern was considering contributing, 
the “sum had to be big” and transferred through existing channels of the International Secretariat. , see fol. RGASPI 
542/1/30, 56. 
771 RGASPI 542/1/30, 50, Letter from Fimmen, Geneva, to Chatto, Berlin, 2/6-1929. 
772 IISG LSI Collection 1717/14, Letter from Brockway, London, to Adler, Zurich, 5/7-1929. 
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character of the real leadership of the “League” and of the Congress will be concealed from 
the Socialist workers.773 
The LSI’s analysis concluded that Maxton certainly would have to confront a similar treatment as 
the one meted out to Cook, and receive “a flood of insults” from the communists as a reward for 
his services. In comparison to the LSI’s analysis in October 1927, their analysis in 1929 
scrutinised the leadership of the LAI even more harshly. Above all, it portrayed Münzenberg as an 
unabashed and ruthless individual who was working in the service of Bolshevism, and who used 
every strategy available to convince socialists to partake in “all kinds of united front and similar 
manoeuvres”. According to the LSI, the LAI was only a part of the grand conspiracy of the 
communists, thus, the socialist movement had to understand that the organisation was an 
expression of the provocative and “barbarous methods” international communism implemented to 
establish influence.774 
 
The undertaking to nominate delegates and assemble the delegations in Moscow followed a 
different rationale compared to one used by the International Secretariat. It was a meticulous 
process, e.g. the preparatory work in relation to the Negro delegation confirms how carefully the 
candidates were selected. Arnot assigned Ford to supervise the work who could, in turn, use his 
contacts with the Profintern and the ECCI Negro Bureau. Nevertheless, for Ford, the LAI congress 
represented a perfect opportunity to begin the work of preparing the “upcoming RILU [ITUCNW; 
International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers’] conference in July 1930”. Hence, Ford 
counted on getting the “Negro delegation” to “hold a preliminary conference” at the LAI congress 
in order to discuss the idea of organising an ITUCNW conference: 
[…] the success of such a Conference depends upon the number of Negro delegates 
representative of Negro workers' organisations. [sic] who will attend this Congress. To give 
such a conference the proper political and future organisational effect, it is necessary to be 
assured of representatives of Negro workers from America [illegible] Africa and the West 
Indies as [sic] least.775 
                                               
773 SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, “The ‘League Against Imperialism’ and the Labour and Socialist International”,  
in International Information, Zürich, Vol.VI, Nr.28, 20/7-1929, pp.300-302. 
774 SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, “The ‘League Against Imperialism’ and the Labour and Socialist International”, 
in International Information, Zurich, Vol.VI, Nr.28, 20/7-1929, pp.300-302. On 22 July, two days after the release of 
the report, the “Mitteilung” of the ECCI Information Department (Informatsionnyi otdel IKKI), an information service 
for the staff working at Comintern headquarters in Moscow, included the LSI analysis, see fol. RGASPI 495/33/203, 
226-228, Copy of the LSI article on LAI 20/7-1929, INFORMATIONSABTEILUNG DES EKKI, Mitteilung No. 727, 
Moscow, 22/7-1929. 
775 RGASPI 542/1/30, 48, Letter from Ford/Profintern, Moscow, to the “Commission on the LAI”/Bittelman, Moscow,  
31/5-1929. 
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This objective depended, however, on the consent of other actors. Ford informed Bittelman of the 
idea and, on 5 June, the “Sub-Committee” endorsed Ford’s proposal on the condition that the 
“informal conference” incurred “no additional expense” to the congress budget.776 
      The “Sub-Committee” instructed Ford on the political composition of the Negro delegation, 
which had to include a member of the ECCI Negro Bureau who under no circumstance should 
pose as a representative of the Comintern. Apparently, “the comrade must be included in the 
American delegation while posing as a delegate of one of the American organisations”. On 8 June, 
the ECCI Negro Bureau suggested Patterson as its representative, using the cover as a delegate of 
the ANLC,777 while Ford aimed to appear as a delegate of the Profintern, representing the 
“International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers of the RILU”. In a letter to the 
International Secretariat, Ford wrote that the “coming World Congress” was of “great importance” 
for the anti-imperialist movement, with the LAI realising that it was one of the few “strong 
leaders” uniting the “struggles of colonial and oppressed peoples”. Furthermore, Ford hoped that 
the LAI would allow the ITUCNW to hold “small preliminary conferences”: 
The coming Congress of the League offers us an opportunity to hold in connection with your 
Congress a one day conference of Negro trade union and worker delegates and 
representatives of Negro workers who shall attend the League Congress. We therefore ask 
your permission and co-operation in the holding of such a conference.778     
The delegations from China, Japan, the Philippines, Indochina, Singapore, Java and Korea were 
assembled through Bittelman, consisting essentially of “colonial comrades” who were either 
working at Comintern headquarters or pursuing studies at the KUTV. In June, these delegations 
received their instructions to attend the congress.779 
 
The “Delegationsliste” (List of Delegations) presents the colonial element at the LAI congress, a 
document which includes the names and nationality of every delegate, political party 
                                               
776 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 37, Minutes of organisation sub-committee for the preparation of the LAI congress, 5/6- 
1929. 
777 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 37, Minutes of organisation sub-committee for the preparation of the LAI congress, 5/6- 
1929; RGASPI 495/155/67, 17, Minutes of meeting of the ECCI Negro Bureau, Moscow, 8/6-1929. Present at the 
closed meeting of the ECCI Negro Bureau on June 8 were Bittelman, Nasanov, Ford, Patterson and Whitman 
(pseudonym: “Charlton”). According to the minutes, Bittelman reported “for the Small Commission of the Eastern 
Secretariat” [the “Commission on the LAI”]. The “Complete” list of attendance for the LAI congress include Patterson 
as the ANLC delegate and member of the American delegation, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 26, “Complete” [list of 
attendance], July 1929. Münzenberg was informed of Patterson’s nomination by Bittelman in June, see fol. RGASPI 
542/1/30, 72. 
778 RGASPI 542/1/33, 7, Letter from the ITUCNW, Moscow, to the “Commission on the LAI” (Moscow) &  
Münzenberg (Berlin), 14/6-1929. Ford acted, on the one hand, as representative for the “Negro Committee of the 
Profintern” and, on the other hand, as delegate of the Soviet delegation, RGASPI 542/1/92, 30, “Complete” [list of 
attendance], July 1929. 
779 RGASPI 542/1/30, 72, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 11/6-1929. 
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representatives, organisations, associations and those appearing in their capacity as individuals. 
This document represents a joint effort by Münzenberg, Chatto and Bittelman.780 Thus, thanks to 
the “Delegationsliste”, it is possible to analyse the size and political character of the colonial 
delegations and to verify these delegates’ locale of activity, with the latter disclosing the actual 
places of residence of the “colonial” representatives expected to attend the congress. 
      The “Delegationsliste” suggested 286 delegates from 41 countries, including “imperialist” 
(16), colonial and semi-colonial countries (25), regions (the Balkan, North Africa, West and East 
Africa), and international organisations (21). However, the actual physical residences of the 
colonial and semi-colonial delegates were primarily located in colonial metropolises such as 
Berlin, Paris and London. The second LAI congress was therefore, despite its ambition to pose as a 
colonial pilgrimage linking together the “imperialist nations” with the colonial world, bound 
within a European framework. The table below makes the following distinctions between colonial 
representation and physical residence to clarify this postulation:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
780 The International Secretariat gathered intelligence on suitable candidates, the material then being despatched to  
Bittelman for further consideration who, in turn, added or deleted delegates before sending the final list to Kuusinen 
for approval. In June, Bittelman confirmed that he had received a lot of material (administrative documents and 
information on the delegations) from the International Secretariat, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 72, Letter from 
Bittelman, Moscow, to Münzenberg/Berlin, [blueprint], 11/6-1929. 
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Table 7.3: Geographical Division and Colonial Representation Invited to the Second 
International Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism 1929  
 
Invited  Total No.: Colonial & 
Semi-Colonial 
Europe USA 
India 27 12 14 1 
Indonesia 13 2 11 - 
Mexico 2 2 - - 
Venezuela 2 - 2 - 
Cuba 2 1 1 - 
Bolivia 1 - 1 - 
Panama 1 1 - - 
Columbia 1 1 - - 
Argentina 3 2 1 - 
Brazil 2 2 - - 
Ecuador 1 1 - - 
Paraguay 1 - 1 - 
Uruguay 1 - 1 - 
Iraq  2 2 - - 
Egypt 1 1 - - 
Syria 5 2 3 - 
Palestine 2 2 - - 
Persia 3 1 2 - 
Korea 5 - 4 1 
China  8 5 3 - 
Japan 3 - 3 - 
Indochina  2 2 - - 
Philippines 2 2 - - 
Mongolia 1 1 - - 
South Africa 4 [6] 4 - - 
North Africa 2 - 2 - 
East Africa 1 - 1 - 
West Africa 1 - 1 - 
African Organisations 
outside Africa  
4 - 4 - 
Arab Organisations  7 - 7 - 
Total:  110 46 62 2 
              Source: RGASPI 542/1/92, 1-16, Delegationsliste, May-June 1929 
 
The total number of colonial delegates were 110, a criteria based on nationality. A majority of the 
delegates lived in Europe (62), while a fraction came from the USA (2), thus, the actual colonial 
representation was in the minority (46). This verifies the assumption that Europe represented the 
centre for anti-imperialist network(s), especially the fact that the continent had anti-colonial hubs 
such as Paris, London and Berlin. Furthermore, Europe provided the anti-imperialist movement 
with a political space in which to develop and carry out political, organisational and social 
activism, a prerequisite lacking in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Yet, one must also 
understand that the “Delegationsliste” was only a prognosis of the anticipated colonial 
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participation, and that it was a reflection of a vision created by the International Secretariat and the 
“Commission on the LAI” (Bittelman). External explanations are also equally relevant, e.g. the 
national surveillance carried out by the German, British and French national security services, 
while internal explanations shed light on the difficulties of the International Secretariat to secure 
money to fund the travel costs for colonial delegations. The South African delegation was an 
illustrative example of this. 
      Josiah. T. Gumede intended to represent three organisations at the congress: the ANC, the 
native Bantu organisation La Bafe, and as the leader of the South African LAI Section. Other 
members in the South African delegation were Andrews of the South African Trade Union 
Congress (SATUC) and two unknown delegates of the Furniture Workers’ Association (FWA) and 
the communist Native Federation of Trade Unions (NAFTU).781 Despite the International 
Secretariat’s grandiose ambitions, in the end, everything depended on finance. At the end of May, 
Münzenberg needed a “first contribution” to guarantee the travel arrangements for the South 
African delegation. Eventually, Andrews ended up being the only delegate from South Africa at 
the congress, representing both the SATUC and the FWA.782 
      The Indian and Indonesian delegations illustrate the Eurocentric character of the anti-colonial 
movement. The Indian delegation consisted of 27 delegates from the INC, the AITUC, the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Party (WPP), the All Indian Youth League, the London INC section, the 
student group Indian Association from Oxford, the Central European Indian Association and the 
Glasgow branch of the India Union. Twelve of the delegates were planning to travel from India, 
while fourteen lived in Europe and the Ghadr Party delegate Rattan Singh was in Moscow. The 
Indonesian delegation had 13 delegates which, compared to the Indian delegation, was more of a 
homogenous group, dominated by Hatta’s leadership and 10 delegates of the PI. The trade unionist 
Moesso, and Achmed Sukarno of the National Party of Indonesia, were planning to leave 
Indonesia for Europe. 
      The delegates from Middle Eastern and African countries lived mainly in European cities. The 
delegate from East Africa, Johnstone (Jomo) Kenyatta of the Kikuyu Central Association, lived in 
London, as did the delegate of the West African Students’ Association (WASU) Lapido Solanke. 
The “Delegationsliste” also referred to invited “Negro organisations outside Africa” which 
included Kouyaté of the LDRN, the anti-colonial journal Courir des Noirs and unknown 
representatives from Guadeloupe and the Antilles, all of whom had Paris as a base for their 
                                               
781 RGASPI 542/1/92, 1-16, Delegationsliste, May-June, 1929. The South African delegation belonged to the “Britisch  
Afrika” delegation. 
782 RGASPI 542/1/30, 37, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 4/5-1929; RGASPI 542/1/92, 29,  
“Complete” [list of attendance], July, 1929. 
310 
 
activities. The Middle Eastern delegates also had Europe as their base: the Pan-Arab Committee 
was based in Paris, while the Islamic association Islamia and the Arab Association were active in 
Berlin.783  
      For the “Commission on the LAI”, despite its efforts to establish organisational and ideological 
models for the congress, the major challenge now was how to turn theory into practice. 
 
* 
 
Bound for Utopia  
Chatto believed that the second international congress against imperialism and colonialism would 
celebrate the LAI’s achievements, and link together “anti-imperialist forces all over the world”.784 
A utopian vision further elaborated by Bridgeman: 
Of the highest importance to that ever growing number of men and women throughout the 
world who are menaced either with unemployment or exploitation by reason of the growth of 
imperialism. It is to the working class both in the capitalist countries and in the colonial 
countries that anti-imperialist organisation is particularly important.785 
The comprehensive aim of the second LAI congress was to demonstrate a transformation of the 
sympathising organisation into a mass organisation. In England and the USA, the national sections 
organised public events from May to July, to draw attention to the LAI congress. The British LAI 
Section held a “Garden Party” in London in order to raise money to finance the journey and 
accommodation for the delegation in Paris. This was, nevertheless, an idea concocted by the 
Colonial Commission of the CPGB, instructing Olive Budden to arrange meetings (referred to by 
the CPGB as “attempts”) for the sole purpose of raising money, explaining that the party did not 
intend to finance the British delegation’s journey.786 In the USA, the AAAIL organised three public 
demonstrations in New York, on 17 and 30 May and on 2 June, whilst on 15 June, a final large 
conference at Irving Plaza was held. During these meetings, the AAAIL managed to consolidate 
the transcontinental character of the anti-imperialist movement in the USA, e.g. nationalists and 
anti-colonial activists from the West Indies, China, and East Asia, together with members of Afro-
                                               
783 RGASPI 542/1/92, 29, “Complete” [list of attendance], July 1929. 
784 Virendranath Chattophadyaya, „Zum antiimperialistische Weltkongress“, in Der Rote Aufbau, II. Jahrgang, June,  
1929, Berlin, 134. According to Chatto, the second LAI congress would be a good place to discuss the Indian question 
and the situation in the Arab countries and a good venue for the “First International LAI Youth Conference”. 
785 Reginald Bridgeman, “The World Struggle Against Imperialism”, in Labour Monthly, Volume 11, July 1929,  
Number 7, pp.417-424. 
786 Pressedienst, Nr. 22, 21/6-1929, 2; RGASPI 495/60/134a, 97-98, Minutes of Colonial Committee of CPGB, 15/4- 
1929. 
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American and Asian organisations: the ANLC, the Harlem Tenants’ League, the Haitian Patriotic 
Union and the Chinese Students’ Alliance of America.787 
      In June, both the Political Secretariat and the Standing Commission wanted to examine the 
work being done by the “Commission on the LAI” in Moscow. Hence, the “Commission on the 
LAI” had to urgently complete its resolutions, confirm the key speakers and nominate the 
delegates of both the ECCI delegation and the congress communist fraction, material and decisions 
which had to be finalised before being passing on to the Standing Commission. On 18 June, the 
“Commission on the LAI” set about finding a solution to most of these issues at its final meeting 
in Moscow, a session which confirmed just how far the decision-makers at Comintern 
headquarters were willing to go in order to secure control over the LAI congress. Present at the 
meeting were Manuilsky, Schubin, Melnitschansky, Ramirez, Freyer, Moirova, Kitaigorodsky, 
Mif, Piatnitsky, Bittelman and Münzenberg. Bittelman acted as Chairman and presented every 
issue on the agenda: the congress resolutions, the report on the Krestintern788 as well as the revised 
agenda for the congress. Furthermore, the “Commission on the LAI” suggested Pollitt as the 
speaker on the international political situation and the war threat, and introduced the members of 
both the ECCI delegation and the congress communist fraction. Most importantly, the attitude of 
the communists in the Congress Presidium vis-à-vis the non-communists was formulated during 
this final session of the commission.789 
      Münzenberg’s statement at the session implied an alteration to the original plan, informing the 
“Commission on the LAI” that the International Secretariat had changed the location for the 
congress from Paris to Frankfurt am Main for “technological reasons”. These “reasons” were that 
                                               
787 The “national office” of the AAAIL was located at 799 Broadway, Room 433, New York City, FOIA 61-6065/1e  
All American Anti-Imperialist League, ”Call for a Conference Against Imperialism and Imperialist War”, 9/6-1929 
[written on invitation]; FOIA 61-6065/1e All American Anti-Imperialist League, Letter from the FBI Director to 
Robert F. Kelley, 17/6-1929; Pressedienst, Nr. 22, 21/6-1929, 2. Robert F. Kelly, Chief of Division of Eastern 
European Affairs in Washington, heard of the Irving Plaza conference from a “strictly confidential source”, who 
notified him that the “foreign office of the Soviet Government had financed the conference”. Kelly could not, 
however, confirm any connection between the AAAIL and the CPUSA. 
788 The prospect of sending a Krestintern delegation to the congress never materialised. Once the “Commission on the  
LAI” had reviewed the Krestintern's demands, e.g. that the LAI had to guarantee a member of the Krestintern a 
permanent seat in its Executive, allow the Krestintern to use the congress to hold informal conferences and include the 
peasant question on the agenda, the idea was dropped. Freyer considered the peasant question an easy task to solve. By 
writing a resolution, together with a member of the Krestintern (“The Struggle for the Emancipation of the Peasant 
Masses”), which a “Russian peasant” had to present at the congress with a focus on the collectivisation process in the 
Soviet Union; however, the “Commission on the LAI” did not approve of the other demands. If so, the Krestintern had 
to contact the WEB, which in turn had to endorse the idea and assist with the preparatory work for the conference, 
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of meeting of Commission of the LAI, 3/5-1929; RGASPI 
535/1/212, 16-18, (Confidential) Protocol, meeting of the “Commission on the LAI” (German), Moscow, 18/6-1929. 
789 RGASPI 535/1/212, 16-18, (Confidential) Protocol, meeting of the “Commission on the LAI” (German), Moscow,  
18/6-1929. For a copy of the protocol (English version), see fol. RGASPI 495/60/134a, 38-40. The English version 
contains a section (omitted in the German version), stating that Melnitschansky, Strakhov/Chü Chiu-pai and Bittelman 
intended to leave Moscow “for Berlin not later than 3rd July”. For Bittelman’s request, see fol. RGASPI 495/7/9, 96-
98, Protokoll N.45 der Sitzung der ständigen Kommission des Sekrt. des EKKI, Moscow, 1/6-1929. It was Arnot who 
had invited Münzenberg to attend the conference. 
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French authorities did not intend to allow the LAI to organise a congress in Paris.790 This was a 
major setback for the International Secretariat, forcing them to do what Arnot had warned against: 
“avoid if possible” Germany.791 Münzenberg stated that the congress might expose “political 
risks”, particularly as the LAI was expecting a turnout of some 200 delegates, a majority of whom 
were “Socialists […] liberals and radicals”. Rumours also suggested that within these elements 
there existed a plot to stage a coup in “opposition to our leadership”, with Baldwin as coup leader, 
Münzenberg concluded. What Münzenberg was implying found support in the sanctioned attitude 
and preferred modus operandi amongst the communists at the congress, e.g. the session of the 
“Commission on the LAI” stated that every communist had to use every opportunity to protest 
against the “staggering nature of the so-called left-wing national reformists, as well as the position 
of the Baldwin-Maxton elements”.792 On 27 June, the Political Secretariat endorsed this strategy, 
adding that “the new General Council and the LAI Executive Committee shall be put together in 
such a way that a communist majority is secured”.793 
      The ECCI delegation was the key to securing “a communist majority” at the congress, 
consisting of delegates from the KPD, the CPGB, the PCF, the CPCh, the CPH, the KIM, the 
WEB, the Profintern, Münzenberg and Bittelman.794 Shrouded in secrecy, the Standing 
Commission evaluated and nominated the composition of the congress communist fraction on 6 
July, having Piatnitsky sign the document (“written in 1 copy”), before placing it in a 
“Sondermappe” (Special Dossier). Thus, according to the Standing Commission, Ferguson 
(pseudonym: “Neptun”) of the WEB, Pollitt as the KIM representative, Tsiu Wito [Chü Chiu-pai’s 
party name] of the CPCh, Melnitschansky and Sachianov of the Profintern, Heckert as the KPD 
delegate, Münzenberg and Bittelman would be representing the communist fraction. Additionally, 
                                               
790 The basic message of the articles instructed the delegations and individuals, who were already on their way to  
Paris, to change their destination. At the opening session of the congress in Frankfurt am Main on July 21, 
Münzenberg declared that the change of venue was a result of the French government's erratic behaviour and desire to 
cause confusion within the anti-imperialist movement. Furthermore, it was not possible to hold the congress in London 
due to the hostility of MacDonald and the Labour government, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 16-18, (Confidential) 
Protocol, meeting of the “Commission on the LAI” (German), Moscow, 18/6-1929; Pressedienst der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus, Nr.22, Berlin, 21/6-1929; “Der Weltkongress der Liga gegen Imperialismus in Frankfurt a. M.”, in 
Inprecorr, 4/7-1929, Nr.58, 1393-1394; Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Nr.58, Frankfurt a. M., 21/7-1929, 
p.1519. 
791 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of meeting of the Commission of the LAI, 3/5-1929. 
792 The communist sector (see further below) intended to fulfil two objectives at the congress. Firstly, the attending  
participants had to declare their support of the congress resolutions and, secondly, every communist delegate had to 
put forward arguments from “a communist point of view”, which essentially focused on the need to unite movements 
of a proletarian, communist or colonial revolutionary nature into a vigilant anti-imperialist movement, see fol. 
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 38-40, (Confidential) Protocol, meeting of the “Commission on the LAI” (German), Moscow, 
18/6-1929. 
793 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 55, Confidential directives from the Political Secretariat to the “Commission on the LAI”,  
Moscow, 27/6-1929. 
794 Münzenberg expected the ECCI delegation to arrive in Berlin in “not later than 10 days” to assist with the final  
preparatory work, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 16-18, (Confidential) Protocol, meeting of the “Commission on the 
LAI” (German), Moscow, 18/6-1929. 
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in Moscow other individuals received the instruction to act as ECCI deputies: Worowsky, 
Tschaplina, Magyar, Katayama, Haidar, Patterson and Ford. However, they were also duty bound 
to attend the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow in July and, therefore, would not be able to travel to 
Frankfurt before the plenum had ended. The ECCI delegation and the communist fraction were to 
guarantee that the LAI congress was turned into a demonstration in defence of the Soviet Union 
and a protest against the war threat, the Standing Commission concluded, something that would 
contribute to enforcing “the new line” on the LAI. Hence, the ECCI delegation had to gain control 
over the congress proceedings: 
As the ECCI delegation has to control the progression of the Congress and, if a Comrade 
from Moscow travels to the Congress, another Comrade must immediately be ready to leave 
the Congress. Comrade Wassiljew is instructed to mobilise Comrades [in Moscow, author’s 
own remark].795 
The idea was, therefore, to sustain the system of control for the duration of the congress, a 
prerequisite requiring the delegation and the communist fraction to hold closed and, above all, 
secret meetings with other communists: an undertaking which Bittelman, along with Magyar, 
Ferguson and Smeral (“if he is in Germany during the congress”) would supervise. According to 
the Standing Commission’s instructions, every deputy, as well as the members of the ECCI 
delegation, would have to conceal their activities in order to be able to infiltrate the delegations in 
Frankfurt am Main.796 This exceedingly conspiratorial behavioural scheme was nevertheless 
already familiar to the communists and, thus, the stage was set to impose “the new line” on the 
LAI. 
      Münzenberg returned to Berlin only to find the International Secretariat on the verge of panic. 
Without any money in the “congress account” and the congress about to begin, it seemed 
impossible to be able to finalise the administrative preparations. Münzenberg contacted Bittelman, 
to explain, “I will not take the responsibility of organising the congress when every possible 
method of securing money has failed. I am therefore forced to take an aeroplane and visit you, and 
convince you”.797 In the end, however, Münzenberg did not travel to Moscow; instead, the 
Standing Commission assisted in solving the crisis in Berlin. Was this the end of the LAI’s 
                                               
795 RGASPI 495/7/10, 96, Sondermappe, streng vertraulich, Protokoll No [illegible] der Sitzung der ständigen  
Kommission des Sekretariats des EKKI, Moscow, 6/7-1929. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Ulbricht, 
Garlandi, Kuusinen, Bittelman, Wassiljew and Heimo. The Standing Commission had, however, not yet agreed on the 
delegates from the CPH and PCF. 
796 RGASPI 495/7/10, 96, Sondermappe, streng vertraulich, Protokoll No. [illegible] der Sitzung der ständigen  
Kommission des Sekretariats des EKKI, Moscow, 6/7-1929. The strategy was not a new one, but rather the ECCI 
delegation was merely continuing the practice adopted at, for example, the Brussels congress in 1927. 
797 Münzenberg demanded that Bittelman transfer $500 to the International Secretariat as soon as possible, see fol.  
RGASPI 542/1/30, 77, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Bittelman, Moscow, 4/7-1929. 
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organisational and ideological preparations? Apparently, a final episode contributed to defining the 
political discourse of the second LAI congress: the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow in July. 
 
* 
 
Confirming “Class against Class”: the Tenth ECCI Plenum, 3- 19 July 1929 
 
The united front strategy, which we used to carry out from below, we have since then no 
longer pursued from below, but from above. We have through our tactic a stable position 
among the broad working masses, [and] in the mass movements of the proletariat.    
Kuusinen, 16th Session, 10th ECCI 
Plenum, Moscow, 13/7-1929 
 
At the 16th Session of the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow on 13 July, Kuusinen urged the 
delegates to understand his fear that the international communist movement was about to become 
an isolated political phenomenon. However, this observation was not a critique of the Comintern’s 
policy shift at the Sixth International Congress. Far from it, Kuusinen believed the doctrinal shift 
from below (“the united front”) to from above (“the new line”) had been a correct and wise 
decision. Above all, the new Comintern policy had improved the ties between “leading Comrades” 
in the national sections (the communist parties), as well as strengthened connections with the “life 
of the proletarian mass movement”, Kuusinen argued.798 This was an argument which, in itself, 
verifies Kuusinen’s ideological belief, as he delivered his reflections on the international 
communist movement in front of 108 delegates, representing parties and organisations from 30 
countries, at the plenum.799 The peculiar and extraordinary impression left by the Tenth ECCI 
Plenum, is that the event served the purpose of confirming the correctness of the Comintern’s 
policy change, with the involved actors using the opportunity to both praise and demand obedience 
                                               
798 RGASPI 495/168/120, 1-25, X Plenum, 16. Sitzung/nachmittags, Moscow, 13/7-1929. 
799 The delegates were categorised as “Present Members of the ECCI”; “Absent [Members of the ECCI]”; “Present  
ECCI Candidates”; “Absent ECCI Candidates”; “National Representatives with Consultative Rights”; Krestintern; 
Profintern; IAH; KIM; IRH; ILS; and “ECCI Apparatus”. For the lists of attendance, see fol. RGASPI 495/168/151, 3-
8. The number given in Kahan (1990, pp.43-44) – 108 – corresponds with the lists of attendance; however, Kahan’s 
summary did not include the 153 delegates who were expected to attend the plenum. This document also discloses 
pseudonym/real name and origin: Banderas/Stanislaw Pestkowski (Poland); Bennett/David Lipec [Petrovsky] (USSR); 
Boskovic/Filip Filipovic (Yugoslavia); Chang Piao/Chang Kuo-tau (China); Ercoli/Palmiro Togliatti (Italy); 
Garlandi/Ruggero Grieco (Italy); Gorkic/Josip Cizinski (Yugoslavia); Ledo-Amerigo/Fernando Lacerda (Brazil); 
Leo/Walter Häbich (Germany); Lovera/Luigi Amadesi (Italy); Miff/Michail Firman (USSR); Tanaka/Yamamoto 
Kenzo (Japan); Tsju Vito/Strakhov/Chü Chiu-pai (China); Vitkovsky/Adam Landy (Poland). The Tenth ECCI Plenum 
essentially focused on the international situation and the tasks of the Comintern; the economic struggle and the tasks 
of the communist parties; the international day of struggle against the imperialist war; and the expulsion of Bukharin, 
Benjamin Gitlow, Serra and Humbert-Droz from the ECCI Presidium, as well as Jilek, Lovestone and Spector’s 
expulsion from the ECCI. The colonial question was not the focus of attention according to the agenda, see Degras 
vol.III 1965, p.36. 
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to “the new line”. The phraseology of “the new line” had by now gained its credentials within the 
Comintern, e.g. without any exception, “the new line” endorsed the categorisation of political 
opponents as “social fascists”. Thus, by 1929, this harsh policy sanctioned the political agenda of 
“class against class”, which had begun to filter through in the Comintern in 1927-28. Hence, the 
above was part of the process whereby the Comintern commanded the national sections to learn 
and apply Bolshevization as the guiding principle for their political and organisational work. “The 
new line” abided by its own chronological rationale, including resentment and a radicalised 
attitude towards the social democratic movement. Introduced formally during the Ninth ECCI 
Plenum in 1928, and endorsed at the Sixth International Congress, “the new line” approach 
reached its zenith at the Tenth ECCI Plenum. Additionally, the plenum officially relieved Bukharin 
of his functions within the Comintern. For Kuusinen, however, the primary question was how to 
maintain and develop the antagonism of the communist movement vis-à-vis social democracy. 
According to Kuusinen’s report on “The International Situation and the next task of the C. I.”, the 
Comintern imposed “the obligation of all the Sections of the Communist International to intensify 
their fight against international Social Democracy as the social base of capitalism [added in 
handwriting by Kuusinen]”.800 This was a central argument within the rhetoric of the “class against 
class” policy, and, with reference to Kuusinen's statement at the plenum, the session was the 
Comintern’s “watershed”, as it explicitly declared obedience towards the omnipotent influence of 
Stalin and also revealed the “militant agenda” of “the Third Period”. This plenum also witnessed 
the definitive end of democratic centralism, only to be replaced by the milieu and rigid structure of 
bureaucratic centralism within the Comintern apparatus.801 Before the opening of the plenum, 
Manuilsky introduced the principal aim of what looks like a militant agenda: 
Firm Bolshevik foundations have now been laid in that all elements which attempt to split 
the communist movement must suffer shipwreck […] there can be no communist movement 
outside the Comintern.802 
Despite the increased militancy of the Comintern at the plenum, which professed “firm Bolshevik 
foundations”, did any of the sessions address the colonial question? If so, how did the plenum 
conceptualise this question in the context of “class against class”? As introduced in the previous 
chapter, is it possible to distinguish a discussion in terms of a “Colonial Conference”, which the 
                                               
800 According to Kuusinen: “[T]he Plenum of the ECCI proposes that special attention be paid to an energetic struggle  
[inserted by hand] against the “Left” wing of Social Democracy [inserted by hand] which retards the process of the 
disintegration of Social Democracy by sowing the illusion that it represents an opposition to the Social Democratic 
leadership whereas, in fact, it whole-heartedly supports the policy of Social Fascism”, see fol. RGASPI 495/168/14, 
50-69, (English version) The International Situation and the next task of the C. I., (Report by Kuusinen, vertraulich), 
July, 1929. 
801 McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp.85-103. For the “militant agenda”, see Worley 2002, pp.119-120. 
802 Degras vol.III 1965, 36. 
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Eastern Secretariat was expecting to hold in connection with the ECCI Plenum? The final question 
addresses whether it is possible to verify how many of the delegates at the plenum also attended 
the second LAI congress which opened on 21 July, i.e. two days after the plenum had ended. The 
Tenth ECCI Plenum and the second LAI congress do not only share a chronology; apparently, the 
plenum determined the ideological nature of the LAI congress. Retrospectively speaking, the shift 
from the united front strategy to the principle of “class against class” was a contradiction in terms 
of the LAI’s activities, thus, it had a long-term effect on the purpose and aims of the LAI as a 
sympathising communist organisation. It is therefore plausible to assume that the decision-makers 
at the headquarters of the Comintern in Moscow deliberately deceived the LAI at the congress in 
1929, driven by a motive to assess the practical implications of the “class against class” principle. 
Manuilsky’s conclusion on the historical heritage of the united front, delivered at the plenum, 
bears witness to this: 
We [Comintern] never thought of the united front as a formula valid for all times and 
countries. There was a time when we negotiated with the Second and Two-and-a-half 
Internationals, with the General Council of the Trade Unions and Purcell. Now we are 
stronger and therefore use more aggressive methods in our struggle to win the majority of 
the working class.803  
Manuilsky’s conclusion was not only a repeat of Kuusinen’s statement on the isolation of the 
international communist movement; it also addressed the Comintern’s criticism of the very raison 
d'être of a sympathising organisation such as the LAI. Thus, Manuilsky had expounded the 
theoretical platform for the communists at the LAI congress in Frankfurt am Main. 
      At the plenum, some delegates briefly discussed the colonial and semi-colonial question during 
the sessions. For example, Lozovsky argued that the Indian strike movement was a complicated 
issue in the context of organising proletarian support campaigns, particularly the Meerut 
Conspiracy Trial. Yet, in the end, Lozovsky realised that it was up to the communist parties in the 
“imperialist countries” to “systematically aid” the colonial freedom struggle, a remark that had 
been merely taken from Kuusinen’s colonial theses. According to the draft of a telegram 
(completed at the plenum), the primary concern for the Comintern was to protest against the 
“henchmen of English Imperialism” in India and, by doing so, ease the process of establishing a 
movement of proletarian solidarity in support of the defendants.804 Strakhov/Chü Chiu-pai [“Tsiu 
Vito”] addressed the Indian question in similar terms and included an accusation of betrayal 
                                               
803 Degras vol.III 1965, 37. 
804 For Lozovsky, see Degras vol.III 1965, pp.62-63. Taken from Inprecorr, ix, 46, 979, 4/9-1929; RGASPI  
495/168/148, 7, Telegramm-Entwurf. An die im Meerut-Prozess angeklagten Vertreter der indischen Arbeitern und 
Bauern, X Plenum ECCI, Moscow, July, 1929. 
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against Nehru for having deceived the revolutionary masses in India by simply posing as a leader 
of social democracy. This, therefore, meant that the colonial communist parties had to execute “a 
more intensive struggle against right-wing deviations”. It was, nevertheless, on the basis of the 
opinion of G. A. K. Luhani, a communist from India, that the Comintern chose to define its 
approach towards India at the plenum. At the plenum, Luhani performed the act of self-criticism in 
relation to his former ties to and support of Roy, concluding with an appraisal of Kuusinen’s 
colonial theses in the context of India: 
The de-colonisation of India can only be the result of a “strong anti-imperialist policy” 
(Colonial Theses), a policy expressed in the revolutionary action of the mass of exploited 
under the leadership of the proletariat. […] Roy systematically deceived the Communist 
International through his double political book-keeping […]805 
There is no explicit discussion or reference to the LAI in the published and unofficial protocols of 
the plenum. However, interjections by Lozovsky, Luhani and Manuilsky indicate a two-fold 
understanding of the colonial question in the Comintern in 1929. Firstly, the Comintern’s colonial 
policy was following the correct ideological direction and, secondly, the attitude introduced by 
Manuilsky supported a frame of mind which the actors involved in preparing the “Colonial 
Conference” or the LAI congress in Moscow, and who later attended the LAI congress, eagerly 
carried out in practice.  
      The thematic connection between the Tenth ECCI Plenum and the second LAI congress is easy 
to identify for reasons other than pure ideology. The group of delegates at the plenum involved in 
preparing the LAI congress, and who would later travel to Frankfurt, all had a thorough 
understanding of the LAI. According to the list of attendance from the plenum, it is possible to 
discern which actors were directly connected to the LAI, the congress and the “Colonial 
Conference”. As noted in the categories below, my aim is to verify the extent of knowledge of “the 
new line” among the actors (present at the ECCI Plenum) who later travelled to the LAI congress. 
For example, Bittelman had been in tune with the final and critical phase of the organisational and 
political preparations, while Pollitt had been at the plenum and then travelled to Frankfurt to 
deliver a speech authored by Pavel Mif. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
805 Degras vol.III 1965, p.41, 45, 49. Taken from Inprecorr, ix, 46, 973, 4/9-1929; RGASPI 495/168/148, 10-11,  
Declaration of Comrade Luhani, X Session, X Plenum ECCI, Moscow, 8/7-1929; On Luhani, see Lazitch 1986, p.282. 
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Table 7.4: Making the Connection: The LAI Congress and the “Colonial Conference” 
 
Source: RGASPI 495/168/151, 1-8; RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, “Complete” [lists of delegations], 
July, 1929.  
 
The final category, the “Frankfurt Congress”, indicates that six delegates attended both the plenum 
in Moscow and then later the congress, whereas three individuals who were not present in Moscow 
nevertheless turned up in Frankfurt. Thus, it is logical to assume that these delegates acted as 
apprentices of the Manuilskyan theme “there was a time when we negotiated”, a commitment 
carried out to the fullest by Ford, Pollitt and Chü Chiu-pai, while Bittelman observed how the 
policy of “the new line” and the communists put the envisaged strategy into practice. The Tenth 
ECCI Plenum was an event which set the scene for the political discussion and results of the 
second LAI congress; thus, it had a lasting effect on both the LAI and on the anti-imperialist 
movement, once the communist sector had crashed head-on with the non-communist elements in 
Frankfurt am Main. 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Colonial Conference (7) – Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Bittelman, 
Josefowitsch, Ford, Ewert 
2. LAI Congress (Commissions & Preparations) (19) – Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, 
Manuilsky, Bittelman, Bell, Kolarov, Bela Kun, Lozovsky, Molotov, Mif, 
Gusev, Moirova, Ulbricht, Kornblum, Ford, Chü Chiu-pai/Tsiu Wito, 
Wassiljew, Schubin, Petrovsky 
3. Frankfurt congress (9) – Bittelman, Ford, Misiano, Monmousseau, Pollitt, Chü 
Chiu-pai/Tsiu Wito, Heckert, Darsono, Dimitrov  
 
Note: Names in italics refer to absence at the Tenth ECCI Plenum. 
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Utopia Disrupted, Frankfurt am Main, 20 – 28/7-1929 
 
The First Congress of the LAI in Brussels worked out the theoretical [author’s italics] 
programme of the League and set up the principles of the anti-imperialist struggle. The 
Second World Congress of the League in Frankfurt must forge the weapon to carry out the 
programme which has been adopted. The Frankfurt congress must help to transform 
[author’s italics] the LAI from an association of loosely connected propaganda groups into a 
strong an active fighting mass organisation. 
Letter from Chatto to Lindhagen, Frankfurt 
am Main, 18/7-1929806 
 
The “Second International Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism” convened at the 
Zoological Gardens in Frankfurt am Main on 21 July. Before the official opening in the congress 
hall, the LAI had organised an “impressive demonstration” on the streets in Frankfurt, an event 
described as a passionate anti-imperialist phenomenon, according to Inprecorr.807 However, the 
Frankfurt Congress was an event and tumultuous scene which witnessed the derailment of the 
utopian vision of turning the LAI into a mass organisation. My aim here is not to disclose or 
evaluate every question addressed and debated at the congress; but rather to analyse the topics 
which caused controversy during the congress debates. A fundamental starting point is to make it 
clear that the communists – referred to here as the communist sector – more or less reduced the 
non-communist delegates to passive bystanders at the congress. Above all, this perspective 
discloses the rationale and logic for how and why the congress spiralled out of the control of the 
official organiser: the International Secretariat. The focal point at the congress was the agenda and 
its political discourse, yet, who were the supporters and targets? The congress turned into a scene 
characterised by non-pluralistic debates on India, China, the role of the trade unions and the Negro 
question, in which the pièce de résistance was the pre-determined repetitive mantra in defence of 
socialist construction in the Soviet Union, and against the war threat. For the communist sector, the 
congress functioned as a forum to urge the LAI to “cleanse its ranks” of the “agents of 
imperialism”. After the congress, Emile Burns summarised the event in Labour Monthly thus: “the 
agenda contained one general subject – the political situation and the war danger – and a number 
of more limited subjects”. On 20 July, the LAI Executive gathered for a meeting in Frankfurt with 
                                               
806 Chatto “welcomed” Lindhagen after he had arrived at “Pension Winkler” in Frankfurt am Main on 18 July, SCA CL  
Collection, volume 131, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Lindhagen, Frankfurt, 18/7-1929; SCA volume 131, 
“Information and Press Service – Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress. From the 20th to the 31st July 1929 in 
Frankfurt am Main, No. 1, English edition”, pp.1-4. 
807 McMeekin erroneously concludes that the LAI was liquidated in 1929, see McMeekin 2003, p.208; Inprecorr, “Der  
Verlauf des Kongresses”, Nr. 64, p.1519; Gross  1967, p.210. 
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the sole purpose of endorsing the congress agenda, concluding “[T]here can be no doubt [that] the 
most valuable” question was “the international situation and the war danger”.808 One of the 
communist sector’s fundamental aims was to target some of the non-communist delegates, 
addressing them in callous terms, e.g. Maxton and the ILP, or the delegate of the INC, Shivaprasad 
Gupta. In comparison to the 1927 Brussels Congress, an event where the communists had 
remained in the background in order to evaluate the reactions and behaviour of the congress 
crowd, the Frankfurt Congress displayed a diametrically opposed attitude. Nonetheless, the 
behaviour of the communist sector was not an expression of spontaneity; it had been a 
meticulously planned strategy, conceived with precision at Comintern headquarters and, once on 
location, it assumed a harsh and brutal nature. For the International Secretariat, the initial belief 
had been to use the Frankfurt Congress as a mobilising source to unify the anti-imperialist 
movement. However, the congress was convened at the moment in the history of international 
communism when the Comintern had resolved to show no tolerance towards its principal enemy: 
the socialist movement.  
 
* 
 
A Note on the Sources: Biographies, Scholarly Interpretations and their Limitations 
Recollections and scholarly interpretations of the Frankfurt Congress are scarce and, in some 
cases, inaccurate. Babette Gross’ biography is one of the few accounts describing the actual 
congress. However, Gross’ account has, therefore, assumed the character of a seminal book in the 
historiography of the LAI, with, for example, Imanuel Geiss’ depiction of the congress being a 
rehash of Gross’ narrative on how the Comintern “pushed aside” the “bourgeoisie nationalist 
element”. Another erroneous factor is intentional negligence. Vijay Prashad avoids mentioning the 
congress at all in his discussion of the LAI, only to concede that the Comintern simply strove to 
implement a “homogenous strategy for world revolution” without explaining either how or why. 
Furthermore, Gross’ narrative is, in some respects, flawed by misconceptions which have acquired 
a second life in Barooah and McMeekin’s biographical accounts.809 Gross wrote that Manuilsky 
attended the congress, where he led the ruthless attack against the socialist and colonial delegates. 
The crux of the matter is that Manuilsky was never in Frankfurt, but in Moscow, and, according to 
                                               
808 Emile Burns, “World Congress of the League against Imperialism”, in Labour Monthly, Vol.11, September 1929,  
No.9, London, p.559-563; RGASPI 542/1/32, 52-53, Sitzung und Beschlüsse des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus, Frankfurt am Main, 20/7-1929. Münzenberg, Chattophadyaya, INC representative Shivaprasad Gupta, 
Maxton, Fimmen, Bridgeman, Saklatvala, Baldwin, Hatta, Melnitschansky, and Chedli attended the meeting. The 
protocol is also filed at IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/71, (copy) Sitzung und Beschlüsse des Exekutivkomitees der Liga 
gegen Imperialismus und koloniale Unterdrückung, Frankfurt am Main, 20/7-1929. 
809 Gross 1967, p.210; Geiss 1968, p.258; Prashad 2007, p.30; Barooah 2004, p.267, 281 (see footnote 103);  
McMeekin 2003, p.208. 
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the document, the “Complete” list of attendance from the congress, Gross must have simply 
confused Melnitschansky with Manuilsky,810 particularly as the day-to-day reports of the congress, 
published by Inprecorr in July-August, did not mention Manuilsky’s name on one occasion. In 
fact, Manuilsky had returned to Moscow in June to assume a leading position within the 
Comintern after having completed his tenure as the leader of the WEB in Berlin. Thus, if 
Manuilsky had been in Frankfurt, his name would have appeared in these Inprecorr reports. 
      Any empirical analysis of the Frankfurt Congress is a daunting task, characterised by obstacles 
one has to surmount and overcome. The documents, printed commentaries and summaries of 
speeches, congress material, lists of attendance, correspondence and published articles do, 
nevertheless, provide a thorough picture of the congress.811 However, what do these sources tell 
us? In comparison to the empirical richness of the Brussels Congress, the documents connected 
with the Frankfurt Congress are not orderly, particularly if one compares them with the clarity of 
the official protocol from the Brussels Congress (Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont), and 
in light of the fact that Münzenberg seemed disinclined to write any reports at all during the 
congress. The closest account, in time, were the Inprecorr reports, however, their biased nature 
contributes to a lack of accuracy, a criticism which also applies to other articles on the congress in 
the communist and socialist press.812 Nevertheless, what has previously been a gap in the history 
of the LAI has achieved a fuller understanding through the narratives in the writings of Emile 
Burns, Bela Kun and Ludwig Magyar, in addition to the reports Münzenberg wrote after the 
congress, and those from Bittelman, the Eastern Secretariat, Hatta and the socialist Bjarne Braatoy, 
as well as Ulmen’s biography on Wittfogel. 
 
* 
 
 
 
                                               
810 Gross 1967, p.209. 
811 The LAI Collection at the IISG contains the majority of official documents from the congress (commentaries and  
summaries of speeches, printed material, telegrams handed out during the congress, leaflets, a printed form to be filled 
in by the delegates, resolutions and the congress manifesto). The British pacifist, Oscar H. Swede (1900 – 1942), 
gathered a variety of documents on location, later handed over to the IISG. Two reports by the socialist Bjarne Braatoy 
in the LSI Collection (sent to Adler in August), recorded the atmosphere and behaviour of the congress crowd, above 
all that of the communist sector. Additionally, Chatto had invited Carl Lindhagen to deliver a speech (which he did) 
and, while on location in Frankfurt, he collected a number of documents (summaries of speeches by Pollitt, Ford, 
Ledebour and others and administrative information on the congress proceedings), later filed in the LAI dossier at the 
SCA. 
812 Communist journals, or newspapers, for example, Labour Monthly, the IAH journal Mahnruf, Frankfurter Zeitung,  
Berlin am Morgen, Welt am Abend, and A-I-Z, the French communist paper Monde and the organs of the KPD, 
Arbeiter-Zeitung and Die Rote Fahne, published articles on the congress. Another biased source is the antagonism of 
the German pro-colonial journal, Übersee-und Kolonialzeitung which in an article discussed the apparent “weakness” 
of the LAI at the congress. 
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A Note on the Delegates and the Delegations 
On 20 July, Chatto informed the LAI Executive that the International Secretariat was expecting 
400 delegates to turn up at the congress. This is, however, a problematic figure to confirm. 
According to Braatoy’s observation, after having participated at the congress, there were 200 
delegates representing 169 organisations along with an additional 100 guests at the Zoological 
Gardens. Alternatively, as noted in the official material, Information and Press Service, released by 
the International Secretariat and handed over to the delegates upon arrival at the congress hall, 
there were 399 delegates and 2000 guests representing 124 organisations, along with 11 national 
LAI sections from 33 countries.813 All of the above are clearly estimates. Rather it is from the 
“Complete” [list of attendance], compiled by the International Secretariat on location, that a 
concise understanding of the size of individual participation at the Frankfurt Congress emerges, 
confirming that 263 delegates from 31 countries and regions representing 99 organisations 
attended the congress.814 Additionally, the “Complete” list discloses the political leanings of 
almost every delegate: 
 
Table 7.5: Political and Colonial Representation, Frankfurt am Main, 21-27/7-1929 
LAI Members 58 (22%) 
Communist 88 (33%) 
Non-communist 57 (22%) 
Colonial Organisations 60 (23%) 
Total: 263 (100%) 
  
The communist sector dominated the congress, having the delegates located with all due caution in 
national delegations. Particularly within the LAI sections, the communists dominated the 
representation, e.g. Münzenberg, Hans Jäger, Lucie Peters, Olive Budden, Wittfogel, Saklatvala 
and Burns. In addition there were the non-communist members, Maxton, Bridgeman, Hatta, 
Fimmen and Leon Feuchtwanger. The LAI also introduced itself as a transcontinental organisation, 
boasting sections in Germany, England, France, Holland, USA, Mexico, Cuba, Columbia, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Peru. However, this list also exposed the inability of the LAI to establish 
itself in either Asia or Africa. 
                                               
813 RGASPI 542/1/35, 52, Sitzung und Beschlüsse des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Frankfurt am  
Main, 20/7-1929; IISG LSI Collection, 3050/61, Report from Braatoy, Berlin, to Adler, Zürich, 6/8-1929. Both Chatto 
and Münzenberg had mentioned the figure of 400 delegates prior to the congress, Willi Münzenberg, “Vor dem 
Antiimperialistische Weltkongress in Frankfurt”, Inprecorr , No. 62, pp.1475-1476,; SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, 
“Information and Press Service. Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress”, No.1 (English Edition). According to 
Degras, total number of delegates was 260, out of which 84 were of a “colonial” origin, Degras vol.III 1965, pp.78-79. 
814 The figure of 99 organisations does not, however, include the national LAI sections, instead, the sections have to be  
viewed as being representatives for one organisation, the LAI, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, “Complete” [list of 
attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929. 
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      Anti-colonial organisations in Europe attended the congress in droves, although the anticipated 
appearance of colonial delegations arriving en route from the colonies turned into a 
disappointment. The Indian, Chinese and Indonesian delegations dominated the Asian influx in 
Frankfurt. The Indian delegation consisted of 23 individuals, only four of whom (the INC 
representative Gupta and his wife, G. L. Amin and Annapamandanda) had travelled from India, 
whilst fourteen lived in Europe, Rattan Singh had arrived from Moscow, and Rajani Palme Dutt, 
who appeared as the delegate of the London-based Workers’ Welfare League of India, lived in 
Brussels.815 A logical explanation as to why the Indian delegation had such a predominantly 
European character was the sanctioned policy of British security services to restrict the approval of 
valid travel permits for LAI activists in India. Gupta stated at the congress that “owing to passport 
and other difficulties” it was impossible “to send a strong delegation” from India. The delegations 
from China and Indonesia had faced a similar dilemma; hence, a majority of the delegates arrived 
from different places in Europe, rather than from their countries of origin. The Indonesian 
delegation was under the control of Hatta and the PI, consisting of delegates from Switzerland and 
the Netherlands. The Chinese delegation had thirteen delegates and was of a more diverse 
character, yet not one of them had arrived from China. Six delegates lived in Moscow (Tsiu 
Wito/Chü Chiu-pai, the trade union delegates Li Fang and Huang Ping, Dschau Hau of the Chinese 
IRH section, Lo-tin-ju of the Chinese KIM section and Hansin Liau, who had briefly returned to 
Germany), while the others lived either in Berlin, The Hague, or Delft in the Netherlands. The 
Korean delegation consisted of two individuals: Sue Ring Hei of the Korean Association in Paris, 
and Kim of the Berlin-based Association of Korean Students’. “The well-known Japanese 
revolutionary leader” Sen Katayama attended as the delegate of the Communist Party of Japan, 
along with two Japanese delegates from Germany, Yamada and Teido Kunizaki of the KPD 
auxiliary organisation the Japanische revolutionäre Gruppe. The places of residence for Senda of 
the Japanese Anti-war Association and Migake [?] remain unknown. Two Palestinian delegates 
acted as the Middle Eastern delegation – Karmi of the Arbeiterfraktion and Ben Saul of the “Left-
section” of the Poale Zion, while A. Téhéransky and Alimard of the Communist Party of Persia 
represented the Persian delegation.816 
                                               
815 The Indian delegation consisted of Chatto as LAI secretary, A. C. N. Nambiar (Association of Indian Journalists),  
the INC London section (Mazumdar, the Jussuf sisters, and Sinha), Naidu, Mirza and Saikh from the Central 
European Association of Indians, the Indian Student Union in Glasgow (N. N. Bose, J. J. Saha, and A. Roy) and 
Muhammed Iqbal Schedai of the Indian Revolutionary Association in Tashkent. Five individuals remain impossible to 
confirm: Sedhi (Indian Trade Union), Thoia (Jugendliga Bombay), Satyadev, Lal, and Dinkar (guests), RGASPI 
542/1/92, 17-32, “Complete” [list of attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929; SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, 
“Letters of Greeting etc. sent to the Congress”, Frankfurt am Main, July 1929 [published and handed out at the 
congress]; see Callaghan (1993, p.99) for Workers’ Welfare League of India, and Rajani Palme Dutt. 
816 RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, “Complete” [list of attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929. 
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      The Latin American delegation was a homogenous group. The International Secretariat had 
hoped to see eleven delegations, but ended up with seven delegations from Mexico, Venezuela, 
Cuba, Columbia, Argentine, Uruguay and Peru, consisting of sixteen individuals, out of which ten 
had travelled from Latin America, and six from Europe.817 The African and Afro-American 
movement nevertheless had a widely-spread representation around the world. Andrews from South 
Africa; the North African Boukur of the Paris branch of the Étoile Nord-Africaine and Ibrahim 
Youssef from Egypt. Patterson was a member of the USA delegation and acted as the ANLC 
delegate. Other members were Henry Rosemond, who represented three organisations (the 
Furriers’ Union in New York, the USA LAI Section and the Haitian Patriotic Union), and 
Pickens. Kouyaté who was the representative for West Africa as the LDRN delegate, was included 
in the French delegation. Jomo Kenyatta appeared as the delegate of Eastern Africa. According to 
the Information and Press Service, Kenyatta perceived the congress as an “opportunity of putting 
the case of my people in Kenya” to the European anti-imperialist movement.818 Ford belonged to 
the delegation from the Soviet Union (“USSR”), and acted as a delegate of the Profintern “Negro 
Committee” [ITUCNW]. During the congress, Pickens openly questioned Ford and his ties to the 
communist movement and demanded an honest explanation of Ford’s adventures during his long-
term residence in Moscow.819 Braatoy observed how Ford avoided giving Pickens an answer. 
Additionally, Ford was the informal leader of a “Negro Delegation … with 10 members 
representing 13 organisations”.820 
      How did the individual character and distribution of the communist sector come across at the 
congress? Firstly, a majority of the communist delegates introduced themselves as representatives 
                                               
817 Latin America was represented by Mexico (Hurwitz, representative of the LAI Executive and the KIM in Mexico  
and the Caribbean; L. G. Arzubide of the LAI Section in Mexico City), Venezuela (Alfons Goldschmidt, Pedro Brito 
Alfonso, and Aurelio Fortiul from the Revolutionary Party of Venezuela), Cuba (J. Chelala-Aquilera and J. Borges of 
the Verband der kubanischen Emigranten in Paris; Fernandez Sanchez: the Cuban LAI Section and Trade Union 
Federation), Columbia (trade unionist Ravel Mahecha, Laureano B. Cayredo of the Columbian LAI Section and 
Communist Party of Columbia), Argentina (Jose Vital Mata from the Argentinean LAI Section), Uruguay (Martinez of 
the Labour Association in Montevideo; Luis Pierre of the Antiimperialistische Jugend; A. Fierro from the Uruguay 
LAI Section), Peru (Indorio R. Perez from the Peru LAI Section and Lateinamerikanische Studenten in Paris; Estelle 
Perez as “guest”), see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, “Complete” [list of attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929. 
818 SCA CL Collection, volume 131, Information and Press Service. Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress, No.1 
(English Edition) 1929. 
819 RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, “Complete” [list of attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929; IISG Labour and  
Socialist International Collection, 3050/64-64b, Letter from Braatoy, Berlin, to Adler, Zürich, 13/8-1929. 
820 Ford recognised his supervision of the Profintern “Negro Bureau” at the congress in his “Autobiography”, RGASPI  
495/261/6747, 6, Autobiography by Ford, April 1932; RGASPI 495/155/77, 184-186, Report on the Negro Question of 
the League against Imperialism Congress, Moscow, 3/10-1929. The members of the Negro delegation were [in 
brackets: affiliation and nationality/race]: Ford (the ITUCNW; USA/Negro), Pickens (the NAACP, the John Brown 
Memorial Association; USA/Negro), Henry Rosemond (the Haitian Patriotic Union, the  Furriers’ Union in New 
York; USA/Negro), Garan Kouyaté (the LDRN; France/West Africa/Negro), Johnstone Kenyatta (the Kikuyu Central 
Association; Kenya East Africa/Negro), Josef de Keersmaecker (the KIM, the Colonial Commission of the Communist 
Party of Belgium; Belgium/White), Andrews (the South African Trade Union Congress; South Africa/White) and Ali 
(the CGTU; Algeria/Paris/White). 
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of organisations and associations, rather than as members of communist parties. However, the aim 
here is not to postulate on some kind of stigma based on guilt by association for the simple reason 
that these individuals were communists in belief and appearance. Rather, the purpose here is to 
illustrate and discuss how the communist sector controlled the congress on all levels. While some 
of the communist delegates have already been introduced (Ford, Patterson, Katayama, Tsiu 
Wito/Chü Chiu-pai and Münzenberg), an in-depth analysis will, nevertheless, illustrate the breadth 
and strength of this sector. For example, Melnitschansky was the leader of the Profintern 
delegation, supported by the Soviet delegates Timsch and Sachianova.821 The European communist 
movement had an array of actors present in Frankfurt. Monmousseau and Herclet acted as 
delegates of the CGTU, Ferguson as a delegate of the CPGB [unofficially as a member of the 
WEB], Saklatvala appeared as a member of the LAI Executive, Pollitt of the National Minority 
Movement (NMM) and Dimitrov attended under the pseudonym “Helmuth” as a delegate of the 
Kommunistische Balkanförderation, de Visser of the CPH, Gabrielle Cormon of the PCF and Josef 
de Keermacker of the KIM section in Belgium. The communist delegates from Germany 
nonetheless dominated the scene at the Frankfurt Congress. For example, Flieg and Heckert 
attended as members of the ZK KPD, Peter Schiffer of the KPD Cologne party district, Fritz 
Knittel and Robert Leibrand of the KIM and Josef Dünner from the Kommunistische Studenten 
Fraktion (KOSTUFRA). In total, the German delegation consisted of 79 delegates, dominated by 
organisations linked to the communist movement either overtly or covertly, e.g. the IRH, the IAH, 
and Sportintern.822 
      The agenda for the congress, and its anticipated outcome amongst the decision-makers at 
Comintern headquarters, was the central issue. As presented below, a review of the agenda reveals 
how the communist sector dominated every topic at the congress, which illustrates how the event 
seemed to follow a pre-destined rationale in order to comply with the Comintern’s endorsed 
strategy. The following chronological table outlines the congress and its agenda from 20 July to 28 
July, and its key speakers (in brackets): 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
821 T he delegation from the Soviet Union (“USSR”) consisted of Müller (MOPR), Kossarew and Boretzky (Russian  
Communist Youth Association/KIM), William Rust, Kuno [?], Diek [?] (KIM), Alfred [?] (Profintern Youth secretariat) 
and Ford. 
822 RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, “Complete” [list of attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929; SCA, CL Collection, 
volume 131, Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress. Agenda, 1929. 
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Date Activity, Agenda and  Themes  
20/7 LAI Youth Conference, meeting of LAI Executive 
21/7 Demonstration at the Hippodrome ; opening session at Zoological Gardens 
22/7 “The World Political Situation and the War Danger” (Harry Pollitt); debate on 
anti-imperialism and pacifism 
23/7 “The Struggle for Indian Independence” (Rajani Palme Dutt); debate on the state 
of the anti-imperialist movement   
24/7 Continued debate on India; criticism of ILP  
25/7 “The Chinese Revolution: the Struggle against Imperialism and against the 
Nanking Government” (Strakhov/Tsiu Wito/Chü Chiu-pai); Irish question 
26/7 “The Struggle for Emancipation of the Negroes in Africa and America” (Ford); 
the war threat against the Soviet Union; the Arab region; Indonesia; liberations 
movements in Europe; Indochina; North Africa; criticism of Poale Zion; 
intellectuals  
27/7 “The Work of the Trade Unions in the Struggle against Imperialism” 
(Melnitschansky); Latin America; “closed” ITUNWC conference; speech by 
Maxton 
28/7 “Political and Organisational Report on the Activity of the League 
Organisational Report” (Münzenberg); continued debate on Melnitschansky’s 
speech; administrative questions and election of the LAI Executive 
Committee823 
                                               
823 Inprecorr, No.62, 64, 66-68, 1929. The official invitation introduced the running order of the congress: 1. Opening  
Speeches and Greetings; 2. The World Political Situation and the War Danger; 3. The Struggle for Indian 
Independence; 4. The Chinese Revolution: the Struggle against Imperialism and against the Nanking Government; 5. 
The Present Stage in the Struggle for Freedom of the Oppressed Peoples of the Pacific; 6. The Need to Co-ordinate the 
Struggle of all Arabian Countries against Imperialism; 7. The Struggle for Emancipation of the Negroes in Africa and 
America; 8. The Struggle of Latin America against British and North American Imperialism; 9. The Work of the Trade 
Unions in the Struggle against Imperialism; 10. The Social, Political and Economic Position of Women in Colonial 
and Semi-Colonial Countries; 11. Political and Organisational Report on the Activity of the League; 12. Report on the 
First International Anti-Imperialist Youth Conference; 13. Organisation Questions: a. Constitution, b. Elections; 14. 
Miscellaneous, SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress. Agenda, 1929. 
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Implementing the Plot: “Cleanse the Ranks” 
 
The League against Imperialism would have to cleanse its ranks of those vacillating and 
confused elements who were a source of weakness in the struggle against imperialism. The 
League had grown greatly in strength since its last Congress and must also strengthen its 
struggle against imperialism and become the most powerful instrument in the struggle of the 
colonial peoples. 
    Harry Pollitt, Frankfurt, 22/7-1929  
The LAI Congress quickly turned into a scene of disputes and controversy, demonstrating the 
vindictivness of the communist sector in dominating the proceedings. On 22 July, Pollitt declared 
the communists’ current ideological platform in his speech on the war threat, emphasising the need 
for the LAI “to cleanse its ranks” and rid itself of “vacillating and confused elements”. If one may 
be so bold as to state that this speech in itself was confirmation of how the LAI had begun its “turn 
to the left”.824 
      At the opening ceremony on 21 July, Maxton welcomed the delegates at the Zoologischer 
Garten and delivered a short introductory speech. According to Inprecorr, Münzenberg then took 
the floor and proceeded to accuse the leader of the British Labour Party, Ramsey MacDonald, who 
had recently been elected leader of a Labour minority government in Great Britain, of having 
sanctioned the restriction of LAI activities within the British Empire. Münzenberg’s criticism was 
aimed to function as a response to the fact that British authorities had refused to give the LAI a 
permit to organise the congress in London, as a substitute for Paris. Hence, this refusal signified 
how the Labour government was continuing the oppressive tradition and structures of the British 
Empire, a peculiarity particularly evident in India, Münzenberg stated; a theme further elaborated 
upon as Münzenberg attacked the former Chairman of the LAI, Lansbury, for having been a lackey 
in the service of the “imperialist system”. Inprecorr observed how Münzenberg’s conclusive 
statement had been applauded with jubilant cheers from the congress crowd, who, in turn, 
demanded that Maxton explain how the socialist movement intended to position itself on the 
question of colonialism and imperialism. Maxton retorted that he was “speaking here only as a 
representative of the League, not on behalf of other organisations”. However, from a broader 
perspective, Münzenberg’s speech had introduced the main thread of the congress.825 Thus, 
                                               
824 Ulmen 1978, p.103. Ulmen did not, however, mention the turmoil at the congress, thus, it is likely that Wittfogel  
either neglected to mention or had forgotten about the nature of the event. According to Ulmen, Wittfogel attended 
primarily for the reason that he lived in Frankfurt am Main, and functioned as the leader of the LAI section in the city. 
In August 1929, Wittfogel moved to Berlin and became “intimately connected with the radical culture and intellectual 
life of the capital”. 
825 Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Nr. 64, p.1519-1520; The British Labour Party won the parliamentary  
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Maxton’s evasive statement gave the communist sector the impetus to initiate its carefully planned 
strategy of attacking both the “staggering nature of the so-called left-wing national reformists and 
the position of the Baldwin-Maxton elements” at the congress in Frankfurt. In connection with 
Münzenberg’s speech, and after Maxton’s evasive reply, a number of communist delegates 
appeared on the rostrum to outline the agenda for the event. For example, Tsiu Wito/Chü protested 
against the brutality of both the KMT and the Nanking government, urging everyone to sing “The 
International”, while Ferguson stated that it should be a logical step for every delegate to support 
the Chinese liberation struggle and demonstrate their allegiance towards the Soviet Union. The 
opening ceremony ended with Melnitschansky charging the LAI to begin making a distinction 
between “friend and foe”, selecting Maxton and the ILP as its principal targets.826 The stage was 
now set for Pollitt. 
 
“Hear, hear!”: The Crisis of the Anti-Imperialist Movement and the War Threat: Pollitt’s speech 
had a profound impact on the audience, with shouts of “hear, hear” during the “long drawn-out 
applauses” being heard as he left the rostrum, according to the Information and Press Service. In 
his speech on the “international political situation and the war threat”, the first topic on the 
congress agenda, Pollitt’s performance determined the political discourse of the congress. What 
were the principal arguments in Pollitt’s speech? The primary aim of his speech was to introduce 
and declare the necessity of defending the Soviet Union and its construction of socialism, a social 
experiment threatened by the war threat of “imperialist nations”. Pollitt argued that the 
collaboration of the colonial “native bourgeoisie” and international social democracy assisted the 
plans of the “imperialist nations” for a military invasion of the Soviet Union. Hence, this explained 
why imperialism continued to plague the world after the end of the Great War, Pollitt stated. What 
role did the LAI play in all of this? Pollitt argued that the LAI and its support of the colonial 
freedom struggle constituted a strong political actor, capable of disrupting the politics of the 
“imperialist power bloc”. Yet, the LAI was facing a crisis both in its organisation as well as in its 
political outlook, e.g. the LAI had commenced the work of defending the building of socialism in 
the Soviet Union and had established propaganda campaigns against the war threat of the 
“imperialist nations”. As global politics had entered “the final struggle between the imperialist 
                                                                                                                                                          
elections in England on 30 May, 1929 and, for the second time since the Great War, was in power, see Matthew 
Worley, Labour Inside the Gate: a History of the British Labour Party Between the Wars, I. B. Tauris, London, 2005, 
pp.119-120. 
826 RGASPI 495/60/134a, 38-40, (Confidential) Protocol, meeting of the “Commission on the LAI” (German),  
Moscow, 18/6-1929; Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Nr. 64, p.1520. 
329 
 
countries and the Soviet Union”, Pollitt declared that “no anti-imperialist could remain neutral 
[and] a real anti-imperialist must out of necessity support the Soviet Union”.827 
      Aside from his ideological support for the Soviet Union, Pollitt’s speech was rooted in 
realpolitik. In May 1929, “Chinese militarists” [the Nanking government] had intervened against 
Soviet military forces in a border dispute, creating a sensitive situation which culminated in July in 
an undeclared state of war between the two nations. For the Soviet Union, this conflict confirmed 
its fears of the war threat against the socialist fatherland. Hence, this required that the LAI and its 
congress function as a forum to mobilise the communist movement’s propaganda against the 
KMT, Pollitt concluded, a statement further developed by Tsiu Wito/Chü Chiu-pai in “the 
Congress considers an attack upon the Soviet Union as an attack upon the oppressed throughout 
the world”.828 The responses to what Pollitt had said brought forward other perspectives than just 
simply an increased militant support of the Soviet Union. For example, the Swedish socialist 
Lindhagen suggested that pacifism would be a more appropriate solution in confronting the war 
threat rather than a military response. According to Lindhagen, “the class struggle is not the best 
method with which to destroy imperialism”, a statement Pollitt repudiated as being a concept 
embraced by “well-meaning politicians”, a position the LAI had to avoid. Other actors in the 
communist sector also reacted with fiery speeches and verbal attacks against Lindhagen. 
Melnitschansky stated that the war threat was a real fact and that “no White soldier was going to 
put his foot on Soviet soil without being punished”.829 
      Pollitt continued and observed how the LAI had failed to understand the international political 
situation, and that, therefore, both the organisation and the anti-imperialist movement themselves 
had retreated into a crisis due to the “compromises” given to both Maxton and the ILP as well as 
Gupta and the INC, actors advocating “reformism” rather than a revolutionary approach in the 
colonial struggle. There was “no room” for reformists within the LAI, Pollitt stated, hence this 
                                               
827 Sachianova from Russia supported Pollitt’s argument, demanding that the LAI pay more attention to the anti-war  
movement, see Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Nr. 64, p.1520; SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, 
Information and Press Service No. 5. Afternoon session, July 22, 1929”. Issued by the League against Imperialism 
(English version), p.1-3. On 22 May, Manuilsky, Lozovsky, Kuusinen, Schubin, Kitaigorodsky, Freyer and Piatnitsky 
discussed the question of the report on the war danger and the international situation, giving Mif the instruction to 
write Pollitt’s speech, as well as the resolution, see fol. RGASPI 495/60/134a, 36, Minutes of meeting Commission on 
the LAI Congress, 22/5-1929. 
828 SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, “Information and Press Service No. 5. Afternoon session, July 22, 1929”. Issued  
by the League against Imperialism (English version), p.1-3; The Sino-Soviet dispute in 1929 is discussed in Bruce A. 
Ellerman, Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917- 1927 (Sharpe, 
Armonk NY, 1997, p.282). This conflict concerned a border dispute between the Nanking government and the Soviet 
Union, with a focus on the railway in the borderlands. For Wito’s protest, see IISG LAI Collection 3392.1, p.79, 
“Summary of Comrade Tsiu WITO’s report on the Chinese Question”, Frankfurt am Main, 21/7-1929. 
829 SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, “Information and Press Service No. 5. Afternoon session, 22 July, 1929”. Issued  
by the League against Imperialism (English version), 1-3; Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am 
Main 23.Juli 1929, Nr.66, p.1545. Georg Ledebour described Lindhagen’s speech as “rubbish”, whereas Helene 
Stöcker only concluded that she was “delighted” to see the “building of socialism” in the Soviet Union. 
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meant that the LAI had to “cleanse its ranks”. Later, as noted in the “Congress Manifesto”, Pollitt’s 
demand was further expounded: 
[…] the anti-imperialist forces throughout the world must wage an uncompromising struggle 
against the allies and agents of imperialism within the national movements. […] fight against 
its agents in the labour movement, against international Social Democracy, the Amsterdam 
Trade Union International and, the most brazen of all – the British Labour Party […] Each 
national social reformist group is trying to promote the imperialist interests of its ‘own’ 
bourgeoisie by demoralising the anti-imperialist front at home and in the colonies.830 
The antagonism of the communists on the question of “reformism” was the key issue in a majority 
of the speeches at the congress, particularly in the performances by Pollitt, Melnitschansky and 
Ford. Illustrative of the above was Ford’s attack, describing the LSI and the British Labour 
government as being “chauvinistic”, urging the LAI to mould the anti-imperialist movement upon 
“the Soviet model” in order to increase the “struggle against reformism” within the colonial 
liberation movements. Ford later reported to the ECCI Negro Bureau that the question of 
“reformism” had revealed that some of the Negro delegates nourished social democratic 
tendencies, e.g. the South African Andrews had given “a social democratic speech”.831 
 
“Sources of Fire”: India and China: In the aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress, as noted in the 
“Congress Manifesto”: “[I]n China and in India forces are maturing for decisive battles against 
imperialism. The working class of China and its revolutionary organisations stand at the forefront 
of the national revolution leading into the liberation struggle of the oppressed peasantry and the 
whole working population”. For Rajani Palme Dutt, who delivered the keynote speech on India, 
the country was a “source of fire” which had to confront the system of imperialism and 
colonialism with a militant response, suggesting the Meerut conspiracy trial to be the signal for “a 
new war” in India. Dutt observed nevertheless that the colonial fire in India was facing two 
principal obstructions. Firstly, the surveillance by the British security services had succeeded in 
curbing the colonial struggle and, secondly, the reluctance of the INC and the All-Indian Trade 
Union Council towards affiliating with the LAI had created a problem in unifying “every anti-
imperialist force” in India. Thus, as a solution to the above, or at least to the latter problem, Dutt 
called on the LAI to purge itself of its “weak elements”. Dutt was referring particularly to Gupta’s 
                                               
830 SCA CL Collection, volume 131, “Information and Press Service No. 5. Afternoon session, 22 July, 1929”. Issued  
by the League against Imperialism (English version), 1-3; For the LAI Congress Manifesto, see IISG LAI Collection, 
3392.1, p.78. 
831 Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main, 25.Juli 1929, Nr.66, p.1546; Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf  
des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main, 26.Juli 1929, Nr.67, p.1565; RGASPI 495/155/77, 184-186, Report on the Negro 
question at the League against Imperialism Congress, Ford, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/10-1929. 
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attendance at the congress as the INC delegate, a typical example of a reformist actor who seemed 
content with accepting Dominion status rather than national independence. In Gupta’s response to 
Dutt’s accusation, he urged the congress delegates to understand the most basic fact that India was 
“the prey for the most violent Imperialism”. Yet, the solution to achieving national independence 
in India was not through a revolutionary struggle, but rather along the path introduced by 
Gandhi.832 
      Gupta’s statement caused the communist sector to react with disdain. According to Ibrahim 
Youssef, the accomplishment of revolution in India would “send a signal” to the oppressed peoples 
around the world, while Rattan Singh stated that the INC had failed to unify the workers and 
peasants into “one class conscious” movement. Huang Ping, the Chinese trade unionist, likened 
the INC’s “betrayal” to the acts committed by the KMT prior to the April 1927 putsch. For Gupta, 
these fierce reactions were an unpleasant experience. In an attempt to calm the tense discussion, 
Gupta stated that the INC would not compromise on the question of attaining national 
independence, conceding nevertheless that achieving it would be a question of time and method. 
Thus, it was not merely enough to deploy revolutionary tactics, or accuse the British Labour 
government of being a “supporter of Imperialism”.833 After the congress, Gupta returned to India 
and informed Nehru of his ordeal in Frankfurt, information that Nehru later referred to when 
criticising the LAI’s attitude towards the INC: 
The attitude adopted towards our delegate, Shivaprasad Gupta, […] recommended to us, 
after his experience of that Congress, that we should not formally affiliate or associate (he 
did not appreciate the difference) ourselves with your League.834 
Gupta’s reaction did not come as a surprise; however, the communists’ antagonism at the congress 
essentially contributed to damaging the International Secretariat’s links to India, e.g. the relation 
between Chatto and Nehru. 
      The agitation continued as Tsiu Wito/Chü introduced the Chinese question, describing the 
social situation for the industry worker in China. According to Tsiu Wito/Chü, the state 
administered repression by both the “fascist” KMT and the Nanking government kept the Chinese 
industry workers in a vice. However, if the workers and peasants succeeded in unifying their 
                                               
832 Gupta addressed Gandhi as the “great leader”, whose methods of “boycottism” and “acts of aggressive non- 
violence” were the real way to solve the situation in India, methods that would finally win over the “feudalists and 
capitalists”, Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main 23.Juli 1929, Nr. 66, p.1545. 
833 Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main 24.Juli 1929, Nr. 66, p.1546; Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf  
des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main 26-27.Juli 1929, Nr. 67, p.1564-1565. 
834 RGASPI 542/1/44, 51-54, Official letter from Nehru, Allahabad, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 30/1-1930. 
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forces, and took up arms against both the KMT “agents of Imperialism” and the Sino-Soviet 
conflict, it would end in favour of the freedom struggle, Tsiu Wito/Chü argued.835 
 
“Tendencies Hostile to the Negro Liberation Movement” and the ITUCNW: The Negro question 
epitomised the strategy of the communist sector. According to the “Resolution on the Negro 
Question”, the Negro movement had to confront “hostile elements of reformism and Garveyism” 
by preparing a militant struggle to “cleanse its ranks” for the sole purpose of transferring the 
liberation question from “race” to “class”. At the congress, Ford was the leading actor to exploit 
the Negro question to the fullest.836 According to Ford’s speech, “the modern history of the Negro” 
was divided into three specific categories: the “Negro trade” and the historical traits of the slave 
trade, the plantation industry in the USA, and the necessity to radicalise the Negro workers. Ford’s 
report was “19 pages and given in full”, while some of the delegates, e.g. Bjarne Braatoy 
perceived Ford’s performance in Frankfurt as having been “very extreme”.837 How did Ford link 
together the “modern history of the Negro” with the LAI? Ford stated that the LAI had not 
understood that the Negro movement did not concern either a “native disposition” or a “racial 
dimension”, instead the question of “emancipating the Negro” was focused on social aspects and 
the class struggle rather than race. In connection with Ford’s speech, Patterson stated that the LAI 
had to “speed up” its organisational work in the USA and “cleanse its ranks”. The latter was a 
remark made against Pickens, who had questioned why Ford had made a distinction between class 
and race. According to Pickens, statistics indicated the difference in the economic and social 
progression of the Negro race in comparison to the ruling elite in the imperialist nations; hence, the 
Negro movement was essentially a question of race, not of class.838 However, Ford and Patterson’s 
criticism was aimed solely at demoting Pickens’ position within the LAI, a strategy formulated by 
Patterson in March 1929: 
Link the struggle of [the Negro] masses up with the imminent danger of imperialist war, with 
the feverish preparation of the imperialists for an attack upon the Soviet Union and of the 
                                               
835 Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main 24.Juli, 1929, Nr.66, p.1546. 
836 Prior to the congress, Münzenberg described Ford as a “young and active politician, in charge of organising and  
leading North American Negro organisations”, see Willi Münzenberg, “Die Negerfrage auf dem Antiimperialistischer 
Weltkongress”, Inprecorr, Nr. 60, 1929, pp.1442-1444. 
837 IISG LSI Collection, 3050/64-65, Letter from Braatoy, Berlin, to Adler, Zürich, 13/8-1929. Gross later used  
Braatoy’s reports in her recollection of the congress. Additionally, Braatoy does not mention that Manuilsky appeared 
at the congress, see footnote 1 in Gross 1967, p.210. 
838 Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main 25 July 1929, Nr. 66, p.1546. Other speakers on the  
Negro question were Kouyaté, who discussed the “horrors” of French colonialism in West Africa; Andrews, 
Rosemond, Bellam and Mary Adams. Adams is also known as Williana Burroughs (Mary Adams was her party name) 
and she had attended the Sixth International Comintern Congress in 1928 as the CPUSA delegate, who during 1928-30 
carried out “a variety of duties for the CPUSA” and visited Moscow on a frequent basis to deliver reports, see Klehr, 
Haynes, Firsov 1995, pp.199-200. 
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tremendous importance the continued existence of the Fatherland of the exploited toiling 
colonial masses has for them. We [the ECCI Negro Bureau] do not believe that any report 
Mr. Pickens might make would enhance the development of the revolutionary movement, 
[…] We do not feel that Mr. Pickens can draw a clear picture of the uncompromising 
position of the League, towards the international bandits who have raped and ravished Africa 
and degraded and dehumanised the Negro masses everywhere.839 
This dispute at the congress, and its aftermath between Pickens on the one side, and Ford and 
Patterson on the other, was a question resolved by the ECCI Secretariat on 9 October 1929, by its 
endorsement of the decision to withdraw Pickens’ LAI membership. Ford and Patterson had 
objected to Pickens’ resistance towards some of the formulations in the Negro resolution, e.g. the 
“designation of the USSR as the fatherland of workers and oppressed peoples”. According to the 
ECCI Secretariat’s verdict, there was no room in the LAI for a person who aided “the forces of 
imperialism”.840 
      Ford’s major achievement in Frankfurt, however, were the two separate ITUCNW conferences 
held during the congress. The “Negro Delegation” invited selected delegates to attend these 
conferences, e.g. Saklatvala, Burns and Gupta, and discussions were focused on both how to 
“outline the work of the RILU [Profintern] with regards to Negro workers” and the idea to 
convene the first international conference of the ITUCNW in London in July 1930.841 Additionally, 
after the congress had ended, Ford organised a trip for Kenyatta, Burroughs and Kouyaté to visit 
the Soviet Union and Moscow, an undertaking which Ford experienced as having been rather 
complicated: 
I had to take care of all of the technical details in connection with bringing these comrades 
here from Frankfurt, arranging their travel, securing their passports in Berlin, which took a 
whole day, their travel, on the way, etc. I raise this question because of the extra time and 
                                               
839 RGASPI 495/18/664, 1-3, (Secret) Draft letter to the LAI by comrade Wilson (W. Patterson), Moscow, 25/3-1929. 
840 RGASPI 495/155/77, 184-186, Report on the Negro Question of the League against Imperialism Congress,  
Moscow, 3/10-1929; RGASPI 495/18/664, 108-112, (Confidential) Draft letter to Communist Fraction of LAI, 
unknown author, endorsed by ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 9/10-1929. The last part of this statement reads as follows: 
“Shades of Banquos’ ghost. Enough! We welcome the announcement frank and open as it is. One more betrayer of the 
masses has proclaimed himself. The membership role of the League can know his name no longer. Farewell ‘friend’ 
Pickens”. 
841 Bridgeman received the assignment to act as liaison for the ITUCNW in London, assisting with the preparatory  
work of preparing the congress. According to the report in Inprecorr (perhaps due to conspiratorial motives), an 
“international Negro workers’ congress” would take place in Berlin in 1930, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/450, 50-52, 
Report on the Negro Question at the League Against Imperialism Congress, 91.3.X.29.242.8; RGASPI 495/155/77, 
184-186, Report on the Negro Question of the League against Imperialism Congress, author: Ford, Moscow, 3/10-
1929; Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main 26.Juli 1929, Nr. 67, p.1565; RGASPI 534/3/450, 
34, (copy) Letter from Ford, Moscow, to, unknown recipient and location, 9/10-1929. See further in Weiss (2011) and 
Adi (2008). 
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expense that was placed upon me. In the future, assistance could be given by comrades in 
Berlin, in matters of this nature.842 
Consequently, the Frankfurt Congress and Kouyaté’s journey to Moscow established the 
collaboration between the International Secretariat and the LDRN. In September 1929, the LDRN 
organised a German section in Berlin and located its activities in the bureau of the International 
Secretariat office at 24 Friedrichstraβe.843 
 
Confirming “Friend and Foe”: The Trade Union Question and the Maxton Dispute  
The “Resolution on the Trade Unions” observed how “[T]he Congress considers the affiliation of 
the Soviet Labour Unions, the organisation of the workers in the land of the proletarian 
dictatorship, to be of first-rate importance. The affiliated class trade union organisations represent 
the mass basis of the LAI. […] The Congress appeals to the workers of the imperialist and colonial 
countries to close their ranks”. The trade union question at the congress embodied the antagonism 
of the communist sector towards the non-communist delegates; especially the callous rhetoric 
against Maxton. According to Melnitschansky, Maxton had hampered the LAI’s efforts to establish 
contacts with workers in “the imperialist and colonial countries”. The sole reason for making this 
accusation was to create a split between the LAI and Maxton in order to topple him from his 
position as Chairman of the LAI. Thus, for Melnitschansky it was all about forcing the LAI to 
recognise the distinction between “friend and foe”. Maxton epitomised the “inherent weakness” in 
the LAI, displaying above all else an incapacity to understand “class-oriented ideology”. This had 
resulted in reformist actors as the INC and ILP being given political space, which had led the anti-
imperialist movement “into the abyss”. Braatoy witnessed Melnitschansky’s performance and 
concluded that it had been “such a harsh speech” that, on the evening of 26 July, everyone felt as 
though the congress was over.844 How did Maxton respond to Melnitschansky’s speech? For 
Maxton, he needed to find a way of making everyone grasp the fact that the LAI had only existed 
for two years, thus, it had “a long way to go” in tackling “one of the biggest tasks”: 
To produce a world of men and women free from the terror of war and the shackles of 
Imperialism. […] No organisation has as yet set themselves the task of the League nor 
endeavoured to bring these people together.845 
                                               
842 RGASPI 495/155/77, 184-186, Report on the Negro Question of the League against Imperialism Congress, author:  
Ford, Moscow, 3/10-1929. 
843 RGASPI 495/155/77, 404-408, Kurzer Tätigkeitsbericht der Liga zur Verteidigung der Negerrasse, author:  
Kouyaté, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 30/11-1930. 
844 Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main 27.Juli 1929, Nr. 67, p.1565-1566; IISG Labour and  
Socialist Archives, 3050/60-61, Letter from Braatoy, Berlin, to Adler, Zürich, 6/8-1929. 
845 IISG, Labour & Socialist Archives, 3050/62-63, Maxton’s statement during the evening session, July 26, 1929,  
Frankfurt am Main. 
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Maxton admitted that Melnitschansky and the congress deserved an explanation on the question of 
“reformism”, as well as a reflection on the LAI’s demand to “cleanse its the ranks”. Firstly, the 
LAI was a symptom of the “world today”, an organisation aiming itself towards voluntary 
participation. Secondly, Maxton referred to himself as being a “revolutionary Socialist” who 
wanted to change a “world in political and economic bondage, affected by a political and 
economic mechanism, controlled by a small body of capitalist exploiters”. Thus, the question as to 
how to change the world was the very core of the dispute, with Maxton questioning the unrealistic 
illusion, introduced by the communist delegates at the congress, that a military overthrow would 
result in a social revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries in order to achieve national 
independence. According to Maxton, this was a perspective which ignored the facts of the current 
and existing political reality, suggesting that parliamentary activism would be a far more 
prosperous and constructive approach to exerting influence over the question of colonialism and 
imperialism. In a British context, the parliamentary arena could question the “imperialist policy” 
of the Labour Party, Maxton stated. However, for the present moment, Maxton declared that the 
Labour Party was in a minority “in a capitalist country”, thus producing the image of a party 
which had assumed the role as a “caretaker of Capitalism and Imperialism”.846 
      The German communist newspaper, Frankfurter Nachrichten, stated that the congress had 
been a “Sturm über Maxton” (Storm over Maxton).847 Is it possible to give a rational explanation 
for this storm? One explanation is found in the observation made by Burns about Maxton, i.e. that 
he “lay low and said nothing”.848 Nonetheless, the initial idea was to diminish Maxton’s 
importance at the congress, a strategy which had been proposed by the “Commission on the LAI” 
in Moscow, thus, the communist sector only had to wait for the most opportune moment. 
Furthermore, Maxton’s silence encapsulated the powerlessness of the non-communist delegates to 
respond to the attacks from the communist sector. For the communist delegates, this made it 
possible to increase its criticism of the ILP, the INC and the “reformists”, declaring themselves as 
being the only ones capable of adapting a “class-conscious” ideology.849 
      The communist sector’s plot was a pre-determined strategy carried out to perfection from the 
beginning until the end of the congress. The Manuilskyan theme of “there was a time when we co-
                                               
846 IISG, Labour and Socialist Archives 3050/62-63, Maxton’s statement during the evening session, 26 July, 1929,  
Frankfurt am Main; Emile Burns, “World Congress of the League against Imperialism”, in Labour Monthly, Vol.11, 
September 1929, No.9, London, pp.559-563. 
847 Mohammad Hatta, ”A Retrospective Account of the Second Congress of the League against Imperialism and for  
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848 Burns (1929). 
849 Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main 27July 1929, Nr. 67, pp.1565-1566. 
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operated” had been a framework redefined by the communists while repeating the mantra of the 
war threat, in defence of the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union, and getting across the 
message that the LAI had to “cleanse its ranks”. “Class” was the ideological scaffold upon which 
the communist sector created a split with the non-communist delegates at the second LAI 
congress, rather than focusing on the discussions of colonialism and imperialism. The Frankfurt 
Congress turned into an event characterised by the practical implications of the new “class against 
class” policy, thereby initiating a process to definitively subordinate the LAI and its International 
Secretariat to the Comintern. In an attempt to bring the congress to a successful close, Münzenberg 
managed to end the congress on a contradictory note. 
 
* 
 
Finale  
 
The League finds itself […] still in the phase of organisation and preparation. The time has 
come to unify every movement […] and create a storm all over the world. 
Münzenberg, Frankfurt am Main, 27/7-
1929 
 
Münzenberg was the last speaker at the congress. After having introduced the congress 
proceedings on 21 July, Münzenberg kept himself in the background for the duration of the event, 
only to re-appear and summarise his impressions on 27 July. Münzenberg had, from the beginning, 
planned to deliver a report on organisational questions and on the geographical spread of the LAI, 
although, due to the turmoil at the congress, he apparently changed the focus of his speech. His 
decision to do this might seem like a contradiction, especially as Münzenberg was well aware of 
the communist sector’s intentions prior to the congress. Yet, it seems as though Münzenberg could 
not refrain from addressing and reminding the congress crowd of the LAI’s purpose and aim, 
declaring a profound pride in the fact that the LAI was the “first attempt” to create a movement 
which aspired “to uniting millions” and linking “the proletarian strugglers in their ‘mother 
countries’ with the oppressed colonies”. Hence, this was a political and social initiative which 
relied on its “sources of support” (the “socialists, communists, anarchists and pacifists”). For the 
LAI, in order to strengthen its “struggle against imperialism” and connect it with “the liberation 
struggle in India”, the organisation depended on the continued support of the INC, Münzenberg 
argued.850 This conclusion differed markedly from that of the communist sector. However, shortly 
after the congress, Münzenberg changed his opinion. In August, Münzenberg stated in Inprecorr 
                                               
850 Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main 27July 1929, Nr. 67, p.1566. 
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that he scorned the idea that the LAI was an “arena for everyone”. What had caused Münzenberg 
to change his mind? Münzenberg believed that the Frankfurt Congress had been “a considerable 
step to the left” for the LAI, thus the organisation no longer depended on any moral support from 
intellectuals or “liberal women and men” in order to establish connections with “workers and 
peasants in the oppressed countries”.851 This “turn to the left” marked a fundamental difference 
from the picture Münzenberg had painted at the congress. In September, another explanation 
emerged when Münzenberg visited Moscow and stated the following to the Political Secretariat: 
One must not forget that the Frankfurt Congress took place under completely different 
circumstances than the Brussels Congress, and its execution was a hundred times more 
difficult […]852 
Other actors perceived the Frankfurt Congress as a general failure with respect to the LAI. The 
Frankfurter Zeitung stated that the congress had witnessed the definitive end of the “enthusiasm” 
(Begeisterung) in relation to the LAI, while Braatoy concluded that the “real congress” had taken 
place “behind the scenes”, with the communist delegates struggling to establish its control over the 
event.853 Hatta’s “retrospective account” also interpreted the result of the communist strategy: 
At the moment – and no-one will deny this – the League finds itself in a difficult crisis. A 
reconciliation of opposing views did not materialise in Frankfurt. […] The differences are 
too great, the Prinzipienreiterei has gone too far. […] The communists regard it as their holy 
duty to fight the left-wing socialists and nobody would deny them this right. But to transfer 
this bitter fight to the League with the ensuing danger that the League will collapse, is 
irresponsible.854  
Münzenberg’s speech was the final act at the congress, a performance which pointed towards an 
end of the LAI’s original aim. Bringing the congress to its formal end, the crowd applauded, a sign 
of its approval for the new LAI Executive: Dr. Thengdi from India as Chairman, Nehru, Hatta, 
Ford, Rivera, Sandino, Maxton, Bridgeman, Pollitt, Saklatvala, Herclet, Münzenberg, Georgi 
Dimitrov and Melnitschansky.855 
      On 28 July, the congress hall at Zoologischer Garten closed its gates at 3 pm. According to 
Gross, Münzenberg went, along with Fimmen and other congress delegates, to the restaurant 
                                               
851 Willi Münzenberg, ”Der Frankfurter Kongress der Liga gegen Imperialismus”, in Inprecorr, Nr. 68, pp.1577-1578. 
852 RGASPI 495/3/120, 72-75, Erklärung des Gen. Münzenberg, Moscow, to the Political Secretariat, Moscow, 25/9- 
1929. 
853 Frankfurter Zeitung, “Der Weltkongress gegen Imperialismus”, 29/7-1929, see IISG LAI Collection 3392.1, p.102;  
IISG Labour and Socialist Archive 3050/60-61, Letter from Braatoy, Berlin, to Adler, Zürich, 6/8-1929. 
854 Hatta [1929] 1972, pp.200-204. 
855 RGASPI 542/1/92, 33-34, [List of proposals for the LAI Executive, presented by the Mandatsprüfungs- 
kommission] Frankfurt am Main, July 28 1929; Inprecorr, “Der Verlauf des Kongresses”, Frankfurt am Main 27 July 
1929, Nr. 67, p.1566. Olive Budden, the leader of the “Examining Commission of the Congress” (Mandatsprüfungs-
kommission), confirmed 257 “authorised voters” had elected a new LAI Executive. The new Chairman, Thengdi, the 
leader of the All-India Trade Union Council, had been a defendant in the Meerut conspiracy trial. 
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“Heyland am Römberberg”, located in the old quarter of Frankfurt am Main, with the feeling that 
the idea of the LAI had been “ditched”, leaving a “feeling of farewell” in the air.856  
      The Frankfurt Congress had witnessed a clash of ideologies. The essence of the entire congress 
had been the question of control. The second international LAI congress had been an event 
contrived from the very beginning at Comintern headquarters in Moscow, carried out en masse on 
location by the communist sector. The meticulous preparatory work done by the “Commission on 
the LAI” in Moscow had, consequently, restricted both Münzenberg’s and the International 
Secretariat’s ability to influence the organisational and ideological framework of the second LAI 
congress. The Frankfurt Congress marked the end of a chronological process which had begun 
with the Hands off China campaign in 1925, which had led to the inauguration of the LAI in 1927 
and the International Secretariat’s efforts to create a vigorous organisation in 1927-28. The LAI’s 
life and purpose was, however, far from over. The end of the congress was the start of a new phase 
for the LAI and the International Secretariat. The central question, nevertheless, is what was left of 
the LAI after the Frankfurt Congress, with later erroneous interpretations of the history of the LAI 
having concluded that the organisation simply disappeared.857 Finally, did the Frankfurt Congress 
imply the end of the idea of turning the LAI into a mass organisation? The drama of the Frankfurt 
Congress and its aftermath marked the beginning of a rigorous pressure on the International 
Secretariat, a scenario which developed itself into a year of confusion which would, ultimately, 
transform the LAI. 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
856 Gross 1967, p.210. 
857 McMeekin 2003, p.208. 
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PART III 
 
 
Chapter 7. Anni confusionis 
  
My opinion is that the congress was not a powerful demonstration against imperialism and 
for the defence of the Soviet Union […] but a considerable organisational improvement 
compared to the first congress. 
Münzenberg to the Eastern Secretariat, 
12/8-1929 
 
In relation to the further organisational consolidation of the anti-imperialist movement of 
workers and peasants in the colonial countries, which is the main task of the League, the 
achievements of the II Congress must be considered insignificant. 
Eastern Secretariat, Draft Resolution on 
Results of the II World Congress of the 
LAI, 27/8-1929 
 
The aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress marked the beginning of a year of confusion within the 
LAI, characterised by uncertainty, internal commotion and the confirmation of a crisis. However, it 
is misleading to speak in terms of one year since the confused state of affairs at the International 
Secretariat, perceived here as the Anni confusionis – the year of confusion – lasted from August 
1929 till September 1930.858 Developments in the wake of the Frankfurt Congress proved to be 
both tedious and difficult for both the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement, and did nothing 
whatsoever to improve the European communist parties’ colonial work. However, was this all part 
of a greater purpose? The aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress was characterised by numerous 
unresolved questions, e.g.  the idea of splitting the International Secretariat into three secretariats, 
with  representation in Berlin, Paris and London, as well as the critique against the International 
Secretariat for not seeming capable of understanding the full extent of the political situation in the 
colonial countries. More importantly, opinions suggested that the LAI had not adopted the 
endorsed “working methods” introduced at the Tenth ECCI Plenum.859 The criticism against the 
LAI and its International Secretariat came to a head when the Eastern Secretariat submitted a 
detailed report on the Frankfurt Congress, “Draft resolution on Results of the II World Congress of 
                                               
858 A similar chronological perspective is adopted in Weitz’ narrative of the KPD after the NSDAP had assumed power  
in 1933, coined as the Anni terribli for the German communist movement, see Weitz 1997, pp.280-310. 
859 RGASPI 542/1/30, 140, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to “Sch“ [Eastern Secretariat], Moscow, 3/8-1929;  
RGASPI 542/1/33, 9, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Manuilsky, Moscow, 13/8-1929; RGASPI 495/18/740, 72-
73, Letter from Heimo/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 21/8-1929. 
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the LAI and its direct tasks” (hereinafter: DR LAI), a document which would later function as 
consultative material for the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters.860 After the Frankfurt 
Congress, there was a sudden increase in activity and exchanges of opinion concerning the LAI at 
Comintern headquarters, discussions which concluded that the LAI had retreated into a crisis. 
Thus, the Comintern decided it was necessary to re-organise the LAI, primarily in order to get the 
International Secretariat to succumb to its dictates. This process took place at the same time as the 
European communist parties were continuing to refuse to support or even to carry out colonial 
work. Hence, the colonial question would prove to be (despite several attempts to correct it in 
1929) a daunting task to solve during the Comintern’s “third period”. 
      The aim of this chapter is to analyse the anni confusionis and its ensuing crisis at the 
International Secretariat. The Frankfurt Congress had resulted in a situation which forced the 
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters to both seriously discuss and find a way of re-
organising the structure of the LAI, as well as to restore its political credibility. These discussions 
involved arguments about why it was essential to sustain the activities of the LAI rather than 
recommend a swift liquidation. However, the anni confusionis was a progressive process which, 
once it had surfaced and become an established fact, gained pace in three chronological phases. 
Firstly, in August and September 1929, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters discussed 
and evaluated how to solve the confusion that had arisen after the Frankfurt Congress. These 
discussions involved scrutinising the hierarchy of relations at the International Secretariat, the 
purpose and aim of the LAI, and the non-communist elements within the LAI Executive. At the 
beginning of 1930, the second phase confirmed the crisis. This also strengthened the position of 
the decision-makers in Moscow during the deliberations on how to solve the crisis, which in turn 
led to the International Secretariat not taking any independent action. Thirdly, the final phase was 
the trial of the LAI at Comintern headquarters in August-September 1930. The drama of this 
particular process included the evaluation and final assessment of the LAI, which only ended once 
the decision-making elite at the headquarters of the Comintern had resolved to discuss the 
organisational functions and ideological value of the LAI within the international communist 
movement. This latter act illustrates how the elite performed its own variant of self-criticism. 
      The LAI’s crisis reflected, in a sense, the indifference amongst the communist parties in 
Europe to support and to carry out “routine” colonial work. For the Comintern, the LAI was a 
pivotal actor in establishing colonial connections and in contributing to the development of the 
                                               
860 RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft resolution on results of the II World Congress of the LAI and its direct tasks,  
passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929. Translations of the draft resolution (original language: Russian) 
to English and German versions were completed on 29 August; RGASPI 495/3/120, 1, Protokoll Nr.51 von der 
Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 2/9-1929; RGASPI 495/7/11, 64-67, Protokoll Nr.55 von der Sitzung der 
Ständigen Kommission des Sekretariats des EKKI, Moscow, 4/9-1929. 
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colonial question. Nevertheless, in November and December of 1929, once various departments at 
Comintern headquarters (the ECCI Secretariat, the Political Secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat) 
had chosen to re-examine the LAI’s colonial work, despite Arnot and Bittelman’s previous 
evaluations in 1929, their conclusion would be one of disappointment. Apparently, the lack of 
enthusiasm for colonial work was an expression of the continued confusion which had manifested 
itself within the parties. The CPGB struggled to adapt itself to “the new line”, e.g. one attempt was 
made to reconstitute and co-ordinate its “revolutionary leadership”. In Germany, the KPD pursued 
its ambition to manifest itself as the only and genuine representative for the German labour 
movement, while at the same time encountering difficulties in both interpreting and implementing 
“the social fascist doctrine” in practice.861 The time and energy spent understanding the doctrine 
drained the parties of administrative strength, which consequently meant that their colonial work 
was not given due attention. In December 1929, the Eastern Secretariat criticised the ZK KPD for 
having failed to carry out any colonial work, e.g. the LAI had not received any active support, 
while the KPD had neglected to establish any “systematic connection between the Comintern and 
… the revolutionary movement and the communist parties in the colonies”. The “Politbureau 
CPGB” received similar critique from the Political Secretariat, who urged the party to expose 
“ruthlessly, perseveringly and systematically” the “counter-revolutionary, social-imperialist and 
social-fascist nature of the Labour Government” on the colonial question. In order to achieve this, 
the CPGB was supposed to form a “united front of the British proletariat and the oppressed 
colonial peoples from below” in order to intensify the “struggle against the Colonial policy of 
British social-imperialism”.862 The Eastern Secretariat and the Political Secretariat criticised both 
the PCF and the CPGB for their low efficiency and inability to carry out even the simplest of tasks 
concerning colonial work, e.g. supporting the anti-imperialist organisations (the LAI, the LDRN). 
The British communist and member of the WEB, Aitken Ferguson, tried to explain to the 
International Secretariat the CPGB’s failure to support the British LAI Section, realising that “no 
other section of the League” could attain the same political impact as the British. However, one 
could not avoid the fact that the “party takes all necessary measures to see that the Comintern line 
is carried through on these auxiliary bodies”, while at the same time trying to establish connections 
with colonial immigrants and students in England, an undertaking which had apparently failed 
completely.863 Additionally, the KPD representatives within the ECCI in Moscow, Ulbricht and 
                                               
861 Worley 2002, p.132; Hoppe 2007, p.157. 
862 SAPMO ZPA-BA I 6/3/198, 1-3, Vertraulich. Ostsekretariat des EKKI, Moskau, an das Z. K. der KPD, Berlin,  
23/12-1929; RGASPI 495/4/5, 201-205, (Confidential) On Colonial Work of the CPGB, Political Secretariat, Moscow, 
to the CPGB, London, 27/11-1929. 
863 According to Ferguson, the NMM should organise “immigrants from the colonial countries in the revolutionary  
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Philipp Dengel, demanded that the ZK KPD find communists in Germany known to be skilful in 
“colonial languages”, and “register Comrades” who had colonial contacts.864 
      In 1929, the international communist movement was in a crisis. While the Tenth ECCI Plenum 
had confirmed the accuracy of the “class-against-class” policy in July, this plenum had also 
initiated an ideological purge and “well-orchestrated attack” against “Rightist” functionaries 
within the ECCI departments at Comintern headquarters. This purge sent shudders through the 
national sections, resulting in the parties turning inwards only to uncover internal flaws.865 This 
process ran parallel with the Comintern’s objective to strengthen its hierarchical structure and to 
increase its control over the national sections. More importantly, the establishment of the Political 
Commission in August/September 1929, on the suggestion of the Political Secretariat, answered 
the need to have a forum in which to discuss political and administrative questions of a peculiar 
and sensitive nature.866 
      In 1929-30, while the industrialisation and collectivisation drive within the Soviet Union was 
following its own rationale,867 other contextual explanations also contribute to elucidate the 
dynamics of this anni confusionis. According to Zara Steiner, the global restructuring and then 
disintegration of economic, political and social relations during the 1920s and the 1930s was “the 
hinge”, with the 1920s representing a decade of reconstruction, while the 1930s witnessed a 
decade of crisis in international relations.868 In Germany, “the hinge” saw the emergence of the 
NSDAP as a political actor actively opposing the KPD and the SPD, all actors striving to increase 
their parliamentary influence and position in the Reichstag.869 Outside Germany, the Wall Street 
crash in New York on 24 October 1929 had a considerable global impact, causing the Great 
                                                                                                                                                          
unions” in order to bring them closer “to the Party and necessary steps should be taken to give them a political 
education”. Furthermore, the LAI section in England functioned as the channel for the CPGB to get in contact with 
“immigrant students […] and to bring the most revolutionary, tried and reliable elements into the Party”, see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/33, 49, Letter from A. F. [Aitken Ferguson/”Neptun”], London, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 
17/12-1929. 
864 OMS would be in charge of their political education, see SAPMO ZPA-BA I 6/3/198, 1-3, Vertraulich.  
Ostsekretariat des EKKI, Moskau, an das Z. K. der KPD, Berlin, 23/12-1929. 
865 This forced the Standing Commission to advocate the need to establish a “Purge Commission” at Comintern  
headquarters (active from September 1929 to January 1930). This commission screened and purged communists 
suspected of nourishing deviant political views. It consisted of the following members, as noted in Peter Huber’s 
analysis: Ulbricht, Piatnitsky, Wassiljew and Mirov of the “Cells Bureau”, Heimo and Abramov of the OMS. 239 
officials at Comintern headquarters were screened, out of which 201 were confirmed as loyal party cadres, 31 received 
a warning and seven were expelled from the CPSU (B), see McDermott & Agnew 1996, p.85; Peter Huber, ”Structure 
of the Moscow Apparatus of the Comintern and decision-making”, in Rees & Thorpe (eds.) 1998, p.42. 
866 The Political Secretariat appointed the members to the Political Commission, an institutional actor that functioned  
as a consultative sub-department to the Political Secretariat; see Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.69. 
867 Kotkin (1995); Hagenloh (2009). 
868 Steiner 2005, p.635. 
869 Striefler 1993, pp.48-51; Babette Gross, ”German Communists’ United Front”, in The Comintern: Historical  
Highlights, Drachkovitch & Lazitch (eds.), Stanford University, Stanford, 1966, p.115. Gross wrote that while the 
NSDAP peaked in the German elections on September 14, 1930, the KPD focused essentially on strengthening the 
struggle against the SPD. According to Gross, the German communist movement pursued a “suicidal general line”. 
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Depression and economic recession during the 1930s. The economic collapse of Western societies 
provided the Soviet Union with an ideological confirmation that the Bolshevik analysis of 
capitalist society and its impending crisis had been correct. Thus, the societal crisis would amplify 
the war threat and the likelihood of an intervention by the imperialist nations in the Soviet Union, 
resulting in global revolution. According to Hobsbawm, the Great Depression was paradoxical for 
the defenders of communism, as it portrayed the Soviet Union as being “immune” to the global 
recession. The economic crash therefore provided the international communist movement with one 
of its “strongest ideological weapons”, while in Germany; the recession paved the way for a 
completely new political scenario.870 
 
* 
 
Aftermath: The Onset of the Anni confusionis  
The Frankfurt Congress left the International Secretariat shaken by its internal tremors. In August 
and September, all activity ceased in Berlin, while the Comintern failed to send its monthly 
budget. Chatto wrote to Piatnitsky to explain that the International Secretariat would be on the 
verge of closing down if no money arrived in the LAI account.871 However, the German LAI 
Section did not experience complete desolation as an immediate consequence of the Frankfurt 
Congress. On 8 August, the local IAH branch in Hamburg assisted the German LAI Section in 
organising a public meeting in the Altona district – a stronghold for the German labour and 
communist movement – where Pickens delivered a speech on the significance and meaning of race 
as a factor in the anti-colonial struggle. The Hamburg police authority noted that the event was 
“obviously communist” since a majority of the delegates focused the discussion on “class 
consciousness”. When it came to mentioning the Frankfurt Congress, the meeting addressed it as 
being the beginning of a new and more radical phase for both the LAI and the anti-imperialist 
movement, especially the task of unmasking the social democratic movement as an “agent of 
imperialism” and disposing of the “treacherous” Maxton.872 The Frankfurt Congress and its 
aftermath marked the beginning of the anni confusionis, a period which signifies a thematic and 
chronological divide in the history of the LAI. However, for the International Secretariat, this 
                                               
870 McDermott & Agnew 1996, p.89; Hobsbawm 1997, p.425; Brendon 2002, pp.92-95. 
871 Chatto declared that if the money arrived in Berlin at the end of October, he promised Piatnitsky to stop sending  
complaints about how the financial question was draining the International Secretariat of “energy and efficiency”. 
However, for the time being, the LAI had borrowed money from “neighbouring” organisations connected to the IAH 
which were also experiencing a shortage of funds, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/4, 44, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to 
Piatnitsky, Moscow, 12/10-1929. 
872 SAPMO ZPA-BA R8051/82/2, 462-465, 8/8-1929. The Hamburg LAI section expected to hold a public meeting on  
27 August, and scheduled to appear were Eleonore Midgley from England, Goldschmidt, the Indonesian Abdur 
Raman, and the German Rudolf Kappe. If the meeting happened, remain unknown. 
344 
 
process extended beyond its sphere of influence; rather, the future of the LAI depended on the 
goodwill and consent of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters. 
      On 13 August, Bittelman informed Manuilsky that the “first draft of a resolution on the results 
of the 2nd Congress of the LAI” had been discussed at a meeting in Berlin, with “part of the ECCI 
delegation, consisting of comrades Heckert, a representative of WEB [Dimitrov or Ferguson], 
Bittelman, […] comrades Burns and Chatto”. Unable to attend the meeting, Münzenberg 
nevertheless told the Eastern Secretariat that he regretted having missed the opportunity to discuss 
the political results of the congress with Bittelman.873 For Münzenberg, the primary aim of the 
congress was nevertheless not its political outcome; it was the organisational future of the LAI in 
Europe, a topic raised at the meeting. Apparently, Emile Burns wanted to split the International 
Secretariat in three divisions, thereby making it easier to develop LAI activities throughout 
Europe, especially in Berlin, Paris and London. Münzenberg dismissed this idea with over “a 
hundred reasons” and urged the Eastern Secretariat to understand that the LAI “was such a 
complex organisation” to control and lead. For example, the International Secretariat had to 
supervise and control contacts with political and colonial groups which themselves had no 
relations whatsoever with each other. Münzenberg argued that “the homogenous centre” of the 
European anti-imperialist movement was Berlin. For Burns, the scenario developed itself into an 
uncomfortable situation, explaining to the Eastern Secretariat that he did not want to enter into a 
personal confrontation with Münzenberg. Since it was “obvious that no compromise” could be 
reached, e.g. Burns had said that Münzenberg had threatened to “resign, and […] fight” against 
“the false line”, Burns chose to leave Berlin in August.874 Münzenberg reflected further over the 
fact that “class against class” questioned the LAI’s very ’raison d’être’ and aims, particularly its 
vital collaboration with “socialist, syndicalist and national revolutionary groups” in order to 
strengthen the anti-imperialist movement. However, Münzenberg’s critique did not focus on the 
ideological essence of “class against class”, far from it; his objective was to ensure that the 
International Secretariat could continue with its work to centralise the anti-imperialist movement 
in Berlin. Münzenberg actually believed that the Frankfurt Congress had been a “powerful 
demonstration against Imperialism and for the defence of the Soviet Union”, in which the LAI had 
demonstrated a “considerable organisational improvement” since the Brussels Congress.875 
                                               
873 RGASPI 542/1/30, 140, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/8-1929; RGASPI  
542/1/33, 9, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Manuilsky, Moscow, 13/8-1929. 
874 RGASPI 542/1/30, 140, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/8-1929; RGASPI  
542/1/30, 100, Letter from Burns, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 15/8-1929. Burns intended to continue 
“League activity in the British section”. On August 16, he left Berlin together with his wife. 
875 RGASPI 542/1/30, 82-84, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to “Sch” [Wi/Sch.]/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 12/8- 
1929. 
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      Mauno Heimo did not agree with Münzenberg. On 21 August, Heimo sent a letter informing 
Münzenberg that the Political Secretariat would soon be discussing the “question regarding the 
Frankfurt Congress proceedings”, adding a “personal observation” on his (Münzenberg’s) “grave 
miscalculation” of the LAI congress. Firstly, the congress had been convened in a completely 
different political context than the Brussels Congress, referring to the KMT’s “betrayal” and the 
evident failure of the revolutionary struggle in China. Secondly, the LAI had not implemented the 
theoretical framework of Kuusinen’s colonial and semi-colonial theses, e.g. the congress had 
neither forcefully demonstrated its support of the Indian revolutionary movement nor highlighted 
the global radicalisation of the proletariat. Thus, Heimo questioned whether the International 
Secretariat was even aware of the fact that the world was rapidly heading towards revolution, 
hence it seemed almost as if the LAI did not understand the “working methods” endorsed by the 
Tenth ECCI Plenum in July.876 According to Heimo, the LAI had to “urgently adjust and find a 
new orientation” by replacing its invalid collaborations with “left-wing social democracy and 
individual figures such as Maxton and Gupta” with “new reserves of … real anti-imperialist and 
revolutionary layers” within the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The question of the LAI and 
its future was, nevertheless, in the hands of the Political Secretariat to decide upon, Heimo 
concluded.877 The Political Secretariat relied, though, on Bittelman’s expertise to initiate a 
discussion of the LAI. 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
876 Heimo’s critique of the “working methods” of the LAI was harsh, particularly considering the fact that the ECCI  
plenum ended on July 19 and the Frankfurt congress commenced on July 21. There was, therefore, no time to adjust 
the apparatus of the LAI. Some of the congress delegates had attended the Plenum, so they acted as messengers of the 
“working methods” advocated at the ECCI Plenum. 
877 RGASPI 495/18/740, Letter from Heimo/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 21/8-1929. 
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The Apparatus at Work: Bittelman and the DR LAI 
 
[…] one will have to admit that the chief reason for the inadequate results of the II Congress 
and for the unsatisfactory composition of the delegations was the fact that the policy of the 
League had lagged behind the class processes which had taken place lately in colonies and 
dependencies. 
“Draft Resolution on Results of the II 
World Congress of the LAI and its 
Immediate Tasks”, passed by the Eastern 
Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929  
 
Bittelman intentionally avoided any public attention at the Frankfurt Congress. The primary reason 
for this was so that he could observe and register both the reaction to and outcome of the strategy 
put into practice by the communist sector. Münzenberg also knew that Bittelman had a key 
position. Thus, on 3 August, Münzenberg urged the Eastern Secretariat to wait with its final 
decision on the LAI until he had visited Moscow in September.878 Despite this request, Bittelman 
proceeded to complete his consultative report (the DR LAI) after returning to Moscow, a document 
the Eastern Secretariat adopted on 27 August. The primary aim of this report was to provide a 
deeper insight into the LAI to the members of the Political Secretariat. What were the principal 
arguments included in the DR LAI and how had Bittelman perceived the Frankfurt Congress? 
      On 2 September, Bittelman introduced the DR LAI to the Political Secretariat, an analysis 
which more or less confirmed the correctness not only of Kuusinen’s colonial and semi-colonial 
theses, but also of “the Magyar thesis”. Bittelman argued that “the shortcomings” of the Frankfurt 
Congress could be interpreted by using Kuusinen’s perception of the fact that the “national 
bourgeoisie in colonial countries do not adopt a uniform attitude to imperialism […] the 
commercial bourgeoisie directly serves the interests of imperialist capital” in its promotion of 
“national reformism”. In fact, the Frankfurt Congress had avoided any discussion of “the rapid 
transition of the colonial national bourgeoisie to the imperialist and counter-revolutionary camp 
[and] the process of differentiation in the camp of national reformism”. Much of the blame for this 
was, according to Bittelman, due to the incapacity of the International Secretariat to understand the 
colonial “class processes”. Yet, despite this critical shortcoming, the congress had: 
[…] developed into an imposing demonstration against reformism, imperialism and 
imperialist wars, and for defence of the Soviet Union. […] the fact that it took place at the 
start of the military provocations of the Nanking Government against the Soviet Union, 879 
                                               
878 RGASPI 542/1/30, 140, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/8-1929. 
879 Theses on the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries, adopted by the 6th Comintern Congress, 1928. Taken from  
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The DR LAI mirrored Bittelman’s and the Eastern Secretariat’s expectations of the LAI and its 
congress. Moreover, the document also reveals the confused understanding of the international 
situation amongst some of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters. The DR LAI stated that 
the LAI congress did not “reflect a historical fact of world importance”, as it likewise had not 
showed any “further organisational consolidation”, while confirming the failure of the LAI to 
orient itself towards the “workers’ and peasants’ movements in colonies”. Thus, the DR LAI 
avoided the fact that the LAI Congress had been a project directed from its inception, at the 
beginning of 1929, by the Eastern Secretariat and the “Commission on the LAI”. Bittelman also 
argued that its political manifestation had been “inadequate”, 
[…] colonial countries were very inadequately represented […] delegates from non-colonial 
countries predominated, trade unions were inadequately represented, and the peasantry was 
hardly represented at all. […] Even if one takes into consideration police and financial 
reasons.880 
However, Bittelman acknowledged the fact that “the tactical line” to subvert the non-communist 
delegates had been a successful undertaking by the communist sector, manoeuvred with care by 
the ECCI delegation: 
[…] the delegation was confronted by the bloc of Nationalists and the Maxton group which 
is in the course of formation and which reflects the ever-growing tendency of national 
reformism establishing co-operation with social-reformism and fascism. Under these 
conditions, the tactical line […] which aimed at demonstrating the united front […] formed 
between the Nationalists and the Maxton group by isolating the latter, was perfectly 
correct.881 
The success of the ECCI delegation was, however, not a result due to the support of the 
International Secretariat. According to Bittelman, the International Secretariat had failed 
completely in this respect by not providing a “bureau of the [communist] fraction” to organise the 
work for “Communist delegates” to “canvass among non-communist delegates”. This criticism 
against the International Secretariat’s administrative shortcomings was, however, not comparable 
with the evaluation of the purpose and aims of the LAI in the DR LAI. The DR LAI realised that 
the primary purpose of the LAI was to attract individuals, organisations, associations and political 
parties outside of the communist movement. However, the indifferent behaviour of the non-
                                                                                                                                                          
Degras vol.II, 1960, pp.530-548; RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft Resolution on Results of the II World Congress 
of the LAI and its Direct Immediate Tasks, passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929. 
880 RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft Resolution on Results of the II World Congress of the LAI and its Direct  
Immediate Tasks, passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929. 
881 RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft Resolution on Results of the II World Congress of the LAI and its Direct  
Immediate Tasks, passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929. 
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communist LAI Executive members at the congress, e.g. Maxton, Fimmen and Hatta made 
Bittelman question the reasons for their involvement, ignoring the fact that the communist sector 
had rhetorically smashed the non-communist delegates at the congress. Receiving Bittelman’s 
report and having examined the DR LAI, the Political Secretariat resolved to push through a 
structural change within the LAI. Setting the Comintern apparatus in motion in Moscow, the 
Political Secretariat instructed the Standing Commission to examine the individual “composition” 
at the International Secretariat, and to assess whether Berlin really was the most logical place for 
the headquarters of the LAI. These administrative measures were a part of the larger question 
aiming to scrutinise the entire organisational structure of the LAI. The Political Secretariat urged 
the Eastern Secretariat and the Organisational Department (Orgabteilung) to examine the level of 
activity within the national LAI sections, and more importantly, whether they were reliable from 
an ideological perspective. Once this examination was at an end, the Political Secretariat 
envisioned the LAI and its sections commencing the work of establishing connections with the 
national minority movements in Eastern Europe.882 
      The reaction to the DR LAI, and the ensuing recommendation from the Political Secretariat 
was, initially, favourable. However, the Standing Commission objected to the opinions expounded 
both in the DR LAI and by the Political Secretariat. What was the reason for their objection? The 
Standing Commission wanted to give Münzenberg a chance to explain himself in relation to the 
congress results. For Bittelman, the DR LAI marked the end of his assignment as the LAI liaison 
in Moscow. On 4 September, the Standing Commission approved Bittelman’s application to spend 
a vacation at a sanatorium (location unknown), with all expenses paid.883 
      Despite the Standing Commission’s objections, the Comintern apparatus’ work evaluating the 
LAI had gained pace in Moscow. The Political Commission instructed Pavel Mif to write a 
“comprehensive” article on how the Comintern perceived the LAI and the Frankfurt Congress.884 
The most serious question was nevertheless the evaluation of the individual “composition” of the 
International Secretariat. For the Political Secretariat, the Czechoslovakian communist and 
                                               
882 RGASPI 495/3/120, 1, Protokoll Nr.51 von der Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 2/9-1929. Present at the  
meeting were: Paul Reimann, Manuilsky, Ulbricht, Strakhov/Chü Chiu-pai, Bell, Piatnitsky, Heimo, Bittelman, 
Wiesner, Melnitschansky, Oskar and Müller. The Political Secretariat instructed the Eastern Secretariat to work out the 
details on the national minority question together with the ECCI Balkan Secretariat. Furthermore, Bela Kun 
introduced the question at a meeting with the Political Commission on 13 September, which concluded that it was 
necessary to form a commission to examine the idea. The Political Secretariat endorsed Kun’s proposal and authorised 
him to act as leader of the commission, working together with Reimann, Georgi Safarov, Voitkovitsch [?], Oscar [?], 
Walecki, Stepanov and a KIM delegate, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/1, 13, Protokoll Nr.5 von der Sitzung der Politischen 
Kommission des Politsekretariats EKKI, 13/9-1929; RGASPI 495/3/122, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.53 der Sitzung der 
Politsekretariats, 20/9-1929. 
883 RGASPI 495/7/11, 64-67, Protokoll Nr.55 von der Sitzung der Ständigen Kommission des Sekretariats des EKKI,  
Moscow, 4/9-1929. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Bell, Ulbricht, Heimo, Feinberg, Miff and Wassiljew. 
884 RGASPI 495/4/1, 1-3, Protokoll Nr. 1 von der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats 4/9-1929.  
Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Manuilsky, Ulbricht, Heimo, Bell, Petrovsky, Wuletzki and Wassiljew. 
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Comintern emissary, Bohumíl Smeral, was the most reliable candidate to assume a leading 
position at the International Secretariat as a secretary, guided by the motive to “strengthen the 
League” in Berlin. The reasons why Smeral emerged as a candidate seem to have been two-fold: 
firstly, Smeral would co-ordinate the day-to-day routines at the International Secretariat, write 
articles and visit the LAI sections in Europe. The second reason was, however, of a more subtle 
and ambiguous nature. Due to the apparent inconsistencies existing at the International Secretariat, 
a dilemma highlighted by the DR LAI, it seems as though Smeral’s primary objective would be to 
monitor the activity and behaviour of the other members at the International Secretariat, 
impressions Smeral would compile in confidential reports addressed to designated persons at the 
headquarters of the Comintern. This is, however, an objective which is almost impossible to verify, 
particularly as there does not appear to exist any clear-cut decision in print, despite much allusion 
to the fact that such was the case. For example, once Smeral had arrived in Berlin in November, he 
began the work of providing “Michail” in Moscow, a pseudonym used by Piatnitsky, reports on the 
International Secretariat on a regular basis.885 Furthermore, Smeral was also involved in the 
activities of the WEB in Berlin, an actor the DR LAI had recommended in order to “organise 
systematic continuous leadership … in regard to the work of the League”.886 The Political 
Commission approved the proposal to nominate Smeral as a secretary of the International 
Secretariat on 13 September. Smeral was in Berlin in September and received the instruction to 
return to Moscow in order to obtain detailed information “on the work” of the LAI.887 Smeral’s 
appointment was accompanied by a revision of the “composition” of the “comm. [communist] 
fraction of the LAI”, including “comrade Münzenberg, Chatopadya [sic]” and Smeral. The Small 
Commission gave the final approval to Smeral’s new assignment on 28 September.888 
      Smeral’s appointment was, nonetheless, perceived as “an error” by Chatto. On 14 October, 
Chatto sent his reaction to the Small Commission, a document which reveals how one of the 
leading figures at the International Secretariat reacted against the dominance of the Comintern to 
define the political, administrative and financial business of the LAI. Additionally, Chatto wanted 
                                               
885 For “Michail”/Piatnitsky, see Jeifets, Jeifets & Huber (eds.) 2004, p.263. 
886 RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft Resolution on Results of the II World Congress of the LAI and its Direct  
Immediate Tasks, passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929. 
887 According to the protocol, Smeral was in Berlin in September. The Political Secretariat approved his request to visit  
his family in Czechoslovakia for a week before he returned to Moscow, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/120, 1, Protokoll Nr.51 
von der Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 2/9-1929; RGASPI 495/4/1, 11-12, Protokoll Nr.4 von der Sitzung der 
Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats EKKI, 13/9-1929. Present at the meeting were Manuilsky, Ulbricht, 
Piatnitsky, Heimo, Miff, Tsiu Wito/Chü Chiu-pai and Lozovsky. 
888 Smeral had taken part in the discussion on the Palestinian question at a meeting of the Political Secretariat on 16  
October, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/125, 29-31, Protokoll Nr.58 der Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 16/10-1929; 
RGASPI 495/4/2, 18, Protokoll Nr.8 von der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Sekrt., 28/9-1929. Present at the 
meeting were Piatnitsky, Manuilsky, Garlandi, Heimo, Reimann and Kachan. As noted in Chatto’s letter, the final 
discussion on Smeral in the Small Commission took place on 28 September, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 104-106. 
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Münzenberg to support him in his case, pleading to him, “I hope that you agree with me on this”. 
Why did Chatto disapprove of Smeral’s nomination as a secretary? Chatto told the members of the 
Small Commission (Kuusinen and Manuilsky): 
Smeral has no connection whatsoever in the colonial countries. […] We shall only be adding 
a superfluous, superficial politician to the Secretariat, instead of comrades with real 
knowledge of and connections in the colonies.889 
Chatto’s verdict harshly exposed the contradictory nature of relations between the International 
Secretariat and the Comintern. Without passing any judgement on the Comintern’s colonial policy, 
Chatto nonetheless questioned how the Comintern chose to deal with the LAI question. For 
Chatto, Smeral’s nomination was a clear-cut decision designed only to facilitate the need to “carry 
out the political line of the ECCI”, while simultaneously adding to the workload of the staff in 
Berlin to meet the expectations of “a talent” [Smeral] for writing “manifestos and pamphlets or 
giving ‘Direktiven’”. The rash decision to appoint a “well-known […] European communist” to 
represent the International Secretariat would cause unwanted attention from national security 
services, as well as increase the already existing “conflicts with national revolutionary 
organisations”, Chatto argued. Above all, Chatto would prefer to employ “ten colonial 
communists”, or a communist from “one of the imperialist countries […] specialised in some 
definite group of colonial countries” to work at the International Secretariat. Chatto continued to 
question how the Small Commission could approve sending a person with restricted linguistic 
skills in the German language. Smeral could not even deal with the correspondence at the 
International Secretariat, particularly letters and documents in English, French and Spanish. If 
Smeral wanted access to any correspondence, this would therefore force someone to translate the 
letters, and add a “fresh burden upon our technical staff”. Chatto also reflected over the fact that 
Smeral’s nomination also obliged the International Secretariat to give him a monthly salary ($150 
per month), something which would drain the already meagre monthly “Comintern subvention”.890 
Chatto wondered whether the nomination had been based on other reasons, rather than on the 
objective to “carry out the political line of the ECCI”:  
There is no special employment at present for Smeral in the Comintern, and that the vacancy 
caused by the resignation of Burns is being used as a convenient solution of the Smeral 
                                               
889 RGASPI 542/1/30, 104-106, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to the Small Commission, Moscow, 14/10-1929. A copy of  
Chatto’s letter is filed in fond 495/4/4, 41-43 (German version), a document that does not include Chatto’s signature. 
890 Chatto accepted Smeral’s appointment on one condition, he expected “in hope and belief” in the Comintern that  
Smeral’s “salary [would] at least [be] paid by the Comintern, if no increase was made in the subvention to the LAI”, 
see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 104-106, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to the Small Commission, Moscow, 14/10-1929. For 
Smeral’s salary in 1030, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 32. The GDP in 2009 for $150 is equivalent to $1,880 (1929), 
and $1,930 (1930). 
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problem – at the cost of the efficiency of one of the most important and valuable auxiliary 
organisations of the Comintern.891 
A far more constructive solution would have been to assign Smeral as a “special representative 
[liaison]” for the LAI in Moscow at Comintern headquarters, to co-ordinate and “maintain speedy 
contacts” with the Comintern, Profintern and other mass and sympathising organisations. Did 
Chatto’s letter receive any response? It seems as though the decision-makers in Moscow chose to 
ignore his letter and, on 14 November, the Political Commission considered the matter closed, 
telling the LAI “kom.Fraktion” to accept and abide by the Small Commission’s decision.892 While 
the Political Commission was still evaluating Chatto’s letter, Smeral had already arrived in Berlin 
from Moscow to assume his position as LAI secretary at the International Secretariat.893 
 
* 
 
Münzenberg’s Speech for the Defence   
On 22 September, Münzenberg left Berlin in the company of Chatto on a trip to Moscow, where 
they both remained for a couple of weeks.894 On 25 September, acting on the request of the 
Standing Commission, Münzenberg gave his “explanation” (Erklärung) to the Political Secretariat 
on the results and consequences of the Frankfurt Congress. Münzenberg’s speech was an act of 
defence, both for himself, as well as for the International Secretariat. 
      According to the running commentary of the “Erklärung des Gen. Münzenberg” (Explanation 
by Com. Münzenberg), recorded at the meeting in Moscow, it has been possible to retrace how 
Münzenberg addressed the Political Secretariat and defended his interpretation of the congress. 
Thus, for Münzenberg, it was a question of making a distinction between the past, present and the 
future of the LAI. The central issue was to refute the conclusions presented by the Eastern 
Secretariat in the DR LAI. According to Münzenberg, this document had been a typical example of 
an account crammed with “false information”, presenting a misrepresentative picture of the 
congress, the preparatory work and of the International Secretariat’s colonial network. For 
example, the DR LAI had misinterpreted the Maxton question, and left the impression that the LAI 
had only weak and fragile connections with national revolutionary organisations. For Münzenberg, 
the LAI faced a monumental task to combat the existing ignorance and indolence within the 
                                               
891 RGASPI 542/1/30, 104-106, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to the Small Commission, Moscow, 14/10-1929. 
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European communist parties, a perspective that Bittelman had neglected to mention in the DR 
LAI. This fact alone had contributed to bringing the Frankfurt Congress to its chaotic end, 
confirming “the difference of opinion” between the ECCI delegation and the “entrusted comrades” 
from the International Secretariat. The “tactical disagreements in the Comintern delegation” had 
therefore inflicted damage on “such an important event” yet, if the ECCI delegation had allowed 
the “comrades” of the LAI to attend its closed meetings, this conflict of interest would not have 
become an issue, Münzenberg stated. In fact, the so-called failure of the congress could be 
explained by external causes, especially the intervention of local “police authorities and money”, 
rather than the explanation given in the DR LAI, which lay the blame on the International 
Secretariat. Giving support to the advice given by Heimo, Münzenberg concluded that it was not 
advisable, or for that matter, logical to compare the Frankfurt Congress with the Brussels congress. 
Münzenberg’s “explanation” was a ritual of self-criticism; however, he did not concede that the 
organisational failures of the Frankfurt Congress could be blamed on the International Secretariat. 
Despite the mistakes made in Berlin, e.g. the failure to secure the attendance of leaders of the 
“anti-imperialist struggle in the most important colonial countries” (China and India), Münzenberg 
argued that the reasons for this could be found in the widespread repression administered by 
colonial security services in the colonies. The source of this problem could also be found in the 
Comintern’s refusal to guarantee the money aimed to finance the journeys of colonial delegations. 
Yet, this had not stopped some colonial delegates from attending the congress. Münzenberg 
explained that Gupta’s struggle to travel from India to Frankfurt was an exceptional example, 
Gupta having financed his trip with his own money. This statement from Münzenberg contradicted 
the Eastern Secretariat’s conclusions in the DR LAI, which had described Gupta as “a big 
landowner, a Right nationalist”, an observation that Münzenberg considered to be contradictory to 
the LAI’s view. How did Münzenberg respond to the Eastern Secretariat’s criticism and accusatory 
labelling of Gupta? Münzenberg believed that the LAI was an organisation with “an international 
reputation”, thus it was crucial to treat the few existing links to India with extra care due to the 
increased pressure from the British police (“Polizeischikanen”).895 Essentially, the question was 
how to maintain the fragile connections the International Secretariat still had to India. Another 
serious question raised by Münzenberg at the meeting was to protest against the idea to split the 
International Secretariat into three secretariats and to locate them in Berlin, Paris and London. If 
realised, Münzenberg stated that this would lead to the destruction of the LAI. Describing a 
possible scenario, Münzenberg predicted that the LAI secretariat in London would have to turn to 
                                               
895 Münzenberg explained that the policing techniques of the German Schutzpolizei had contributed to curb the  
enthusiasm of the congress, for example, restrict congress delegates to arrive from other countries, see fol. RGASPI 
495/3/120, 72-75, Erklärung des Gen. Münzenberg, Moscow, Political Secretariat, 25/9-1929. 
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illegal means due to the surveillance of British security service. Hence, if the Comintern apparatus’ 
motive was to correct the errors of past times, Münzenberg stated that, instead of seeking a “cure-
all” as outlined in the DR LAI, the issue of the LAI required more subtle and sophisticated 
solutions. Firstly, the Comintern had to rectify the “passive and complete indifference” of the 
communist parties in Europe towards supporting the LAI, and ensure an understanding within the 
parties that, despite the LAI posing as a “non-communist organisation”, it was working exclusively 
in the service of communism. Secondly, Münzenberg wanted to re-define the ideological work at 
the International Secretariat. This implies that he already was aware of the idea to appoint Smeral 
as a secretary in Berlin, yet this did not restrict him from asking that the candidate had to be in the 
possession of an independent network with colonial activists, rather than have skills in “fractional 
techniques”.896 
      Münzenberg’s “explanation” is a significant episode in the history of the LAI, which reveals 
that a sympathising organisation such as the LAI was a both sensitive and complex issue for the 
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters to deal with. Münzenberg’s speech for the defence also 
leaves us with the following suggestion: his performance is proof of the fact that Münzenberg was 
retreating from the daily routine work at the International Secretariat, leaving all decisions on the 
future of the LAI completely up to the decision-makers in Moscow. 
 
* 
 
The “prominente Persönlichkeiten”: Expulsions and Voluntary Resignations 
The purging of the “prominente Persönlichkeiten” is a sad finale to the non-party nature of the 
LAI, defining how the policy of “class against class” was used to purge the non-communist 
members on the LAI Executive. After the Frankfurt Congress, there was also an ideological 
cleansing of the LAI. According to Hatta, this “purification process” emerged because of the chaos 
in Frankfurt. Smeral was the one who initiated the process in Berlin, following the distinction 
introduced by Melnitschansky at the Frankfurt Congress of categorising people as either “friend” 
or “foe” when it came to evaluating the “prominente Persönlichkeiten” (prominent personalities) 
in the LAI. A category made up of political and cultural personalities outside the communist 
movement, but one which had been a vital source for the LAI in establishing itself as a non-party 
organisation, while at the same time disguising its communist ties. Smeral’s work assessing the 
“prominente Persönlichkeiten” also illustrates how a believer and advocate of “the new line” 
perceived the LAI’s collaborations with radical left-wing activists, socialists, nationalists and 
intellectuals. Nonetheless, Smeral was not unique in being a communist content to define non-
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communist actors in derogatory terms. For example, Heimo told Münzenberg to get “new 
reserves”, while Bittelman in the DR LAI concluded that it was necessary to “free the League of 
these elements” by severing its ties to representatives of reformist nationalist movements in the 
colonies (Gupta, Nehru, Hatta “and others”). Hence, a “systematic campaign” against Maxton and 
Fimmen would only be a natural reaction to expose their treachery, Bittelman stated. Smeral 
described the non-communists in vivid terms, referring to Baldwin’s ties to an “anti-communist 
front”, or that after the Communist Party of Mexico had expelled Rivera, a logical reaction was 
therefore to relieve him of his position on the LAI Executive. On 2 January 1930, Smeral 
completed his first evaluation of the LAI Executive, and passed on his results to Piatnitsky and the 
Eastern Secretariat: 
Table 8.1: Composition of the LAI Executive Committee, January 1930 
Name Nationality  Status 
Dr. Thengdi India  
Huang Ping China  
Jawaharlal Nehru India + 
Shapurji Saklatvala India  
Mohammad Hatta Indonesia + 
Fuad Chimali Syria  
J. W. Ford Negro  
Diego Rivera Mexico + 
Augusto Sandino Nicaragua  + 
Melnitschansky The Soviet Union  
Georgi Dimitrov The Balkans   
A. Herclet France  
Willi Münzenberg Germany  
Reginald Bridgeman Great Britain  
James Maxton Great Britain + 
Harry Pollitt Great Britain  
Edo Fimmen Holland + 
      Source: RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat and     
      Piatnitsky, Moscow, 2/1-1930  
 
Members of the LAI Executive marked with a “+” were “soon to be, or were already on the other 
side of the barricade”, Smeral concluded, whereas the ones without any mark remained as 
trustworthy members. In the latter case, however, a majority were either loyal communists or 
imprisoned colonial figureheads (Thengdi). This ideological evaluation of the LAI Executive also 
defines the crisis within the LAI, as this “purification process” went against the ECCI Secretariat’s 
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directives to the International Secretariat in December 1929, which had urged the LAI to begin 
acting “as a broad non-party organisation … not obliged to copy the Comintern”.897 
      The aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress was a phase characterised by its contradictions, which 
were essentially caused by the militancy of the “class against class” principle. It was therefore only 
a question of how long the non-communist members in the LAI Executive would endure. The 
focus here was now on how Maxton, Fimmen, Hatta and Nehru would respond to the International 
Secretariat’s criticism while, in the background, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters 
were expecting the International Secretariat to both shun and defame these collaborators. This 
“purification process” lasted for several years after 1929; however, in a majority of cases, the 
“prominente Persönlichkeiten” chose to resign voluntarily from the LAI. For the LAI, the purging 
of its non-communist members called into question the very essence of a sympathising 
organisation which, as in this case, existed solely to aid the Comintern’s colonial ambitions, but 
which also relied on the consent and the support of political and intellectual actors outside the 
communist movement in order to justify its existence. The other side of the coin was the 
defamatory rhetoric used by the International Secretariat towards the “prominente 
Persönlichkeiten”, a form of behaviour which tipped the scale in favour of the non-communist 
members leaving the LAI. Maxton proved to be the exception to the above. 
      James Maxton: Maxton was the political sacrifice the Eastern Secretariat expected the 
International Secretariat to make after the Frankfurt Congress. According to the DR LAI, Maxton 
had had the opportunity to express his “sincerest of sympathy” for the “anti-imperialist struggle of 
the colonial peoples” at the congress. Nonetheless, Bittelman concluded that Maxton’s 
performance had been a “serious error” which had caused “a gross distortion and infringement of 
the CI line”.898 For Maxton, any chance of averting the “storm” around his persona was now out 
of his hands. Münzenberg tried to reduce the criticism against Maxton, initially stating that the 
opinions raised at the Frankfurt Congress had been enough. However, if the Comintern 
commanded the LAI to “break with” Maxton, the International Secretariat would endorse the 
decision. Maxton was a valuable political source in England for both Münzenberg and the LAI. On 
10 September, Münzenberg told Maxton in a letter about his concern that “our organisation has 
completely failed in its duty” to get involved in the Wailing Wall riots in Palestine. In August 
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2007, pp.43-45; RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat and Piatnitsky, 
Moscow, 2/1-1930; RGASPI 495/18/740, 95-96, (Vertraulich) An das Exekutivkomitee der Antiimperialistischen Liga, 
the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, December, 1929. This letter was not, however, 
aimed to be read by the LAI Executive (see above), it was addressed to the “kom.Fraktion” at the International 
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1929, the riots in Jerusalem had culminated in a violent dispute between the Jewish and Arab 
populations on the question of who had access rights to the last remnants of Herod’s temple. 
Additionally, the Honorary President of the LAI, Albert Einstein, referred to this episode as being 
the reason to resign from his position in the LAI due to its anti-Semitic propaganda in its release of 
a “resolution against the Jewish population in Palestine”. Hence, while the non-party character of 
the LAI was beginning to crumble, Münzenberg perceived Maxton as being one of the LAI’s few 
remaining links capable of organising “strong parliamentary and extra-parliamentary actions 
against the MacDonald Government” in order to draw attention to the Wailing Wall riots.899 
      Maxton’s performance at the Frankfurt Congress was not the only factor contributing to this 
political confrontation. According to William Knox’s biography of Maxton, Maxton simply 
refused to do what Münzenberg, Chatto and the British LAI Section expected of him, i.e. to 
publish the transcript of his speech at the Frankfurt Congress in the New Leader. Maxton 
apparently feared that such an act would increase the conflict between the ILP and the MacDonald 
government. A more rational explanation was also that Maxton had reach the end of the road in his 
relations with the LAI, frustrated and tired of being “bullied, harassed and pestered as to the times 
and methods by which he should express himself”. As noted in Gordon Brown’s biography of 
Maxton, after the Frankfurt Congress Maxton travelled to Largs in Scotland for a vacation. Once 
there, and beginning to hear rumours of his impending expulsion from the LAI, Maxton concluded 
that he was “more interested at the moment in the solution of a mystery story than half a dozen 
expulsions from the LAI”.900 Nevertheless, the attacks against Maxton continued “in the most 
sectarian terms”, but this time under the direction of the British LAI Section rather than the 
International Secretariat. John Saville wrote that the section’s central aim was to relieve Maxton of 
his duties as Chairman of the LAI – an initiative the International Secretariat had not, as yet, 
sanctioned. Thus, the British LAI Section had decided to act independently and, on 17 September, 
at a meeting in London, the section decided to expel Maxton from the LAI. Bridgeman explained 
the reason for this decision: 
                                               
899 RGASPI 542/1/30, 82-84, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 12/8-1929;  
RGASPI 542/1/33, 18-21, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Maxton, London, 10/9-1929 (the draft, German version, 
was finished on 30 August, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/33, 11-14). For the Wailing Wall riots, see Fieldhouse 2006, p.161. 
On 6 September, Albert Einstein informed the International Secretariat of his immediate resignation as Honorary 
President of the LAI, stating that the “resolution against the Jewish population in Palestine makes it impossible for me 
to be connected in any way to the League.” This quote was later included in Smeral’s report on the Arab countries to 
Magyar, a document filed in the Piatnitsky dossiers, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 6-19, Bericht des Sekretariats der 
“Liga gegen Imperialismus” über die arabische Arbeit in der Periode von August bis Dezember1929, Berlin, 10/1-
1930. A copy of this report is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/44, 6-19; IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/86, Resolution über 
die arabischen Länder, Frankfurt am Main, 20-31/7-1929. 
900 William Knox, James Maxton, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1987, pp.87-88; Gordon Brown, Maxton,  
Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1986, p.201. 
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[…] there was no doubt whatever that he [Maxton] apparently displayed no interest whatever 
in events of tremendous importance in colonial countries leading to the despatch of troops 
and warships to Palestine, with much bloodshed, thus creating the impression that he was 
looking for an opportunity to resign from the League.901 
The decision was a rash one. Most importantly, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters 
had not authorised the section to expel Maxton. Thus, in the beginning of 1930, the leader of the 
WEB in Berlin, Helmut/Dimitrov, instructed the International Secretariat to reprimand the British 
LAI Section for having committed an act that went against “the principles and activities of the 
League”.902 What did this act of insubordination consist of? Primarily, it was a question of control. 
On 21 February 1930, the Colonial Commission of the CPGB wanted the International Secretariat 
to realise that Maxton’s unsanctioned expulsion would be used by the LSI in their propaganda to 
describe how the communists treated their political associates. Thus, the Maxton affair had 
damaged the “League as a whole”.903 Secondly, the unsanctioned expulsion of Maxton turned into 
an ideological question. For the International Secretariat, the negative effects had to be deflected 
by finding some kind of resolution. According to an article, “James Maxton und die Liga gegen 
Imperialismus”, published in Pressedienst on 30 May 1930, the International Secretariat declared 
that the British LAI Section had interfered with the jurisdiction of the LAI Executive.904 The crux 
of the matter is that at the time this article was published, i.e. on 30 May 1930, the LAI had no 
Executive. 
      Edo Fimmen: Bittelman stated in the DR LAI that Fimmen had intentionally concealed his 
support for social democracy. Nevertheless, in contrast to how the Maxton case had played itself 
out within the British LAI Section, the Comintern and the International Secretariat proceeded with 
caution in examining the LAI’s relation with Fimmen after the Frankfurt Congress. On 2 January 
1930, Smeral concluded that Fimmen had begun to ignore the International Secretariat after the 
congress, and was apparently acting “against us”. Somehow, Smeral had managed to read a letter 
from Fimmen to Nehru in which he had stated that “the communist dominance in the League 
                                               
901 Saville concluded that Maxton’s expulsion was a “bizarre event understandable only in terms of the sectarian  
excesses that followed the application of the general political line of the 6th Congress of the CI [Comintern]”, Reginald 
Bridgeman to F. Gardner, 21/9-1929, in Bellamy & Saville (eds.) 1984, p.31. 
902 RGASPI 499/1/17, 54-55, Bericht des Sekretariats durch Münzenberg, Smeral and Chatto, WEB, Helmut/Dimitrov,  
Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 13/1-1930. The International Secretariat sent the letter to the British LAI Section on 3 
April; see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 88-91, Letter from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the British LAI Section, 
London, 3/4-1930. 
903 RGASPI 542/1/44, 59, Letter from the COLONIAL DEPARTMENT [CPGB], London, to the International  
Secretariat, Berlin, 21/2-1930 
904 RGASPI 542/1/46a, 78-81, Pressedienst, “James Maxton und die Liga gegen Imperialismus”, Internationales  
Sekretariat, Berlin, 15/5-1930. In connection with the re-launching of the LAI Executive in Berlin in 1931 (see next 
chapter), the Political Secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat formulated the details for Maxton’s “formal expulsion”. 
The focal point for the LAI was to expose these so-called “agents of imperialism” (Hatta, Fimmen and Nehru), see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Protocol: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-1931. 
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deserves no comment”.905 Furthermore, Magyar had visited Amsterdam in either November or 
December 1929, where he had held a “private consultation” with Fimmen to discuss why the latter 
had expressed discontent towards the development of the LAI. At the meeting, Magyar declared to 
Fimmen that there was no turning back for the LAI and, despite Fimmen still remaining as vice-
deputy of the LAI, “the time has passed [for] us [communists]” to associate openly with the “left-
wing” of the Amsterdam International. Fimmen considered that the “militancy” of “the new 
course” was sending the LAI off in the wrong direction. From Magyar’s perspective, this merely 
confirmed that Fimmen was a “corrupt Amsterdam bureaucrat […] good for nothing”.906 Whether 
Fimmen’s meeting with Magyar provoked a desire to sever his ties with the LAI, remains 
unknown. However, on 19 February 1930, Fimmen contacted Chatto, demanding to retrieve every 
document (letters and circular information) mentioning his name, which the LAI bureau had on 
file in Berlin. If Chatto did not fulfil this request, Fimmen intended to resign with immediate 
effect.907 Nevertheless, Fimmen waited until 27 October 1930 to send his letter of resignation from 
the LAI Executive to the International Secretariat. The primary reason for Fimmen’s resignation 
was that the LAI’s original objective – to become an international leader and spokesperson for the 
anti-imperialist movement – had turned into a failure of grandiose proportions. The political 
results after the Frankfurt Congress were nil, Fimmen stated and, worst of all, the LAI was an 
“illusion” about to “fade away”.908 Smeral did not know how to react after reading Fimmen’s 
letter, and decided to send the document on to the Eastern Secretariat for further consideration. In 
Moscow, the Political Commission reviewed Fimmen’s letter, instructing the Eastern Secretariat to 
compose a “short draft of a resolution”, while urging the International Secretariat to act vigorously 
by publishing articles and pamphlets in order “to ridicule” Fimmen. The Eastern Secretariat 
completed its resolution on 22 November, after which the ECCI Secretariat duly endorsed the 
document and passed it on to the Political Commission for a final review. Heimo, on the other 
hand, instructed the International Secretariat to publish this resolution in Pressedienst. What were 
the primary arguments against Fimmen in this resolution? Apparently, Fimmen had “sabotaged 
every decision of the League since the Frankfurt Congress”. By not acting as a “real supporter” of 
the struggle against imperialism, Fimmen was actively supporting “counter-revolutionary Zionism, 
this agent of British Imperialism”. These arguments were also included in the article, “Gesunde 
                                               
905 For the original document, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to the Eastern  
Secretariat/Piatnitsky, Moscow, 2/1-1930. For a copy of this report, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 5-11. 
906 RGASPI 542/1/44, 56, Letter from “Edwin”/Magyar, Berlin/Moscow, to the Eastern Secretariat, 6/2-1930.  
“Edwin”/Magyar deliberately did not reveal to Fimmen the purpose of his visit in Amsterdam – “ich sagte ihm auch 
nicht wo ich arbeite und was ich mache“. 
907 RGASPI 542/1/44, 57, Letter from Fimmen, Amsterdam, to Chatto, Berlin, 19/2-1930. Whether Chatto ever sent  
these documents to Fimmen remains unknown. 
908 RGASPI 542/1/44, 76, Letter from Fimmen, Amsterdam, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 27/10-1930; A  
copy of this letter is filed in the ECCI Secretariat’s dossier, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/863, 26. 
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Erscheinungen in der Liga gegen Imperialismus” (Healthy Action in the League against 
Imperialism), which was published in Inprecorr on 28 November.909 On 3 December, the Political 
Commission considered the matter to be closed, instructing the International Secretariat to send 
Fimmen a formal letter of expulsion from the LAI.910 
      Mohammad Hatta: The chaos at the Frankfurt Congress had a lasting impression on Hatta. In 
Hatta’s “retrospective account”, published in the Indonesian nationalist newspaper Indonesia 
Merdeka in the autumn of 1929, he wondered whether the “international platform for all anti-
imperialists of any political inclination” would collapse under the weight placed on its shoulders 
after the “purification process” which the communist “hardcore elements” within the LAI had 
instigated. If the motive was to purify the LAI, Hatta feared that “a new League will arise from its 
ruins and only the suppressed nations of coloured race could be its supporters”, without any 
support from the former stronghold: the anti-imperialist movement in the “imperialist countries”. 
This article had an “immense repercussion” on Hatta’s political life, which, as noted by Mavis 
Rose, made him a “target for Comintern attack”. However, there was more to this than the 
publication of one article. After the Frankfurt Congress, Hatta had insisted that the PI sever its ties 
to the Dutch LAI Section, so once Smeral became aware of his article and the above 
recommendation, Hatta became a persona non grata. From a broader perspective, Hatta had been 
the International Secretariat’s link to Indonesian activists in both the Netherlands and across 
Europe. Once Smeral and Hatta resolved to terminate this relationship, irrespective of each other’s 
motive, the LAI lost its Indonesian connection. For the Dutch LAI Section, the situation worsened 
and was one of despondency. Smeral observed how the section “barely managed to exist” after the 
Frankfurt Congress.911 
      Jawaharlal Nehru: Nehru left the LAI Executive on his own initiative. Nehru’s case also 
illustrates the level of isolation the LAI was experiencing in India. Furthermore, the narrative 
discloses Chatto’s radicalisation from being an Indian revolutionary to being a loyal advocate of 
communism. Barooah has thoroughly analysed the relationship between Chatto and Nehru; 
                                               
909 RGASPI 495/4/67, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.99 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 11/11- 
1930; Inprecorr, “Proletarische Massenorganisationen. Gesunde Erscheinungen in der Liga gegen Imperialismus”, 
[illegible number and page], 28/11-1930, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 23-23a. 
910 RGASPI 495/18/863, 23, Short note from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to the ECCI Political Commission,  
Moscow, 22/11-1930; RGASPI 542/1/44, 82, Letter from Heimo/ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to the International 
Secretariat, Berlin, 22/10-1930; for the final discussion by the Political Commission on Fimmen, see fol. 495/4/72, 1-
3, Protokoll Nr.104 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, Moscow, 3/12-1930. Present at the 
meeting were Manuilsky, Piatnitsky, Weinstone, Sokolik, Heimo, Zirul, Safarov, Kutschumov, Magyar, Lozovsky, 
Walecki, Angaretis and Furubottn. For the resolution, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/72, 10-12, Resolutionsentwurf des 
Sekretariats der Antiimperialistischen Liga (Moscow), 6/12-1930. A copy of this resolution is filed in fol. RGASPI 
542/1/44, 81-82. 
911 Hatta [1929] 1972, pp.200-204; Mavis Rose, Indonesia Free. A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta, Equinox  
Publishing, Singapore, 2010 (first published 1987), p.92; RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to 
Eastern Secretariat and Piatnitsky, Moscow, 2/1-1930. 
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however, the fact that this relationship also illustrates the difficulties the LAI were experiencing in 
establishing its activity in India is also worth further consideration. The Frankfurt Congress had 
not enhanced the possibilities for the LAI to establish itself in India. As a solution to this dilemma, 
Chatto needed advice from Bittelman on how to proceed, only to receive the answer that he was 
suspicious of the political contacts the LAI had in India. Bittelman argued that it was inadvisable 
to continue the relations with “national reformists” (the INC), urging Chatto to establish contacts 
with “revolutionary trade unions and peasant organisations”. If this was done, the LAI would 
remain “safely in our hands”.912 Yet, after Bittelman had resigned from his assignment as liaison 
for the LAI in Moscow, all discussion of India abruptly ended. In October 1929, Chatto contacted 
Freyer [?] at the Eastern Secretariat, asking “what steps have been taken?”. However, Freyer’s 
reply to Chatto only confirmed the effectiveness of the hierarchy of relations at play at the 
International Secretariat, i.e. Münzenberg had already received “advice” on the question, therefore 
Chatto only had to ask him what to do.913 Chatto concluded in December that a majority of the 
LAI’s former contacts in India, e.g. with the communist movement in Bombay, had disappeared.914 
At the beginning of 1930, Nehru represented one of its few remaining links to India. 
      Nehru had not witnessed the controversy and political commotion at the Frankfurt Congress. 
However, Nehru managed to establish an understanding of the event from other sources, e.g. from 
Gupta, Fimmen and Baldwin, who had referred to the LAI’s “metamorphosis”. Realising that the 
Frankfurt Congress had been a serious episode, not only in relation to the drastic change in the 
LAI’s political platform, Nehru contacted Chatto to explain that, if the LAI continued along the 
line of the communists, this would lead to the “collapse of the League”. Chatto had nevertheless 
begun to radicalise his attitude towards Nehru. In his response to Nehru, Chatto complained about 
Gandhi’s omnipotent influence over the INC, and blamed Nehru, as INC Chairman, for this “tragic 
collapse” particularly as he had endorsed the “Delhi Manifesto” in October 1929. This manifesto 
was, above all, a result of Gandhi’s ambition to get the INC to initiate a political collaboration with 
both the Liberals and other moderate political forces in India, and to achieve a political amnesty 
for political prisoners. The “Delhi Manifesto” did not question when or whether India would 
achieve dominion status; it was rather a political demonstration which focused on working out the 
                                               
912 Bittelman wanted Chatto to explain in detail on his plan for India: “[…] we wish to know through whom you are  
planning to send the finances, and who, in your opinion, will receive the money in India and who is going to initiate 
the organisation of the organising committee. Certainly it will not do at all to send the money to Nehru or similar 
elements and have them undertake the organisation of the League section in India”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/33, 10, 
Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Chatto, Berlin, 27/8-1929. 
913 RGASPI 542/1/33, 38, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Fryer/Freier, Moscow, 16/10-1929. This letter arrived in  
Moscow on 18 October (stamped); RGASPI 542/1/33, 37, Short note from Fryer/Freier, Moscow, to Chatto, Berlin, 
11/11-1929. 
914 RGASPI 542/1/44, 24-37, Bericht über die indische Arbeit des Internationalen Sekretariats der Liga gegen  
Imperialismus. Periode von August bis Dezember 1929, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 9/1-1930. 
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details for a possible constitution based on India receiving dominion status. The manifesto had 
been largely a reaction to a political field study of India in 1929 and its ensuing evaluation by a 
British government official, Lord Irwin, who advocated the opinion that dominion status was a 
realistic goal to achieve for the Indian independence movement. However, Nehru did not consider 
this to be enough and, at the INC session in Lahore in December 1929, he referred to the manifesto 
as being the reason for having adopted the far more radical Purna Swaraj Resolution, a document 
which demanded “complete independence” for India. This act in itself also made Nehru renounce 
his support of the LAI’s radical policy and of its connections with the communist movement 
before the INC members in Lahore. Benjamin Zachariah’s study of Nehru concludes that Nehru 
realised that it was “dangerous to be bound” by the communists’ methods, referring particularly to 
the episode of the KMT putsch in April 1927, which had proven to be so disastrous for those 
involved.915 
      Chatto continued to criticise Nehru. In the end, Nehru reacted by severing both his relation 
with Chatto and the INC’s collaboration with the LAI. On January 30 1930, Nehru sent two letters, 
the first a personal letter to Chatto, and the second to the International Secretariat declaring his 
resignation from the LAI Executive. Nehru explained in his letter to Chatto the reason why he had 
decided to leave the LAI: 
My dear Chatto, […] I am afraid you are often very much mislead by some of your 
correspondents in India. I can well understand a difference in outlook. If this difference is 
fundamental then co-operation is difficult. […] In any event it does not help matters much by 
calling people with whom you may happen to disagree a little traitors and the like.916 
In his letter of resignation to the International Secretariat, Nehru introduced himself as the INC’s 
representative. According to Nehru, “many things that your secretariat had done appeared to us 
[INC] strange”, especially the hostility shown towards Gupta in Frankfurt and the “attitude to our 
Congress”. Nehru questioned even why he had bothered to support the LAI, a belief that in turn 
had made the INC question Nehru’s position. Thus, the International Secretariat’s common 
practice of magnifying “such criticisms does not make it any easier for us to continue our 
association with you or to contribute to your funds”, thus, “the sooner we separate the better”, 
                                               
915 Roger Baldwin lost his interest in the LAI in 1931. In a letter to Nehru, Baldwin explained that he had “just been  
expelled” because of his support for the INC, see Roger Baldwin to Nehru, 29/4-1931, in Nehru 1958, pp.96-97; V. 
Chattophadyaya to Nehru, Berlin, 4/12-1929, in Nehru 1958, pp.79-81; Barooah 2004, pp.262-265; Benjamin 
Zachariah, Nehru, Routledge, Oxon, 2004, pp.64-66. 
916 Nehru argued that Chatto would change his mind if “you came in personal contact with some of our most  
aggressive young men who pose as workers’ leaders you might change your opinion of them. Some of them 
undoubtedly are fine young men but some also are entirely untrustworthy”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/44, 50, Letter from 
Nehru, Allahabad, to Chatto, Berlin, 30/1-1930. Nehru’s letter is also included in Gopal 1975, p.139, and Barooah 
(2004, p.266). 
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Nehru concluded.917 The International Secretariat reacted to Nehru’s resignation with silence. 
However, Chatto experienced the situation as humiliating, asking the ECCI to allow him to reply 
to Nehru, a point of view supported by the ZK KPD, who told Piatnitsky that Nehru’s behaviour 
was an intolerable act which deserved some kind of response.918 However, the Political 
Commission advised everyone involved to remain silent and to await further instructions, while 
informing the International Secretariat to act cautiously in its future contacts with Nehru. Chatto 
ignored these instructions, however. Barooah writes that Chatto sent a letter to Nehru, asking him 
to show tolerance towards “mistakes simply because these happen to be pointed out by 
Communists”. At this point, however, the split between the two of them had deepened to such a 
degree that they could no longer see eye to eye. The Nehru case had revealed Chatto’s “fateful 
ideological conversion” from being a nationalist revolutionary to having communism as his only 
ally.919 
 
The aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress merely confirmed the complete dependence of the 
International Secretariat on the Comintern apparatus in Moscow. On 6 and 19 December 1929, the 
International Secretariat held two meetings in order to assess the situation, reaching the conclusion 
that activity had either slowed down or had reached a complete standstill at all levels, e.g. its 
                                               
917 According to Nehru, the separation was a logical step for both parties: “[I]f you feel that there is a vital difference  
between your viewpoint and that of the Congress then it obvious that we cannot work on a common platform […] That 
would be a straightforward course and that would give both parties full freedom of action. But it is an impossible 
position for us to be associated with you and to be continually attacked by you”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/44, 51-54, 
Official letter from Nehru, Allahabad, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 30/1-1930. 
918 RGASPI 542/1/44, 55, Decision of the International Secretariat, author: Chatto, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 2/2- 
1930. The Colonial Commission of the CPGB did not appreciate the suggestion to expel Nehru at once, and referred to 
the mistakes committed by the British LAI Section in connection with Maxton’s expulsion. This differed from the 
opinion of the ZK KPD, which urged Piatnitsky to get the ECCI to sanction the “direct” expulsion of the “traitorous” 
Nehru, RGASPI 542/1/44, 59, Letter from the COLONIAL DEPARTMENT [CPGB], London, to the International 
Secretariat, Berlin, 21/2-1930. For the ZK KPD, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 22, Vertraulich, ZK KPD, to Piatnitsky, 
Moscow, 6/2-1930. 
919 Barooah 2004, p.266. In Frankfurt, Chatto described to Bjarne Braatoy that the Indian movement came “in first  
place”, and communism was the second option, see IISG LSI Archives 3050/60-61, Letter from Braatoy, Berlin, to 
Adler, Zurich, 6/8-1929. Why did the Political Commission restrain Chatto? According to the Political Commission, 
Kuusinen should send “directives” to the International Secretariat “kom.Fraktion” (Münzenberg and Smeral), and tell 
them to do nothing at all. Thus, if Nehru received no response from the International Secretariat, time would be the 
LAI’s ally. However, if the International Secretariat sent a “formal reply” to Nehru, it should contain no criticism; it 
would need to be focused on Nehru’s “defection” from the LAI Executive. In India, Nehru was preoccupied with other 
issues, e.g. Gandhi’s salt manufacturing campaign, and the civil disobedience movement, the latter resulting, on 14 
April 1930, in Nehru’s arrest and a prison sentence of six months. On 7 October 1930, Smeral discussed Nehru’s arrest 
with Münzenberg and Chatto, only to conclude that he was tired of waiting for a decision from someone at Comintern 
headquarters on what to do with the Nehru question. Making an effort to solve the stalemate, Smeral wrote a draft 
resolution on Nehru and sent it to the Political Commission. However, the Political Commission dismissed this 
resolution, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/19, 1-4, Protokoll Nr.47 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des 
Politsekretariats des EKKI, 23/3-1930; RGASPI 495/4/19, 86, Confidential letter from [Kuusinen], Moscow, to 
Münzenberg and Smeral, Berlin, 28/3-1930; RGASPI 542/1/40, 108, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Münzenberg & 
Chatto, Berlin, 7/10-1930. For Smeral’s draft, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 109-111; Gopal 1975, pp.141-143. 
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connections with India and the Meerut trial campaign920 as well as the Negro question,921 while 
internal chaos had begun to consume several of the sections (the Dutch and British sections). 
Unable to pay the debts (13,021 Marks) accumulated in connection with the Frankfurt Congress, 
Münzenberg, Chatto and Smeral had no answer to the question of how to proceed. To confirm the 
crisis, Hans Jäger, the secretary of the German LAI Section in Berlin, told Münzenberg that, due to 
the lack of finance, that section would cease activity on 1 January, 1930. Jäger needed a monthly 
sum of 50 Marks to finance its work.922 The crisis had arrived. 
 
* 
 
The Crisis 
“My initial impression of the general situation”, as noted by Smeral on 2 January 1930, was that 
the crisis dealt essentially with the “very existence” of the LAI. Previous interpretations of the LAI 
have ignored the structural effects the Frankfurt Congress had on the International Secretariat, 
leading to the beginning of a dynamic period. Despite Haikal’s discerning and ground-breaking 
narrative on the LAI, he only conceded that, by the beginning of 1930, the organisation had lost 
almost every non-communist member, and that this was merely a “reflection of Comintern policy 
in the ‘Third Period’”. Another interpretation has been given in Matthew Worley’s evaluation of 
the British LAI Section, which describes a section which had voluntarily retreated into isolation 
due to the expulsion of former left-wing supporters, although this did not prevent the British LAI 
Section from continuing “to function”.923 This is a perspective which offers a deeper understanding 
of the dynamics of the crisis. The primary aim here is to evaluate and analyse how this crisis 
                                               
920 The Comintern wanted to develop the Meerut campaign at the end of 1929. CPGB member, Tom Bell, suggested to  
the political advisor for the campaign, J. T. Murphy, that every step of the campaign had to be co-ordinated along “the 
lines of the Tenth ECCI Plenum”, i.e. to prepare “political questions and speeches from the prisoners”, expose 
“imperialist rule in India under the MacDonald Government” and connect the trial with the theme of “class 
suppression of all labour organisations in India”. Hence, the declarations of “international solidarity of the colonial 
masses with workers in the metropolitan countries” would pave way for the support of “the Soviet Union as the 
Workers’ fatherland”, and in defence of the Comintern, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/4, 10, Letter from Tom Bell, London, 
to Political Commission, Moscow, 1/11-1929. Bell’s letter was forwarded by Piatnitsky to the Political Commission, 
see fol. RGASPI 495/4/4, 12, Short note from the ECCI Bureau, Moscow, to the Political Commission, Moscow, 2/11-
1929. 
921 The Negro question was primarily taken care of by either the ECCI Negro Bureau or the Profintern Negro Bureau  
in Moscow. 
922 RGASPI 542/1/39, 49-54, Protokoll der Sekretariatssitzung, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 6/12-1929;  
RGASPI 542/1/39, 55-58, 55-58, Protokoll der Sekretariatssitzung , Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 19/12-
1929. 
923 Haikal 1995, p.151; Worley 2002, p.228. By 1930, the international communist movement was targetted by the  
uncertain development of the “class against class” policy, according to Worley (ed., 2004, p.11). Janet Patricia Little 
offers in her biography of French philosopher and petitioner against colonialism, Simone Weil, another approach to 
this complex scenario. According to Little, at the beginning of the 1930s Weil experienced the left-wing movement as 
being somewhat split along ideological lines, in which the LAI had “lost its impetus” due to internal dissent and a 
conflict between the communists and reformists, see Simone Weil & Janet Patricia Little (ed.), Simone Weil on 
Colonialism: an Ethic of the Other, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2003, p.11. 
364 
 
affected the LAI. The general objective here is to discern how the decision-makers (individuals 
and departments) at Comintern headquarters negotiated in order to come up with an idea that 
would resolve the crisis.  
      Smeral’s 2 January report was a vivid testimony to the LAI. In the report, Smeral 
recommended that Piatnitsky reflect over the need to get the Eastern Secretariat, the WEB and the 
communist parties in Europe to “systematically assist” the LAI.924 In fact, this was a conclusion 
which had originally been introduced by Bittelman in his DR LAI. However, while Bittelman had 
discussed the option of re-organisation as a solution to the inherent problems of the LAI, at the 
beginning of 1930, the question centred around finding motives to sustain and keep the LAI alive. 
At this point in time, the WEB emerged as one of the solutions to assist Smeral and the decision-
makers at Comintern headquarters in gathering intelligence on the International Secretariat.925 
Adding to its emerging paranoia, the International Secretariat suspected some of the non-
communist members in the LAI Executive of plotting a coup to seize power over the anti-
imperialist movement. 
      Smeral observed how the national sections barely existed in the “most important countries”: 
England,926 France, USA, Germany and the Netherlands. This was further borne out by the facts 
that the sections had not organised any conferences after the Frankfurt Congress, the members 
refused to pay any fees, while the International Secretariat had no money with which to support the 
sections. Nonetheless, Smeral believed that these problems should not prevent the sections from 
taking their “own independent initiatives”, e.g. raising money or establishing campaigns. However, 
“Michail”/Piatnitsky should have “no high illusions”.927 On the other hand, Hans Jäger offered a 
more realistic picture of the troublesome situation in Germany: the German LAI Section was on its 
knees due to the constant shortage of money and having at its disposal useless political material.928 
However, this was an internal crisis; therefore neither the International Secretariat nor the German 
                                               
924 RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to “Freunde” [“Michail”/Piatnitsky], Moscow, 2/1-1930. 
925 RGASPI 495/4/4, 55a, Information from the Bureau of the [ECCI] Secretariat, Moscow, to members of the Political  
Secretariat, Moscow, 2/11-1929. Helmut/Dimitrov was the formal leader of the WEB, supported by other European 
communists, e.g. Remmele, Barbé, Ferguson and Tischler. 
926 Bridgeman wondered whether Arnot could ask the International Secretariat to send some money to the British LAI  
Section. Working together with A. Glyn Evans, the “organiser” in London (according to Bridgeman), the section was 
suffering from a constant shortage of funds, a fact that made it impossible to find new contacts, maintain old ones and 
organise propaganda campaigns, RGASPI 542/1/46, 6, Letter from Bridgeman and A. Glyn Evans (“organiser”), 
London, to Arnot, Moscow (Hotel Lux), 19/1-1930. 
927 Smeral had noted that the International Secretariat only had 16 Marks left in its cash box at the office, however, its  
debts amounted to over 10,000 Marks, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to ”Freunde” 
[”Michail”/Piatnitsky], Moscow, 2/1-1930. 
928 According to Hans Jäger, Der koloniale Freiheitskampf had a monthly circulation of 4,000 copies in Germany, yet  
this was not enough to sustain activity. A minimum of 100 Marks per month would keep the section alive, supported 
by an additional 250 Marks to cover the travel costs for “instructors and referents” to visit the local branches. In the 
beginning of 1930, the German LAI Section had branches in Berlin (250 members), Frankfurt (550), Chemnitz (100), 
Cologne (85), Remscheid (56), Hamburg (125), Dresden (40), Hagen (36), Essen (49) and Munich (32), RGASPI 
542/1/46, 13, Report on the German LAI Section, Hans Jäger, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 1930. 
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LAI Section publicly announced the deteriorating state of affairs. Instead, the International 
Secretariat announced that it was planning to organise public meetings and a series of seminars in 
Berlin, together with the German LAI Section, in February and March.929 From the Schutzpolizei’s 
perspective in Berlin, however, these public announcements by the LAI were one explanation for 
the sudden increase of “Russian emissaries” in the city.930 
      The International Secretariat believed that the non-communist members in the LAI Executive 
were aiming to use the crisis to “lay their hands” on the anti-imperialist movement. Smeral 
referred to this so-called “initiative” as the “Independence from Moscow” group (Unabhängigkeit 
von Moskau) which was striving to cleanse the anti-imperialist movement of any communist 
involvement. Additionally, the International Secretariat informed the Eastern Secretariat that 
repeated “incidents” (without referring to any particular episode) by the “prominente 
Persönlichkeiten” after the Frankfurt Congress pointed towards a suspected takeover of the issue 
by the anti-imperialist movement. The International Secretariat then had to summon the LAI 
Executive to discuss organisational questions, as well as the status of the LAI in the Arab region, 
the recent development of the Negro question in Haiti as well as the current state of affairs in both 
South and East Africa.931 The crux of the matter was that, at this point in time, there existed no 
functional Executive of the LAI, according to Helmut/Dimitrov. Helmut/Dimitrov also told the 
ECCI that the International Secretariat had to revise the LAI’s ideological “programme” in order to 
react against the antagonism from the non-communist members. Solving the crisis was, 
nevertheless, the central issue, Helmut/Dimitrov stated. Thus, rather than holding a meeting with a 
now defunct LAI Executive, the ECCI should support the idea of organising a “Colonial 
                                               
929 The Berlin branch of the German LAI Section intended to hold a course on “Imperialism in Different Colonial  
Countries” at IAH headquarters in February-March, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 2, Welt am Abend, no.37, 
13/2-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 7, Die Rote Fahne, No.65, 16/3-1930. 
930 At an LAI meeting in Berlin on 28 January, Münzenberg, Sandalino Junco from Mexico and Cavarello from Spain  
all gave speeches. The Schutzpolizei concluded that it had been a communist meeting, suspecting the event of 
functioning as a cover for the KPD, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 3-5, Der Polizeipräsident. Abteilung IA an 
den Herrn Preußischen Minister des Innern, z.Hd.des Herrn Ministerialrats Schönner, hier, Berlin, 10/2-1930; 
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1001/6751, 125, Short note from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Eingeborenenkunde, Berlin, to Herrn 
Geheimrat Eltester, Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 28/1-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1001/6751, 128/130, Cover and 
backpage, Der koloniale Freiheitskampf. Organ der Liga gegen Imperialismus (Deutsche Sektion), Nr.1, III.Jahrgang, 
Berlin, 1/2-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1001/6751, 31, Short note from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Eingeborenenkunde, 
Berlin, to Herrn Geheimrat Eltester, Auswärtige Amt, Berlin, 12/3-1930. 
931 RGASPI 542/1/44, 20-23, Report from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow,  
11/1-1930. The first political question Smeral devoted attention to at the International Secretariat was the Arab 
question. According to one of the first confidential reports from Smeral to Piatnitsky (completed in January), the 
“Arab work” of the LAI had to establish connections with “every anti-imperialist organisation and force” in the 
region. One personal contact was of particular value to the LAI Smeral stated: the Arab nationalist Hamdi el Husseini, 
who lived in Jerusalem and frequently sent reports to the International Secretariat. Additionally, the International 
Secretariat intended to establish a “Klub der arabischen nationalen Erweckung” in Berlin, and to publish a nationalist 
paper in the Arabic language, RGASPI 495/19/312, 5-19, Bericht des Sekretariats [author: Smeral] des Liga gegen 
Imperialismus über die arabische Arbeit in der Periode von August bis Dezember 1929, Berlin, to the Eastern 
Secretariat [?], Moscow, 10/1-1930. A copy of this report is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/44, 6-19. 
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Conference” with delegates from the European communist parties.932 In another letter to the ECCI, 
the secretary of the WEB in Berlin, “Alarich” (pseudonym used by the German communist 
Richard Gyptner), declared that the primary intention with such a conference would not be to 
examine the colonial work in the parties, but rather it would be to establish guidelines for the 
future work of the International Secretariat.933 
      The Political Commission discussed Helmut/Dimitrov’s proposal on 13 February, concluding 
that the idea would be an “inappropriate” step, especially as there existed no adequate 
documentation on the characteristics of the LAI crisis at Comintern headquarters. Furthermore, 
considering the total disarray of the colonial work in the parties, the decision-makers in Moscow 
found it almost impossible to even have a theoretical discussion of the issue. This resulted in the 
Political Commission calling for an investigation of the crisis, with Mif being instructed to gather 
intelligence on both the LAI and on the colonial work in the parties and, in connection with the 
Enlarged ECCI Presidium in Moscow (8 – 28 February 1930), to hold “minor conferences” with 
delegates from the parties.934 
 
* 
 
The Fear, and Going to Moscow: The Crisis Confirmed 
 
We hope, despite the present political and material crisis in the League, to turn the League 
into an active and useful organisation […]. We have to win time. 
“Max” [Petrovsky] to Münzenberg and 
Smeral, 15/1-1930 
 
“Max”/Petrovsky assured Münzenberg and Smeral that the ECCI Secretariat knew about the crisis, 
the major question nevertheless being the need to understand the reasons and dynamics which had 
caused the crisis. As part of the solution, the International Secretariat and the WEB had to send 
reports to the Eastern Secretariat outlining the nature of the crisis.935 At this point in time, the 
                                               
932 RGASPI 499/1/17, 54-55, Report from the WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 13/1-1930. Excerpts from the  
report, including the passim on the LAI is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/37, 2, Auszug aus dem Protokoll des WEB, 
Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 13/1-1930. 
933 Alarich/Gyptner enclosed a number of documents in his letter to the ECCI, including one on the LAI Executive;  
reports on India and the Arab countries; and Chatto’s “personal” letter in response to Nehru’s defection. According to 
Alarich/Gyptner, if the communist parties in Europe chose to support the LAI, this would solve a majority of the 
organisation’s problems as well as those at the International Secretariat, RGASPI 542/1/37, 3, Protocol Betr. LAI, 
author: Alarich [R. Gyptner]/WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 14/1-1930. 
934 RGASPI 495/4/14, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.42 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des EKKI, 13/2-1930. Present at  
the meeting were among others Piatnitsky, Heckert, Heimo, Kuusinen, Kirsanova, Manuilsky, Wassiljew, Lozovsky, 
Tschang-Piao, Kornblum, Mif, Rossi and Angaretis. 
935 RGASPI 495/18/863, 12-15, Letter from ECCI Secretariat [author: “Max”/Petrovsky], Moscow, to Smeral and  
Münzenberg, Berlin, 15/1-1930. Max/Petrovsky’s name is not included in a copy of the letter, see fol. 495/4/11, 58-60, 
Confidential letter to Smeral and Münzenberg from the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow, author “Max” [Petrovsky], 
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institutional or individual actors at Comintern headquarters had no idea of how to solve the crisis, 
a conundrum that spurred some in Moscow to react with a fear of losing control over the anti-
imperialist movement in Europe. This also strengthened the opinion that the LAI was facing an 
uncertain future; hence, the Comintern had to commence a structural and ideological re-
organisation of the LAI. The central question revolved around whether to either disband or to save 
the LAI. If the decision-makers chose the latter option, Berlin would be the ideal place for the 
International Secretariat, and what position would the LAI then have within the international 
communist movement? This crisis set in motion a critical discussion of the LAI’s ideological 
development since the Brussels Congress in 1927; however, the Comintern apparatus’ underlying 
motive was to confirm its administrative grip on the International Secretariat. 
      For Petrovsky, the Comintern’s objective was clear, telling Münzenberg and Smeral to adapt 
the International Secretariat to the conditions determined by the crisis, and to try to “win time” in 
order to neutralise the “present struggle”. Hence, it was a question of getting through the ordeal 
and “winning time”, Petrovsky concluded. However, what did this “present struggle” consist of? 
By dividing the struggle into both “objective” and “subjective” explanations, the former concerned 
the successful repression in the colonies by the “imperialist nations”, resulting in “weak 
communist parties”, as well as the poor liaison between Europe and the colonies, and the lack of 
money, while the latter explanation focused on the reasons why it seemed impossible to carry out 
any constructive work, caused essentially by the passive national LAI sections and the 
“indifferent” behaviour of the communist parties (the PCF, the CPGB and the KPD). Due to all 
this, the LAI had failed to establish connections with workers and peasants in the imperialist and 
colonial countries, while at the same time, the “prominente Persönlichkeiten” in the LAI were 
plotting to form “a new league”, Petrovsky stated. Despite Petrovsky’s verdict on the non-
communist members on the LAI Executive, he warned of the risk of transforming the LAI into a 
“pure, communist organisation”.936 
      Petrovsky’s evaluation was the first one on the LAI crisis to reach Comintern headquarters. 
Perceived as a prognosis, the Political Commission examined Petrovsky’s opinions and resolved to 
instruct the Eastern Secretariat to introduce a draft for a plan on how to re-organise the LAI, a 
                                                                                                                                                          
stamped date: 21/1-1930. A third copy is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/37, 8-11, Letter from ECCI Secretariat [?], 
Moscow, to Smeral and Münzenberg, Berlin, 15/1-1930. However, this version does not mention the author of the 
letter. 
936 Petrovsky explained that it was useless to transform the LAI into a genuine cover organisation for the Comintern. A  
more constructive approach was to re-activate the national sections, convince the communist parties that the LAI was 
an important factor in the communist movement, as well as improve the administrative and financial structure, see fol. 
RGASPI 495/18/863, 12-15, Letter from ECCI Secretariat [author: Max/Petrovsky], Moscow, to Smeral and 
Münzenberg, Berlin, 15/1-1930. 
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process which also had to include the PCF and CPGB.937 This called for the imminent summoning 
of Münzenberg and Smeral to Moscow, for the sole reason that the Political Commission wanted 
to hear their versions of the crisis. Upon receiving Piatnitsky’s order to travel to Moscow, Smeral 
reacted with unease. Smeral explained to Piatnitsky that he was preoccupied with “doing work for 
the ECCI” in Europe, thus, a more constructive solution would be to hold a discussion of the LAI 
with representatives of the Profintern and the WEB in Berlin, while sending Münzenberg to 
Moscow.938 Piatnitsky turned down Smeral’s request. At the same time, Piatnitsky instructed 
Mikhail Trilliser (1883 – 1940; also known by his Comintern persona Moskvin) to act as an 
intermediary between the secretaries at Comintern headquarters in order to co-ordinate the meeting 
with Münzenberg and Smeral. Furthermore, Moskvin/Trilliser was to examine the LAI question, 
beginning with Petrovsky’s prognosis, before presenting a conclusion on why it was necessary to 
re-organise the LAI. Moskvin’s/Trilliser’s involvement indicates that the question of the LAI was a 
crucial issue, particularly as Moskvin/Trillier was the head of the Soviet state security service’s 
Foreign Department in Moscow, perceived as being “one of the founders of Soviet intelligence”.939 
However, despite the vast number of empirical sources on the LAI in the Comintern Archive, this 
is one of only a few explicit observations linking the LAI to the Soviet intelligence apparatus. 
      Moskvin/Trilliser pursued this assignment with vigilance. As noted in a short memorandum, 
addressed to the Eastern Secretariat, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Piatnitsky, Gusev and Molotov on 26 
February 1930, Moskvin/Trilliser believed that the Eastern Secretariat could not solve the issue of 
re-organising the LAI on its own. In fact, the issue required the involvement of the highest 
authoritative level in the Comintern. Moskvin/Trilliser nevertheless admitted that the scheduled 
meeting between Münzenberg, Smeral and the Political Commission represented an opportunity to 
present the Eastern Secretariat’s plan on how to re-organize the LAI.940 The Eastern Secretariat 
had completed the draft of a plan, “Projekt des Briefes vom Sekretariat des EKKI an das ZK der 
KP Frankreichs in der Frage der Umorganisierung und Belebung der Arbeit der LAI” (“the re-
organisation project”) which, despite the signature of the ECCI Secretariat, aimed to function as 
consultative material in support of the decision-making process. The central issue in “the re-
organisation project” was how to re-organise the LAI and its activities, and why it was necessary 
                                               
937 RGASPI 495/4/11, 5-8, Protokoll Nr.37 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats des EKKI,  
23/1-1930. 
938 Smeral explained to Piatnitsky that he was overburdened with work. In January, Smeral had given twelve speeches  
on the Five Year Plan system in the Soviet Union in Berlin, and he felt that he had no reason to travel to Moscow.  
Smeral stated that the issue was of a completely different nature for Münzenberg, who needed to receive instructions 
from the Political Commission on a coming conference of the Friends of Soviet Union, RGASPI 495/19/312, 23-24, 
Letter from Smeral [handwritten], Berlin, to “Michail”/Piatnitsky, Moscow, 7/2-1930. 
939 Rosenfeldt vol. II, 2009, p.215, 367-368. 
940 RGASPI 542/1/39, 64, Moskvin, Moscow, to unknown recipient, Moscow, 26/2-1930. 
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to do so. Furthermore, the document discloses how the Eastern Secretariat perceived a 
sympathising organisation such as the LAI during “the third period”, 
If the League is to carry out its task in the present period it must base its support on workers 
and peasants organisations. This is the central organisational task of the League.941 
Prior to Münzenberg and Smeral’s arrival in Moscow, the Enlarged ECCI Presidium was 
convened. At one of its sessions, Manuilsky addressed the status of the national revolutionary 
movement in the colonies, introducing the rhetorical question: “who was to lead the peasant 
classes, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat?” The answer was obvious for Manuilsky, who declared 
that it was the task of the communist party to lead the proletariat in the colonies. The crux of the 
matter was that there hardly existed any operative or functional parties in the colonial and semi-
colonial countries, e.g. the recent events in India pointed in that direction. Kuusinen admitted 
rather self-critically that he “feared the masses [in India] more than British Imperialism”. The 
reason he gave for this was that there existed no effective strategy to prevent the Indian 
bourgeoisie from sustaining its control over the workers’ and peasants’ movements. Due to 
Kuusinen’s failure to contribute to constructing such a strategy, he concluded that the recent period 
of Comintern activity in India had been nothing more than a “sham struggle”.942 In comparison to 
the previous plenums in 1928-29, and the Sixth International Comintern congress in 1928, the 
Enlarged ECCI Plenum in February 1930 served the purpose of both declaring the communists’ 
ideological conviction and highlighting the Comintern’s vigilance in realising its advocated policy 
of “class against class”. 
      On 1 March, Münzenberg and Smeral had their meeting with the Political Commission. 
According to the protocol of this meeting, Smeral delivered a report on the current situation in the 
LAI [not filed in the dossier], and took part in the ensuing discussion on “the re-organisation 
project”, an issue which apparently did not involve Münzenberg. The meeting ended with the 
Political Commission endorsing a strategy on how to proceed, instructing Smeral to edit the 
“confidential decisions”, bearing in mind the “exchange of opinions” (Meinungsaustausches) at 
                                               
941 RGASPI 542/1/39, 65-76, Projekt des Briefes vom Sekretariat des EKKI an das ZK der KP Frankreichs in der  
Frage der Umorganisierung und Belebung der Arbeit der LAI, author: Eastern Secretariat, Moscow 16/2-1930; 
RGASPI 495/4/16, 81-90, Letter from the ECCI Secretariat to the ZK der KP Frankreichs, 23/3-1930; RGASPI 
495/4/35, 40-52, Letter from the International Secretariat [ ECCI Secretariat], Moscow/Berlin, to the CC CPGB, 
London, [3/6-1930]. 
942 The Enlarged Presidium discussed the preparations for the Fifth International Profintern Congress (scheduled to  
convene in Moscow, August 1930); the situation in the communist parties in Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the 
Soviet Union; and the struggle on how to achieve communist hegemony within the national revolutionary movement. 
Manuilsky’s discussion on “proletarian hegemony” implied that the communist parties in Europe were strong enough 
to “cut the cords” with the “bourgeois class society”, thus, the communist movement was liberated from “petty-
bourgeois ideology” and, therefore, could pursue an “independent class policy”; see Degras vol.III 1965, pp. 98-99. 
According to McDermott and Agnew, ,Manuilsky introduced the resolution by pure “coincidence” in connection with 
Stalin’s infamous article, “Dizzy with Success”, a text which called for a momentary pause in the collectivisation 
process in the Soviet countryside, see McDermott & Agnew 1996, p.96. 
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the session which had contributed to the altering of the original plan of “the re-organisation 
project”.943 According to the Political Commission, however, it would be inadvisable to dissolve 
the LAI for the simple reason that it would cause a political risk: 
The League must not be transformed into a genuine communist organisation; it must retain 
and develop its broad basis as a non-party mass organisation. The liquidation of the League 
is therefore politically dangerous, as the left-wing social reformists and national reformists 
would inevitably take over the business of the Anti-Imperialist League.944 
Nevertheless, the Political Commission expected the LAI to ruthlessly expose “left-wing social 
reformists” (Maxton and Fimmen) and “national reformists” (the INC, the PI and the NAACP), 
while at the same time expressing its concerns about turning the organisation into “a genuine 
communist organisation” (eine rein kommunistische Organisation verwandeln). It was a mass of 
contradictions, calling for provisional solutions. Firstly, the International Secretariat should get 
“comrades” in Europe to travel to India and Indonesia to carry out missions, but only once the 
Political Commission had approved each candidate. This meant that Smeral had to find candidates 
by visiting the LAI sections in France, England and the Netherlands and, during his visit, explain 
the purpose and aim of the re-organisation plan. Secondly, the International Secretariat had to 
continue the work of supporting the establishment of LAI sections in the colonial and semi-
colonial countries.945 
      The Eastern Secretariat stated in “the re-organisation project” that it was obvious why it was 
necessary to re-organise the LAI, first and foremost to get the organisation accustomed to the 
policy of “class against class”. Nonetheless, it “was not an easy task” to re-activate the LAI after 
the Frankfurt Congress, the Eastern Secretariat conceded. This involved primarily scrutinizing the 
nature of the LAI network, which unfortunately had already been proven to have very few 
remaining contacts. According to the Eastern Secretariat, “the re-organisation project” was focused 
essentially on why the LAI existed, i.e. to fulfil the role as Comintern intermediary in colonial and 
semi-colonial countries, and to either develop or support communist activism in regions that were 
                                               
943 RGASPI 495/4/15, 1-5, Protokoll Nr.43 der Sitzung der politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats des EKKI,  
1/3-1930. Present at the meeting were Kuusinen, Piatnitsky, Heckert, Manuilsky, Heimo, Smeral, Münzenberg, 
Jewreinov, Hopner, Mif, Chitarow, Wassiljew, Schubin, Gussew, Koplenig, Tschernin, Jefremova and Walecki. 
According to this protocol, Münzenberg was not involved in the discussion on the LAI, focusing rather on the Friends 
of Soviet Union and Mezhrabpom-Film. 
944 RGASPI 495/4/15, 15-17, (Vertraulich) Beschluss der Polkommission, Moscow, 1/3-1930. For a copy of this  
decision, see fol. 495/20/722, 67-69. 
945 The Political Secretariat instructed the WEB to distribute this letter to the European communist parties, see fol.  
RGASPI 495/4/15, 15-17, (Vertraulich) Beschluss der Polkommission, Moscow, 1/3-1930. A copy of this decision is 
filed in fol. 495/20/722, 67-69; RGASPI 495/3/154, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.78 der Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 
6/3-1930. For the WEB, see fol. RGASPI 499/1/17, 90, Report from the WEB, author: Helmut/Dimitrov [?], Berlin, to 
the ECCI, Moscow, 15/3-1930. The Political Secretariat sent the resolution to the WEB in Berlin, which passed on the 
document for “reconsideration” to the International Secretariat. 
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generally sealed off to the international communist movement. However, as a result of the 
Frankfurt Congress, this latter objective was facing a critical moment. The Eastern Secretariat 
believed that the LAI and its “organisational work” was an imperative source of inspiration for the 
international communist movement: 
We think it is unnecessary to emphasise that a non-party organisation such as the LAI, is an 
important organisation in the Third Period of Post-war capitalism. Due to its non-party 
character, not limited like other international communist organisations in this period of 
increased antagonism and with the growing liberation struggle in the colonial and semi-
colonial countries, it represents more significance than other international non-party 
organisations such as the IAH, the IRH, the Friends of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Fascist 
League.946 
The Eastern Secretariat’s argument presented a concrete reason for why it was essential to keep the 
LAI alive. However, aside from the Eastern Secretariat explicitly declaring its support in 
sustaining the LAI, this quote was omitted in the final version of “the re-organisation project”, 
according to the letters sent to the PCF and the CPGB.947 The question is why, and for what 
reason? Firstly, the Eastern Secretariat had declared that the LAI was suffering from having been 
established during “the second period” of post-war capitalism, which had provided socialists, 
social democrats and intellectuals with a chance to influence and dominate the organisation. At the 
same time, the communist parties had chosen to ignore the fact that the LAI was not only 
influencing these groups in a communist direction but also represented one of the few existing 
channels between the Comintern and the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The Eastern 
Secretariat argued, above all, that the LAI was the leading agent to distribute Bolshevik 
propaganda around the world. In comparison to other mass and sympathising organisations of the 
Comintern, e.g. the IAH, the IRH, the Friends of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Fascist League, the 
LAI was not overtly identified as a communist organisation, the Eastern Secretariat argued. It was 
therefore crucial to retain the notion that the LAI was not a “genuine Communist International 
organisation” in order for the organisation to continue its work in public spaces, something that 
other Comintern organisations were not able to do.948 Whether this was the argument which caused 
                                               
946 RGASPI 542/1/39, 65-76, Projekt des Briefes vom Sekretariat des EKKI an das ZK der KP Frankreichs in der  
Frage der Umorganisierung und Belebung der Arbeit der LAI, author: Eastern Secretariat, Moscow 16/2-1930. 
947 The letter to the Central Committee of the PCF was sent on March 23, while the letter to the Central Committee of  
the CPGB on June 3, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/16, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.44 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des 
Politsekretariats des EKKI, 8/3-1930; RGASPI 495/4/16, 81-90, Letter from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to ZK der KP 
Frankreichs, Paris, 23/3-1930; RGASPI 495/4/35, 1-4, Protokoll Nr.63 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des 
Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 3/6-1930; RGASPI 495/4/35, 40-52, Letter from the International Secretariat [ ECCI Secretariat], 
Moscow/Berlin, to the CC CPGB, London, [3/6-1930]. 
948 Fredrik Petersson, “The League against Imperialism: The Most Valuable Organizational Tool for Bolshevik  
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the “exchange of opinions” at the meeting with the Political Commission remains unknown. 
However, one must not forget the fact that the Eastern Secretariat’s opinion concerning the LAI’s 
relevance within the international communist movement had been deliberately deleted.  
      The LAI’s spiritual awakening and organisational revival depended on establishing some kind 
of curative measures, the most urgent being that the communist parties had to stop ignoring their 
colonial work. The ECCI Secretariat received intelligence on the French LAI Section from both its 
secretary Herclet and from the functionary at the PCF secretariat in Paris, Gabrielle Cormon (real 
name: Henriette Tartavel). The disheartening information indicated that “no intellectuals wanted to 
remain” in the anti-imperialist movement in France, while “the LAI had ceased to exist from an 
organisational point of view” and was merely a figment of the imagination “printed on paper”.949 
The British LAI Section was no better off, having the Political Secretariat question why the 
Central Committee of the CPGB had chosen to support the Friends of the Soviet Union rather than 
the LAI.950 The ECCI and the Political Secretariat considered the activities of the LAI sections in 
Great Britain and France as crucial because these countries were the “strongest imperialist 
powers”, and they would, therefore, be able to link the anti-imperialist movement in Europe with 
the ones existing in the French and British colonies. The ECCI Secretariat realised, however, that 
the PCF and CPGB had to focus on different issues in its support for the LAI sections. In France, 
the PCF could help the section to increase its membership ratio by instructing the IAH, the IRH, 
the Friends of the Soviet Union and the LDRN to become collective members and, secondly, by 
establishing connections in the trade unions and among seamen from the “black African 
colonies”.951 In Great Britain, the section had to apply a from-below perspective, i.e. focus on 
colonial associations active in the universities, e.g. the Indian Students’ Association and the West 
African Students’ Union had branches in Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Manchester, Belfast and 
Glasgow. The CPGB could therefore contribute by assisting the section to organise curricular 
courses on imperialism and Marxism. The courses had to be held under the strictest of precautions, 
                                                                                                                                                          
Propaganda in the ‘Imperialist’ and Colonial World during the Interwar Era? Synopsis of a doctoral thesis”, in The 
International Newsletter of Communist Studies, Bernhard H. Bayerlein (ed.), Vol.XIII (2007), No.20, University of 
Mannheim, Mannheim, pp.105-110. 
949 RGASPI 495/4/16, 81-90, Letter from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to ZK der KP Frankreichs, Paris, 23/3-1930.  
For Henriette Tartavel (1904 - ?), first a syndicalist then a communist, see Rachel Mazuy, Croire plutôt que voir? 
Voyages en Russie soviétique, 1919-1939, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2002, p.341 (see footnote 41). 
950 The letter from the International Secretariat (authored in secrecy by the ECCI Secretariat) to the Central Committee  
of the CPGB stated the following: “We are of the opinion that the problems to which we are earnestly calling the 
attention of the Party leadership in this letter can be solved in a satisfactory manner only if the Polit Bureau of the 
Party devotes sufficient attention to them and if our fraction in the Executive of the League succeeds with the help of 
the Party in bringing about a definite advance in its organisational and political work”, RGASPI 495/4/35, 40-52, 
Letter from the International Secretariat [ECCI Secretariat], Moscow/Berlin, to the CC CPGB, London, [3/6-1930]. 
951 The ECCI Secretariat realised, however, that it was “impossible to establish an open, legal League organisation” in  
the French colonies, above all in East Africa. The LAI should therefore use “covert” strategies to distribute its 
propaganda, and to find contacts in “clubs, associations for national liberation, or only as committees”, see fol. 
RGASPI 495/4/16, 81-90, Letter from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to “ZK der KP Frankreichs”, Paris, 23/3-1930. 
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the ECCI Secretariat argued, and the section could only engage itself with the colonial associations 
once “the Party has checked up on them”. Essentially an idea relying on a hierarchical agreement 
between the party and section, having the section co-ordinate the connections with the British 
colonies, but only under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the CPGB. The 
question of West Africa proved, nevertheless, to be an exception to the above. According to the 
ECCI Secretariat, the first step there was to evaluate whether it even was worth the effort to 
“organise the West African organisations into a section of the League (Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, 
Gambia and Nigeria; workers’ and peasants’ organisations)”. If the idea seemed too complicated to 
realise, the British LAI Section had to, at least, establish “contacts through sailors” who could be 
used to distribute propaganda on the LAI in West Africa.952 These propositions from the ECCI 
Secretariat also indicated that the International Secretariat should perfect its role as the hub for the 
anti-imperialist movement in Europe. However, in order to execute its original aim as a Comintern 
intermediary, the International Secretariat in Berlin needed to be more closely supervised by the 
WEB and the KPD. 
 
* 
 
A Languishing Movement, Part I 
Smeral left Moscow in March. Upon his return to Berlin, Smeral discovered that the International 
Secretariat was languishing. William Patterson, acting as the plenipotentiary of the Profintern 
Negro Bureau, also made a similar comment after visiting the International Secretariat in April, 
describing it as a place of “apathy and passivity”.953 An even more detailed description of the 
International Secretariat was given by the American communist, “Margaret Dean” (real name: 
Margaret Cowl), in a letter to Piatnitsky. After having completed a secret mission in England in the 
beginning of 1930 to prepare “the 5th World Congress” of the Profintern, Dean made a short 
stopover in Berlin before travelling to Moscow. Dean went to the International Secretariat where 
she met Chatto, who informed her of the steady decline of the LAI on all levels, telling her to pass 
on this information to Piatnitsky: 
                                               
952 RGASPI 495/4/35, 40-52, Letter from the International Secretariat [ ECCI Secretariat], Moscow/Berlin, to the CC  
CPGB, London, [3/6-1930]. 
953 Smeral instructed Magyar to pass on this letter to Kuusinen after he had read it, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 37,  
(Confidential) Handwritten letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 27/3-1930; RGASPI 534/4/330, 1-4, 
(original) letter of WW[ilson]/Patterson to Negro Bureau/Profintern, London 18 April, 1930; RGASPI 534/4/330, 20 
letter from Padmore (G.P.) to ‘Dear Comrades’, 15/4-1930. First, Patterson’s reference to the “apathy” in Berlin 
concerned, above all, the indifference at the International Secretariat to assist with the preparatory work for the 
ITUCNW conference in Hamburg. Hence, Patterson wondered whether this attitude extended to the colonial question 
in general. The ITUCNW conference convened in Hamburg on 7 July, with Chatto appearing as an LAI delegate, see 
fol. RGASPI 534/4/330, 13fp+bp handwritten letter from WW [Patterson], London, to the Negro Bureau Profintern, 
Moscow, 24/5-1930, see Weiss (2011) and Adi (2008). 
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They want something to be done about the League becoming a more functioning body. 
Comrade Chatto said that workers in colonial countries must be placed in the League. More 
attention to colonial work. […] What is needed is some organisational changes. Smeral who 
is receiving USD 150.00 a month in wages, really has no important work to do in the office. 
In his stead some workers on colonial work could be taken in. Chatto said Smeral himself 
says he has no work to do in the office.954 
This languishing state of affairs brought to the attention of the institutional and individual actors at 
Comintern headquarters the need to re-organise the LAI. However, the process depended on 
getting the PCF and the CPGB to respond to “the re-organisation project”, leaving the 
International Secretariat on its own to face the consequences of the crisis. 
      Münzenberg knew that the question of the communist parties’ indifference towards supporting 
the LAI had been an issue addressed by the Political Commission. Attempting to re-approach the 
ZK KPD, Münzenberg declared that a majority of the difficulties linked to the activities of the LAI 
in Germany were due to the lack of administrative support from the party apparatus. Thus, to 
improve the almost non-existent relations between the LAI and the KPD, something that in turn 
would bolster the LAI in Germany, Münzenberg wondered whether the ZK KPD could instruct 
“every member” to begin showing an interest in colonial questions, as well as get other communist 
organisations to become collective members. Münzenberg stated that the ZK KPD could no longer 
continue to ignore the LAI, especially as the organisation had managed to infiltrate and influence 
different colonial communities in Berlin. For Paul Scholze, a secretary of the German LAI Section, 
the gravity of the situation had a more serious implication, informing the Eastern Secretariat that 
the section had reached its lowest point in Germany, where the local branches resembled “clubs” 
rather than large, active sections.955 
      Despite the crisis, Chatto still attempted to co-ordinate the anti-colonial activists in the LAI 
network in both Berlin and beyond. Yet, Chatto’s long-standing antagonism towards Roy reached a 
critical point in 1930, consuming most of his energy. After Roy’s official expulsion from the 
Comintern due to his alleged support of the German social democratic “Brandler organisation”, a 
decision endorsed by the ECCI Presidium on 11 November 1929, Roy became a persona non 
                                               
954 RGASPI 495/19/312, 32fp/bp, Letter from Margaret Dean [Margaret Cowl, Margaret Undjus, “Krumbein”],  
Moscow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 6/6-1930. Dean had been a student at the ILS, conscripted during her studies to carry 
out clandestine missions in the service of the Profintern in between her studies. Dean’s surname was Undjus, not 
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Charles Krumbein, a person involved in the Comintern’s “clandestine service” in Great Britain. Krumbein was 
arrested in England in 1930, where he served “six months in prison for using a false passport”, see Klerh, Haynes and 
Firsov (eds.) 1995, pp.42-43; Herbert Romerstein & Eric Breindel, The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage 
and America’s Traitors, Regnery Publishing, Washington, 2000, p.526. 
955 RGASPI 542/1/39, 102-103, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the ZK KPD, Berlin, 20/3-1930; For Paul Scholz,  
see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 7, Protokoll der Sekretariatsitzung der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, to the Eastern 
Secretariat, Moscow, 25/5-1930. 
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grata. From the autumn of 1929 up until November 1930, Roy was living in Berlin under the 
pseudonyms “Roberto” or “Villa Garcia”, completing his book Revolution and Counter-Revolution 
in China, before returning to India in December 1930.956 Chatto regarded Roy’s presence in Berlin 
as uncomfortable, telling Münzenberg that Roy used every opportunity to fraternise with Indian 
anti-colonial activists. Apparently, Chatto suspected that either Roy was interfering intentionally in 
his activities, by convincing LAI members to leave the organisation, or that he was simply stealing 
candidates supportive of the organisation. Because of this, Chatto urged Münzenberg to help him 
to curb Roy’s actions. One way to do so was to send “a warning” about Roy’s activities to the ZK 
KPD and the ECCI. Hence, Chatto suggested using the communist press to expose the Roy’s 
“adventures” in Berlin, and by so doing, this would hopefully disrupt his connections with Indian 
activists, as well as reveal his intimate collaboration with the “Brandlerianer”. The root of Chatto’s 
dismay was that Roy had evidently managed to establish some kind of contact with Indian 
associations in Berlin. For example, the Indian Association (Verein der Inder) frequently referred 
to Roy, particularly as one of its members, Saikh, was also living in Roy’s apartment. Furthermore, 
Chatto suspected that Roy had infiltrated the Indian Students’ Central Association in London. In 
addition, the secretary of this association, Sunder P. Kabadi, was a supporter of Roy, the latter 
having convinced the former to move to Berlin, Chatto stated. For Saklatvala, this was all 
particularly embarrassing, as it was he who had first introduced Kabadi to the British LAI Section, 
Chatto concluded. This paranoia continued as Chatto accused Clemens Dutt of having been in 
contact with “comrade” Rhadouri, apparently known to be closely connected to Roy. Thus, Dutt 
had to end this relationship, and if he refused to do so, Chatto told Münzenberg to contact the 
ECCI and the Central Committee of the CPGB for the sole reason of warning Dutt. In Berlin, Roy 
had organised a number of fairly successful political “evenings”, which included the provision of 
“free beer”. Chatto actually feared that if “the Roy people” continued to obstruct the activities of 
the LAI, it would be “necessary for the Comintern to organise a campaign in the Indian press to 
expose Roy before he has stirred up too much confusion”.957 
      The paranoia regarding Roy, and the ensuing confusion caused by the crisis, ultimately 
destroyed Chatto. Smeral observed how Chatto’s health was deteriorating rapidly, due to liver 
problems. In March, Chatto was admitted to a hospital in Berlin to receive urgent medical care. 
                                               
956 RGASPI 495/213/18, 26, Auszug dem Protokoll Nr.21 der Sitzung des Präsidiums des EKKI, Moscow, 23/11-1929.  
Present at the meeting were Kuusinen, Chitarow, Lozovsky, Rust, Manuilsky, Purman, Piatnitsky, Bell, Katayama, 
Garlandi, Ulbricht, Strakhov, Kolarev, Meriko Ledo, Reimann, Musso, Bela Kun and Stalin. Piatnitsky signed the 
decision; Samaren Roy, M. N. Roy. A Political Biography, Orient Longman Limited, Hyderabad, 1997, p.85. Samaren 
Roy writes that Roy lived in Münzenberg’s flat, however, this is an unlikely proposition, particularly as the Comintern 
had categorised Roy as a persona non grata. 
957 RGASPI 495/19/312, Letter [Abschrift] from Chatto, Berlin, to Münzenberg, [?], 24/3-1930. Saikh attended the  
Frankfurt Congress as the accredited delegate of the Verein der Indier Zentraleuropas, and Allindische 
Jugendkongress, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 23. 
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While this was happening, Münzenberg himself received a diagnosis of being “overworked”, 
while at the International Secretariat Otto Schudel notified Smeral of his resignation and of his 
plan to travel to Basel to work for the IAH. Nevertheless, Smeral promised the Eastern Secretariat 
that the International Secretariat would try its best to continue its activity.958 What kind of activity 
did Smeral have in mind? The Meerut Conspiracy Trial campaign had nearly ceased to exist in 
Germany, thus the International Secretariat wanted, in collaboration with the ZK KPD, to revive 
the campaign, rather than merely act as its financial supporter. For example, Smeral had provided 
Pollitt with an unknown amount of money to “rescue” the Meerut campaign within the British LAI 
Section. A second question was the “Negro Labour Congress” [ITUCNW] in July, for which 
Chatto had written a “European Declaration” in the name of the LAI to be delivered at the 
congress. Finally, the International Secretariat had sent instructions to the Central Committee of 
the CPUSA on how to revive its LAI section.959 For the International Secretariat, however, this 
only uncovered its existing flaws, with the constant lack of money limiting the LAI’s scope and 
opportunity to develop its activity. The ECCI Secretariat finally conceded that the International 
Secretariat could not do any more than was possible due to the crisis, informing the WEB that the 
LAI question would remain unresolved until further notice.960 
      The Meerut campaign was the exception to the above. Münzenberg seemed convinced that the 
campaign would get support from the ZK KPD, particularly as the LAI had infiltrated the Indian 
community in Berlin. The German LAI Section planned to organise proletarian solidarity 
demonstrations in Berlin, with a focus on the Meerut prisoners, with Münzenberg telling the ZK 
KPD that these events would summon large crowds available for the KPD to “infiltrate”.961 After 
the May Day “struggle against imperialism” demonstration in Berlin, Münzenberg persisted with 
his negotiations with the ZK KPD and the WEB on the Meerut campaign. Yet, the central question 
                                               
958 RGASPI 542/1/39, 37, (Confidential) Handwritten letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 27/3-1930.  
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961 RGASPI 542/1/39, 102-103, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the ZK KPD, Berlin, 20/3-1930. 
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for Münzenberg was to get the Political Secretariat to withdraw its decision temporarily 
prohibiting the International Secretariat from engaging itself in the Meerut campaign. To meet 
Münzenberg midway, Helmut/Dimitrov contacted the Political Secretariat to convince them to lift 
the ban.962  
      The chance to devote its attention to the Meerut campaign was enough to persuade the 
International Secretariat to introduce the idea of sending an LAI delegation from Europe to India. 
According to an official request sent by the International Secretariat to the Secretary of State for 
India in London, the composition of the delegation was presented and the purpose of the journey 
to India laid out: 
Sir, at a special meeting of the Secretariat of the LAI to consider the situation that has arisen 
in India, it was resolved to send a delegation of the League to that country to report on the 
position there, and the following gentlemen were appointed to be members of the delegation: 
Reginald Bridgeman, London, J.R., London, Edo Fimmen, Amsterdam, Prof. Zdenek 
Nejedly, Prague, Henri Barbusse, Paris, Willi Münzenberg, M.d.R., Berlin, Georgij Dimitrov, 
Sofia. It is intended that the delegation should proceed to India not later that June 1st next 
and we should therefore be much obliged if you would be good enough to instruct the British 
Council in Berlin to grant the necessary visas to the above mentioned gentlemen whose 
passports will be duly submitted to the Consulate for this purpose by the Secretariat of the 
League.963 
The British India Office in London refused to approve the necessary visas. Yet, this refusal in itself 
functioned as a pretext for launching anti-imperialist propaganda in Germany. For example, Die 
Rote Fahne stated that the MacDonald government’s decision to refuse a delegation of the LAI to 
visit India illustrated the suppression of the Indian liberation struggle.964 
      The responses from the PCF and the CPGB on “the re-organisation project” turned into a farce. 
In April, Smeral wanted to visit the PCF Secretariat in Paris to see whether the party had initiated 
any discussion.965 However, he chose to remain in Berlin. In May, the International Secretariat 
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informed the WEB that Smeral could leave for Paris at any given moment to pressure the PCF. The 
WEB decided to assume control over the question, and sent “the re-organisation project” letter for 
a third time to Cormon at the PCF. Cormon was acting temporarily as the leader of colonial work 
in Paris after Doriot’s arrest and imprisonment. As it turned out, Cormon never replied to this 
letter, either to the International Secretariat or to the WEB. The situation reached such a critical 
point that Smeral had no other option than to contact Magyar on 4 June. According to Smeral, the 
PCF’s indifference, not even bothering to acknowledge receipt of the letter, was nothing short of 
shameful, a behaviour which made it “very difficult” to re-organise the LAI. With Doriot now out 
of prison, he was able to meet Smeral in Berlin in June, and tried to explain that any letters from 
the LAI or the WEB were no longer to be found at the PCF Secretariat in Paris. Despite Smeral 
informing him of the repeated attempts to send “the re-organisation project”, Doriot stated that he 
knew nothing about the plan.966 Whether or not Doriot had deliberately concealed any knowledge 
of both the letters and the plan is unknown and, despite Cormon having discussed “every question 
on the colonial work” with Magyar in Moscow, the Political Commission nevertheless decided to 
give Doriot four months in which to compile an extensive report on the French LAI Section and 
the anti-imperialist movement in France.967 
      The Central Committee of the CPGB realised it would be easier to respond during the Fifth 
International Profintern Congress in Moscow.968 In May, the WEB sent a draft of “the re-
organisation project” to Arnot in London, who told Smeral that it would “be very useful in giving 
an impetus to the work”. The International Secretariat sent the final version to the Central 
Committee of the CPGB in June.969 While waiting to proceed with the re-organisation of the LAI, 
Münzenberg and Smeral decided to gather intelligence on the colonial work being done by other 
European communist parties, with a focus on their relations to the LAI. This depended on having 
the opportunity to first identify and then locate the sources of information. Thus, the most 
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constructive solution, according to the International Secretariat in a request to the Eastern 
Secretariat, was to send Smeral as an LAI delegate to the Fifth International Profintern Congress in 
Moscow (15 – 30 August, 1930). In Moscow, Smeral could both approach and hold informal 
negotiations with a selection of delegates on the re-organisation of the LAI.970 On 23 June, Magyar 
presented this idea to the Political Commission, which decided that it would be convenient “to 
invite” Smeral to the congress in order to give him a chance to meet “specific delegations” and to 
discuss the LAI.971 
 
* 
 
The Trial 
 
The League question is not a question about the so-called representation, it is a question for 
the Comrades there [Moscow] to make use of existing possibilities to develop the League.    
Münzenberg to Smeral, 22/8-1930 
 
The League was established during the “second period” as a united front, with the intention 
of playing a progressive role between the national bourgeoisie in the colonies and the 
international revolutionary labour movement. […] The misfortune of the League was that it 
started during, and is connected to, the second period, when this period was coming to an 
end.  
Smeral to the Political Commission, 
Moscow, 13/9-1930 
 
Smeral left Berlin in July. Before arriving in Moscow in August, Smeral visited Prague to hold a 
couple of meetings with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) 
to supervise and organise the Friends of the Soviet Union section and to give a public speech on 
the Five-Year-Plan system in the Soviet Union. For the Profintern, the Fifth International Congress 
in Moscow in August 1931 confirmed its definitive and official break with the “reformist” trade 
union movement, focusing instead on increasing its independence as a “revolutionary trade union 
opposition”. Edward Hallet Carr wrote in his study of the Comintern that Smeral “unexpectedly 
spoke as a delegate” of the LAI at the congress, where he declared that the organisation was “no 
longer ‘a fighting alliance between the national bourgeoisie of colonial countries and the masses of 
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the international proletariat’, but ‘a united revolutionary mass organisation’”.972 While Carr 
interpreted Smeral’s appearance as an unexpected performance, Smeral’s presence at the congress 
was crucial as he was gathering intelligence on the LAI from the delegates; information Smeral 
needed to accumulate in order to, primarily, study how the communist movement perceived the 
LAI, and secondly, to write and present a report to the Political Commission detailing both why it 
was essential to re-organise the LAI and how it would be possible to accomplish such an 
undertaking. This was the LAI’s trial. Smeral’s role in this drama resembled the role of a defence 
lawyer. For Smeral, this required the holding of closed meetings and the organising of a smaller 
conference with some of the delegates. After these sessions, Smeral summarised (in most cases) 
his observations in reports, documents which functioned as the primary sources in completing his 
analysis of the LAI.973 The general aim of Smeral’s visit was to get the decision-makers at 
Comintern headquarters, the Political Commission in particular, to formulate some kind of opinion 
on the LAI. Thus, the reference to a trial likened Smeral’s challenge to a defence of the LAI, 
introducing a constructive solution to the question at stake and, finally, convincing the Political 
Commission of the LAI’s potential utilisation in the context of the international communist 
movement. What did this process unveil? How did the decision-makers react to Smeral’s analysis, 
and what was the result of the trial? 
      Smeral’s activity in Moscow cannot be compared to how Arnot evaluated the colonial work in 
1929. Nonetheless, one cannot refute that Smeral had similar ambitions. By this I mean that by 
inviting delegates known to have an opinion on colonial work, Smeral succeeded – where earlier 
efforts had failed – in organising a “colonial conference”. According to an invitation to some of the 
delegates at the Profintern congress, Smeral expressed the desire to hold a joint discussion on an 
issue which focused on what kind of “relations” the communist parties had to the LAI, to colonial 
work in general, and whether there existed any understanding on the colonial question. On this 
occasion, Smeral wanted to hear suggestions on necessary measures for the “strengthening or 
eventual establishment … of the non-party mass organisation [LAI]” in their home countries. This 
invitation was a document signed by both the International Secretariat [Smeral] and the Profintern 
Colonial Department, and was endorsed by the Profintern Presidium on 14 August. This invitation 
                                               
972 For Smeral’s activities prior to the Profintern Congress, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 16-19, (Streng vertraulich)  
Report from Smeral, Berlin, to “Liebe Freunde” (Magyar), Moscow, 5/7-1930. E. H. Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, 
Pantheon Books, New York, 1982, p.385. Carr’s reference to Smeral’s “unexpected” appearance, taken from Protokoll 
des V Kongresses der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale (1930). Smeral’s manuscript is filed in fol. RGASPI 
534/1/143. 538 delegates from 60 countries attended the congress, which ended with a “pompous” celebration outside 
the Trade Union building in Moscow, see Tosstorff 2004, pp.670-671; Ny Dag, “RFI-kongressens avslutning”, 2/9-
1930, 1, 8 (in English: “The Completion of the RILU Congress”). 
973 The documents in fond 542/1/42 consist of reports or transcripts of Smeral’s meetings with delegates from the  
CPGB, the CP Austria, the CPUSA, the CP Bulgaria, the CP Hungary, the CP Greece, the CP Indonesia (Darsono), the 
CP Canada, Latin America, Arab region, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. 
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also disclosed how the LAI, Profintern and the Comintern had categorised the anti-imperialist 
movement on a global scale, a movement that had an active representation in eight operative parts 
(“a – h”):  
a. England, Ireland, France, Germany 
b. USA and Canada  
c. “small European states with legal possibilities” (Belgium, Denmark, Holland, 
Sweden, Norway, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain and 
Greece)  
d. “small European states with openly Fascist regimes” (the Balkans, the Baltic 
states, Poland, Hungary, Italy) 
e. Latin America 
f. India, China, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Australia  
g. Arab region (Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and South Africa [!])  
h. the “Negro situation”.974 
 
* 
 
The “Colonial Conference” at the Hotel Lux 
Smeral had to co-ordinate the investigation on different hierarchical levels within the Comintern 
structure. Once the Political Commission had approved Smeral’s appearance at the Profintern 
congress in Moscow as the LAI representative, the Eastern Secretariat assumed responsibility over 
the project and worked out the details together with Smeral. This involved a discussion with 
Lozovsky, and with the leader of the Profintern Eastern Department (Ostabteilung), Lev N. Geller 
(known pseudonym: Leo Heller; 1887 –?). Their primary aim was to reach an agreement on who 
to invite from the “non-colonial” delegations to meet Smeral, and secondly, the investigation 
should not cause any “disturbances” at the congress. The final step for the Eastern Secretariat was 
to notify a range of actors at Comintern headquarters, e.g. Molotov, Manuilsky, Kuusinen, 
Piatnitsky, Mif, Saffarov, Wassiljew, Magyar, Lozovsky, Heller and delegates from the communist 
parties, of Smeral’s intention to gather intelligence on the LAI during the congress in Moscow.975 
      Smeral used the Hotel Lux (“Zimmer Nr.12”) as the base for his investigation. In the privacy 
of his own room, Smeral met and interviewed representatives, later summarizing his observations 
and impressions in written statements. Smeral realised that it was not sufficient to only have 
private and separate sessions, a conference was also needed. By inviting delegates from Italy, 
Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Greece and 
Spain to attend a “colonial conference” at the Hotel Lux, at “1 pm in Room 37” on 1 September, 
                                               
974 RGASPI 542/1/42, 2-4, An alle Delegationen des Profinternkongresses, signed: Die Koloniale Abteilung der  
Profintern & Internationales Sekretariat der “Liga gegen Imperialismus“ [Smeral], Moscow, 14/8-1930. 
975 RGASPI 542/1/42, 1, Letter from Smeral, Moscow, to the Profintern Presidium, Moscow, 17/8-1930; RGASPI  
542/1/42, 5, Information from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, [August 1930]. Lev N. Geller became a victim of the 
purges during the Great Terror; see Tosstorff, 2004, p.731. 
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Smeral hoped that this would be enough to achieve a thorough understanding of the issues at 
stake.976 The “Einladung” (Invitation) explained that the “colonial conference” was scheduled to 
last about one hour and would focus on assessing and determining “tangible [and] practical 
propositions” on the LAI. At the conference, the delegates were also asked to hand over reports to 
Smeral, along with the promise to either increase or establish contacts with the International 
Secretariat in Berlin.977 
      What did these meetings and reports reveal to Smeral, and what was the attitude towards the 
LAI among the delegates? Smeral heard that the delegates’ general understanding of the LAI was 
that it was a failure, with some of the delegates also taking the opportunity to criticize themselves 
for the incapacity of the communist parties to carry out any colonial work. Smeral gathered 
information (based on his personal meetings) from the CPGB (Pollitt, William Rust), the CPUSA 
(Earl Browder), the Communist Party of Indonesia (Darsono), on Latin America (Charles Gamba, 
and Gibarti), the Middle East (Mustafa Saadi from Palestine), Austria (Karl Toman, Goriktschoner 
[?]) and on Hungary from an unknown delegate. These reports indicate how the causality of 
internal factors (the strategy of the Comintern, structural disruptions and a lack of organisational 
coherency) as well as external factors (ideological confusion, mistrust and repression) explained 
why the LAI had not become an international mass organisation. 
      Pollitt and Rust were critical towards the “utopian and … unrealistic” ideas the Eastern 
Secretariat had introduced in its “re-organisation project”. Taking into account the experiences and 
results of the colonial work in Great Britain, the CPGB considered it to be a difficult duty to 
formulate a coherent plan of action for the British LAI Section, despite the fact that the matter was 
under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Commission of the CPGB. According to Pollitt and Rust, 
Bridgeman was the sore point, despite him having a very influential position within the section. 
The CPGB preferred to see reliable, communist functionaries such as Arnot, Rathbone and Percy 
Glading leading the section. Nevertheless, “the most important figure” for the LAI in Great Britain 
was Clemens Dutt, and his relation to his brother Rajani Palme Dutt, the “specialist on the Indian 
question”. Pollitt and Rust concluded that despite the reliability of the above candidates, this was 
not enough to solve the frustration within the section. For example, the frequent complaints from 
                                               
976 Any protocol from this so-called “colonial conference” has not been found. 
977 The top strata in the Comintern apparatus received the “Einladung”. Some of the documents, e.g. the undated  
reports from the Rumanian, Greek and Hungarian delegations came from the “colonial conference”. Furthermore, 
Smeral was unable to bring “proper working material” from Berlin, thus, Smeral told the Political Commission that 
the investigation in Moscow depended on getting access to as much empirical material as possible in Moscow in order 
to analyse the LAI properly. The Political Commission granted Smeral an additional ten days to complete his report, 
see fol. RGASPI 542/1/42, 6, Einladung, Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, undated [August 1930]; RGASPI 495/4/49, 1-
2, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.79 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 3/9-1930. Present at the 
meeting were Manuilsky, Heckert, Sokolik, Wassiljew, Zirul, Gerisch, Smeral, Lozovsky, Francon, Monmousseau, 
Ferrat, Stepanov, Magyar and Bela Kun. 
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“colonial comrades” on the direction and political work in the section caused confusion, yet the 
CPGB chose to “ignore” these “comrades”.978 
      The USA LAI Section was in a terrible situation, Browder stated, resulting primarily from 
Lovestone’s fractional struggle in 1929. Hence, this episode had produced a permanent, 
ideological imprint, creating a political space for “fascist agents” within the anti-imperialist 
movement. According to Browder, Baldwin’s prominence and his eager support of Lovestone had 
“paralysed” the section. In fact, Browder argued that the USA LAI Section had been “liquidated” 
after the Frankfurt Congress, leaving in its wake “only a very weak central organisation”. 
Browder’s criticism conveyed the idea that the issue involved more than just the present LAI 
crisis. Thus, this meeting offered Browder a chance to declare that in the CPUSA it was “ein 
Kampf zwischen uns und den Rechten” (a struggle between us and the Right) on the colonial 
question. The central question was to ensure that the CPUSA did not deviate from “the struggle of 
the Leftist” against the “Rightist”, with Browder promising to continue to push the party “strongly 
to the Left”. A suitable example of this was the Indian liberation movement in the USA, a 
movement, according to Browder, overcrowded with “Gandhist” followers whom Lovestone and 
Baldwin controlled. However, the CPUSA had been unable to respond due to the perilous state of 
its organisational structure, Browder concluded, conceding that in order to develop a strong 
communist movement in the USA, a new set of organisational conditions was required. In 
comparison to Europe, Browder expressed his envy of the fact that the European parties had access 
to an institutional actor such as the WEB. If the CPUSA had a similar actor at its disposal, it would 
improve the “unstable and complex” administrative and ideological work on the Latin American 
continent.979 
      The report on Latin America corroborated the LAI crisis on the American continents (North, 
Central and South America). After Smeral had met Charles Gamba at the congress, and prior to 
leaving Berlin in July, having consulted Gibarti, Smeral’s report outlined the fragile outlook for the 
LAI in Latin America. Firstly, the IRH (referred to as the International Labour Defense [ILD] in 
the USA and Latin America) had taken over the activities of the LAI in Mexico. Secondly, Julio A. 
Mella’s murder in 1929 was the event which had most destroyed the LAI’s tentative attempts to 
establish itself, particularly in Mexico. Thus, Gamba and Gibarti believed that in order to resurrect 
the activities of the LAI in Latin America, an organisational and ideological re-constitution of the 
                                               
978 RGASPI 542/1/42, 12-14, Besprechung mit den Vertretern der englischen Partei, Pollitt and Rust, über die Liga- 
Fragen, Smeral, report completed in Moscow, 18/8-1930. Smeral met Pollitt and Rust on 11 August in “X” [Moscow]. 
979 RGASPI 542/1/42, 42-47, Besprechung über Liga-Arbeit in den Vereinigten Staaten, Earl Browder to Smeral,  
Moscow, [August 1930]. Bill [William F.] Dunne told Smeral to contact Ford if he wanted any information on “the 
Anti-Imperialist work in the Revolutionary trade unions” in the USA, see RGASPI 542/1/37, 99, Short note from Bill 
Dunne, Moscow, to Smeral, Moscow, 29/8-1930. 
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LAI was required, solely for the reason of attracting the anti-imperialist movement in the Americas 
(North and Latin America), although this would also call for a decentralisation of the decision-
making process. This referred explicitly to finding a solution to its structural constraints, 
particularly the fact that both the USA LAI Section and the Latin American anti-imperialist 
movement had New York as their operative centre. One of the major reasons for having located the 
centre in New York was that not “one instructor” lasted longer “than a month … [in the] small 
[Latin American] countries”, hence, it had seemed to be impossible to establish a functional centre 
in any of the Latin American countries. This had been a poor solution, Gibarti argued, explaining 
that New York was neither a practical location nor an ideological answer to the demands of the 
movement in Latin America. More importantly, the ordinary Latin American worker neither 
understood nor grasped the fundamental implications of the directives issuing from New York. The 
central question was, therefore, how to resuscitate the Latin American work. In comparison to 
Browder’s appraisal of the WEB, Gamba and Gibarti wanted to involve the International 
Secretariat more closely in their work assisting the activities of the LAI in Latin America.980 
      The reports on the Arab countries and Indonesia showed that the activity of the LAI defined 
itself by external factors. According to Mustafa Saadi from Palestine, the LAI had barely 
“survived” after being subjected to a vigorous surveillance by colonial authorities. In order to 
circumvent this surveillance and thereby solve the dilemma, Saadi hoped that the re-organisation 
would enable the LAI to pose as “another type of anti-imperialist organisation” in the Middle East. 
This involved above all else establishing “independent associations” in countries under the control 
of “the imperialist nations”, able to “exploit the differences” that existed in the bilateral relations 
of the French, British and Italian mandate powers. Thus, this shift in focus would increase the 
possibility of getting “leftist nationalists, intellectuals and semi-proletarians” to join the movement 
which, in turn, could convert these elements to the service of the communists.981 
      The anti-imperialist movement in Indonesia was defined by the repression of the Dutch 
colonial mandate. According to Raden Darsono, the “intensification of the persecution” had 
culminated in the adoption of a law in 1930 prohibiting “any connection with international 
organisations”, a decree which had forced the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) to retreat into 
submission and become “very weak”, with restricted contact to the peasants’ and workers’ 
movements. Furthermore, the isolation of the communist movement more or less confirmed itself 
with the establishment of a “united front against communism” in 1930 which joined together 
                                               
980 RGASPI 542/1/42, 32-34, Report on the League work in Latin America [Gamba & Gibarti], Smeral, Moscow,  
21/8-1930. For Charles Gamba, see Philip Deery, “Malaya, 1948: Britain’s Asian Cold War?”, in Journal of Cold War 
Studies, Vol.9, No.1, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp.29-54. 
981 RGASPI 542/1/42, 39, Besprechung mit Saadi (Arabischer Genosse aus Palästina), Smeral, Moscow, 20/8-1930. 
385 
 
“imperialists, nationalists and social democrats” and included rhetoric portraying the LAI as “an 
instrument of Moscow”. For Darsono, the central issue was that there existed no direct 
communication links from Indonesia to the International Secretariat in Berlin. Darsono told 
Smeral to consider the idea of organising “roundabout” communications by instructing 
“trustworthy Indonesians” in Europe, preferably students or members of the PI, to act as couriers 
from Europe to Indonesia. However, if Smeral or the Comintern did not approve, Darsono 
suggested using the IRH’s network, a functional channel through which to send illegal propaganda 
to Indonesia via the services of colonial sailors who, on a regular basis, docked in Antwerp, 
Amsterdam and Hamburg. However, after his meeting with Darsono, Smeral questioned whether 
Darsono could be trusted, stating in a conclusive remark that “Darsono is not a man of mass 
work”. Why was Smeral suspicious towards Darsono? According to Smeral, Darsono was a 
journalist, something that made him “act in an undisciplined manner” by fraternising with the 
“middle leaves” of the Indonesian nationalist movement, rather than with the communists.982 
      Karl Toman and Goriktschoner told Smeral that “one can do anything in Austria”, while in 
Hungary, the LAI had to connect the anti-imperialist movement with the work of “cultural 
organisations” controlled by the communists. Apparently, the anti-imperialist movement in Austria 
and Hungary shared the stigma of having neither a solid structure nor any reliable contacts, while 
the low level of academia on the colonial question within the communist movement required 
education on the theoretical implications of anti-imperialism. Toman and Goriktschoner 
nevertheless admitted that the Balkan nationalist revolutionary movement in Vienna was a vibrant 
element, which also had reliable connections to Berlin. For the LAI, this was a movement that 
deserved more attention as it would offer a passage into the Balkan countries. If the International 
Secretariat wanted to establish contact with Balkan nationalist revolutionaries and associations, 
e.g. the editor of the communist-biased journal Balkanförderation Dimitrije Vlachoff, or the leader 
of the Albanian Committee for the Liberation of Kosovo Fan Noli, who had also attended the 
Frankfurt Congress and was known to travel on regular basis between Vienna and Berlin, they had 
to let the Communist Party of Austria know about it. Smeral also received information on a third 
candidate, the Serb nationalist Mustafa Golubitsch, a member of the Black Hand (Schwarze 
Hand), the organisation which had, as highlighted by Toman and Goriktschoner, arranged the 
“Sarajevo assassination in 1914”.983 Aside from this reference to Golubitsch, Vlachoff and Fan 
Noli were, however, not new faces to the LAI. 
                                               
982 RGASPI 542/1/42, 22-25, Besprechung mit Darsono, Indonesia, report completed by Smeral, Moscow, 20/8-1930. 
983 RGASPI 542/1/42, 10-11, Besprechung über Liga-Arbeit in Österreich (Toman and Goriktschoner), Smeral, August 
1930. Karl Toman (1887 – 1945) was a leading person in the Austrian communist movement, in charge of relations 
between the trade unions and the CP of Austria, see Lazitch 1986, p.473. The identity of Goriktschoner is unknown. 
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      In 1928, the Berlin Chief of Police began to investigate the original source of the Balkan 
communist propaganda being disseminated from Vienna, suspecting that Berlin was the original 
place of distribution. Despite the fact that Vienna was functioning as the centre and rallying point 
for Balkan nationalist activism during the inter-war years, it was not the only hub linking together 
the activities of the Balkan revolutionary movement. The Balkanförderation was using Berlin as 
its centre of activity, from where Vlachoff and Fan Noli were organising their operations, an 
arrangement which came to fruition during Fan Noli’s visit to Moscow in 1928, at least according 
to the suspicions of the Berlin Chief of Police.984 The establishment of the association Bund Freier 
Balkan in 1929 was the result of an increasing presence of Balkan nationalist revolutionaries in 
Berlin. The Bund Freier Balkan engaged a string of well-known left-wing characters: Erwin 
Piscator, Ledebour, the Danish author Karin Michaelis, Barbusse, Sinclair, bishop Montgomery 
Brown, the author Maxim Gorki and Münzenberg. However, the Berlin Chief of Police could not 
verify whether the LAI, the Balkanförderation and the Bund Freier Balkan had established any 
connection, deciding to leave the question open for further investigation.985 In fact, the first and 
tentative step to establish relations between the LAI and the Balkanförderation was initiated on 15 
April 1930, when Vlachoff wondered whether Chatto could write an article on India for inclusion 
in the newspaper Balkanförderation. In conclusion, the contact between the International 
Secretariat and the Balkanförderation had been an arrangement co-ordinated by Helmut/Dimitrov 
of the WEB.986 
      While summarising his observations from the meetings, Smeral realised that the LAI and its 
International Secretariat was caught in a deadlock. And, on an even more serious note, Smeral 
recognised that not a single delegate had approved of the LAI’s political guiding principle: to focus 
the LAI on workers’ and peasants’ associations, parties and movements in colonial and semi-
colonial countries. On the contrary, the reports disclosed that the LAI had to strengthen its ties to 
                                                                                                                                                          
For the Hungarian report, see RGASPI 542/1/42, 19-20, Report on the League work in Hungary, completed 4/9-1930, 
author: Smeral. 
984 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20697, 429, Notiz [Polizeipräsident], Berlin, 1928. According to the Berlin Chief of  
Police in a report on Fan Noli, dated 28 March 1928, Noli’s birthplace was Ibrik Tepe in Albania, 1 January 1882, see 
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20697, 431-433, Abteilung IA, Kriminal-Kommissar, Polizeipräsident, Berlin, 28/3-1928. 
For Fan Noli’s participation at the Frankfurt Congress, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 25. Michael Schmidt-Neke, 
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Balkan” and “Die Balkanförderation”, Goehrke, Berlin, to the Minister of the Interior, Berlin, 21/4-1932. 
986 RGASPI 539/2/432, 15-17, Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale  
Unabhängigkeit, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R 8051/82/8, 718-724, Handwritten notes, Willi Budich, 
Berlin, 1-2/6-1931. For Dimitrov and the Balkanförderation, see Hans-Joachim Bernhard, Georgi Dimitroff, Urania-
Verlag, Leipzig, 1982, p.145. Nissan Oren’s somewhat dated, yet still discerning analysis of the attempts of the 
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revolutionary trade unions, establish functional sections or support existing ones in order to make 
them capable of responding to a repressive societal milieu (Indonesia and the Middle East), while 
some delegates already considered the LAI to be disbanded and had used Smeral merely as a 
vehicle to air their discontent and political conviction. 
 
* 
 
The Hearing 
Münzenberg followed Smeral’s progress from a distance in Berlin. Showing a great interest in how 
Smeral had managed to collect a number of different opinions on the LAI, Münzenberg was 
nevertheless “amazed and surprised” upon hearing of the criticisms levelled against the LAI. 
Münzenberg wrote to Smeral, urging him to contact Kuusinen and Magyar for the sole reason of 
preventing any negative comments further up in the hierarchy before introducing the report to the 
Political Commission. Most importantly, Smeral had to get them to ensure that the Comintern 
intended to continue to support the LAI financially.987 On 13 September, Smeral was scheduled to 
give his report, an analysis aimed to influence the Political Secretariat’s final decision on the future 
ideological and organisational direction of the LAI. Smeral’s report, “Bericht des Gen. Smeral 
über die Lage der ‘Liga gegen Imperialismus’” (Report of Com. Smeral on the Situation in the 
‘League against Imperialism’), was both an account and an interpretation of how one of the 
involved actors in the LAI was experiencing not only the crisis, but also the organisation in 
general. For Smeral, the question at stake, aside from presenting his individual opinion, was to 
delineate a strategy which the Comintern could take into account when re-organising the LAI, 
rather than merely suggesting its dissolution as the only answer. Moreover, Smeral hoped that his 
report would highlight the difficulties encountered by the contradictory historical tendencies 
within the Comintern, especially its policy changes and how these had affected a sympathising 
communist organisation like the LAI. 
      Smeral introduced his analysis by describing how he had felt isolated at the International 
Secretariat after arriving in Berlin in November 1929. However, the Political Commission had to 
understand, above all, that the aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress, and the LAI’s ensuing crisis, 
had strengthened relations between the individuals at the International Secretariat: 
I must first of all say that for such an important meeting for the League, the other two 
secretaries of the League, Comrades Münzenberg and Chatto, should have been invited. […] 
we as secretaries and as a group, a collective, since I started in Berlin, I did not understand 
                                               
987 RGASPI 542/1/37, 98, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Smeral, Moscow, 22/8-1930. 
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that the League question is seen in this scope, and I have never discussed the question with 
them [Münzenberg, Chatto] on this level.988  
“The collective leadership” at the International Secretariat is what had kept the LAI together, 
Smeral argued, wondering how the “League question” and its “scope” could differ so much in 
Berlin in comparison to the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters. From Smeral’s point of 
view, the LAI and its “scope” was focused on its instrumental role within the international 
communist movement during “the third period”. Unfortunately though for the LAI, the 
inauguration of the organisation had coincided with the peak of the “second period” [the united 
front], upon which Smeral conceded that it was not logical and “wrong to apply the policy [the 
third period] of today to the former”. This was the essential dilemma that the LAI had to confront. 
“The scope” also explained the misfortunes which had befallen the LAI since 1928, especially the 
chaos of the Frankfurt Congress, Smeral argued. The latter had been an event, organised with the 
ambition to demonstrate a united front against colonialism and imperialism, where the organisers 
(the International Secretariat) seemed to have missed the fact that the “second period already was 
over”. Caught in the void between the second and third periods, the very idea of turning the 
organisation into “a progressive” political actor had been thrown into question, Smeral argued. 
Indicative of the above was the conclusion that the Comintern no longer endorsed the idea of 
getting the LAI to connect the “national bourgeoisie elements” in the colonies with the 
“prominente Persönlichkeiten” in Europe, especially the left-wing movement in Europe (socialists, 
social democrats, pacifists and trade unions). However, Smeral believed that the Comintern would 
have recognised the LAI as “a success” if more “work during the ‘second term’” had been carried 
out.989 This statement merely confirmed Smeral’s perception of the contradictory nature of the 
relations between the LAI and the Comintern since the LAI’s inception in 1927. 
      Which solutions did Smeral recommend in order to re-organise and keep the LAI alive? In 
Moscow, Smeral had re-assessed the Eastern Secretariat’s “re-organisation project”, focusing on 
the deleted passage which had been included in the draft version. According to Smeral, the 
question the Comintern needed to ask itself was whether the LAI was the only sympathising 
organisation within the Comintern’s network of auxiliary organisations capable of both distributing 
Bolshevik propaganda on a global scale and establishing contacts in the colonial and semi-colonial 
countries. If the LAI was given the chance to develop its organisation and activities, it had every 
                                               
988 Smeral finished his report on 8 September, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/52, 12-42, Bericht des Gen. Smeral über die  
Lage der “Liga gegen den Imperialismus”. Für die Sitzung der Politkommission, Moscow, 13/9-1930. Two different 
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chance of becoming “a serious organisation […] to fulfil the important task” of establishing and 
supporting a safe channel for the communist movement to the colonies. This required that the 
decision-makers ignore the ideological guiding principle included in “the re-organisation project”: 
to transform the LAI into a connective point for the colonial workers’ and peasants’ movements. 
Hence, in order to get the LAI to assist in “the struggle [to achieve] world revolution”, the answer 
was to be found in a more pragmatic approach, Smeral concluded. The question was how. Smeral 
had taken notice of the LAI and its political discourse, suggesting a focus on the “liberation 
struggle in the colonial and dependent countries”, “the revolutionary class struggle of the 
proletariat” and the defence of the “building of socialism in the USSR”. Yet, while this appeared to 
be merely a repetition of “class against class”, what Smeral strove to achieve was to get the LAI 
functional again. Thus, Smeral told the Political Commission that this would require dividing the 
LAI into two halves, with one covert and one overt side. This organisational restructuring would 
also enable the Comintern to more closely define its control over the LAI and its International 
Secretariat and, therefore, save the organisation from dissolving. The re-organisation of the LAI 
had to abide by the following principle, Smeral stated: 
In almost all the colonies and dependent countries, the social structure of the population […] 
represents a very important part of the active revolutionary movement. […] In this situation, 
the work, the means and the apparatus of the Comintern have to be more devoted than 
before. […] Certain reasons (increased and improved connections, political reasons) suggest 
that this work has to be done outside the USSR. This work should be done by the LAI, in 
part, as a relief [organisation; author’s remark and italics], partly as a cover [author’s italics] 
of the Comintern. […] Although the LAI would retain full independence on the outside, in 
fact they would be less independent than before. As an auxiliary organ, acting as a cover, it 
would be connected with the Comintern much more than until now.990    
The principle implied the definitive submission of the LAI and its International Secretariat to the 
Comintern, however, the crux of the matter was that, in 1930, the LAI had very few and fragile 
connections in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Smeral was aware of this dilemma, urging 
the Comintern to understand the necessity of contributing with active support. Particularly as the 
aftermath of the Frankfurt congress had more or less obliterated the LAI’s network to the colonies, 
an event which had “burnt these bridges” observed Smeral. This had prevented the LAI from 
introducing itself as a political actor opposing imperialism. According to Smeral, the option of 
posing as a relief organisation could solve the problem, but only if the Comintern decided to make 
the organisation operative again, but how? Firstly, the International Secretariat had to be certain 
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that the monthly endorsement from the Comintern would arrive, and secondly, that instructors 
from Moscow visited the Berlin bureau to give political directives and assist in the practical work. 
Smeral stated that if the decision-makers chose to endorse this vision, the LAI would do its utmost 
to fulfil its aim of laying a foundation for the communist movement in the colonial world.991 The 
question was under what kind of pretext. 
      The International Secretariat was a central factor in both explaining and solving the crisis. As 
the Frankfurt Congress had left the International Secretariat severed from its connections to anti-
colonial activists in Europe, and in order to reconstruct the LAI’s network, the working conditions 
at the bureau in Berlin had to be improved. According to Smeral, in the summer of 1930, the 
International Secretariat was suffering from a lack of personnel, money and people with the 
necessary linguistic skills (aside from Chatto). After his investigations in Moscow in August, 
Smeral had become convinced that the matter of solving the organisational and ideological 
confusion within the LAI lay entirely in the hands of the decision-makers at Comintern 
headquarters. Thus, this would realise the ambition of re-organising and transforming the LAI into 
two entities: to pose as a relief organisation, yet exist under the pretext of functioning as a cover 
for the Comintern for the sole purpose of finding reliable candidates who would be able to spread 
anti-imperialist and Bolshevik propaganda around the world. Having completed his report, the 
decision was “now in the hands” of the Political Secretariat, as noted by Smeral in a letter to 
Münzenberg after the session. Approached by the secretaries [unknown] of Magyar and 
Moskvin/Trilliser, Smeral was told that the Political Secretariat’s ambition was to solve the 
question of the LAI in “a constructive way”.992 
 
* 
 
Verdict and Repentance  
The members of the Political Secretariat assessed Smeral’s performance and report before handing 
down their verdict. This was the culmination of a process which had emerged both at the 1929 
Frankfurt Congress and, especially, in its aftermath. The Political Secretariat’s verdict aimed to 
present both an answer and a solution to the crisis. This depended, however, on whether the 
Political Secretariat was willing to consent to the idea of transforming the LAI into a relief 
organisation on the one hand, while at the same time functioning as a cover for the Comintern. On 
16 September, the Political Secretariat members (Magyar, Lozovsky, Manuilsky, Ford, Kuusinen 
and Chitarow) endorsed Smeral’s report and his recommendations to link the LAI more closely “to 
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the Comintern” as a cover organisation and re-introduce the LAI as an organisation, this time 
under the guise of “relief activities”. The Political Secretariat nonetheless observed that the present 
challenge was to prepare and circulate a credible “political programme” outside the communist 
movement, containing the message that the LAI was indeed an “independent non-party 
organisation”. According to the Political Secretariat, Manuilsky had to compose the LAI’s revised 
anti-imperialist agenda. The agenda Manuilsky had in mind was a political manifesto structured 
around the Bolshevik conception of building socialism. Manuilsky argued that the LAI should 
support the message of absolute national independence for the colonies, the dismissal of armed 
forces, the expropriation of large estates and their equal distribution among the peasants, the 
disbanding of “imperialist-owned enterprises” and total independence as well as the right to 
assembly for workers’ and peasants’ organisations in the colonies. The Political Secretariat also 
contributed with a more practical solution, concluding that the International Secretariat would 
receive regular transactions of money and instructors from Moscow to Berlin “to guide” the 
transformational process. This depended on resolving a few organisational questions. In relation to 
the LAI and the youth question, the Political Secretariat sanctioned the KIM to both nominate a 
youth secretary at the International Secretariat, and finance the individual in Berlin. Moreover, in 
order to present its revised political agenda, the International Secretariat had to re-launch the LAI’s 
theoretical organ The Anti-Imperialist Review in the “imperialist metropolises” London, Paris and 
New York. The most urgent issues to solve were the agreement of a monthly budget and to ensure 
that the LAI started collecting missing membership fees, particularly from the Russian 
AUCCSLU, money which the International Secretariat could use to finance the travel 
arrangements for its instructors in Europe. There was, however, a level of scepticism and concern 
expressed by the Political Secretariat, wondering whether the LAI would ever succeed in turning 
itself into an international mass organisation. The most fundamental problem the LAI had to 
confront was the hostility from former prominent LAI Executive members (Maxton, Fimmen, 
Nehru and Hatta). This would most likely contribute to making it difficult to realise the leap to 
becoming a mass organisation; however, the Political Secretariat conceded that the LAI had every 
chance of establishing itself in Latin America, China, India and in “some Negro areas” in Africa.993 
                                               
993 RGASPI 495/4/52, 7-9, Nach Anhören des Referates des Genossen Smeral, Political Secretariat, Moscow, 16/9- 
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      At first glance, the protocol from the Political Secretariat’s meeting on 16 September seems to 
indicate that it had just been a routine meeting at Comintern headquarters to discuss Smeral’s 
report. However, reaching a verdict on the LAI was not easy. The customary procedure at meetings 
at Comintern headquarters was to make no records and “no stenographic reports of the speeches”. 
Instead, a short summary was compiled and added to the protocol. According to the summary in 
the protocol of the meeting on 16 September, the Political Secretariat authorised the following 
regarding the LAI: 
The EAST L.S. [Ländersekretariat] is authorised to formulate, together with Comrade 
Smeral, the basic guidelines for strengthening the activities of the LAI in a few short points, 
so that these policies can serve as a basis for a concrete plan of [action for] the League. The 
EAST L.S. is to hand over these guidelines to the Political Commission for review.994 
Thus, according to this summary, a solution had been found to the problem. Smeral had also 
attended this 16 September meeting and compiled a summary (“Diskussion im Polsekretariat”), a 
document which illustrates just how much the members of the Political Secretariat had deliberated 
before giving their final verdict on the LAI. Why did Smeral write this summary? According to 
Smeral, the sole reason was to be able to tell Piatnitsky (unable to attend the meeting) what the 
Political Secretariat had discussed.995 What does this “Diskussion im Polsekretariat” disclose? 
Firstly, Smeral’s 13 September report had initiated an internal debate on how to solve the crisis 
within the LAI. Secondly, the Political Secretariat conceded that the International Secretariat in 
Berlin had not caused the crisis, far from it; the crisis was the result of internal factors originating 
in Moscow in 1929 during the preparatory work for the Frankfurt Congress. This was an 
observation which corresponded with Manuilsky’s conclusion at a Political Secretariat session in 
August 1930: “there are always excesses in the communist movement when sharp changes are 
made”.996 Smeral’s summary is, therefore, a crucial eyewitness account of a peculiar episode, 
detailing how Magyar, Lozovsky, Manuilsky, Ford, Kuusinen and Chitarow in fact resorted to 
using self-criticism as a way of explaining the anni confusionis of the LAI. In comparison to the 
protocol, Smeral’s summary show how several of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters 
felt it was a complicated course of action to adapt the LAI to the policy of “class against class”. 
This observation contradicts the general understanding of the Comintern as a rigid institution 
                                                                                                                                                          
adopted this new political direction, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/201, 395-404, Draft resolution for the Session of the 
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Struggle for Freedom”, in The Anti-Imperialist Review, Vol.1, September-October, 1931, No.1, International 
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author of “Protokoll Nr. 92”, see fol. RGASPI 495/155/90, 80. 
995 RGASPI 542/1/40, Briefe No.2, ”Fraktion der Liga”, Berlin, to ”Freunde” [Magyar], Moscow, 3/11-1930. 
996 Taken from Worley 2004, p.11 (for Manuilsky’s quote, extracted from the files of the CPGB [“Communist  
Archive”], see p.17, footnote 34). 
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merely adhering to strict doctrinal behaviour for the sole purpose of fulfilling its aim of 
establishing organisational coherency and control. For the LAI and its crisis, this 16 September 
Political Secretariat meeting was an opportunity for its members to reflect, regret and repent, 
without losing face. 
      Magyar did not appreciate how the LAI had progressed in 1930. Appearing as the sternest 
critic at the meeting, Magyar stated that it was “a duty” to tell the others that he had lost interest in 
and patience with the LAI. He was willing to give the LAI “one more chance” to become “a real 
mass organisation” but, should it fail once more, the organisation would have to be “liquidated”. 
Magyar’s statement opened up the discussion, and with everyone expected to give their opinion on 
the crisis, responses were received from Lozovsky, Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Chitarow and Ford. In 
Lozovsky’s opinion, it was “inadvisable” to liquidate the LAI, especially as the crisis had been a 
result of internal disputes. The firm belief amongst the decision-makers at Comintern 
headquarters, that the Frankfurt Congress had to be turned into a forum for discussing the 
revolutionary trade union movement, had been a serious mistake, Lozovsky argued. This serious 
mistake in relation to the trade union question had, in fact, destroyed any opportunity of using the 
LAI as a “legal weapon … to connect with colonial countries”, especially to send instructors from 
Europe to India, Africa and the USA. Lozovsky believed that responsibility for solving the crisis 
lay fairly and squarely in the hands of the Comintern. According to Manuilsky, liquidation was not 
a creative solution to the problem, as it would only force the Comintern to establish a section of 
the Eastern Secretariat in one of the colonial metropolises in Western Europe. This section would 
nevertheless fairly soon attract attention from leading antagonists such as the LSI and the national 
security services, Manuilsky stated. Kuusinen condemned Magyar’s sceptical attitude as not being 
particularly constructive. Kuusinen stated that if liquidation was the only option, the Comintern’s 
and Profintern’s “detour” of establishing “a new organ for the anti-imperialist” movement would 
consume time, energy and money. This continued as Chitarow admitted that the primary reason for 
letting the LAI continue its activity was that it represented one of the few auxiliary organisations 
which, “in a legal way”, could operate in a public setting. Thus, for the Comintern, the LAI offered 
a chance to influence social and political actors who would otherwise remain completely out of the 
reach of the communist movement.997 
      The central question was whether the members of the Political Secretariat could accept the fact 
that the Comintern had not properly supported the LAI since its inception in 1927. According to 
Lozovsky, the International Secretariat had received minimal assistance at every level 
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(administrative and financial); therefore, it was an illogical proposition to blame the LAI for the 
crisis, concluding, “we all have a share in the guilt”. Manuilsky did not agree, however, and 
despite the crisis being an “established fact”, there existed no clear solution to the LAI question. 
Kuusinen told everyone present at the meeting that they had to understand that the demands placed 
on the shoulders of the LAI and its International Secretariat had been too much to cope with. 
Appearing as the moderating force at the session, Kuusinen stated that the crisis was a result of the 
indifference amongst the communist parties and the revolutionary trade unions to support the LAI, 
which had resulted in the LAI retreating into a state of isolation. Kuusinen admitted quite frankly 
that the crisis had also emanated from the endorsed attitude by the Comintern: 
We thought they [the LAI] could be established as a mass organisation with large reformist 
trade unions, and we have criticised them for the fact that the work was not achieved quickly 
enough. Maybe that was possible 5 years ago. Since then, this has been impossible. In this 
matter, one cannot blame the lack of energy.998 
These reflections and this level of self-criticism were an indication of the Political Secretariat’s 
position on the LAI question and the crisis: that this was an issue entirely in the hands of the 
Comintern to solve. Kuusinen’s conclusive remark was the Political Secretariat’s verdict on 
Smeral’s analysis, which proposed the necessary transformation of the LAI: 
I tend to think thus that the League should not in fact formally be a joint body of the 
Comintern and Profintern for mass revolutionary agitation in the field of the anti-imperialist 
struggle. […] We will not publicly say that it is our institution. We must consciously [use it] 
as a united front instrument [to connect with] the petite bourgeoisie and workers elements 
not yet ripe but considered necessary for communism.999 
This verdict by the Political Secretariat provided both an answer and solution to the crisis. Most 
importantly, the verdict also authorised the LAI to retreat from the Comintern’s endorsed “new 
line” policy, and to return to its original purpose i.e. functioning as a united front. Thus, by 
returning to the role of acting as an “intermediary” for the Comintern, Kuusinen and the Political 
Secretariat wished that the LAI would still be able to secure elements “not yet ripe” for 
communism. Was this even a plausible proposition as the anni confusionis was coming to its end? 
 
* 
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Chapter 8. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back  
 
The LAI is an international organisation of the Comintern. […] The work of the League is 
similar to the work of the Comintern, whose actions usually run parallel with the League. 
Der Reichsminister des Innern.  
I A.2065/20.8, Berlin 20/8-1930 
 
The situation has worsened since the aid [money] granted to us by our other friends 
[Comintern] does not come regularly […] we are sitting here in an office and looking at each 
other, unable to do anything. […] We have not paid the rent, […] The anti-imperialist work 
of the International Secretariat can and should be extended, but the means to do so, 
especially if the union dues [AUCCSLU] are not paid, have to be found outside the current 
budget. Smeral left Moscow with the impression that all major colleagues (Manuilsky, 
Kuusinen, Lozovsky, Wassiljew, Chitarow and the Eastern Secretariat) were in agreement.   
The International Secretariat, Berlin, to 
the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 2/1-
1931 
 
The LAI crisis in 1930 led to the re-birth of the organisation.1000 With the Political Secretariat’s 
consent and its realisation that “class against class” was of no use to the LAI, the organisation 
returned to its united front strategy as a result of the crisis. The anni confusionis had shattered the 
LAI’s anti-imperialist agenda and structure, while the irresolute decisions from and the behaviour 
at Comintern headquarters had forced the organisation to make a detour from its original aim of 
acting as an intermediary between the anti-colonial movement and the international communist 
movement. Granted the right to return to its united front strategy, the LAI was able to take a big 
step forward. However, the LAI was in such a perilous state after the ordeals and repercussions of 
the Frankfurt Congress, that by 1930, the organisation had been pushed two steps backwards.1001 
As Smeral had emphasised in his report to the Political Commission, it was of the utmost 
importance to strengthen the ties between the International Secretariat and the Comintern, only 
then could the LAI resume its activity. Despite the acts of self-criticism from several of the 
members at the Political Secretariat in September, the outcome of Smeral’s investigation was the 
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transformation of the LAI into a relief organisation, whereas Kuusinen’s verdict had confirmed 
that the LAI was nothing more than a cover for the activities of the Comintern. Thus, the 
International Secretariat was facing an enormous challenge, involving adjustments to both internal 
and external factors. With the return to its united front strategy, this in turn attracted attention from 
the German national security services (the MdI and the Auswärtige Amt), institutional actors which 
decided to increase their vigilance in order to confirm the LAI’s communist ties and composition. 
Moreover, despite the Political Secretariat’s verdict, the anni confusionis had had a lasting effect 
on the International Secretariat. The crisis had left the International Secretariat with the 
momentous task of re-constructing the LAI in a German socio-political milieu in a highly volatile 
state, characterised by violent confrontations between the extreme Left (the communists) and the 
extreme Right (the NSDAP) on the streets in Berlin.1002 
      The aim of this chapter is to analyse how the International Secretariat adjusted and adapted 
itself to meet the demands and outcome of the crisis. While “class against class” had been the 
ideological principle during the anni confusionis (1929-30), a policy which had contributed 
immensely to destroying the LAI, by 1930 the organisation was an isolated and fragile structure. 
The following narrative covers the chronological period from October 1930 to December 1931. 
This period covers the re-birth of the LAI, although events and episodes occurring after the anni 
confusionis would continue to marginalise the LAI. Thus, this chapter has defined a number of 
thematic questions on which the International Secretariat focused in order to re-activate anti-
imperialist activism. 
 
This was the nadir of Münzenberg’s involvement in the LAI, as he was now focusing on other 
matters, particularly the commencement of preparations for the tenth anniversary of the IAH in 
1931.1003 The International Secretariat “kom.Fraktion” (Münzenberg, Smeral, Chatto and the 
Turkish communist and Comintern emissary Bekar Ferdi, see further below) concluded in October 
1930 that Münzenberg had to at least visit the International Secretariat two or three times per 
month.1004 Another serious question was the increased pressure on the LAI due to the collaboration 
between the British and German national security services. Towards the end of 1929, the British 
Metropolitan Police (Special Branch) in London had asked the German ambassador, van 
Scherpenberg, to assist the British “Passport Control Officer” in Berlin. The British Special 
                                               
1002 For the German context, see Hoppe (2007); Striefler (1993); Schlögel (1998). 
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Branch’s primary motive was to strengthen the “existing police liaison” in order to gain access to 
intelligence on the “visits of British communists to the KPD, the WEB and other Communist or 
semi-Communist centres in Berlin”, mentioning, for example, that the activities of Münzenberg, 
Chatto and the LAI were of particular interest. Van Scherpenberg passed on this proposal to the 
German Minister of the Interior (MdI), Albert Grzesinski, in Berlin, who instructed the officials at 
the department to increase their surveillance of the German communist movement both in Berlin 
and across the country.1005 In 1930, the MdI accelerated its pace in accumulating intelligence on 
the variety and character of the radical political scene in Germany. With reference to the 
communist movement in Berlin, the MdI particularly wanted to confirm the whereabouts of the 
increased number of foreign communists in the city. The MdI’s focus was also in line with the 
expressed requests of other governmental agencies in Berlin: to unmask the city as the “Bolshevik 
headquarters in Western Europe”. In this context, the LAI was referred to, as noted in an article in 
the Dutch newspaper Politik Economisch Weekblad (“Die deutsche Gefahr”, published on 9 July 
1930) as a vital actor co-ordinating the operations of the international communist movement in 
Berlin. Brückner, an official at the MdI, read the article and notified the Auswärtige Amt of the 
urgency in strengthening the surveillance of dubious organisations and associations in order to 
maintain “public order” in the Weimar capital.1006 One way of doing this was to limit the amount 
of public space available for political activism. On 13 August 1930, the Berlin District School 
Board, along with a school deputation, authorised a ban prohibiting “extremist political 
organisations” from using the school’s premises to hold meetings or other kinds of activities. This 
ban included the LAI, the Friends of the Soviet Union, the Association of Proletarian Writers’, the 
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IAH, the KIM and the IRH. It was also a decision which indicated a political leaning towards 
organisations linked to the Nazi movement.1007 
      The German authorities’ hostile attitude towards the communist movement contributed to 
turning the streets of Berlin into a political scene during the autumn and winter of 1930. This 
nevertheless suited the LAI’s return to its united front strategy. The International Secretariat, 
together with the German LAI Section and the Chinese Student Association (Klub Chinesischer 
Studenten), organised a public celebration at the Piscator-Bühne in honour of the memory of Sun-
Yat-sen, and held a demonstration in support of “Sowjetkanton-Sowjetchina!” at which both 
Münzenberg and Karl August Wittfogel delivered speeches. This was part of a larger Chinese 
campaign in Berlin, which reached its climax on 16 December at a public rally “in defence of the 
Soviet Union and Soviet China”. According to the real organiser of the campaign, the WEB, the 
main purpose of the demonstration had been to publish and distribute propaganda against the 
global “conspiracy to organise an intervention against the USSR”. The WEB chose to use the LAI 
as the most suitable cover behind which to organise public meetings and to act as the formal leader 
of the campaign. For the WEB, this campaign was an opportunity to assess whether the LAI could 
distribute propaganda against the “war threat against the Soviet Union” and “in the defence of the 
Soviet Union”, and whether it would create any positive reaction. The campaign also provided the 
LAI with a chance to distribute “League-signed leaflets” and to invite “if possible, non-
communist” speakers to declare their support for the LAI. Additionally, the campaign celebrated 
the joining of political forces between the IRH and the LAI, who declared their joint aim to assist 
each other as “relief organisations”.1008 
 
* 
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“dangerously towards an attitude of passive neutrality” towards the NSDAP during its challenge for power in the 
Weimar Republic in 1927-30, see His-Huey Liang, “The Berlin Police and the Weimar Republic”, in the  Journal of 
Contemporary History, Sage Publications, London, 1969:4, pp.169-170. 
1008 The meeting at Piscator Bühne began at “11.30 am”, at the same time as the demonstration at the Wallner-Theater,  
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 26, Die Rote Fahne, No.288, 10/12-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 27, Die 
Rote Fahne, No.290, 12/12-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 32, Die Welt am Abend, No.294, 17/12-1930; 
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 30, Short note, re. MOPR, December 1930. For the WEB and China, see fol. 
RGASPI 499/1/17, 238-239, Projekt des Protokolls über die Sitzung des Sekretariates der Liga gemeinsam mit dem 
Vertreter WW, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 20/11-1930; Steiner 2005, p.711. 
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The Return to a United Front  
 
The LAI is a broad, non-party organisation which aims to unite every fighting force against 
imperialism. The claim that the LAI is a Communist organisation, or a tool of party politics, 
is a deliberate falsehood which the imperialists spread in order to monitor the followers of 
the League. 
Inprecorr, “Gesunde Erscheinungen in 
der Liga gegen Imperialismus”, 28/11-
1930 
 
Correcting the errors of the past was easier said than done. The International Secretariat knew that 
the Comintern had given its consent to letting the LAI return to using the united front strategy as a 
means of strengthening the organisation. However, once Smeral had arrived from Moscow, the 
challenge was to re-introduce the conception of the LAI as a “broad, non-party organisation”. 
Smeral fairly quickly admitted that this would increase the pressure on the LAI, particularly as the 
Comintern also expected the organisation to pose as a relief organisation, while really acting as a 
cover for the Comintern. The International Secretariat nonetheless promised the ECCI that “the 
time has come” to act as the uncompromising, revolutionary non-party organisation Manuilsky had 
once envisioned.1009 This all depended, however, on the tripartite interactionism between the 
International Secretariat, the Eastern Secretariat and the WEB’s meticulous supervision in Berlin. 
      Improving relations between the International Secretariat and Comintern headquarters was 
primarily a question of assessing the capacity of administrative functions and the inclusion of 
individuals. In a similar way to Smeral’s appointment as LAI secretary after the Frankfurt 
Congress, the Political Commission instructed Bekar Ferdi to leave Moscow and travel to Berlin. 
Once in Berlin, Ferdi was to use the International Secretariat as the base for his operations in 
Europe. However, Ferdi’s connection to the LAI differed in one important aspect from Smeral’s, 
with Ferdi focusing entirely on covert missions as an LAI emissary in order to visit the LAI 
sections in Europe. What united the two of them was their relationship to the WEB. Magyar 
recommended that the Political Commission authorise the decision to send Ferdi to Berlin as a 
way of seeing through the transformation of the LAI. Before Ferdi departed from Moscow, 
Magyar held a private session with Piatnitsky and Kuusinen, at which the three men decided that 
Ferdi should visit and analyse the European LAI sections, deliver directives and send regular 
reports to the Eastern Secretariat on how the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement were 
                                               
1009 RGASPI 542/1/44, 95-96, (Confidential) Report from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow,  
October 1930. 
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progressing.1010 As noted in “Brief Nr. 1” [an insignia indicating the beginning of a new phase for 
the International Secretariat], Ferdi arrived in Berlin in October 1930. 
      These regular reports from the International Secretariat “kom.Fraktion” to the Eastern 
Secretariat were a crucial element in improving relations. Nevertheless, the “kom.Fraktion” argued 
that, despite the new confidence being invested in the LAI, the organisation’s few connections to 
the colonies was a “big embarrassment”. While Ferdi’s arrival had been a constructive solution by 
providing “useful assistance on the general political line” as well as his linguistic skills in the 
French language, the International Secretariat was by no means willing (or able) to pay Ferdi’s 
salary of 600 Marks per month. This was a confirmation of the incongruous relations between the 
International Secretariat and the Comintern, characterised by a continued lack of understanding of 
the actual situation in Berlin. Yet, the focal point of interest in the aftermath of the anni confusionis 
was to see whether the LAI could introduce a credible anti-imperialist agenda, which was expected 
to create a reaction across broad political layers. Thus, it was crucial for the International 
Secretariat to re-launch the LAI journal, The Anti-Imperialist Review, in order to circulate and use 
it as a means to outline the new agenda. This depended not only on knowing that the Comintern 
would give its “systematic support” but also on receiving support from the communist “solar 
system”, i.e. the Profintern, KIM, Krestintern, the national communist parties and the 
revolutionary trade unions. In this “Brief Nr.1”, the International Secretariat made a sketch of the 
potential geographical spread of the LAI, a concept which relied on the Eastern Secretariat’s 
endorsement: 
It is necessary to send a man working for the League to Africa (Negro areas) and one to the 
Arab region. As for India, you [the Eastern Secretariat] need to quickly identify the line for 
the local League work, since the last meeting with you it has not been clear what is to be 
done (opinion of Comrade Kuusinen). Perhaps it is necessary to have a man there too. The 
Chinese work can only be done by the party [CP China] and you.1011 
The principal consequence of the anni confusionis was the complete submission of the 
International Secretariat to the Comintern apparatus. Hence, in order to realise its return to the 
                                               
1010 RGASPI 495/4/48, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.78 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 28/9- 
1930. Present at the meeting were Heckert, Manuilsky, Piatnitsky, Zirul, Wassiljew, Gerisch, Magyar, Scholdack and 
Lenzner. For Kuusinen and Piatnitsky, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/3, 40-41, Protokoll Nr.12 der Sitzung der Politischen 
Kommission des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 21/10-1929. Ferdi’s covert missions in Europe from November 1928 till 
September 1932 are not mentioned in the “Chronology”, filed in Ferdi’s personal file in the Comintern Archive. One 
of Ferdi’s principal activities was to find communists of Turkish origin, evaluate the candidates and send them to 
Moscow for further education at the KUTV, see fol. RGASPI 495/266/38, 1, Chronology, Bekar Ferdi, Moscow, 
undated; RGASPI 495/4/14, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.42 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des EKKI, 13/2-1930. 
1011 The “Brief Nr. 1” was made out in three copies: the Eastern Secretariat, Münzenberg’s own copy and the last one  
“destroyed”. After the letter had arrived in Moscow, additional copies of the report were printed and distributed to the 
Political Commission, Meissner [?], Kitaigorodsky (KIM), and Lozovsky, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 26-37, Brief Nr. 
1, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 18/10-1930. 
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strategy of the united front, the International Secretariat had to begin by re-constructing its 
network in Berlin and beyond. 
     Symptomatic of the above, the International Secretariat held a number of closed conferences 
with several “Negro friends” in Berlin in October (see further below). However, the re-
introduction of the LAI depended primarily on accumulating intelligence and finding new and 
reliable connections as well as on deciding a tactic which countered imperialist policy, e.g. the pro-
colonial propaganda in Germany.1012 In his role as leader of the WEB, Helmut/Dimitrov informed 
Smeral that “soon a plan” from the ECCI, containing political and administrative directives from 
the Political Secretariat, will be given by the WEB to the International Secretariat.1013 The crisis 
had deepened the structural dependency of the International Secretariat on the Comintern at every 
level. For example, Smeral requested permission from Piatnitsky [“Michail”] to travel to Austria 
and Czechoslovakia, where he intended to act as a representative of the Friends of the Soviet 
Union and to “deliver a series of lectures on the Moscow process” against the wrecking of Soviet 
industry carried out by the subversive “Industrial Party”. However, this idea had been introduced 
by Münzenberg.1014 Piatnitsky had endorsed the idea but, once on location in Austria, Smeral’s 
mission quickly collapsed. In Vienna on 7 December, after Smeral had finished giving his lecture, 
the Austrian police arrested him and charged Smeral with advocating “communist subversive 
ideas”. Escorted to the Czechoslovakian border, Smeral was deported with immediate effect.1015 
      The anti-colonial community in Berlin experienced an increased pressure from the national 
security services in November-December 1930. Colonial residents, known to be attending public 
LAI meetings, were either being targeted by the RKÜöO or arrested on the spot by the 
Schutzpolizei. These actions made it difficult for the International Secretariat to convince colonial 
activists to publicly support the LAI: 
                                               
1012 The “kom.Fraktion” at the International Secretariat informed the Eastern Secretariat that the pro-colonial  
propaganda in Germany had a stronghold in “the Hansa cities” (Bremen and Hamburg). Hence, the LAI had to use 
these ports and the ships coming into these ports to distribute its anti-imperialist propaganda. With roughly 50 ships 
arriving into Hamburg harbour each day, the potential was enormous, the “kom.Fraktion” stated, see fol. RGASPI 
542/1/40, 56-61, Beilege Nr-2 Briefe Nr.1, Deutsche Kolonialpropaganda, International Sekretariat, Berlin, to the 
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, October, 1930. The appendix arrived in Moscow on 22 October. 
1013 RGASPI 542/1/37, 267, Auszug aus dem Prot. d. WEB, Nr.157, Berlin, to Ost-Ländersekretariat, Moscow, 26/11- 
1930. This extract is also filed in fol. RGASPI 499/1/17, 261. For Neptun/Ferguson’s note to Magyar, see fol. RGASPI 
542/1/37, 277, Auszug aus dem Prot. des WEB Nr.154, to, Magyar, Moscow, 20/11-1930. A copy of this note is filed 
in fol. RGASPI 499/1/17, 237. The WEB reported on the following travel routes for its members in November: 
Neptun/Ferguson (England and Ireland), Magnus/Gyptner (Sweden, Norway and Denmark), while Helmut/Dimitrov 
planned to meet the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Austria in Vienna, see fol. RGASPI 499/1/17, 262, 
Feststellung der Tätigkeit in der nächsten Woche, WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 27/11-1930. 
1014 RGASPI 495/19/312, 46fp/bp, (Original, handwritten) Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to “Michail”/Piatnitsky,  
Moscow, 3/12-1930. For the trial against the “Industrial Party”, see Acton & Stableford 2005, pp.343-344. 
1015 RGASPI 542/1/40, 133-137, Brief No.3, LAI, International Secretariat, Berlin, to, the Eastern Secretariat,  
Moscow, 22/12-1930; RGASPI 542/1/40, 139, Abschrift. Bundes-Polizeidirektion Wien, 7/12-1930. 
402 
 
Although they were released again, most colonial residents fear that their residence permit 
may be revoked and that they could be deported. This creates great difficulties for us, in 
particular when it comes to deciding upon speakers for public meetings.1016 
The International Secretariat had to consider the possibility that the anti-colonial movement in 
Berlin was losing its influence on the political scene. Thus, the expectation initially introduced by 
Magyar, to “aim a programmatic declaration” at every member and organisation affiliated to the 
LAI to continue to give their support, had to be fulfilled. However, without a strong “League 
secretariat”, despite the inclusion of Ferdi, this was an impossible proposition. In Moscow, Magyar 
had decided to retract his former critical attitude of the LAI, instead urging the Political 
Commission to understand that the KIM had to send a secretary to lead the youth question in 
Berlin. This also involved getting a “Negro secretary” to lead the African question at the 
International Secretariat, and two steno-typists to assist with the daily administrative routines. 
Magyar believed that in order to get the LAI to demonstrate its revised agenda, LAI emissaries had 
to travel to Africa and to the Middle East, while a “Continental Committee” should to be 
established in Montevideo.1017 The Political Commission approved Magyar’s proposal, even 
though it depended on all current obstacles impeding the realisation of this vision being first 
cleared away. Hence, the Eastern Secretariat had to present a budget for every cost and, if it was 
not capable of doing this, it would have to postpone the plan ad infinitum.1018 
      The uncertainty surrounding the LAI’s new political direction and transformed character 
reached a peak while Ferdi was visiting the LAI sections in Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels in 
December 1930. Apparently, the relationship between the International Secretariat and the sections 
was in an amorphous state after the crisis. Ferdi had hoped to meet and hold creative sessions with 
representatives of the communist parties and the sections; however, once on location, Ferdi 
observed how the French section had barely managed to resurrect itself, the Dutch LAI Section 
“existed only on paper”, while in Belgium the “the League’s address” was no longer functional. 
Stunned by the fact that both the Communist Party of Belgium and the mass organisations were 
“weak”, Ferdi was annoyed by the fact that Rajani Palme Dutt had not even bothered to respond to 
his request to meet him in Brussels before he (Ferdi) was due to return to Berlin.1019 
                                               
1016 The police had arrested Chinese and Japanese activists (no names mentioned), see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 133- 
137, Brief No.3, LAI, International Secretariat, Berlin, to, the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 22/12-1930. 
1017 RGASPI 495/4/75, 12-13, Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to the Political Commission, Moscow, 7/12-1930. A copy  
of Magyar’s letter (unsigned), which purportedly refers to the International Secretariat as being the author, is filed in 
fol. RGASPI 542/1/44, RGASPI 542/1/44, 97-98, (Confidential) Letter from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to 
the ECCI, Moscow, 7/12-1930. Codovilla and Condreras were to nominate the liaison in Montevideo. 
1018 RGASPI 495/4/75, 1-6, Protokoll Nr.107 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 23/12- 
1930. 
1019 Ferdi’s letter arrived in Berlin on 16 December and was forwarded to Moscow in January (arrived 16 January,  
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      At the beginning of 1931, the WEB expressed its intention to reinforce the work of 
Bolshevizing the West European communist movement. According to the “Arbeitsplan” of the 
WEB, one crucial aspect was to increase the supervision of the “international auxiliary [cover] 
organisations” for the sole purpose of “re-activating” the “international struggle in defence of the 
Soviet Union [and] against the war threat” in organisations such as the Krestintern, Sportintern, the 
Friends of the Soviet Union and the LAI.1020  
 
* 
 
No Light in Sight 
Resurrecting the LAI’s activities to its former glories proved to be a complicated undertaking for 
the International Secretariat. Despite the WEB’s aim to “re-activate” the “international auxiliary 
organisations”, this did not involve solving practical issues. On 9 January 1931, the 
“kom.Fraktion” informed the Eastern Secretariat that they had no money to pay the monthly rent 
for the office or to buy stamps to send out circulars on the “anti-imperialist struggle on India”. As 
the Comintern’s monthly allocation had not arrived in time, the “kom.Fraction” concluded that the 
only thing left to do was to sit around at the office and “look at each other”. The “kom.Fraktion” 
wondered whether “our major colleagues” (Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Lozovsky, Chitarow and the 
Eastern Secretariat) had already forgotten the promise they had given to Smeral in September to 
secure money from the Profintern and the KIM, and for the sum to be made available to the 
International Secretariat in Berlin.1021 Due to its financial “difficulties”, as declared in the 
Pressedienst, the International Secretariat informed “the members of the League” that at the 
current moment, the LAI had a very, fragile organisational structure, calling out to every “cadre 
who knows about the colonial question” to begin acting in an altruistic fashion, above all to 
engage in voluntary work without expecting to receive any money for their services (organising 
public meetings and political rallies).1022 Aside from the altruistic tone of the statement, it was also 
a plea confirming one of the lowest points in the history of the LAI, caused primarily by the 
consequences of the crisis.  
                                                                                                                                                          
1931). The “kom.Fraktion” reported on Ferdi’s mission to Paris, Amsterdam and Belgium in “Brief No.3”, see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/40, 138, Letter from Ferdi, Paris, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 11/12-1930; RGASPI 
542/1/40, 133-137, Brief No.3, LAI, International Secretariat, Berlin, to, the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 22/12-1930. 
For Ferdi’s report, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 1-9, Bericht des Genossen Ferdi über seine Reise, International 
Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 5/1-1931. For the report on the French LAI Section, see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/48, 10-21. For Ferdi’s opinion on how the Belgian LAI Section should be re-organised, see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/49, 2-3, Einige Vorschläge zur Organisierung der antiimperialistischen Arbeit in Belgien, Ferdi, Berlin, 
to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 5/1-1931 
1020 RGASPI 499/1/34, 5-6, (Vertraulich) Arbeitsplan, WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 2/1/1931. 
1021 RGASPI 542/1/51, 1-2, Letter from Smeral, Chatto, Ferdi, Münzenberg (“kom.Fraction”), Berlin, to the Eastern  
Secretariat, Moscow, 9/1-1931. 
1022 RGASPI 542/1/46a, 34, Pressedienst Nr. 1 der Deutschen Sektion der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, 1931. 
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     The only issue resolved at Comintern headquarters was the nomination of an LAI youth 
secretary. In Moscow, the Executive of the KIM appointed “Comrade Miller” (see further below), 
an individual who “mastered the necessary languages and could be used safely for League 
operations”. The reaction from the International Secretariat “kom.Fraktion” to “Miller” was two-
fold: firstly, relieved to finally have a youth secretary, the “kom.Fraktion” nonetheless questioned 
why the International Secretariat had to pay “Miller’s” monthly salary, particularly as Chitarow 
had promised Smeral that the KIM would pay for the LAI’s youth secretary. The suggestion that 
the LAI would have to pay for his salary was an “ill-conceived and frivolous” proposition, the 
“kom.Fraktion” concluded.1023  
      Who was “Miller” and did this person ever arrive in Berlin? “Miller” was the pseudonym of 
the half-Danish, half-Japanese Hans Peter Thögersen. In February 1931, Thögersen had “just 
arrived a few days ago” en route from Moscow to Berlin. According to Thögersen’s 
correspondence to the KIM secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat after assuming his position at 
the International Secretariat, he identified himself by his communist party name “York”. On 9 
March 1931, MI5 observed that York/Thögersen was acting as the “representative of the Youth 
Section of the LAI”, was in charge of the Negro question in the USA and also administered 
organisational and financial issues at the International Secretariat.1024 York/Thögersen was 
nonetheless not one of those “prominent in the League” in comparison to the core (Münzenberg, 
Smeral and Ferdi), and very few traces reveal any detailed information about his activities in 
Berlin. Yet, York/Thögersen was, upon his arrival in Berlin, already familiar with the activities of 
the LAI. In 1927-28, York/Thögersen had pursued studies at the International Lenin School in 
Moscow. Under the personal tutelage of Borodin, Lozovsky and Roy, in June 1928 
York/Thögersen was sent on his first international mission as a “messenger” on Far Eastern 
questions – an assignment he carried out at the International Secretariat in Berlin.1025 
                                               
1023 RGASPI 542/1/51, 1-2, Letter from Smeral, Chatto, Ferdi, Münzenberg (“kom.Fraction”), Berlin, to the Eastern  
Secretariat, Moscow, 9/1-1931. 
1024 Firstly, any reference or mention of “Miller” in the correspondence between the LAI/International Secretariat and  
the Comintern does not occur after his nomination. Secondly, this does not imply that it is impossible to discern 
“Miller’s” identity. Rather, it shows how the Comintern put into practice its system of pseudonyms. In February, 
York/Thögersen was in charge of the youth question at the International Secretariat. On 20 March, at an “anti-
imperialist youth conference” in Berlin, he publicly introduced himself as the leader of the LAI youth section, TNA 
PRO KV2 1056, (Secret) Report on Hans P. Thögersen from L. M. [?], Berlin, to D.A.C.S.B., London, 9/3-1931; TNA 
PRO KV2/1056, Thoegersen, Hans Peter, 1/6-1933. For York/Thögersen’s arrival in Berlin, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 
26c, Report from York/Thögersen, Berlin, to unknown, February 1931 [stamped: 9/2-1931]. 
1025 TNA PRO KV2/1056, Biography, Hans Peter Thögersen, August 1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 36, Die  
junge Garde, No.26, 20/3-1931. York/Thögersen informed Chatto of his “special education” at the ILS, which had a 
file that contained “my first and fuller biography together with recommendations from Comrades Borodin, Lozovsky, 
Vilde and Fortunatoff … These were written and deposited with them during Winter 1927”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/56, 
2, Letter from “Hans” [York/Thögersen], Berlin to Chatto, Moscow, 21/1-1932. 
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      Upon arrival in Berlin, York/Thögersen’s primary aim was to begin organising the LAI youth 
section. Approaching the student community in Berlin, especially the contacts in the KOSTUFRA 
network, York/Thögersen prepared and organised conferences and public meetings, a collaboration 
which peaked at the LAI Executive meeting in Berlin (30 May - 2 June 1931) with the convening 
of the “Berlin Anti-Imperialist Youth Conference” at the “Pharussäle” at 142 Müllerstraβe. The 
speakers at this conference were the secretary of the British LAI youth section T. Green, the Indian 
S. Tagore, the German LDRN section representative Joseph Bilé from Cameroon, the Indonesian 
Raden Mas Soewardi Suryaningrat (better known as Ki Hajar Dewantara) and Münzenberg.1026 
      York/Thögersen’s assignment at the International Secretariat also served another purpose, 
which, not unlike those of Ferdi and Smeral, concerned sending confidential reports to the Eastern 
Secretariat on the state of affairs at the International Secretariat, an activity kept secret from the 
other members. In one of York/Thögersen’s first reports, he concluded that since the crisis of the 
Frankfurt Congress, “the method of work generally is not a very energetic one”. Thus, this partly 
explained why the International Secretariat apparently had so much difficulty in establishing 
connections to the colonial and semi-colonial countries, and partly corroborated Ferdi’s conclusion 
that one could even question whether the LAI had any existing and functional sections in the 
“imperialist countries” at all. York/Thögersen focused essentially first on understanding the 
dynamics at the International Secretariat, and then began scrutinising the inner functions of the 
bureau in Berlin. On 14 February 1931, he concluded that the LAI was on the verge of 
disintegrating: 
Many of the organisations and groups [inserted by hand: in the colonies] have simply 
stopped communicating with us. The contact that has been maintained with the organisations 
and sections affiliated to the LAI has been essentially thru [sic] circular letters. […] As far as 
a plan of work is concerned for the LAI, there is none, neither is there a division of work 
amongst the secretaries. […] Some work, of course, is being developed, as for example in 
England and Australia; but looking through all our correspondence of the last several months 
with these countries, we can see that the Secretariat has not been a constructive and 
stimulating force for these developments.1027 
In addition to York/Thögersen’s negative prognosis, the International Secretariat depended 
exclusively on Chatto who, in contrast to the lack of interest Münzenberg was showing in the LAI  
                                               
1026 SAPMO-BA ZPA R134/70/269, 411-413, Reichskonferenz des RFS (28.2-3.3.1931); SAPMO-BA ZPA  
R/1501/20200, 48, Die Rote Fahne, No.208, 24/5-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 50, Die Rote Fahne, 
No.209, 27/5-1931; RGASPI 542/1/51, 77, Antiimperialistische Jügendkündgebüng, Jugendkomitée d. Liga gegen 
Imperialismus. Deutsche Sektion, 30/5-1931. 
1027 RGASPI 542/1/39, 26a, Letter from “York” [Thögersen], Berlin, to unknown [Eastern Secretariat], Moscow, 14/2- 
1930 [1931]. 
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by only taking part “in certain important meetings” to discuss financial matters, alone represented 
the dynamism of the organisation: 
The shipping of material for which great possibilities exist has been organised on a personal 
basis (through Chatto). As a matter of fact practically the entire organisational [inserted in 
handwriting] work that is being done [is being carried out] by Chatto, who also has all the 
contacts thru [sic] which we ship material and is the only one who knows what the various 
addresses which we have in the office mean.1028  
At the start of 1931, the LAI was a mere shadow of its former self. York/Thögersen observed how 
Smeral and Ferdi occupied themselves with “writing long letters to M” [Piatnitsky], or were away 
on missions in Europe. Because of this, and if Chatto was sick or unable to carry out any activity 
at the bureau, the International Secretariat was completely abandoned. This poor conduct made 
York/Thögersen concede that the International Secretariat was in a precarious situation, telling the 
Eastern Secretariat to initiate a commission in Moscow in order to “systematise the work” in 
Berlin. For the International Secretariat, this proposal had a two-edged implication: firstly, it 
implied the beginning of the end for Chatto (see further below), and secondly, the systematisation 
of the work suggested a strengthening of ties to other communist organisations. Thus, rather than 
depending on Chatto’s expertise, York/Thögersen preferred to see the “shipping of material into 
the colonies” going through the channel of the recently established International of Seamen and 
Harbour Workers (ISH), an auxiliary organisation within the Profintern network, established in 
1930.1029 York/Thögersen also emphasised the need to rectify the financial wastage at the 
International Secretariat, especially as “three quarters of the budget” was being spent on wages. A 
decisive step, if the Eastern Secretariat approved the idea, would be to send an “authoritative 
comrade” from Moscow to Berlin to re-organise the LAI apparatus and, while on location, assist in 
developing the LAI’s propaganda campaigns, York/Thögersen concluded. This involved, for 
example, the strengthening of the International Secretariat’s work to organise the “international 
anti-imperialist campaign […] in connection with the Imperialist Exhibition” in Paris in 1931.1030 
 
* 
                                               
1028 RGASPI 542/1/39, 26a, Letter from “York” [Thögersen], Berlin, to unknown [Eastern Secretariat], Moscow, 14/2- 
1930 [1931]. Illustrative of the above, Ford instructed Padmore to distribute the organ of the ITUCNW, The Negro 
Worker, through the channels used by the LAI, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/668, 41, Letter from Ford, Berlin, to Padmore, 
Negro Bureau RILU, Moscow, 7/2-1931. 
1029 The ISH aimed to “appear as a sovereign, self-governing organisation”. According to the biased memoir of Jan  
Valtin, Dimitrov instructed him to begin working at the ISH Secretariat in Hamburg in August 1931, see Jan Valtin 
(Richard Julius Herman Krebs), Out of the Night, Alliance Book Corporation, New York, 1941, p.272. For a more 
balanced account and analysis of the ISH, see Weiss (2011). 
1030 York/Thögersen concluded, “[T]his will require the mobilisation of the Comintern and the various parties’”, see  
fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 26a, Letter from “York” [Thögersen], Berlin, to unknown [Eastern Secretariat], Moscow, 14/2-
1930 [1931]. 
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The “Anti-Imperialist Exhibition” in Paris 
The “International Colonial Exhibition” in Paris was a bizarre event, characterised by its 
nationalism. According to Klaus Schüle’s study, this exhibition was a “peculiar and totally 
contradictory” event which exposed France’s colonial arrogance. The French government had 
issued invitations to former and current “imperialist powers” to participate in the exhibition. 
However, France did not convince either the British Empire, Germany or Spain to even bother 
attending, although Italy, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands did eagerly participate. The 
exhibition opened in May 1931 and was visited by 40 million people during the event. The 
ambiance of the whole affair, and its initial ambition of projecting the civilising mission of France 
in the colonies as something positive, acting for the well-being of humanity, was nevertheless 
contradicted by a common understanding in the international press that the Paris exhibition was an 
“abnormal event”. This exhibition offered an opportunity for the LAI to organise an anti-
imperialist campaign, with the German communist Alfred Kurella directing the activities of the 
PCF in organising an “anti-imperialist exhibition” in Paris.1031 This is not the whole picture and, 
despite the fact that Kurella played a role in preparing the so-called anti-imperialist exhibition as a 
response to the “International Colonial Exhibition”, other actors played a more decisive role, 
particularly the International Secretariat and the PCF, undertakings which were supervised by the 
Comintern in Moscow.  
      As soon as news of the “International Colonial Exhibition” began to circulate in Europe in 
1930, the International Secretariat suggested to the Eastern Secretariat to consider the idea of 
creating a protest campaign against the exhibition. On 11 November 1930, Wassiljew presented 
this idea and convinced the Political Commission to endorse the idea of allowing the International 
Secretariat, together with the PCF, to instigate a campaign to “exploit the Colonial Exhibition”. To 
co-ordinate the work between the LAI and the PCF, Ferdi was to function as the liaison.1032 While 
this merely confirmed a bureaucratic procedure, the challenge was to raise awareness of the anti-
imperialist campaign and its focus against the exhibition in Paris. For example, Ferdi visited the 
PCF Secretariat in December to introduce and co-ordinate this work, while on 23 January 1932, 
Münzenberg and Chatto published an appeal to “all anti-imperialist organisations, individuals, 
newspaper Editors, Publishers and Photographers”. This appeal highlighted the need for assistance 
                                               
1031 Klaus Schüle, Paris. Die kulturelle Konstruktion der französischen Metropole: Alltag, mentaler Raum und  
sozialkulturelles Feld in der Stadt und der Vorstadt, Leske + Budrich Verlag, Opladen, 2003, pp.157-159; Hans-Jürgen 
Lüsebrink, “Historical Culture in a (Post-)Colonial Context. The Genesis of National Identification Figures in 
Francophone Western Africa“, in Identities: Time, Difference and Boundaries, Heidrun Friese (ed.), Berghahn Books, 
Oxford, 2002, pp.206-208. France had a tradition of organising colonial exhibitions; similar events had been convened 
in Marseille 1907 and in 1922. 
1032 RGASPI 495/4/67, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.99 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 11/11- 
1930. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Heckert, Manuilsky, Wassiljew, Magyar and Bittelman. 
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in either organising or supporting the LAI’s public demonstrations against “the economic and 
political power” of imperialist states. According to Münzenberg and Chatto, these demonstrations 
aimed to fulfil a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, to introduce the opinion that the LAI was “the 
only international organisation” in support of the “struggle of the oppressed masses of the colonial 
countries” and, on the other hand, to use the demonstrations as an opportunity to announce the 
need to organise an “Anti-Imperialist Exhibition” in Paris. This appeal therefore required “the 
vanguard” of the anti-imperialist movement to send anti-colonial propaganda (photographs, 
statistical material, published and unpublished reports) to the International Secretariat, material the 
LAI intended to use against the “International Colonial Exhibition” and which could be expected 
to constitute the basis for the anti-imperialist exhibition in Paris.1033 
      This appeal was enthusiastically received. Albert Moreau, an AAAIL member in New York, 
told Chatto, “his colonial friends […] welcomed the idea”, while the secretary of the South African 
Trades and Labour Council, Andrews, promised to support the anti-imperialist exhibition by 
providing Chatto with “useful” anti-colonial propaganda. Andrews also told Chatto, “child 
marriages are not customary with South African natives”, describing how the living conditions in 
the country were a result of “malnutrition owing to poverty, insanitary surroundings, ignorance and 
vice”. Chatto thanked Andrews for “the good material on South Africa”, which could be used in 
different campaigns.1034  
      While propaganda proved easy enough for the International Secretariat to solve, the central 
question was how to co-ordinate the preparatory work. Ferdi informed the WEB in March of his 
intention to travel to Paris “not later than on 25 March”, and that he would remain in the city for 
one month to complete the preparations for the exhibition with the French LAI Section and the 
PCF secretariat. According to Ferdi, the primary aim of the anti-imperialist exhibition was to turn 
it into a big campaign against “British imperialism”. Thus, in connection with the opening of the 
“International Colonial Exhibition” in May, the LAI aimed to celebrate the “Anti-Imperialist 
Week” in the colonial metropolises around the world. To co-ordinate the propaganda for the 
                                               
1033 IISG LAI Collection, 3392.1, p.140, Circular letter, International Secretariat, signed by Münzenberg and  
Chattophadyaya, Berlin, 23/1-1931. Münzenberg and Chatto introduced the idea of turning the “anti-imperialist 
exhibition” into a permanent “International Anti-Imperialist Museum” in Berlin. A copy of the circular (German 
version) is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/49, 15-18. York/Thögersen requested that all “anti-imperialist youth 
organisations, individuals, editors and publishers of youth literature and photographers” send documents on the “anti-
imperialist youth issue” in February, to be included in the exhibition, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/51, 8-10. For a copy of 
York/Thögersen’s circular letter, see IISG LAI Collection, 3392.1, p.140. 
1034 RGASPI 542/1/48, 48, Letter from Albert Moreau/AAAIL, New York, to Chatto, Berlin, 18/2-1931; IISG LAI  
Collection, 3392.1, p.140, Letter from Andrews, Johannesburg, to the Joint Secretaries/LAI, Berlin, 7/3-1931; Letter 
from Andrews, Johannesburg, to Chatto, Berlin, 25/3-1931; Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Andrews, Johannesburg, 
14/4-1931; Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Andrews, Johannesburg, 15/4-1931. The pamphlet [title unknown], which 
Andrews referred to, had been issued by the Joint Council of European and Natives in Johannesburg. Grateful for 
having received the material, Chatto promised Andrews to use it in the campaigns of the LAI, e.g. in connection with 
the international conference on African children in Geneva, 22-25 June 1931, organised by the League of Nations. 
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“week”, the International Secretariat had sent out instructions to the A-I-Z and the editors of the 
Inprecorr to publish articles, while Ferdi aimed to conclude his negotiations with the Central 
Committee of the PCF. During these negotiations, the WEB kept its eye on the PCF, particularly to 
see whether the party and its secretariat were carrying out the ECCI’s instructions to give the 
International Secretariat and the French LAI Section their full assistance in completing the 
preparatory work.1035 
      The original aim of the anti-imperialist exhibition gradually became one of disappointment for 
the LAI. Quite suddenly, Ferdi had to abort his mission as liaison, as he was required to travel to 
Moscow instead of to Paris in April. When the “imperialist exhibition” opened in Paris, the 
International Secretariat could only stand by and watch how the “the lack of any assistance” from 
the Central Committee of the PCF to support the fragile French LAI Section contributed to turning 
the anti-imperialist exhibition into a complete mess. Unable to open the exhibition as planned in 
May, the International Secretariat described the PCF’s conduct as “an immense mass deception” 
against the anti-imperialist movement.1036 Despite the organisational disaster caused by the PCF, 
the French LAI Section opened the anti-imperialist exhibition in Paris in August. This was not, 
however, thanks to any assistance from the PCF, but rather the Soviet consulate in Paris had given 
the LAI an “exhibition stand” in “the Soviet pavilion”, from where the section could present 
statistical material, photographs and documents to illustrate the “horrors of exploitative and 
suppressive colonialism”.1037 
      The organisational adventure of the “anti-imperialist exhibition” was also an expression and 
consequence of the return to the LAI’s united front strategy. For the International Secretariat, 
however, this episode confirmed that the return to former glories was going to be more complex 
than expected. In an attempt to realise its objective of functioning as a cover for the Comintern, the 
International Secretariat adjusted its organisational apparatus to perfect itself as the hub of the anti-
imperialist movement. 
 
* 
 
 
 
                                               
1035 RGASPI 542/1/47, 15, Gemeinsame Besprechung mit dem Sekretariat der Liga, WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, 
received by “Inza” [?], Moscow, 11/3-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 55-57, Brief Nr.12, Internationale 
Sekretariat/Fraktion, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 25/3-1931. 
1036 RGASPI 542/1/46a, 35-36, Zur Pariser Kolonial-Austellung (Pressedienst, Nr.2); RGASPI 542/1/53, 24-29, Ein  
ungeheurerer Massenbetrug – Die Kolonial-Ausstellung in Paris, [unknown], to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 
[undated]. 
1037 “Die Anti-Imperialistische Kolonialausstellung” in Informationsdienst der Liga gegen Imperialismus und für  
nationale Unabhängigkeit, No.2, Berlin, 2/9-1931, p.14. For the Anti-Imperialist Exhibition, see further in Stephen 
Fein’s forthcoming doctoral thesis on the subject. 
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Hub of the Anti-Imperialist Movement 
The anni confusionis had left the LAI unable to orchestrate any massive propaganda campaigns. 
Despite the turbulence of the Frankfurt Congress and its aftermath, leading to the “purification” of 
the “prominente Persönlichkeiten” on the LAI Executive, as well as the undesired exposure of the 
LAI as a “front organisation” of the Comintern, in 1930 the International Secretariat still nourished 
the ambition of establishing contacts with representatives of the anti-colonial movement. For 
Chatto, the crisis had represented an opportunity to transform the LAI from the ardent anti-
imperialist voice it had once set out to be, into an organisation preferring to establish reliable 
connections with anti-colonial activists. This essentially involved the idea of perfecting the LAI as 
the hub of the anti-imperialist movement in Berlin and beyond. An undertaking which meant that 
Chatto was expected to evaluate the ideological leanings and reliability of the candidates 
(“desirable elements”) and, after consulting with the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow, sending the 
candidates in a new direction. Colonial students in European cities, or colonial seamen arriving in 
the vital European ports (Hamburg, Rotterdam, Marseille and Liverpool), were considered by the 
LAI to be valuable targets to aid in the distribution of anti-imperialist propaganda, to carry out 
anti-imperialist activity in the colonies or to undergo political education in Moscow. The ISH 
persistently targeted colonial seamen, with both Weiss’ and Adi’s studies proving that neither the 
African anti-colonial hub in Europe nor the transatlantic links of the anti-imperialist activists 
(represented by the ISH) to the USA, tracing back to Africa, ever corresponded with the aims and 
activities espoused by the International Secretariat. My aim here is therefore two-fold: firstly, to 
disclose the efforts of both Chatto and the International Secretariat in realising the idea of turning 
the LAI into the hub; and secondly, to explain why this endeavour became more or less a failure, 
an aspect which involves a discussion of Chatto’s fate within the international communist 
movement. The core at the International Secretariat carefully monitored Chatto’s activity, e.g. 
Smeral provided Piatnitsky [“Michail”] and Magyar with information on how Chatto’s work was 
progressing. The LAI and its ambition to become the hub also involves solving a few of the 
mysteries in its “lost history”, particularly in relation to shedding some light on several of the 
actors who have previously been kept in the dark, while others continue to exist as illusions. 
      This crisis made the International Secretariat act cautiously in its contacts with the anti-
colonial movement, elements which the “kom.Fraktion” viewed as “political material” rather than 
as individuals or organisations. This was a definition introduced by the “kom.Fraktion” in its 
“Letter No.2” to the Eastern Secretariat on 3 November 1930, after having arranged and held five 
informal conferences in Berlin (13-14 and 18 October) with “Negro friends”: the Gambian E. F. 
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Small, Frank Macaulay from Nigeria, Joseph Bilé and Garan Kouyaté. The “kom.Fraktion” 
observed that the “political material” needed a “patient and serious” treatment: 
They will show you [enclosed reports to the Eastern Secretariat] the political level, the 
psychology and to a certain extent the character of these two friends. […] Our general 
impression is that both of them can be used, at least we shall try to establish connections 
with the students through them and subsequently with other elements in the country. But we 
must wait and see how far they will be active at home and what resistance they will have to 
overcome.1038     
To evaluate the “character” of these “friends” was a difficult process. The “kom.Fraktion” urged 
Piatnitsky to understand that it was not easy to “get deeply into their soul in the course of a hurried 
conversation”.1039 The African question continued to haunt the LAI, which, in comparison to India, 
China and the Latin American continent, remained a blank page. It did not matter that the LAI had 
a connection with the Profintern section, the ITUCNW, the International Secretariat wanted to 
establish independent LAI sections on the African continent, especially in West Africa. Bilé 
(“Morris”) was the key for Münzenberg in this respect, and was perceived to be the most suitable 
candidate to stimulate and lead anti-imperialist activity in West Africa. Nonetheless, this required 
sending Bilé to Moscow to undergo a proper ideological education at the KUTV, a decision 
dependent upon the benevolence of the ZK KPD. Münzenberg explained to the ZK KPD that one 
merely had to review Bilé’s understanding of the anti-imperialist movement and the colonial 
ambitions of the Comintern and, above all, his longevity as secretary of the German LAI Section 
and in the German LDRN section, as well as being a member of the PCF, to understand that he 
was the best candidate. However, Münzenberg did not manage to convince Smeral that Bilé was a 
sincere and devoted anti-imperialist, with Smeral telling Flieg that he opposed the idea of sending 
Bilé to Moscow to study at the KUTV.1040 The Bilé question was not an isolated episode, it was 
                                               
1038 On 13 October, Smeral went to Kiel to meet Small, Macaulay, Bilé and Kouyaté, and escorted the company to  
Berlin, where they held five closed meetings with members of the International Secretariat (Smeral, Chatto, Leitner, 
Hussun and Cantor). Münzenberg attended the final meeting on 18 October. The sessions focused, for example, on 
whether the LAI could establish sections in Nigeria and Gambia, see fol. RGASPI 495/155/90, 78-81, (Confidential) 
Letter No.2, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/11-1931; RGASPI 542/1/40,69-72, 
Briefe No.2, Fraktion der Liga, to “Liebe Freunde“ [Eastern Secretariat and Piatnitsky], Moscow, 3/11-1930; RGASPI 
542/1/40, 77-89, Protokoll der Sitzung des Internationalen Sekretariats mit den Negerfreunden, Berlin, 14/10-1930; 
RGASPI 542/1/40, 102-103, Die letzte Sitzung mit den Negerfreunden beim Genossen Münzenberg, Berlin, 18/10-
1930. For an analysis of these meetings, see Weiss (2011). 
1039 RGASPI 542/1/40, 68, Telegram from Fraktion der LAI, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 6/11-1930. The  
accumulated material from the meetings with the “Negerfreunden” (protocols, and miscellaneous documents) was sent 
to Piatnitsky on 11 November. 
1040 The idea of sending Bilé to the KUTV in Moscow became a long, drawn-out affair, due to a personal conflict with  
another fellow African in Berlin, Wilhelm Munumi, as well as the ZK KPD’s hesitancy towards sanctioning the 
proposal. Additionally, Smeral’s remark that Bilé longed to return to Cameroon and his family contributed to the 
situation, above all the statement that Bilé’s “abilities are limited and he could be of little use”, see SAPMO-BA ZPA I 
2/5/33, 121, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to the ZK KPD Secretariat, Berlin, 28/10-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA I 
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characteristic of the relations between the International Secretariat and the African anti-colonial 
movement in Berlin. For both Kouyaté and the German LDRN section, the incapacity of the 
International Secretariat to support the LDRN with administrative assistance and money was 
nothing more than a bluff, contradicting an agreement entered into in 1929. On 30 September 
1930, Kouyaté informed the Profintern secretariat in Moscow that the International Secretariat’s 
crisis was also having a perpetual effect on the LDRN’s work in Germany. As a solution to its 
inherently weak relationship to the LAI, Kouyaté wanted instead to connect the LDRN network to 
the IRH and the KPD, a move which would entail a definitive separation from the International 
Secretariat. The International Secretariat had no intention of letting Kouyaté’s criticism pass by 
without any response, informing the Eastern Secretariat that they did not understand why Kouyaté 
seemed “displeased and disappointed”.1041 
      Two reasons explain why the International Secretariat found it difficult to confirm a fixed 
trajectory for the LAI in Africa: the first was the repression and monitoring of colonial authorities 
which contributed immensely to limiting the spread of anti-imperialist propaganda; and the second 
involved the internal difficulties which contributed to destroying the LAI’s possibilities to develop 
the African question, particularly as it seemed problematic to even reach a decision on how to 
proceed. For the International Secretariat, the primary aim of the October conferences with its 
“Negro friends” was to observe, learn and to capitalise on the observations of these meetings, 
which, in turn, would result in an African strategy for the LAI. As noted in the draft, “Der anti-
imperialistische Kampf des westafrikanische Volkes” (The anti-imperialist struggle of the West 
African Peoples), this document presented the International Secretariat’s plans and strategies in an 
attempt to attract the attention of the peasants in West Africa. This document was sent to the 
Eastern Secretariat and Piatnitsky on 6 November, 1930. However, in its most modest form, this 
draft was merely a re-appraisal of how to build socialism in Africa, a narrative taken from the 
process of collectivization in the Soviet Union: 
The objective of the LAI in each colony is not only to reveal to the masses the true nature 
and the terrible results of the entire system, imperialist plunder and oppression […] but to 
determine the political and economic objectives of the oppressed masses and to take all 
necessary steps for the organisational leadership of the struggle […] The League supports all 
                                                                                                                                                          
2/5/33, 122, Letter from W. Munumi re. Joseph Bilé, Berlin, to the KPD, Berlin, 22/11-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 166, 
Short note re. Bilé, International Secretariat, Berlin, to unknown receiver, Moscow, 2/11-1931; RGASPI 495/155/90, 
78-81, (Confidential) Letter No.2, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/11-1931. See 
further in Weiss (2011) and Adi (2008) on Bilé. 
1041 RGASPI 495/155/87, 404-408, Kurzer Tätigkeitsbericht der Liga zur Verteidigung der Negerrasse, Deutsche  
Section, Kouyaté, Berlin, to the Profintern Secretariat, Moscow, 30/9-1930; RGASPI 495/155/90, 78-81, 
(Confidential) Letter No.2, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/11-1931; Weiss 
(2011); Aitken (2008). 
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sections of the peasants who are interested in the struggle against imperialism, [and] supports 
and encourages the movement for the formation of farmer co-operatives and associations as 
organs of the struggle against imperialism.1042  
Justifying the societal transformation of the Soviet Union was not, however, an approach that 
worked in the interest of the LAI in this context. In February 1931, Magyar visited the 
International Secretariat and examined the draft before returning to Moscow to attend a meeting 
with the Political Commission in March. During this session of the Political Commission, Magyar 
concluded that the idea of establishing LAI sections in West Africa was hardly realisable. The only 
option for the International Secretariat was to instruct the British LAI Section to co-operate with 
the NMM on the African question, particularly by distributing “anti-imperialist leaflets to West 
African seamen touching at British ports”.1043 
      Hence, the road to establishing the LAI as a political actor in Africa itself came to a dead end 
in 1931. Another field of activity was to establish contacts with anti-colonial activists from Africa 
who were living in Germany and England. However, this undertaking turned into an operation 
burdened by quarrels. On 16 January 1931, Chatto explained in a letter to Macaulay in London, 
that the International Secretariat would not “send money to you when you demand it”, and 
wondered why he did not focus on finding colonial students who were members of the Negro 
Welfare Association in London. Apparently, this was an arrangement which had been agreed upon 
during the October conferences in Berlin, when Chatto had instructed Macaulay to evaluate 
candidates of interest and “their fitness for study”, and to inform Chatto of “their occupation, their 
age, their social status (i.e. whether they were a worker, student etc.)”. Macaulay seemed to have 
taken it for granted that the International Secretariat would, consequently, send money to London 
on a regular basis. Chatto consequently accused Macaulay of negligence, and questioned why he 
had promised the students in London that they could travel to Berlin to undergo political education 
without consulting the International Secretariat.1044 The LAI never turned into an influential actor 
either developing or supervising anti-imperialist activism in Africa; instead, the African question 
remained in the hands of the Profintern and the ITUCNW, supervised by the networks of Ford and 
Padmore in both Europe and the USA. 
                                               
1042 RGASPI 542/1/40, 90-93, (Draft) Resolution: Der anti-imperialistische Kampf des westafrikanische Volkes,  
International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat and Piatnitsky, November, 1930. The draft arrived in 
Moscow on 10 November 1930. 
1043 RGASPI 542/1/47, 10-11, Proposals relative to the activity of the Anti-imperialist League in West Africa [L.  
Magyar], Berlin,15/2-1931; RGASPI 495/4/94, 42, Information re. LAI from Magyar, Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to 
the Political Commission, Moscow, 6/3-1931. 
1044 Chatto believed Macaulay could “do some work in your country [Nigeria] otherwise we should not have entered  
into any connections with you”, TNA PRO KV2/1056, (Intercepted) Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Macaulay, London, 
16/1-1931. Chatto was a leading actor in selecting and assessing the students. According to Ford, Chatto was “well 
informed” on this arrangement, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/669, 93-101, Report to the European Secretariat of the RILU 
on Activities of the ITUCNW at Hamburg, author: Ford [arrived in Moscow 21/2-1931]. 
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      Perhimpunan Indonesia was a vital actor for the LAI. In connection with Ferdi’s visit to the 
Netherlands in December 1930, Ferdi met Abdul Manaff and wondered whether it would be 
possible to strengthen contacts between the LAI and the PI, as well as whether he could find 
“young people” (students and workers) suitable to undergo political education in Berlin. After 
returning to Berlin, Ferdi informed Magyar that Manaff seemed to be a reliable person who 
belonged to “the radical side” of the PI. The reason why Ferdi described Manaff in such 
confidential terms was that a fraction inside the PI had staged a successful “coup” against the 
leader “H” [?] and appointed the Indian communist Abdul Madjid (pseudonyms: Aziz, Hafiz) as 
the new leader of the PI in the Netherlands. This was also the result of the fraction having acted 
upon Ferdi’s instructions. With this internal putsch in the PI, Manaff nevertheless conceded that it 
had not improved contacts between Europe and the revolutionary movement in Indonesia; on the 
contrary, the “opportunities to work” for the PKI were extremely limited after the party had been 
declared illegal in 1930. The LAI and its International Secretariat therefore represented one of the 
few existing connections for the PI to use.1045 In order to establish some kind of collaboration, 
Manaff went to Berlin in January 1931 and had a meeting with Chatto and Ferdi at the 
International Secretariat. Despite Chatto and Ferdi concluding that Manaff was an honest 
character, the chance of re-introducing the LAI in the Netherlands had become a far-fetched 
illusion. The primary reasons for this were that the PI had become a shadow of its former self, 
having only 80 active members, and that both the repression by the Dutch security services and the 
established antagonism from the socialist movement within the country made any activity there 
extremely difficult. Nevertheless, Manaff was still a source of information for the International 
Secretariat on the progress of the Indonesian nationalist movement in Europe. For example, 
Manaff told the International Secretariat that Sukarno was living in Paris, an individual the LAI 
had to approach, especially as he showed a leaning towards communism after having studied 
Marxism and was known to fraternise in communist circles in Paris.1046 
      In Moscow, the Eastern Secretariat made efforts to realise the LAI’s aims in the Far East. Since 
Magyar was the proclaimed expert on the Chinese question at Comintern headquarters, in 
November 1930 the Eastern Secretariat introduced the idea of establishing a Far Eastern sub-
section of the LAI, the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Anti-Imperialist League (FESAIL). The 
FESAIL was to function as an independent actor, without any explicit connections either to the Far 
Eastern Profintern branch or to the ECCI department (the Far Eastern Bureau). The FESAIL’s 
                                               
1045 Abdul Manaff was also familiar with the activities at the International Secretariat in Berlin, see fol. RGASPI  
542/1/49, 1, Letter from Abdul Manaff, Amsterdam [?], to Lieber Freund/Eastern Secretariat/Magyar, Moscow [?], 
3/1-1931. 
1046 RGASPI 542/1/49, 29-38, Report (Ferdi and Chatto) Vertreter der neuen Leitung der indonesischen Organisation  
“Peripoenan” [sic], Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 19/1-1931. 
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primary aim was to co-ordinate the operations of the LAI in the Far East and, above all, to assist 
the International Secretariat in either maintaining or establishing contacts with the anti-imperialist 
movements in China, Korea, Indochina, Formosa, Malacca, Siam, Java, Indonesia and Japan. 
From the outset, the FESAIL was to assume a two-faced Janus character in order to avoid the 
prohibitive measures of the colonial powers in the Far East. Meaning, while publicly introducing 
the FESAIL as a relief organisation based on the fundamental principles of “international 
solidarity”, in reality the FESAIL would have to adhere to the duties imposed on it as a cover 
organisation for the Comintern in order to ensure a safe passage to the Far Eastern countries. 
Despite its grand ambitions, the result of this FESAIL initiative would be nothing more than a 
theoretical sketch, leaving no visible or practical imprint whatsoever.1047 
      While the FESAIL initiative petered out on its own in Moscow, the International Secretariat 
had a few reliable contacts to the Far Eastern national revolutionary movement. In Japan, the 
leader of the Japanese LAI Section in Tokyo, J. Kunigattis, provided Chatto with intelligence on 
the movement. For example, in November 1930, Kunigattis provided information that the 
Japanese communist journal, Central Review, condoned the views of deviationist anti-imperialist 
policies in an article authored under the pseudonym “Tseuno Yonekawa”. Kunigattis had contacted 
Chatto to receive advice on “strategy and tactics” in order to respond to this article.1048 In Berlin, 
the contacts of the International Secretariat to the Far Eastern community were limited but 
functional. Teido Kunizaki (“A. Kon”; “Kohn”), a Japanese communist in Berlin and a member of 
the KPD, began to work at the International Secretariat in 1930, in charge of the Far Eastern anti-
imperialist propaganda. By translating documents from German into Japanese, Kunizaki was a 
valuable and “accurate worker” at the International Secretariat, according to Ferdi. Kunizaki’s 
knowledge of the political leanings of the Far Eastern national revolutionary movement and the 
current political situation in the Far East, contributed immensely to setting up the LAI’s 
propaganda campaigns against the military conflict between China and Japan in 1931 (the 
Manchurian crisis and the Ruegg case in China; see further next chapter). Kunizaki, the architect 
behind the propaganda against “Japanese imperialism”, also organised the distribution of material 
to the LAI sections and co-ordinated several “demonstrations of colonial students” in Berlin. On 
27 November 1931, for example, Kunizaki organised a public demonstration against “Der 
                                               
1047 The Eastern Secretariat argued that the primary reason for establishing the FESAIL was as a response to the  
initiative taken by the CPCh and the Chinese KIM section to form the Eastern Anti-Imperialist League. Thus, the 
FESAIL was to function as “an authorised [LAI] section”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/37, 248-250, Plan of Work of the 
Far Eastern Secretariat of the Anti-Imperialist League, the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, November 1930. For the FEB 
and the ECCI, see Alexander M. Grigoriev, “The Far Eastern Bureau of the ECCI in China, 1929-1931”, in Leutner, 
Felber, Titarenko & Grigoriev (eds.) 2002, pp.156-165, and for the Profintern FEB, see Fowler 2007, p.64. 
1048 This letter included an enclosed article by Tseuno Yonekawa, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 182-192, Tsuneo  
Yonekawa, “Die Probleme der Entfaltung der antiimperialistischen Front“, Central Review, November 1930; RGASPI 
542/1/39, 163, Letter from J. Kunigattis [?], Tokyo [?], to Chattophadyaya, Berlin, 14/11-1930. 
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Einbruch der japanischen Imperialisten in die Mandschurei” in the name of the LAI.1049 Kunizaki, 
driven by a belief that his contribution to the anti-imperialist movement in Berlin and beyond 
would result in a change, lived quite a similar life to the ones experienced by Chatto and Hansin 
Liau in Berlin. While the city was initially perceived as a haven, it was also a situation defined by 
sparse living conditions and a continual harassment from the authorities in Berlin. As Kunizaki 
was not one of the prominent actors at the International Secretariat, he left few imprints in the LAI 
annals. 
 
* 
 
Curricular Activity as Conscription to Communism 
 
As far as the work in Berlin is concerned, the few Comrades and sympathisers we have here 
in the Indian colony have to participate more actively in the work. […] KOSTUFRA wanted 
to take steps to organise a course with the attendance of mostly foreign students. Despite 
several meetings, nothing has come of it. 
Chatto to Münzenberg, Berlin, 24/3-1930 
  
In 1930, the central question for Chatto was to focus the efforts of the International Secretariat on 
establishing connections with anti-colonial activists. This required, above all, scrutinising the 
“political material” in a methodical evaluation before determining who was eligible to receive 
political education. This curricular activity was the essence of Chatto’s idea of utilising the 
International Secretariat and the “Indian Bureau” under the pretext of organising discussions on 
Marxism and the colonial question, with the true purpose of these courses being a conscription to 
communism. The anni confusionis had increasingly altered Chatto’s egocentric network, with a 
majority of his former contacts either being out of reach or having voluntarily disassociated 
themselves (Hatta and Nehru) from the LAI, leaving in their wake a re-defined network. However, 
the “Indian Bureau” and Nambiar were still crucial in sustaining Chatto’s activities, while the 
                                               
1049 Kunizaki’s first contact with the LAI was at the Frankfurt Congress in 1929, which he attended as the delegate of  
the Japanische revolutionäre Gruppe in Deutschland. Additionally, Kunizaki’s contact with the Communist Party of 
Japan was a result of his contact with Katayama. Kunizaki worked at the International Secretariat until August 1932. 
On 3 September, 1932, Kunizaki left Germany after Prussian authorities refused to renew his residence permit and 
travelled to Moscow, see fol. RGASPI 495/205/4516, 1, (Biography) Teido Kunizaki (A. Kon), Kommission, Moscow, 
25/7-1936; RGASPI 495/205/4516, 15-16, Betr. Teido Kunizaki, ZK KPD, Berlin, January, 1933; Fowler 2007, p.89. 
For the Manchurian crisis, see Steiner 2005, pp.637-638. For the demonstration on 27 November 1931, see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/48, 169, Short note from “kom.Fraktion” Liga, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 6/11-1931, 
and SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 71, Die Rote Fahne, No.207, 27/11-1931 and, finally, Kunizaki’s deportation is 
mentioned in RGASPI 534/8/222, 27, Fragebogen: Teido Kunizaki, 9/6-1932. 
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LAI’s contact with Bridgeman in London was also still intact. These two factors were essential to 
the idea of getting the LAI’s curricular activity off the ground in 1930.1050 
      The anni confusionis had also provided Chatto with organisational space in which to introduce 
the idea of curricular activity as a strategy to finding “desirable elements”. Chatto realised, 
however, that previous attempts to organise such activity had received neither any attention nor 
any support from the ZK KPD in Germany, informing Münzenberg that the KPD had to 
understand that “this work is useful, particularly given the weakness of our colonial parties”.1051 
For this reason, Chatto believed that curricular activity would aid the dysfunctional anti-imperialist 
movement in the colonies. Hence, by carefully selecting candidates and providing them with a 
political education in Berlin, and in some cases with further study in Moscow, Chatto claimed that 
this would preserve the continuance of anti-imperialist propaganda in colonial areas suffering from 
repression, lack of communication or a disorganised communist party. The colonial metropolises 
in Europe were the key for Chatto, intersections containing a majority of the candidates ripe for 
influence and for receiving a political education under the tutelage of the International Secretariat. 
In due course, Chatto wanted to either transfer these tutored individuals to colonial and semi-
colonial countries or send them to Moscow for further political education. 
      The case of the Indian communist and Chatto’s friend, Pandurang S. Khankhoji, illustrates this 
strategy clearly. On 31 January 1931, the leading member of the Communist Party of Mexico, 
Manuel Diaz Ramirez, explained in a letter to Chatto that “our work is almost illegal, and our 
apparatus is very weak”. Thus, it was a difficult task to co-ordinate the activities of foreign anti-
colonial activists in Mexico. Ramirez noted that “the Indian emigrant” and party member 
Khankhoji, who was working as an agronomist in Mexico, wanted to return to India. Chatto 
wanted Khankhoji to “come to Berlin for consultation before going home”. Since Khankhoji was 
an expert on “the agrarian question”, as Chatto notified the Eastern Secretariat, perhaps he could 
be “useful for the Party if he returns [to India] after a consultation here and in Moscow”.1052 
Whether Khankhoji ever went to Berlin and visited Chatto remains unknown. However, on 24 
                                               
1050 Bridgeman asked Chatto whether he had heard a rumor initiated by one of Gandhi’s friends in London, Reginald  
Reynolds, referring to the “execution of some Indian in Moscow not long ago – said to have been followers of M. N. 
Roy”. This had aroused interest within the Indian community in London, wondering whether this was true, see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/48, 46, Letter from Bridgeman, London, to Chatto, Berlin, 4/2-1931. 
1051 RGASPI 495/19/312, 29-31, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Münzenberg, [?], 24/3-1930. 
1052 Ramirez described the inefficiency of the Mexican LAI Section to Chatto: “[…] this side of our work is not in very  
good shape; not only on account of the situation but also because it has been neglected by our friends in spite of the 
fact that there is a good field for it among the masses and that they would like to do it; it is only a matter of the proper 
elements to take charge of it and these elements are very scare here. The too many tasks our Party has and so very little 
cadres to do the work impede a great deal the League work, as we do not have anymore – and do not want them either 
– some petty bourgeois intellectual (students) elements which were before engaged in this work, there are only very 
restricted exceptions”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1//48, 43, Letter from Ramirez in Mexico to Chatto, 30/1-1931. For P. S. 
Khankhoji’s relation to Chatto, see RGASPI 495/213/186, 223 and Kaye 1971, p.169 (document “June No.54 
[deposit]”). 
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September 1931, Ferdi wrote to the Eastern Secretariat, informing them that Khankhoji intended to 
travel to Kabul in October to replace Rattan Singh as the representative of the Hindustan Ghadr 
Party. Additionally, the WEB told the International Secretariat “kom.Fraktion” that Khankhoji was 
a “trustworthy comrade”, who had been of “good service” to the Mexican party. It is therefore 
likely that Khankhoji met Chatto in Berlin at some point in 1931, before arriving in Moscow in 
September.1053 
      Chatto completed his report, “Courses for Colonial Students in Berlin”, on 5 November 1930, 
a document which presented the essence of the curricular activity the International Secretariat and 
the “Indian Bureau” planned to organise. This report, which illustrates how Chatto described a 
“small group under our influence” in Berlin, is also an account located and filed in different places 
and archival collections.1054 For Chatto, these “courses” were a crucial project, while others looked 
upon this line of activity with suspicion, particularly how Chatto was dealing with the candidates 
who seemed inclined towards communism in Germany and England. “M” [“Michail”/Piatnitsky] 
expected Smeral to act vigilantly in his examination of how Chatto’s relations with the colonial 
students were progressing: 
Please indicate how the case is with the Indian students in England who joined a course in 
the principles of communism. […] Have you managed to organise any communist education 
of the young Indian nationalists, about whom Chatto wrote? We have no commitments 
towards the participants in these courses. […] If any materials are needed, please write. Best 
regards, M.1055  
Piatnitsky decided to contact Smeral after having read Chatto’s report in November. Yet, already in 
August 1929, after the Frankfurt Congress, Chatto had been pondering the idea of developing 
curricular activity. Hence, it is logical to assume that Piatnitsky wanted to know how the contacts 
                                               
1053 The discussion of Khankhoji’s eventual visit to Moscow depended wholly on the information from the WEB,  
which implied that the International Secretariat “kom.Fraktion” knew that Rattan Singh was to act as a protector if he 
went to Moscow, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 148-150, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 
24/9-1931; RGASPI 542/1/54, 94-95, Letter from WEB, Berlin, “an die kom.Fraktion des Sekretariats der 
“Antiimperialistischen Liga”, Berlin, 16/10-1931. 
1054 The original report was sent to Moscow on 5 November (whether it was addressed to Piatnitsky remains  
unknown), arrived on 6 November and was later filed in the dossiers of the Piatnitsky secretariat. A copy was filed in 
the LAI fond, while a third version of the document (a transcript) was retrieved by the Berlin Schutzpolizei during a 
police raid of the International Secretariat on 21 December, 1931 (see further next chapter). A fourth copy has been 
located in P. C. Joshi’s archive, deposited at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (section: “Archives on Contemporary 
History”), see IISG “P. C. Joshi’s Archives, Catalogue, volume 7” (Jawaharlal Nehru University, Archives on 
Contemporary History), p.96, LAI: IML: ZPA: BERLIN: KURSE FÜR KOLONIALE STUDENTEN IN BERLIN, 
Course for Colonial Students in Berlin: Report by Chatto & Nambiar (Photocopy in German bound); For the 
Comintern Archive, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, and the original RGASPI 495/19/312, 38-42. Examination of 
these two versions discloses no alterations between the original and the copy. For the extracted copy, SAPMO-BA 
ZPA R1501/20200, 111-115, Abschrift IAN 2165 m/9.3. Aus dem Material, das bei der Liga gegen Imperialismus und 
koloniale Unterdrückung, Berlin, Friedrichstr.24, gefunden wurde. The extracted version does not, however, mention 
the date of completion (5 November 1930). 
1055 RGAPI 495/19/312, 37, (Vertraulich) Letter from M. [Piatnitsky], Moscow, to Smeral, Berlin, 14/10-1930. 
419 
 
with anti-colonial activists in Berlin were developing over time. Apparently, “several Oxford 
students” of Indian origin had attended the Frankfurt Congress, before travelling to Berlin where 
they had met Chatto at the International Secretariat, who had observed their inclination towards the 
“Communist Party”. To capitalise on the moment, Chatto wanted the “Indian Bureau” to organise 
“a four-week holiday course [in the summer of 1930] on Marxism with special reference to the 
colonial revolution” in Berlin. However, the snags and hitches in pulling this off proved to be too 
difficult to overcome. Expecting to hold the course in August 1930, and for it to be given in 
English, Chatto engaged Wittfogel and Josef Lenz, the leader of the KPD Agitpropabteilung in 
Berlin, as teachers because of their English linguistic skills. However, Chatto also needed tutors 
proficient in English. Chatto asked Mens [?], “a youth comrade from America” who was living in 
Berlin, to contact the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow, and see whether they could send “a couple of 
teachers” from Moscow to Berlin to give a few lectures. While still attempting to piece this all 
together, the students from Oxford arrived in Berlin in July. However, as Chatto was waiting for a 
decision from the ZK KPD on when the course could begin, and as Mens had failed to secure any 
teachers from Moscow, Chatto was unable to tell the Oxford students what was happening and the 
students simply left Berlin and “went off in different directions for the holidays” after having 
heard nothing from Chatto.1056 For Chatto, the “Indian student colony” in Berlin was a decimated 
clique due to the recent political disputes, a group dominated by “the Roy agents, Tagore, ex-C. P. 
members such as Gupta, and British spies”. Consequently, Chatto stated that the “Indian Bureau” 
needed to expand its activities at the universities in Great Britain and put the word out that 
academic courses on the colonial question were being arranged in Berlin.1057 
      In the latter half of 1930, Chatto and Nambiar were planning to arrange three separate courses 
in Berlin. In October, Wittfogel had already held the first course on “the agrarian question” in the 
colonies, while the second course, “Agrar Politik”, began on 11 November and followed a similar 
theme, with Wittfogel in charge of the seminars at the “Deutsche Hochschule für Politik”. The 
final course, the “Tuesday evening course of 16 lectures” on imperialism, was scheduled to be held 
in December under the tutorship of Hermann Duncker from the MASCH (Marxistische 
Arbeiterschulung; Marxist Workers’ Education) in Berlin. Chatto stated that the courses being 
organised by the “Indian Bureau” fulfilled a two-fold objective: firstly, to “influence Indian 
                                               
1056 RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, Courses for Colonial Students in Berlin, author: Chatto, Berlin, 5/11-1930. The  
Indian students that wanted to attend a course, and had visited the Frankfurt congress in 1929 were Mazumdar, the 
Jussuf sisters, Sinha, and the delegates of the Indian Student Association in Glasgow (N. N. Bose, J. J. Saha, and A. 
Roy), see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 23. For Josef Lenz, see Hoppe 2007, p.21, 213, and, Worley 2002, p.10. Lenz was an 
ardent defender of the “class against class” policy in the KPD, for example, Lenz stated that the Bolshevik delegation 
in the KPD, despite its small size, had “the greatest of influence” in party questions. 
1057 The curricular activity was also a strategy that served the purpose to avoid the ban, issued by the Berlin board of  
school, which prohibited political parties or organisations to hold political meetings in the school premises. 
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students” and to get “Indian newcomers” from England to speak the German language, an 
undertaking supported by the “German comrades of the KOSTUFRA” who were also helping to 
find “suitable communist students” at German universities (Berlin, Munich, Leipzig and Frankfurt 
am Main); and secondly, these courses confirmed that the “Indian Bureau” was an “extremely 
useful … centre for recruiting students”.1058 
      This curricular activity attracted not only the attention of Indian students and activists but also 
that of individuals from Africa and the Arab region (Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Persia). How 
did Chatto evaluate “the political material” and what were his general impressions? His primary 
aim was to assess whether the candidates could be of any use to the LAI. Chatto concluded that six 
students had participated in “the preliminary course”, five from India plus the Palestinian 
Alaeddin, a member of the national revolutionary group under the leadership of Hamdi el Husseini 
in Palestine. In relation to the Indian students, Chatto observed how they were all of different 
political persuasions. For example, Ghosh was studying in London and, once back in India, 
expected to open a publishing house in Calcutta. This was of particular relevance to the LAI, 
Chatto argued, especially as Ghosh was planning to publish “important revolutionary books”. 
However, due to the fact that Ghosh’s father was “a titled Government servant”, he had to conceal 
his sympathies to the LAI. Chatto nonetheless conceded that he did “not expect much from him”, 
but was rather providing Ghosh with a chance to “acquaintance himself with our literature”, and 
perhaps, in the future, he could be of service to the LAI in India. The second student was 
Sengupta, an electrical engineer by profession and a “member of a terrorist-inclined group”. 
According to Chatto, he was a “sincere and serious” person who could be of good service to the 
anti-imperialist movement in India. Khosla, the third student, who was from Lahore and allegedly 
a member of the Indian “terrorist movement”, made “a good impression” on Chatto. However, 
Chatto also questioned several of the students. Yagnik, a member of the Bombay Congress 
Committee, had “acquired a clear working knowledge of communist theory” from the course, 
although Chatto became suspicious of both his ties to the Indian bourgeois press and of his “real 
intentions” for having taken the course, particularly as Yagnik wrote articles for the sole purpose of 
earning money. Chatto nonetheless observed that Yagnik spoke Gujrati, so he could be of use to 
“translate certain [LAI] pamphlets”. Sinha was a student with “a few illusions” who had attended 
the Frankfurt Congress in 1929. According to Chatto, these illusions were expected to disappear 
“during the course of discussions”, especially as he had a “very good and intimate knowledge of 
the condition of the peasantry and the peasant movement” in India.1059 
                                               
1058 RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, Courses for Colonial Students in Berlin, author: Chatto, Berlin, 5/11-1930. 
1059 RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, Courses for Colonial Students in Berlin, author: Chatto, Berlin, 5/11-1930. 
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      The course on “Agrar Politik” based itself on Wittfogel’s expertise of the China question, and 
was attended by students from the Arab region, Africa and India. M. J. S. Naidu, Chatto’s nephew, 
aside from working on-and-off at both the International Secretariat and the “Indian Bureau”, was 
one of the students on the course. Naidu was not, however, given any special treatment, described 
by Chatto as a “sympathiser but one who is very confused and needs education”. Other students 
represented a more valuable source for Chatto, e.g. the journalist and devoted “Pan-Islamist”, Hajj 
Muhammad Jalabi, the “most active and intelligent of the Arabs” in Berlin. Chatto considered it 
worthwhile to make use of Jalabi’s expertise in order to complete his “own ideas” of both Islam 
and the Arab nationalist movement. The Egyptian Ibrahim Youssef could also be of great service to 
the LAI. Working as a journalist in Berlin, Chatto observed that Youssef had published a number 
of articles in the name of the LAI in the Middle Eastern national revolutionary press. Chatto 
concluded, however, that several of the course participants were either unreliable or vague about 
their intentions. For example, the “student of history at the [Humboldt] university”, Abdur Rauf 
Malik, was a “sincere fellow with Gandhist illusions”, while Abdul Alim, a “nationalist of the 
Gandhi school”, had only begun to acquaint himself with “communist literature under our 
influence”. Chatto wanted “to win” Alim over, but only if he acted “seriously and reliably”. The 
course also offered a chance for Chatto to establish closer relations with the Iraqi liberation 
movement. In this regard, the London-based Iraqi diplomat Muzahim Beg Ali Pachachi, who was 
also the leader of the Iraqi Nationalist Party, had informed Chatto that “a group of students” from 
Iraq were planning to visit Berlin and would remain there for a longer period. This visit, Chatto 
explained to the Eastern Secretariat (and Piatnitsky), was an opportunity to first establish contact 
and then to “maintain influence among them”. However, it was essential to prevent the Iraqi 
students from listening to Jalabi’s Pan-Islamic visions, Chatto stated. In the end, however, the aims 
of this curricular activity were essentially covert. Firstly, the International Secretariat and the 
“Indian Bureau” hoped that the courses would set up a viable channel to the anti-imperialist 
movement, with the LAI expecting to assume the role as the administrative hub, and with Chatto’s 
evaluation of the students (the political material”) receiving a final verdict of either acceptance or 
refusal. Secondly, after Chatto’s evaluation of the “political material”, if the student was deemed to 
be a trustworthy candidate, the person would be invited to a closed meeting at the International 
Secretariat with Chatto and other “Oriental comrades” (Ferdi and Nambiar). If the individual 
managed to convince one of the “Oriental comrades” (Ferdi), the candidate was approved to 
undergo further political education in Moscow at one of the Comintern’s educational facilities 
(KUTV).1060 
                                               
1060 RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, Courses for Colonial Students in Berlin, author: Chatto, Berlin, 5/11-1930. 
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      The complexity, impact and ramifications of this curricular activity organised by Chatto and 
Nambiar are, initially, hard to understand, particularly in relation to the fundamental aims of the 
courses. For Chatto, the courses constituted more than just an educational opportunity, they 
functioned essentially as an opportunity to see whether any of the students could be of service to 
the communist and anti-imperialist movement. Secondly, while the courses conveyed the 
impression of providing a broad understanding of the colonial question, in fact the courses were a 
political strategy endorsed by the ZK KPD and the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters. 
Their principal motive was to get the International Secretariat and the “Indian Bureau” to find 
“recruits” for communism. These courses also introduced an opportunity for the LAI to set up 
different channels to colonial and semi-colonial countries; either by convincing the students to act 
as couriers or to carry out missions in their home countries (distributing anti-imperialist 
propaganda, delivering directives or money). As a historical narrative, however, these covert 
results remain a hazy blur and are, therefore, very difficult to analyse.  In conclusion, the range of 
colonial courses proves that the International Secretariat existed in a relatively limited political 
space in Berlin, and the courses also contributed to increasing Chatto’s workload. They likewise 
strengthened Chatto’s position at the International Secretariat after the crisis, which, in turn, 
created a skewed distribution of responsibility, power and knowledge of the extent of the LAI 
network, again in Chatto’s favour. 
      By February 1931, York/Thögersen was arguing that the International Secretariat was in a 
critical condition due to its mismanagement, caused primarily by its incapacity to delegate work. 
This was a criticism levelled against the extent of Chatto’s influence. Since Chatto both controlled 
and supervised the LAI’s valuable contacts at the International Secretariat, York/Thögersen called 
for a change in the hierarchical structure, arguing that it was not logical to let Chatto act as 
“International Secretary” and, at the same time, lead its administrative work. As a kind of “cure-
all”, York/Thögersen told the Eastern Secretariat that the International Secretariat only needed two 
secretaries (York/Thögersen and Chatto), while Münzenberg, in charge of finances and playing a 
crucial role within the German communist movement, had to be drawn “into the work more 
closely”. Initially, there was no sign of any reaction to York/Thögersen’s criticism at Comintern 
headquarters. Yet, at some level, it is possible that it contributed in some way to what was about to 
happen to Chatto in 1931. The question is why. According to York/Thögersen, the International 
Secretariat was still suffering from the crisis, evidenced by its rigid and hierarchical structure. 
Thus, the Eastern Secretariat had to consider establishing an investigative commission in Moscow 
to “discuss the situation”, focusing on Chatto’s dominance and his ability to carry out all the duties 
demanded of him in Berlin. This recommendation principally questioned Chatto’s position at the 
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International Secretariat, above all his knowledge of every contact within the LAI network, a 
source of information York/Thögersen and Ferdi wanted to get their hands on. The question at 
hand for the Eastern Secretariat was to “decide whether Chatto and Smeral, either or both, should 
return” to Moscow, and to get an “authoritative comrade” to assist the International Secretariat 
with its political work.1061 Was there any immediate reaction to York/Thögersen’s proposal? 
      In April 1931, the Political Commission discussed the “accusations against Comrade 
Shattopadhyaya [sic]”, yet these discussions were not necessarily a reaction to York/Thögersen’s 
criticisms. According to “the strictly confidential” protocol, the Political Commission decided to 
transfer the question to the International Control Commission (the internal supervisory organ of 
the Comintern in Moscow; the ICC), without making any further reference to the nature of the 
accusation.1062 The ensuing investigation nevertheless required the summoning of Chatto to 
Moscow to face the indictment. In June, Magyar visited Berlin in connection with the 
reconstitution of the LAI Executive, and instructed Chatto to travel to Moscow. On 23 June 1931, 
Magyar (“A. B.”) informed Kuusinen in a report that Chatto “was ready to leave” Berlin after 
having received “the order” from the ECCI.1063 However, Chatto remained in Berlin in July and 
August. During this period, Chatto carried out “technical matters” under Magyar’s instruction after 
having been prohibited from getting involved in the daily routine work at the International 
Secretariat, and having been deprived of his authoritative position as “International Secretary”. For 
example, Chatto was instructed to translate manuscripts from German into English aimed for 
publication in the re-launched LAI organ, The Anti-Imperialist Review. Chatto was also no longer 
a member of the International Secretariat “kom.Fraktion” which, in August, received a firm 
request from Magyar that Chatto “was expected” in Moscow. The primary reason why Chatto had 
not yet left Berlin was explained in a telegram from Chatto to a “Clarence Miller” [?] at the Hotel 
Lux in Moscow. According to Chatto, he had been “bedridden [for] ten days” due to “severe 
kidney trouble”. Once he had recuperated, Chatto expected to leave Berlin and “arrive Friday or 
Saturday” in Moscow.1064 
                                               
1061 York/Thögersen observed that Ferdi was “in agreement with the essence of these proposals”, see fol. RGASPI  
542/1/39, 26a, Letter from “York” [Thögersen], Berlin, to unknown [Eastern Secretariat ?], Moscow, 14/2-1930 
[1931]. 
1062 RGASPI 495/4/101, 2, (Streng vertraulich! Für SONDERMAPPE!) Protokoll Nr.134 der Sitzung der Politischen  
Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 20/4-1931. On 23 May, the Political Commission endorsed the “new” International 
Secretariat in Berlin: Ferdi, York/Thögersen, Münzenberg, Smeral and a colonial representative. Thus, this marked the 
end of Chatto’s position as “International Secretary”, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/109, 6-7, (Streng vertraulich! Für 
Sondermappe!) Protokoll Nr.142 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. EKKI, 23/5-1931. Present at the 
meeting were Piatnitsky, Knorin, Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Heimo, Arnot, Magyar and Miff. The ICC’s main objective 
was to observe communist discipline amongst the members – sections and individuals – of the Comintern, see further 
in Huber 1995, pp.28-37. 
1063 RGASPI 542/1/48, 110-115, Letter from “A. B.” [Magyar], Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 23/6-1931; RGASPI  
459/213/186, 7-8, Biographical notes: Chatto, ICC, Moscow, 4/9-1936. 
1064 RGASPI 542/1/48, 136, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Berlin/Moscow, to Kommfraktion des Sekretariats  
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      Is it possible to determine the actual accusation against Chatto? Firstly, however, we need to 
re-assess Barooah’s interpretation of why Chatto chose to leave Berlin, an erroneous conclusion 
which contradicts the empirical sources (the protocols of both the Political Commission and the 
ICC and Chatto’s personal file in the Comintern Archive). According to Barooah, Chatto had “no 
other option” than to escape from Berlin in August 1931, after the International Secretariat had 
been transferred to Paris [!]. Prohibited to enter France, and due to the Schutzpolizei’s increased 
surveillance of Chatto, his only option left was Moscow, after having received personal advice 
from Dimitrov, Barooah concludes. Certainly, Dimitrov and the Soviet ambassador in Berlin 
assisted in organising Chatto’s journey to Moscow; however, Barooah’s conclusion as to why 
Chatto left Berlin is based on misconceptions.1065 Most importantly, the decision had never been in 
Chatto’s hands, mainly because the case against him was based on “political dishonesty” and, 
therefore, this matter had been authorised at various hierarchical levels at Comintern headquarters. 
The central issue was that someone in the Comintern, for unknown reasons, was questioning 
Chatto’s involvement in the Indian Committee, an association in Germany which had supported 
the Indian national liberation movement during the Great War and which the German government 
provided with money in order to create and stimulate anti-British propaganda in India. Chatto 
arrived in Moscow in August or September 1931 and began to write down a history of his life as a 
national revolutionary in his so-called “Autobiography”. In this document, Chatto performed an 
act of self-criticism by apologising for “my failures”, and referred to his ideological conversion to 
communism. On 15 October, Chatto handed over his “Autobiography” to the ICC, in which he 
declared: 
My work in the League against Imperialism is known, as well as my failures. Even in this 
respect I should like to add that I scrupulously carried out at each stage the policy laid down 
by the Fraction, and I believe that my colleagues will bear me out when I claim that the 
greater part of the work of building up the connections of the League was done by me. 
During the last two years I was not allowed the scope that I had previously had, because 
comrades [Smeral; Ferdi] were appointed to take charge who had not the least idea of such 
work, and whose policy was bound to lead to the stagnation of the League. I regret that I 
have been removed from the League Secretariat without having had a chance of explaining 
the real position there or of organising the work in the way in which I could have done so. 
[…] In the course of my political activities during the last 25 years there is one period which 
                                                                                                                                                          
LAI, July, 1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 186, Telegram, sender: Chatto, to Clarence Miller [?], Hotel Lux, Moscow, 
August, 1931. Ferdi explained that the reason why Chatto not yet had left Berlin was not due to reluctance, but rather, 
“he feels sick, he hopes to depart in the next few days”. See fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 147, Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to 
the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 18/8-1931. 
1065 Barooah 2004, pp.283-285. 
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has been the subject of suspicion and criticism and, as the true facts regarding my life and 
development are not generally known, this suspicion has naturally caused a number of 
comrades to withhold from me the confidence to which I am entitled. That period was 
deuring [sic] the years 1914-1918, when I, along with all Indians living abroad, co-operated 
with the Kaiser’s government. In order to understand the nature of that co-operation it is 
necessary to go through the documents, as far as they have been preserved, […] But I feel 
that as I was not then a Communist or even a Social Democrat [during the Great War] as my 
relations with the Government were not individual but collective, and as I liquidated those 
connections at the earliest possible moment, these facts should be regarded as extenuating 
circumstances. […] I ask the I.K.K. therefore to examine by statement and the documents of 
the Indian Committee, and to pass final judgement on my war activities, in order to free me 
from the suspicion and mistrust that some comrades, wrongly and unfortunately, entertain 
against me.1066 
This charge against Chatto had a lasting effect on his life as a political refugee in the Soviet Union. 
During the purge of the Comintern apparatus at the time of the Great Terror in the Soviet Union in 
1937, Chatto was sentenced to death on 2 September by the Military Collegium of the Supreme 
Court of the USSR. Charged with having been a German spy on Soviet soil, Chatto was executed 
by firing squad in Moscow once the verdict had been handed down.1067 
      The case against Chatto symbolises a decisive turning point in the history of the LAI. Despite 
the attempts of York/Thögersen and Ferdi to gain access to every contact that had been cultivated 
and administered by Chatto, once Chatto had left Berlin, the LAI and the International Secretariat 
                                               
1066 RGASPI 495/213/186, 215-228, Autobiography by Chatto, Moscow, to the ICC, Moscow, 15/10-1931. 
1067 Barooah plays down Chatto’s anxiety at being accused of “political dishonesty”, instead, he refers to the biased  
memoir of Chatto’s widow, Lidiya Karunovskaya, written in 1970, a narrative which implies that Chatto was far more 
concerned about his “alleged involvement” in the murder of the British diplomat Curzon Wyllie in London in 1909. 
Chatto’s own explanation, according to his “Autobiography” tells, however, a completely different story: “[I]n 1909 I 
openly advocated [this] political assassination and defended Dhingra, who shot Sir Curzon Wyllie in London in July of 
that year, I was elected a member of the Maharashtra secret society, the Abhinava Bharat, and was appointed one of 
the three representatives in Europe for the purpose of (a) organising the Indians abroad for the movement, (b) 
obtaining contacts with European anarchists to get training in explosives and (c) supplying the organisations in 
Bombay and Bengal with revolvers etc.”, see RGASPI 495/213/186, 215-228, Autobiography by Chatto, Moscow, to 
the ICC, Moscow, 15/10-1931; Barooah 2004, p.320-321. Chatto was rehabilitated during the thaw of 1956 in the 
Soviet Union after Karunovskaya’s plea to clear his name. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR 
concluded on 28 April, 1956, that the verdict against Chatto “was lifted”, and “the case against him was withdrawn 
because of the lack of evidence of a crime”. On 22 March, 1958, Karunovskaya received a death certificate indicating 
that Chatto had died on 6 April, 1943. Similar erroneous information on Chatto’s demise is found in Subodh Roy’s 
essay, included in Cecil Kaye’s documentary collection, which states that Chatto “passed away in January 1941”, Kaye 
1971, p.337. Documents on Chatto’s rehabilitation are located in the P. C. Joshi Archive, deposited at the Jawaharlal 
Nehru University/Archives on Contemporary History [not consulted by the author], see IISG in Amsterdam – “P. C. 
Joshi’s Archives, Catalogue, volume 7”, section “V. Chattophadyaya His Activities (In Part)”. Sobhanalal Gupta’s 
analysis of Indian communism includes a fair though short account of Chatto’s years in the Soviet Union, see Gupta 
2006, pp.271-272, 274, 306. 
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lost one of its vital components, one which had been essential in maintaining the links within its 
anti-imperialist network. 
 
* 
 
Revival (or Decline?)  
To some degree the International Secretariat managed to revive the LAI as a cover organisation for 
the Comintern. From a political perspective, however, the organisation was not credible, 
particularly as the LAI had no Executive and no General Council, a consequence of the 
“purification” process in 1930. In the beginning of 1931, this dilemma troubled the International 
Secretariat, especially as it contributed to the LAI being depicted as a dysfunctional body. The 
International Secretariat told Magyar “that it is possible and necessary” to hold an LAI Executive 
meeting in order to “renew” the legal continuity of the LAI, a session that would have to decide 
upon anti-imperialist “propaganda, organisational and tactical issues”.1068 
      It was a question of revival or decline for the International Secretariat. To revise the political 
agenda and, above all, to revive the LAI on an organisational basis, the International Secretariat 
expected a reconstituted Executive to resurrect its activities. The preparations for the LAI 
Executive in 1931 also confirmed the Comintern’s governance vis-à-vis the International 
Secretariat. Correspondence, protocols and drafts of resolutions reveal that the Eastern Secretariat 
and other actors at Comintern headquarters controlled every stage of this LAI Executive meeting, 
in which the WEB acted as both the receiver and executor of its instructions. For the International 
Secretariat, the resurrection of the LAI Executive confirmed its status as a bystander. 
      To propose new members to the LAI Executive was a complex task. Magyar stated that it was 
essential to avoid introducing an Executive which more or less continued the understanding of the 
LAI being a communist organisation. In February, however, as Magyar and the International 
Secretariat were looking into this issue, the list of proposed candidates confirmed its communist 
bias: Bridgeman, Pollitt, Saklatvala, Clemens Dutt, Herclet, the French communist Mireille 
Gaillard (later employed at the Inprecorr bureau in Berlin in 1932), Ford, Helmut/Dimitrov, 
Witcheff, Huang Ping, Arthur Abolin as the AUCCSLU delegate,1069 Magyar of the Eastern 
Secretariat, IRH delegate Louis de Visser, a representative from the PI (“Manaff or Abdul 
Madjid”), Münzenberg, Chatto, Smeral and Ferdi. When it came to the former “prominente 
                                               
1068 RGASPI 542/1/48, 26-28, Report from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat [delivered in  
person by Magyar], Moscow, 12/2-1931. 
1069 Serafima Gopner, a communist from Ukraine (1880 – 1966) and member of the ECCI Secretariat, was instructed  
on 23 May by the Political Commission to contact Arthur Abolin in Moscow and to instruct him to act as the delegate 
of the AUCCSLU at the LAI Executive, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/109, 6-7, (Streng vertraulich! Für Sondermappe!) 
Protokoll Nr.142 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. EKKI, 23/5-1931. 
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Persönlichkeiten”, Magyar instructed the International Secretariat to send an invitation to Nehru 
since he officially remained a member of the LAI Executive. However, Magyar conceded, “he 
would not come”. If so, the International Secretariat should establish “an international campaign” 
against “the betrayal” of Nehru, Fimmen, Maxton and Hatta as a means of “reviving the League” 
as well as “utilising the differences between the imperialists”. It all boiled down to a question of 
money in the initial stages, however. In March, as Magyar travelled back to Moscow, “the 
financial burden” at the International Secretariat was the central issue to be sorted out in order to 
guarantee that the delegates would be able to attend the LAI Executive. According to Magyar, the 
Political Commission needed to endorse the sum of 2,200 Marks in order to cover their travelling 
expenses.1070 
 
* 
 
Deliberations at the Centre  
On 8 March, Magyar introduced the idea of resurrecting the Executive of the LAI at a session with 
the Political Commission. However, Magyar concluded that under no circumstance was the LAI 
Executive meeting to convene at the same time as the Eleventh ECCI Plenum (scheduled for 26 
March – 11 April in Moscow). The Political Commission observed that this session would offer a 
chance for the International Secretariat to realise the need to establish a new focus for the LAI, 
especially the question of the national revolutionary movement in Europe, represented by 
organisations and associations in the Balkans, Ukraine and in Alsace-Lorraine. This proposition 
clashed with Magyar’s vision of the LAI Executive. Magyar had expected the meeting to function 
as a forum to discuss the “development of the liberation movement in the colonies” after the 
Frankfurt Congress, a report on the International Secretariat and to elect both a new LAI Executive 
and General Council.1071 The primary reason why the Political Commission wanted the LAI to 
take on the European national minority movement was an initiative inspired by the apprehensive 
political situation in Eastern Europe in the beginning of the 1930s. Eastern Europe was paralysed 
by chronic instability which, after the adoption of the Locarno Treaty in 1925, had only increased, 
resulting in the Eastern Polish borderlands, for example, being a scene of sporadic violent 
                                               
1070 Magyar confirmed the sum of 2,200 Marks in his report to the Political Commission on 8 March. The expected  
cost for the delegates were: Bridgeman (300), Pollitt (270), Saklatvala (270), Clemens Dutt (270), Herclet (180), 
Gaillard (180), Ford (100), Witcheff (“if released from prison in time”, 400), de Visser (180), the delegate of the PI 
(180), see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 26-28, Report from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat 
[delivered in person by Magyar], Moscow, 12/2-1931. 
1071 RGASPI 542/1/47, 12-14, [Russian original] (Secret) Report from Magyar, Moscow, to the Political Commission,  
Moscow, 6/3-1931 (delivered on 8 March 1931). For a copy of this report (German version), see fol. RGASPI 
495/4/94, 42. For the meeting of the Political Commission, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/94, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.126 der 
Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats EKKI, 8/3-1931. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, 
Kuusinen, Pieck, Knorin, Magyar and Kun. This meeting re-introduced the discussion of the LAI and of the national 
minority movement in Europe, a topic introduced by Bela Kun in September, 1929 (see Anni Confusionis).   
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outbursts, while the growth of nationalism in the Balkan countries had reached new unparalleled 
heights. With the rise of nationalism as a political stimulus, as well as the criticism of the League 
of Nations’ failure to implement the theory of national self-determination in practice, the national 
minority movement was gaining in both strength and size.1072 Yet, when the International 
Secretariat heard of the idea to focus the LAI on establishing contacts with the minority 
movement, the Eastern Secretariat received a less than confident response: 
We are not prepared to handle this question of national minorities in Europe seriously and in 
detail. We need help to develop a good resolution, and this may call for a recommendation, 
perhaps from Bridgeman.1073 
The question of the national minority movement in Europe as a topic had, however, already been 
examined by the International Secretariat in January 1931. Smeral had investigated whether the 
LAI would be able to establish sections in Eastern Europe. For example, together with the Polish 
communist and member of the ECCI Presidium, Julian Lenski, Smeral had assessed the prospects 
of “setting up” a section in Poland and, if successful, repeating the operation in Bulgaria. Smeral 
and Lenski stated that the structural shape of the section had to be “a small committee” which, at a 
later date, could be transformed into a section. However, due to the extensive repression against 
the communist movement in both Poland and Bulgaria, Smeral and Lenski concluded that it would 
be futile to attempt to realise this proposal.1074 The idea of getting the LAI to pay attention to the 
national minority movement did not, however, disappear. While the International Secretariat 
“kom.Fraktion” observed the question as being “politically important”, it also noted that for the 
Political Commission to even suggest that the LAI should introduce a “serious, objective and 
exhaustive resolution” was an illogical proposition. This was an issue entirely under the 
jurisdiction of the Comintern, and it needed to be decided upon before the LAI Executive 
meeting.1075 
      Magyar’s primary challenge was to set up an LAI Executive which would be able to convince 
the European left-wing movement that the LAI was a non-party organisation. After reviewing the 
list of invited guests, Magyar concluded that “very few independents” [non-communist delegates] 
had been included. Realising that two of the focal points at the meeting of the LAI Executive 
would be the expelling of several of the non-communist members on the Executive and the protest 
                                               
1072 Steiner 2005, pp.627-630. 
1073 RGASPI 542/1/44, 101-103, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, March/April  
1931. 
1074 RGASPI 542/1/49, 4-5, Letter from Smeral/Internationale Sekretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow,  
16/1-1931; RGASPI 542/1/49, 9-10, Letter from Smeral/International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern 
Secretariat/Magyar, Moscow, 16/1-1931. 
1075 RGASPI 542/1/48, 55-57, Brief Nr.12, Internationale Sekretariat/Fraktion, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 25/3-1931;  
RGASPI 542/1/48, 51, Zirkularbrief Nr. 10, Fraktion der “Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 
Moscow, 14/3-1931. 
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against “the Imperialist system”, Magyar understood that this session would confirm the 
understanding of the LAI as a forum for “only Communists” and as a cover for the activities of the 
Comintern.1076 For this reason, Magyar challenged the Political Commission to solve the “question 
of the programme and the tactics” of the LAI during the Eleventh ECCI Plenum, and to summon 
both Münzenberg and Ferdi to Moscow.1077 
      The “kom.Fraktion” explained to Magyar that the LAI could no longer invite “neutral 
persons”. Compared to its first year of activity in Berlin, 1927, by 1931 the socio-political 
situation in Germany had completely changed. Attempting to grasp why the LAI had become a 
reclusive organisation, the “kom.Fraktion” admitted that the purging of the LAI after the Frankfurt 
Congress had made it “hard to find here and in the immediate vicinity” anyone willing to “be 
associated with” the LAI.1078 Berlin, once the haven for the anti-colonial movement was, at the 
beginning of the 1930s, turning into a hostile scene for political activism. The LAI and its 
International Secretariat found itself caught in the middle, having to confront the political battles 
between both the Nazi and communist movements, while continually adapting itself to combat the 
daily repression of the Schutzpolizei. 
      On 13 April, Münzenberg and Ferdi attended the Political Commission session in Moscow. 
The “strictly confidential” discussion made it very clear that everyone had to understand the need 
for thorough preparations prior to the meeting of the LAI Executive, and for it to convene at the 
end of May. The Political Commission stated that this would provide Magyar and the Eastern 
Secretariat with enough time to complete the resolutions and agenda, assigning Kuusinen to 
examine the drafts, leaving the question of Nehru’s expulsion in the hands of Münzenberg and 
Ferdi.1079 
      The preparatory work for the resurrection of the LAI Executive was positive proof of how the 
International Secretariat was obediently following the dictates of the Comintern. After completing 
the material for the session in Moscow, Magyar sent the documents, e.g. the agenda and the 
definite date (30 May – 2 June), to the International Secretariat. According to the agenda, the LAI 
                                               
1076 RGASPI 495/4/94, 42, An die Politkommission über die Anti-imp.Liga, Magyar, Moscow, to the Political  
Commission, Moscow, 6/3-1931. 
1077 The Eleventh ECCI Plenum focused primarily on two topics: reports on the communist parties and the “crisis of  
capitalism” (Manuilsky together with Thälmann, Lenski and Cemodanov as co-reporters), and the war threat and the 
fear of a military intervention in the Soviet Union, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/94, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.126 der Sitzung der 
Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats EKKI, 8/3-1931; Kahan 1990, p.28. 
1078 RGASPI 542/1/48, 55-57, Brief Nr.12, Internationale Sekretariat/Fraktion, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 25/3-1931.  
1079 RGASPI 495/4/99, 1-4, Protokoll Nr.131 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI am 13/4- 
1931. Present at the meeting were: Pieck, Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Knorin, Heimo, Dimitrov, Kun, 
Münzenberg, Magyar, Safarov and Ferdi; RGASPI 495/4/99, 5, (Streng vertraulich. Für Sondermappe) Protokoll 
Nr.131 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI am 13/4-1931. After the meeting, Piatnitsky 
summoned Münzenberg, Ferdi and Magyar to a closed session in his office. Any record of this discussion remains 
unknown. However, prior to the session, Piatnitsky wondered whether the sum of 2,200 Marks would be enough to 
cover the costs, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/99, 8. 
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Executive meeting would focus on discussing a report by the International Secretariat, the 
development of national LAI sections, the nature of the anti-imperialist youth movement and the 
question of unifying the “anti-imperialist struggle” with the European national minority 
movement. Magyar estimated that forty-one delegates had received an invitation and 
recommended that the International Secretariat invite Maxton, Hatta, Fimmen and Nehru, despite 
there being “little hope” of them attending the session in Berlin. Magyar instructed the 
International Secretariat to notify every delegate that they were expected to deliver a report at the 
meeting although, in order to avoid any unwanted debate, each delegate had to send a draft of 
his/her report to the International Secretariat “a few days before the meeting”.1080 To complete the 
preparations, Magyar accelerated the “completion of all questions” at the end of May, e.g. the 
resolutions on the political and national minority questions.1081 On 23 May, the Political 
Commission urged the Eastern Secretariat to present its resolutions on both “the Session of the 
Executive Committee of the Anti-Imperialist League” and “the national liberation movement of 
the oppressed European peoples”. For Kuusinen, the LAI’s revised political agenda was a source 
of inspiration in defining the Comintern’s policy on the national question. Kuusinen believed that 
the LAI was capable of influencing and manoeuvring the European national minority movement(s) 
and, on 6 June, at the ECCI Presidium session in Moscow, Kuusinen presented his ideas on the 
question of “National Oppression in Europe”, stating that he believed the LAI could play a pivotal 
role: 
The Anti-Imperialist League … on behalf of the national revolutionary organisations of the 
whole world energetically protests against the existing revolting oppression of millions of 
the masses of oppressed nationalities, primarily in Poland, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Czecho-
Slovakia, Greece, Italy, but also in Spain, France (Alsace-Lorraine), Great Britain (Ireland) 
[…] There could not be a crueller satire on the freedom of peoples which was promised in 
the Versailles Treaty than the practice which is adopted by the Versailles system of 
imperialism. The Anti-Imperialist League resolves to carry on a struggle against the whole of 
this system of imperialist plunder and mass destruction, against all forms of national 
oppression and inequality of rights, for the purpose of winning complete freedom for the 
oppressed peoples.1082  
                                               
1080 RGASPI 542/1/48, 95-96, Antrag zur Sitzung des Sekretariates über die Exekutive der Liga gegen Imperialismus  
[Eastern Secretariat], Moscow, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 4/5-1931 [arrived in Berlin 6/5-1931]. 
1081 RGASPI 542/1/48, 99, Brief Nr.12, Fraktion im Ligasekretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat/Magyar,  
Moscow, 12/5-1931. 
1082 RGASPI 495/4/109, 1-5, Protokoll Nr.142 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. EKKI, 23/5-1931.  
Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Knorin, Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Heimo, Arnot, Magyar and Miff; For 
Kuusinen’s speech, see fol. RGASPI 495/2/180, 129-132, (Confidential) Material on the Report of Comrade Kuusinen 
at the Session of the Presidium of the ECCI, Moscow, 6/6-1931. 
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This idea nonetheless merely confirmed Kuusinen’s appraisal of “the example of the Soviet 
Union” and its role in saving the movement from “national oppression” on “the basis of the Soviet 
system”. In fact, the idea paraphrased the resolution, “Zur nationalen Befreiungsbewegung der 
unterdrückten Völker Europas” which the LAI Executive had endorsed in Berlin on 2 June (a 
resolution had been completed on 27 May and the political resolution on 26 May).1083 Magyar had 
adhered strictly to the policy of “class against class” during the process of completing the 
resolution which, in turn, had exposed the LAI’s communist ties. As noted in the political 
resolution, for example, the LAI should show no tolerance towards its former alliances, especially 
the former non-communist members of the LAI Executive. This also implied an increase in the 
struggle against its principal enemies: the LSI and the Amsterdam International: 
All the bloodhounds are unleashed by the imperialists against revolutionary anti-imperialist 
liberation movements. […] The leaders of the II [LSI] and Amsterdam International are in 
the forefront of the fight against the oppressed peoples. MacDonald’s Labour Government 
fights against the Indian liberation movement […] A most despicable role is played by the 
so-called left Social Democrats, Messrs. Maxton and Fimmen […] Mr. Fimmen deserted the 
Anti-Imperialist League. Likewise, Mr. Maxton shamelessly supported the manoeuvres of 
British Imperialism […] The so-called left socialists, the Jabaralal Neru [sic] and Bose, have 
played a particularly despicable role. […] Neru, who, has become the agent of British 
imperialism.1084 
The rhetoric of “class against class” was used to confirm that the LAI and the anti-imperialist 
movement had “reached a new and higher stage”: 
The intensification of all antagonisms and the seriousness of the situation makes it the 
imperative duty of the Anti-Imperialist League to increase its struggle and strengthen its 
organisation.1085 
Was the resurrection of the LAI Executive in Berlin the step which confirmed “a new and higher 
stage” for the activities of the LAI? 
 
* 
                                               
1083 RGASPI 495/3/201, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.109 der Sitzung des Politsekretariats EKKI, Moscow, 28/5-1931. Present at  
the meeting were Piatnitsky, Weinstone, Manuilsky, Arnot, Gutmann, Bratkowski, Kuusinen, Lozovsky, Knorin, 
Codovilla and Worowsky. For the resolutions see fol. RGASPI 495/3/201, 395-404, Draft resolution for the Session of 
the Executive Committee of the LAI, June 1931, Berlin, Moscow, 26/5-1931; RGASPI 495/3/201, 412-415, 
(Vertraulich) Zur nationalen Befreiungsbewegung der unterdrückten Völker Europas, Moscow, 27/5-1931. Another 
resolution, presented and adopted during the LAI Executive meeting, was the “Resolution über den Terror in den 
Kolonien und Halbkolonien”, see fol. RGASPI 539/2/432, 13. 
1084 RGASPI 495/3/201, 395-404, Draft resolution for the Session of the Executive Committee of the LAI, June 1931,  
Berlin, Moscow, 26/5-1931. 
1085 RGASPI 495/3/201, 395-404, Draft resolution for the Session of the Executive Committee of the LAI, June 1931,  
Berlin, Moscow, 26/5-1931. 
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Resurrection and the Road to Sectarianism: The LAI Executive Meeting, Berlin, 31 May –  
2 June 1931 
I would like to collectively draw your attention to the following. The preparation of the 
meeting was very poor. Even the necessary measures to ensure the participation of the major 
imperialist countries were not taken. […] the reports and discussion left little concrete for the 
future work of the League. 
Helmut/Dimitrov to the ECCI, 8/6-1931 
 
On Sunday 31 May, at 3 pm, at an unknown location in Berlin, Münzenberg opened the meeting of 
the LAI Executive. Münzenberg’s “nearly three-hour long speech” was an outline of the history of 
the LAI which concluded that the mistakes committed by the organisation was a dilemma 
explained essentially by the betrayal of “opportunists” such as Maxton, Nehru, Fimmen and 
Hatta.1086 Forty-six delegates attended this LAI Executive meeting. Fourteen of these delegates 
represented both “the imperialist world” and the mass organisations (the AUCCSLU, the IAH, the 
IRH, the Profintern and the International Secretariat), and there were fourteen representatives from 
“the colonies”, e.g. Bridgeman, Percy Glading, van Münster, Dimitrov, Vlachoff and Popov from 
Macedonia. I, Valnitsky from Poland and the Ukrainian nationalist Petruschewitsch, the KPD 
representative Lenz, the IAH functionary Paul Scholze, Wittfogel, Hans Jäger, Ford, Kouyaté, the 
IAH delegate Otto Katz, Kunizaki, Saklatvala, Tagore, Abdul Madjid of the PI, Willi Budich of the 
IRH, Ferdi, Chatto, Smeral and York/Thögersen were all present. The International Secretariat had 
also invited journalists from the German and foreign communist press, e.g. Inprecorr, TASS, Die 
Rote Fahne, Berlin am Morgen and Welt am Abend. Nonetheless, Ferdi made note of the fact after 
the meeting that not a single, colonial delegate had arrived directly from the colonies, a 
troublesome fact which exposed the incapacity of the International Secretariat to secure money to 
cover travel expenses.1087 Some of the articles published after the meeting, e.g. “Die Kolonial-
Unterdrückten tagen” in Welt am Abend (which included a picture of Ford, Münzenberg and 
Kouyaté standing side-by-side, a picture actually taken at the Frankfurt Congress in 1929) 
described how the new Executive of the LAI celebrated the resurrected body of the LAI. Inprecorr 
published an article authored by the Arab communist and member of the Wafd, Mahmud Husni al-
                                               
1086 The article, “James Maxton und die Liga gegen Imperialismus”, published in Pressedienst, 15 May, defined the  
official attitude of the LAI and its new Executive on Maxton: “Under these circumstances there is no doubt that 
Maxton has violated his solemn promises […], his systematic silence has supported the pro-imperialist actions of the 
Independent Labour Party, and he has not strengthened the campaign against the imperialist terror of the MacDonald 
government in the British colonies”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Protocol: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 
31/5-2/6-1931, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/46a, 78-81, Pressedienst der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nr.9, Internationales 
Sekretariat, Berlin, 15/5-1931. 
1087 RGASPI 542/1/49, 281-287, Bericht des Bureaus der Fraktion der Exekutivsitzung der Liga gegen Imperialismus,  
author: Ferdi, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 31/5-1931. 
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‘Arabi (signed “C. Husny”), which declared that the LAI had entered a “new period of 
development” by leaving behind its “inhibitions and looseness in activity” almost like a historic 
relic. The LAI was now characterised by its “systematic revolutionary mass activism” due to its 
revised and “distinct political line”.1088 
      The LAI Executive meeting was expected to signal a new beginning for the LAI. By the end of 
it, however, the organisation had been exposed as one which had reached the end of its road as a 
political actor. For Münzenberg, the session proved, nonetheless, that “our theories and ideology 
are so good that they are alive and at work”, yet this was nothing more than shallow talk. The 
reconstitution of the LAI Executive in 1931 and this meeting in Berlin (the last one ever to take 
place) was the fork in the road announcing the onset of sectarianism. The LAI’s sectarian 
behaviour strengthened its narrow-minded and open obedience towards communism as well as 
towards the Comintern’s “class against class” policy, as it likewise contributed to distancing the 
LAI from the political scene both in Berlin and beyond. 
      Helmut/Dimitrov concluded after the session had ended that the preparatory work done at the 
International Secretariat for this LAI Executive meeting had been “very poor”. This was based on 
the fact that very few delegates of the European communist parties from “the major imperialist 
countries” had bothered to attend, while its report on the European question and the national 
minority movement remained a blank page due to the “absence of representatives” from Alsace-
Lorraine, Flanders, Catalonia and the Basque province. According to Helmut/Dimitrov, this 
epitomised the inherent and “very weakness of the League”, where the “neglect of work in this 
area” in the European communist parties (“the PCF and its attitude is directly scandalous”) was 
destroying any attempt to revive the LAI. If this continued, Helmut/Dimitrov argued, it would be 
difficult for the LAI to “influence and give new impetus to the national revolutionary movement in 
Europe”. Ferdi believed that despite the organisational shortcomings, the session had proven the 
possibility of organising the LAI along a “more systematic” line; an argument also raised by 
Münzenberg and Heckert in their report to the Secretariat of the IRH in Moscow, which had 
concluded that the LAI Executive meeting was the end of “disharmony”, caused by “compromises 
or open alliances” with unreliable “persons and groups” (the ILP, Maxton, Nehru, Gupta, Hatta 
and Fimmen). Impressions of the meeting continued as Magyar observed that the session had 
exposed “no particular differences”, while the personal intervention of the WEB, particularly that 
                                               
1088 “Die Kolonial-Unterdrückten tagen!“, Welt am Abend, Berlin, 4/6-1931; “Gegen koloniale Unterdrückung. Tagung  
der Exekutive der ‚Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit’“, Inprecorr, No.55, 9/6-1931; “Vor 
einer neuen Entwicklungsperiode der Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit“, von C. Husny, 
Inprecorr, No.60, 23/6-1931. For the articles above, see also SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 55-58a. For Mahmud 
Husni al-‘Arabi, see Joel Beinin & Zachary Lockman, Workers’ on the Nile. Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the 
Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, p.194. Husni al-‘Arabi left 
Egypt for Europe in the summer of 1930, as local authorities were harassing him due to his political activism. 
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of its leader Helmut/Dimitrov, on “the question of oppressed peoples” had saved the event from 
ending in disarray.1089 However, are the arguments introduced above a fair account of the event? 
According to the verbatim record of the LAI Executive meeting,1090 several of the actors had 
commented on the uncertainty within the LAI and the sections. This verbatim record also indicates 
that Münzenberg, Ferdi, Smeral and Ford were in control of the session, whereas others present 
e.g. Bridgeman, Jäger, Scholze, Kouyaté and Chatto stated that both the LAI and the anti-
imperialist movement were in a precarious position. 
      While Münzenberg had introduced the historical dimension of the LAI, Smeral outlined the 
new political agenda of the LAI: the revolutionary national minority movement in Europe. 
Apologising for the “extensive resolution”, Smeral nonetheless focused essentially on attacking 
the LSI and the Amsterdam International, rather than on explaining the principal aim of getting the 
LAI to approach the national minority movement. Later, Smeral’s report was edited and published 
as an article, “Der Kampf um eine vernünftige Organisation der Welt”, in the July issue of Der 
Rote Aufbau. In this article, Smeral claimed that twenty-one European countries persistently 
oppressed national minorities as a result of the Versailles Peace Treaty, nations which received 
eager support from the “imperialist policy” of the League of Nations. Smeral’s performance in 
Berlin and his ensuing article were nothing more than a salute to the Soviet Union and its “national 
organisation”, declaring that it was “the only country in the world in which all nationalities are 
equal”. This was merely a repetition of the Comintern’s policy on the national question, which 
would again be re-stated by Kuusinen at the ECCI Presidium session in Moscow on 6 June.1091 
      Ford’s report on the Negro question ended with the conclusion that the LAI had to recognise 
that “the blacks are an important factor in the struggle against imperialism”. While this was 
nothing more than a rhetorical act, Kouyaté’s disheartening report made Ford react. Kouyaté stated 
that the French LAI Section was a complete mess, while the structural setting in Berlin prevented 
                                               
1089 Helmut/Dimitrov reported to the ECCI that the representative of the PCF, Gadyar, had arrived on 4 June, just in  
time to attend the final meeting of the “fraction bureau”. The “fraction bureau” was an instrument used to control the 
LAI Executive meeting and consisted of Helmut/Dimitrov (WEB), Lenz (KPD), Magyar (Eastern Secretariat), Ferdi 
and Münzenberg, see fol. RGASPI 499/1/33, 44, (Confidential) Letter from ”Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to ECCI, 
Moscow, 8/6-1931 and Ferdi’s report, RGASPI 542/1/49, 281-287, Bericht des Bureaus der Fraktion der 
Exekutivsitzung der Liga gegen Imperialismus, author: Ferdi, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 31/5-1931; RGASPI 
539/2/432, 7, Bericht über die Sitzung des Exekutiv-Komitees der anti-imperialistischen Liga, Münzenberg & 
Heckert, Berlin, to the IRH Secretariat, Moscow, June 1931 [arrived in Moscow 23/6-1931]; RGASPI 542/1/48, 110-
115, (Confidential) Report from “A. B.” [Magyar], Berlin, to Kuusinen/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/6-1931. 
1090 Put on record by the secretary [unknown] at the unknown location for the meeting in Berlin. 
1091 RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931. Smeral concluded in  
Der Rote Aufbau that the following twenty-one European countries acted as oppressive “hosts” against national 
minorities (marked out on a map): Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Iceland, Estonia, Germany, France, Greece, Great 
Britain, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Spain, South Slovenia, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary. According to Smeral, the LSI and the Amsterdam International represented the “tools of the MacDonald 
government”, see Bohumír Smeral, “Der Kampf um eine vernünftige Organisation der Welt”, in Der Rote Aufbau, 
Berlin, 15. Juli 1931, IV. Jahrg. Heft 11, pp.504-509. 
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the German LDRN from carrying out any kind of activity. The LDRN’s predicament troubled 
Ford, urging Kouyaté to work “more energetically”, although Ford conceded that it was difficult to 
achieve any results as Kouyaté was completely alone in Berlin.1092 
      Paul Scholze, the IAH delegate, tried to explain the IAH’s current relations with the LAI, while 
admitting that the IAH’s “organisational weakness” in the colonies was entirely due to its lack of 
contacts. Apparently, Scholze intentionally avoided mentioning the historic tie between the IAH 
and the LAI; yet the IAH had supported the LAI financially from the beginning. However, this had 
not helped to strengthen the network of the IAH outside Europe. Scholze admitted that the IAH 
was experiencing the present moment as difficult as, like the LAI, the IAH had lost several 
collaborations to “different organisations”. Later in 1931, however, an appraisal of the relations 
between the LAI and the IAH appeared in the IAH’s book Solidarität. Zehn Jahre Internationale 
Arbeiterhilfe, which had allegedly been written by Münzenberg and the Czechoslovakian 
communist, Otto Katz. Furthermore, Solidarität had been released in connection with the Tenth 
Anniversary of the IAH in 1931, and presented a picture which differed in many respects from 
Scholze’s report. For example, the IAH’s support had (rightfully) secured the establishment of the 
LAI in 1927, with Münzenberg stating that it had been an initiative which illustrated the IAH’s 
moral stimulus as both a defender and a protector of proletarian solidarity, e.g. by organising 
solidarity campaigns in support of the Chinese and Indian national revolutionary struggles.1093 
Münzenberg’s depiction contrasted with Scholze’s evaluation of the IAH and its relation to the 
LAI. Thus, while Münzenberg argued that the IAH had given the LAI its moral support from the 
beginning, he neglected to mention that the LAI was also the result of the IAH’s administrative 
and financial support. 
      Bridgeman kept his report on the British LAI Section short, concluding that Maxton’s 
“treachery” had inflicted “great difficulties … to overcome” for the section. This particularly 
concerned the official ban, sanctioned by the Labour Party, prohibiting any member of the social 
democratic movement in Great Britain from joining the LAI. After the LAI Executive meeting, 
Bridgeman returned to London and to the despondency of the section. In August, Bridgeman 
accused the International Secretariat “of overlooking the fact that we have no staff and very little 
money”, and questioned how the International Secretariat even had the nerve to urge the section to 
                                               
1092 RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931. Ford was only able  
to attend the meeting for a short while, and left in all haste, according to the keeper of the minutes, concluding that he 
seemed “stressed about something” during his “much reduced” speech, see further in Weiss (2011). 
1093 RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931; Münzenberg 1931,  
pp.331-334. The LAI organised public demonstrations in Berlin, Hamburg, Remscheid, Cannstatt bei Stuttgart, 
Leipzig, Erfurt, Worms and Vienna. 50,000 people attended the meeting in Hamburg, where the leader of the KPD, 
Thälmann, delivered a speech, joined by Bilé on the rostrum, A-I-Z, Jahrgang. X, No. 26, Neuer Deutscher Verlag, 
Berlin, p.522. 
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distribute both its special issue of the A-I-Z, “Leben und Kampf der Schwarzen Rasse” (published 
in the summer of 1931) and The Anti-Imperialist Review at the expense of the section. Apparently, 
the International Secretariat demanded that the British LAI Section buy 800 copies of The Anti-
Imperialist Review, thus Bridgeman wondered whether the LAI “centre” in Berlin realised that the 
situation in London had reached a critical level: 
Do not overestimate our ability to assist you. We will do all we can, but as I have already 
said we have not got any staff or any resources, and can only therefore do one thing at a 
time. I regret this weak state of affairs, but the suggestions which you have made with regard 
to the distribution of the Review indicate that you have got an entirely incorrect idea as to 
our position.1094   
The Secretary of the German LAI Section, Hans Jäger, described a section in a confused and weak 
state concluding that, in comparison to “former organisational standards”, the LAI barely existed 
in the country. Jäger argued that the failure of the section was a result of the political situation in 
Germany, where the “double battle” against “the reformists and then against the fascists”, as well 
as the surveillance by the security services, was consuming a lot of energy. Yet, this struggle was 
also suffering from the constant lack of resources (“no money for posters or events”), leaving the 
section reduced to a passive behaviour, capable only of organising small anti-imperialist 
demonstrations in Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Essen and Remscheid. 
Jäger concluded that both the aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress and the “purification process” 
had caused immense damage to the section, especially with the loss of intellectuals, pacifists, 
socialists and other non-party activists, and yet, the section wanted “to make everything work and 
would not fall short compared to the other sections”.1095      
      At this LAI Executive meeting, Chatto introduced himself as the LAI representative on the 
Indian question. Since this was Chatto’s final performance on behalf of the LAI (which he did not 
disclose at the meeting), his report was an act of self-criticism on the errors of past times, 
especially on the failure to establish a vigorous anti-imperialist movement in India. Chatto stated 
                                               
1094 RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931; RGASPI 542/1/52,  
26, Letter from Bridgeman, London, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 26/8-1931. For the special issue on the 
“Black race”, see A-I-Z, “Sondernummer: Leben und Kampf der Schwarzen Rasse”, Jahrgang X., Nr. 26, Berlin, 
Neuer Deutscher Verlag (1931). Heinrich Stahr concluded that the “Sondernummer” was one of the few existing 
examples highlighting the situation of the Black race in the USA (Stahr, 2004, pp.394-398). The “Sondernummer” 
included an article by Ford (“Die schwarze Rasse stösst zür Roten Front”) as well as other articles which gave an 
account of the “slaves of the white master” (Sklaven der weissen Herren) and the “cheapest hands of the world”, in 
which the latter phrase referred to the systematic use of child labour in Africa. This special issue was a joint effort by 
Münzenberg and Padmore, based on the writings of Scott Nearing in Black America. Padmore had provided an IAH 
functionary in Moscow (who had “only one arm”) with Nearing’s book, who in turn passed it on to Münzenberg, who 
used the book as inspiration to design the “Sondernummer”. On 3 March, 1932, Padmore asked Gross to tell 
Münzenberg that he wanted his book back, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/753, 155, Letter from Padmore, Hamburg, to 
Gross, Berlin, 3/3-1932. 
1095 RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931. 
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that “much had been done” since the Frankfurt Congress, however the LAI’s reaction to the 
Nehru’s “betrayal” had been a disappointment. For Chatto, the LAI’s hesitancy in responding with 
conviction and the reluctance to foment a strong, political campaign against Nehru had damaged 
the organisation. Chatto regretted having trusted Nehru, a person who had “capitulated to Gandhi 
… over and over again”, urging the delegates at the meeting to understand that his (Chatto’s) sole 
objective had been to establish the LAI in India, an aim which depended on establishing “personal 
connections” from Europe to India. Chatto’s final statement was a musing over the above, as well 
as a reflection on the work to continue developing the LAI’s activities in Berlin and England: 
More Indian companions have to participate in the work of the League, and to create closer 
work with the British section. Berlin is always referred to as a section of Moscow. Now this 
is not true. Berlin offers a direct and undisturbed connection with the colonies. 2 million 
Indians live outside India as labourers. The English ports are a very busy traffic of Indians. 
This has to be approached in some way, also the large numbers of West Indian students [in 
England].1096 
This would be Chatto’s epitaph and legacy at the International Secretariat. Nevertheless, during 
this LAI Executive meeting, Münzenberg avoided mentioning in his report on “organisational 
questions” the fact that Chatto was about to leave Berlin, stating only that “important personal 
changes are to be made after some employees resign”. According to the verbatim record, 
Münzenberg concluded that the change in personnel was part of a re-structuring of the LAI in 
1931, referring to the LAI as “in essence, [...] a committee built upon no organisational 
foundation” unable to execute “substantial work”. How did Münzenberg define “work” in this 
context? Münzenberg argued that the LAI was a leading actor in a number of international 
propaganda campaigns (the Meerut trial and the well-known Sacco and Vanzetti case in the USA), 
and was a pivotal actor in protesting against the “imperialist agents”: the LSI and the Amsterdam 
International. While this meeting of the LAI Executive in Berlin aimed to revive the LAI as a 
“non-party organisation”, Münzenberg stated that the organisation did not depend on either the 
consent or the participation of the “leaders of social democracy”. Thus, the meeting in Berlin 
symbolised the re-birth of “valuable political and ideological ideas”, Münzenberg stated: 
The LAI is reflected in its organisational […] strength, its actual influence is not reflected. 
We actually have more, […] stronger influence than we realise. […] Our theories and 
ideologies are so good that they live and work, even without organisations to distribute and 
process them, they exist. The most important result of our conference is the alliance between 
                                               
1096 RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931. 
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the LAI and the organisations of national minorities and, through this alliance, the League 
shall become a world organisation.1097 
To give substance to the vision of developing the LAI into a “world organisation”, the delegates 
approved the following seventeen members to constitute the LAI Executive:  
 
Table 9.1: The LAI Executive Committee, June 1931 
Member Country, or, Region 
Münzenberg (general secretary) Germany 
Robert Dunn USA 
Abdul Madjid Indonesia [India] 
Hamdi el Husseini Middle East 
Chandra Chatterjee India 
[?] Petruschewitsch West Ukraine; part of Poland 
Alex Gossip England 
[?] Pavlov Hungary [imprisoned in Sofia] 
Reginald Bridgeman England 
Harry Pollitt England (NMM) 
Shapurji Saklatvala India 
A. Herclet France 
Augustino Sandino Latin America 
Georgi Dimitrov/Helmut Balkan 
John Ford Negroes; USA 
G. Melnitschansky The Soviet Union 
Huan Ping China1098 
 
A new set of members to the LAI General Council was also appointed at the Berlin meeting: 
Anastasov from Macedonia, the Indian Gopal Basak (one of the accused in the Meerut trial), the 
Albanian Boschi Lano, Jim Larkin Jr. from Ireland, A. Mesta from the Thracian region, the South 
African A. Nzula and Padmore.1099 As one of its first acts, the LAI Executive endorsed a revised 
                                               
1097 Münzenberg wanted to increase LAI activity on all levels, e.g. the representatives of national minority  
organisations should be guaranteed a seat on the LAI Executive; organise a congress on the European national 
minority question; strengthen the youth work; re-launch The Anti-Imperialist Review; and develop “mass work” in 
Germany and England, see fol. RGASPI 539/2/432, 7, Bericht über die Sitzung des Exekutiv-Komitees der anti-
imperialistischen Liga, Münzenberg & Heckert, Berlin, to the IRH Secretariat, Moscow, June 1931 [arrived in 
Moscow 23/6-1931]; RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931. 
1098 SAPMO BA-ZPA R 8051/82/8, 718-724, Handwritten notes, Willi Budich, Berlin, 1-2/6-1931. 
1099 Only Lano attended this LAI Executive meeting. The official report (an edited version of the unofficial protocol  
and Münzenberg and Heckert’s report), had deleted the names of well-known communists who had participated at the 
meeting, e.g. Ford, Dimitrov, Melnitschansky, Pollitt and Münzenberg, only to include the names of Robert Dunn, 
Abdul Madjid, Hamdi el Husseini, Chatterjee, Petruschewitsch, Vlachoff, Saadi from Arabia and Rattan Singh of the 
Ghadr Party, see fol. RGASPI 539/2/432, 15-17, Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus und für 
nationale Unabhängigkeit, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R 8051/82/8, 718-724, Handwritten notes, Willi 
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political programme for the LAI, an agenda which Manuilsky had presented during a discussion of 
the end of the crisis in September 1930 (see previous chapter). The LAI Executive also instructed 
the International Secretariat to improve its work in order to turn the LAI into “a world 
organisation”. This request focused, above all, on strengthening its propaganda and the “enormous 
importance of the liberation struggle of oppressed nations” as well as the unification of “every 
revolutionary workers’, peasant and national revolutionary organisations in the colonial countries” 
as a measure to protect communications running from Europe to both the Middle East and the 
Negro liberation movements in Africa and Latin America.1100 The resurrection of the LAI 
Executive in Berlin exposed the fact that the LAI was a cover organisation in the service of the 
Comintern (“a communist front organisation”). In conclusion, this LAI Executive meeting also 
exposed the International Secretariat as a centre about to implode due to its shattered structure and 
sectarian tendencies. Thus, the resurrection of the LAI Executive marked the arrival of 
sectarianism. 
 
* 
 
A Stagnant Movement 
Ferdi argued that the resurrection of the LAI Executive had put an end to the “illegal character” of 
the LAI. The challenge now though was how the International Secretariat should realise the revival 
of the LAI as a non-political actor. Firstly, the International Secretariat intended to distribute 
information on the LAI Executive meeting to the sections and, secondly, “the working masses” 
had to be convinced to support the new line. However, the brief moment of euphoria at the 
International Secretariat vanished rather quickly, replaced by a feeling of apprehension and 
stagnation. Magyar remained in Berlin after the LAI Executive meeting only to remark that if the 
LAI did not resume its activity, the organisation would miss the opportunity to do so. In 
Helmut/Dimitrov’s opinion, the issue was of a more pragmatic nature, informing the ECCI that the 
International Secretariat had to first become “operational” before being able to capitalise on the 
                                                                                                                                                          
Budich, Berlin, 1-2/6-1931; SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit, Berlin [June 1931]. 
1100 According to an article, “A Decisive Stage in the Development of the League against Imperialism”, authored by  
Ferdi (signed “F”, translated from French to English by Chatto), and published in The Anti-Imperialist Review in 
September 1931, the LAI had a new, political direction: “The LAI came into being at a time when the domination of 
the national bourgeoisie in the anti-imperialist movements of national liberation had attained its zenith. […] the last 
session of the Executive Committee accomplished a task which had been left too long in suspense. It finally liquidated 
the abnormal situation which resulted from the formal presence in its midst of elements not in accord with its essential 
principles. […] gave the League a definitely revolutionary political line and that it imposed the obligation on all its 
members of fighting effectively for the complete independence of the colonies, the semi-colonies and the countries 
containing oppressed national minorities, insincere elements continued to remain within its ranks [Nehru, Maxton, 
Fimmen, Hatta]”, “F“ [Ferdi], “A Decisive Stage in the Development of the League against Imperialism”, in The Anti-
Imperialist Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, September-October, 1931, pp.15-24. 
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“big opportunity” to establish a “partisan fighting alliance of the liberation movements of the 
colonial and semi-colonial countries, the nationally oppressed in Europe and the revolutionary 
proletariat and peasantry in the imperialist countries”.1101 Nonetheless, the International Secretariat 
was also suffering from the pressure of having to undergo a re-organisation on the individual level. 
While the LAI Executive meeting celebrated the idea of resuming a “higher level” of activity, in 
reality the International Secretariat was embarking upon its most sombre period, defined by a 
sectarianism which raged across the international communist movement during 1931. 
      Despite Münzenberg’s lively performance at the LAI Executive meeting, in fact the gulf 
between him and the LAI was, at this point in time, enormous. For Helmut/Dimitrov, this friction 
caused enormous irritation, telling the ECCI to order Münzenberg to cease acting indifferently and 
to contribute more actively to the work of the LAI, despite the fact that “he has many other works” 
which consumed Münzenberg’s energy and attention, especially the preparations for the Tenth 
Anniversary of the IAH (scheduled to convene in Berlin on 9-15/10-1931).1102 With Chatto having 
lost his authoritative position at the International Secretariat, and without Münzenberg’s patronage, 
no other individual seemed capable of assuming responsibility at the International Secretariat. 
According to both Helmut/Dimitrov and Magyar, the capacity of the other remaining members was 
at its best limited. Ferdi was “a good comrade” but a “poor organiser” who had no “political 
initiative whatsoever”, while “York”/Thögersen was an “active and agile” person, yet unable to fill 
the gap left by Chatto. The stagnant atmosphere only increased when Smeral declared that he 
wanted to resign from the International Secretariat (see further below). Thus, the Eastern 
Secretariat instructed Ferdi to take care of the curricular activity for a short period so that the 
International Secretariat did not completely lose control. On 18 August, Ferdi concluded that the 
summer “course for eight Indian students” in Berlin had given “the impression that they have 
benefitted” from it.1103 However, the first step of the individual re-organisation at the International 
Secretariat was introduced on 16 July, when Magyar informed the Political Commission in 
                                               
1101 Ferdi informed the Eastern Secretariat that the resolutions had been published in a pamphlet (German and English  
versions) in June, and preparations for “a French and Arabic edition” were on the way, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/49, 
281-287, Bericht des Bureaus der Fraktion der Exekutivsitzung der Liga gegen Imperialismus, author: Ferdi, to the 
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 31/5-1931, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 128; RGASPI 542/1/48, 110-115, (Confidential) 
Report from “A. B.” [Magyar], Berlin, to Kuusinen/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/6-1931; RGASPI 499/1/33, 44, 
(Confidential) Letter from “Helmut”/Dimitrov, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 8/6-1931. 
1102 RGASPI 499/1/33, 44, (Confidential) Letter from “Helmut”/Dimitrov, Berlin, to ECCI, Moscow, 8/6-1931;  
RGASPI 495/30/715, 7-10, “Resolution zum Bericht des Genossen Muenzenberg ueber die Arbeit der IAH in der 
Beratung der Agitprop des EKKI”, 17/6-1931. 
1103 RGASPI 542/1/48, 128; RGASPI 542/1/48, 110-115, (Confidential) Report from “A. B.” [Magyar], Berlin, to  
Kuusinen/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/6-1931; RGASPI 499/1/33, 44, (Confidential) Letter from  
Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 8/6-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 147, Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to the 
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 18/8-1931. 
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Moscow of the “new” International Secretariat: CPGB member Clemens Dutt, Ferdi, 
York/Thögersen and the Polish communist Joseph Berger (“Bob”, “Boris”).1104 
      Clemens Dutt assumed Chatto’s position as “International Political Secretary” at the 
International Secretariat and became responsible for its curricular activity. In August 1931, Dutt 
arrived in Berlin and held a course on “the Basis of the Action Program for the Communist Party 
of India”. The process to confirm Dutt as Chatto’s replacement turned into a vitriolic procedure, 
characterised by its defamation. Magyar had in fact nominated Robin Page Arnot as the most 
desired candidate to take over Chatto’s position at the International Secretariat. However, Arnot 
had other obligations which prevented him from assuming the position. Clemens Dutt was the 
second preferred candidate who, according to Magyar, was “a person without any initiative”, 
incapable of carrying out either “organisational or political” work. Yet, Magyar acknowledged that 
Dutt was “a man of words” because of his professional background as a publicist and journalist. 
With no other suitable candidate to be found (J. T. Murphy was briefly mentioned as a third 
candidate), Magyar accepted the fact and sent an instruction to Dutt to resign as editor at the 
publishing house Markus Lawrence (Ltd.) in London and to travel to Berlin in August. In August, 
the Political Commission notified the International Secretariat “kom.Fraktion” that Dutt was the 
“colonial member at the Secretariat”.1105 
      In July 1931, Smeral declared his intention of not wanting to continue as a secretary of the 
LAI. Unwilling to carry out the assignments demanded of him, Magyar and Helmut/Dimitrov 
realised that the Smeral question required an urgent solution. Why did Smeral want to leave the 
LAI and Berlin? Apparently, already prior to the LAI Executive meeting, the Political Commission 
had discussed that Smeral wanted “another candidate” to replace him in Berlin.1106 However, in 
                                               
1104 RGASPI 495/4/122, 25, (Secret) Short note [in Russian] regarding the LAI, 16/7-1931. Joseph Berger, born in  
Cracow in 1904, emigrated to Palestine in 1920, and founder of the Communist Party of Palestine. In the latter half of 
the 1920s, Berger underwent political education in Moscow (ILS or KUTV), later to assume a position as an emissary 
of the Comintern (known pseudonym: “Barzilai”). Berger arrived in Berlin on 1 October, 1931, Lazitch 1986, p.23; 
RGASPI 542/1/48, 155, Short note from Berger, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 6/10-1931. 
1105 The Political Commission instructed the Central Committee of the CPGB to find another “Comrade” as a  
replacement for Dutt at the publishing house. According to Ferdi, the nomination of Dutt had apparently caused 
disorder within the CPGB leadership. Yet, the Political Commission remained unconvinced as to whether Ferdi’s 
statement was accurate, telling him that it did not matter if Dutt, or J. T. Murphy were poor organisers, Dutt was “only 
half an Indian”, but he could speak and write in German, something Murphy was unable to do. In fact, the Political 
Commission suspected that “some English Comrades just want to get rid of Murphy”, RGASPI 495/4/124, 1-2, 
Protokoll Nr.161 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 27/7-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 136, 
(Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Berlin/Moscow, to “kom.Fraktion” [Münzenberg, Ferdi, York] des Sekretariats 
LAI, July, 1931. For Murphy discussion, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 142-143, (Confidential) Letter from the Eastern 
Secretariat, Moscow, to the LAI Secretariat, Berlin, 31/7-1931; RGASPI 495/154/783, 15, Letter from Pol.Comm., 
Moscow, to Ferdi, Berlin, 12/8-1931. 
1106 RGASPI 542/1/48, 110-115, (Confidential) Report from “A. B.” [Magyar], Berlin, to Kuusinen/Eastern  
Secretariat, Moscow, 23/6-1931; RGASPI 499/1/33, 44, (Confidential) Letter from “Helmut”/Dimitrov, Berlin, to 
ECCI, Moscow, 8/6-1931; RGASPI 495/4/109, 6-7, (Streng vertraulich! Für Sondermappe!) Protokoll Nr.142 der 
Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. EKKI, 23/5-1931; RGASPI 495/4/119, 7-8, (Streng vertraulich! Für 
Sondermappe!) Protokoll Nr.152 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 3/7-1931. 
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comparison to the case against Chatto, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters showed a 
lenient attitude towards Smeral. If Smeral left the LAI, the main challenge for the Comintern 
would be to find a new assignment for him within the hierarchy. Smeral expressed an irrevocable 
desire to resign and, prior to departing for his vacation in July, Smeral told the “kom.Fraktion” that 
he did not know whether he would return to the International Secretariat.1107 Smeral had grown 
tired of being in Berlin and hoped to find a new direction within the international communist 
movement. While spending the summer holidays with his family in Czechoslovakia, Smeral 
assisted the CPCz in Prague during the municipal electoral campaign. “In early October” Smeral 
expected that Ferdi would have some information “on his fate”, before even considering whether 
he would return to Berlin. Thus, on 13 October, the Political Commission decided to transfer the 
“Smeral question” to the party in Prague. In the meantime, the WEB notified the “kom.Fraktion” 
that the Smeral question would soon “be determined”.1108 Rumour had it that the Political 
Commission had sent Smeral an instruction on 23 October to return to Moscow for a meeting with 
the General Council of the Profintern, although, in the end, this meeting never took place. In fact, 
Smeral left Berlin sometime in November or December 1931 and travelled to Czechoslovakia 
instead of returning to Moscow. In Prague, Smeral delivered a couple of lectures in the beginning 
of 1932 on the progression of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. On 15 April 1932, the 
Political Commission discussed a request from Münzenberg, proposing that Smeral assume the 
leadership of the Czechoslovakian IAH section.1109 In conclusion, Smeral’s departure from the 
International Secretariat also witnessed the end of the “old guard” at the LAI bureau in Berlin. In 
the second half of 1931, the International Secretariat had a new set of devotees. 
 
* 
 
                                               
1107 Magyar explained that due to the fact that “almost all employees are on leave” on summer holidays, the work at  
Comintern headquarters had came to a halt, and nothing could be done until the Political Secretariat had evaluated this 
question. This left Smeral with no other option than to remain in Berlin, RGASPI 542/1/48, 128, Letter from Ferdi, 
Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 8/7-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 136, Letter from Magyar, Berlin/Moscow, to 
Kommfraktion des Sekretariats LAI, July, 1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 140-141, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, 
Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 31/7-1931. 
1108 RGASPI 542/1/48, 148-150, Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 24/9-1931. A copy of  
this report was sent to the Political Secretariat, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 160-163; RGASPI 495/4/145, 1-3, 
Protokoll Nr. 187 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr am 13/10-1931. Berger wondered whether the 
Eastern Secretariat could speed up its work on reaching a decision on Smeral, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 155, Short 
note from Berger, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 6/10-1931; RGASPI 542/1/54, 94-95, Letter from WEB, Berlin, 
“an die Kommfraktion des Sekretariats der “Antiimperialistischen Liga”, Berlin, 16/10-1931. 
1109 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/279, 86, (Abschrift, Berlin den 19. August 1932) Betrifft: Durchsuchung der Räume der  
‘Liga gegen den Imperialismus’, Bezug: Berichte vom 31/12-1931, Der Polizeipräsident, Berlin; RGASPI 
495/272/3640, 1-2, Certificate: Anketa Bohumír Smeral, Moscow, [undated]; RGASPI 495/4/183, 1-5, Protokoll Nr. 
236 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr am 15/4-1932. However, the Political Commission decided 
to transfer the question entirely to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In 1934, Smeral 
left Berlin and travelled with Vasil Kolarov to Outer Mongolia as Comintern emissaries to assist with the work of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Mongolia, see Lazitch 1986, p.434. 
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“Why We Appear” 
The International Secretariat attempted to act as the LAI’s spokesperson after the LAI Executive 
meeting in Berlin. In order to do so, the LAI organ, The Anti-Imperialist Review, was re-launched 
in September 1931. As noted in the introductory note, the International Secretariat stated that the 
reason “why we appear” was to function as the focal point of the international anti-imperialist 
movement. Hence, the moment had arrived to extend and intensify its “activities to a 
corresponding degree” and, with the release of The Anti-Imperialist Review, each member of the 
LAI had a theoretical manual on how to develop and strengthen the anti-imperialist movement. 
The International Secretariat believed that this Review represented a communicative channel for 
the LAI. Above all, the journal was “a weapon” to “rally the forces” in the propaganda against the 
Versailles peace treaty in support of the colonial struggle, and to advocate a re-constitution of 
Europe’s borders on the principle of national self-determination.1110 
      The publication of The Anti-Imperialist Review was one of the few undertakings the 
International Secretariat succeeded in realising after the LAI Executive meeting in 1931. 
According to Ferdi, the review had been “edited … perfectly”.1111 The curricular activity 
continued to represent a central source from which the International Secretariat could find 
“political material” in Europe, however, the primary question was either to develop or support a 
number of propaganda campaigns in 1931. For example, in the second half of 1931, the 
International Secretariat devoted itself to developing a campaign in connection with the 
Manchurian crisis. In September, the WEB released a statement declaring “in defence of the Soviet 
Union and the Chinese revolution” and against the “Japanese offensive”. This statement set out the 
initiation of a support campaign under the supervision of the LAI in Berlin. However, the WEB 
was in total control of this campaign, with Ferdi performing his role as liaison, and Kunizaki 
acting as an advisor.1112 Another question was the Scottsboro case in the USA, a campaign which 
quickly assumed the character of a global protest movement. The case centred on a legal action 
involving nine young Afro-American males, who had been arrested on 25 March 1931, charged 
with having raped two white young females. For the communist movement in the USA, the 
Scottsboro case was one of the major propagandist exercises during the 1930s, registering the 
services and support of the CPUSA and the IRH [better known as the International Labour 
Defence in the USA; ILD]. In Europe, the LAI was part of the communist machinery supporting 
                                               
1110 International Secretariat, “Why we Appear“, in The Anti-Imperialist Review, Vol. 1 September-October 1931, No.  
1, Berlin, pp.3-8. 
1111 RGASPI 542/1/48, 128, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 8/7-1931. 
1112 RGASPI 542/1/48, 148-150, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 24/9-1931. For the joint protest,  
see Degras, “Appeal by the West European Bureau of the ECCI and the European Secretariat of the RILU on the 
Japanese Invasion of Manchuria”, vol. III, 1965, pp.176-179. Taken from Inprecorr, xi, 93, p.2080, 29/9-1931. 
444 
 
the IRH campaign, e.g. by distributing material to the left-wing press and publishing articles. For 
example, on 4 July 1931, Inprecorr published an article by the International LAI Youth secretariat 
[York/Thögersen], “Erkämpft Leben und Freiheit der acht [sic] jungen Neger”, declaring its 
solidarity in support of the defendants.1113 The question at this point in time was, however, whether 
the International Secretariat was on the verge of collapsing due to its sectarian tendencies. 
Moreover, the Chief of Police suspected that the International Secretariat represented a vital hub 
for the international communist movement, especially channelling intelligence back and forth to 
Moscow, an activity supported by a global network of communist agents.1114 
      Ferdi emphasised that the International Secretariat had to carry out some kind of regular 
activity after the LAI Executive meeting in Berlin. Yet, with Chatto about to leave, and Smeral 
refusing to work at the bureau in Berlin, the International Secretariat lacked personnel. 
Nonetheless, on 8 July, Ferdi informed Magyar that a Hungarian communist, Leitner, had arrived 
in Berlin in June. According to Ferdi, Leitner was a “good revolutionary … very capable” in the 
colonial question and “the Negro question”, and had proficient linguistic skills in English, German 
and French. In fact, Ferdi concluded that Leitner seemed overqualified to work at the International 
Secretariat, wondering whether the Eastern Secretariat could ask Piatnitsky if there was a position 
for Leitner in the OMS in Moscow (“let him come to you and give him a job that matches his 
skills”). While Magyar concluded that Leitner could become a leader of “the ECCI translation 
services apparatus” in Moscow, Ferdi, on the other hand, had to send additional documents on 
Leitner before the Comintern could authorise him to travel to Moscow.1115 
      On the question of the “oppressed national minorities in Europe”, Ferdi told the Eastern 
Secretariat that work was “progressing”. This particularly concerned the distribution of 
information (“circular letters”) to national minority organisations in Europe.1116 Münzenberg’s 
                                               
1113 Walter T. Howard (ed.), Black Communists Speak on Scottsboro. A Documentary History, Temple University  
Press, Philadelphia, 2007, pp.1-21; Miller, Pennybacker and Rosenhaft (2001). Prominent and “important Party 
leaders of color” (William Patterson, Harry Haywood, Ford, Cyril Briggs, B. D. Amis, Padmore, and Eugene Gordon) 
were involved in this protest campaign; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1501/20200, 62, “Erkämpft Leben und Freiheit der acht 
jungen Neger“, Inprecorr, No.71, 4/7-1931. 
1114 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 68, Der Polizeipräsident, Abteilung IA., Berlin, an Herrn R. R. von Lengriesser,  
12/8-1931. 
1115 Leitner escaped from Hungary in 1931, leaving his wife behind who, in turn, ended up in a prison in Budapest.  
Known to the others within the “Hungarian mafia” in the Comintern, for example, Gyula Alpári and Magyar, Leitner 
was an entrusted “Comrade”, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 128, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 
Moscow, 8/7-1931. For Magyar’s reply, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 142-143, (Confidential) Letter from the Eastern 
Secretariat [Magyar], Moscow, to the LAI Secretariat, Berlin, 31/7-1931. Leitner was not, however, assigned as a 
translator. Instead, he remained in Berlin throughout 1931 and became seriously ill in December. An arrangement was 
made to send him to Moscow “in the care of MOPR [IRH]”, once he was “strong enough to undertake the voyage”, 
RGASPI 542/1/56, 2, Letter from “Hans” [York/Thögersen], Berlin, to Chatto, Moscow, 21/1-1932. 
1116 In the summer of 1931, the International Secretariat published petitions and public manifestos against both the  
“counter-revolutionary terror in China” and the “arming of the Zionists of Palestine by British imperialism”, RGASPI 
542/1/48, 137-138, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 25/7-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 147, 
Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 18/8-1931. 
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opinion and expectations of the new line were of a more modest character, telling Magyar: “I await 
with great interest the decisions signalled by you in the matter of the league. This is urgently 
needed since the International Secretariat currently is not very productive”.1117 As part of the 
solution in resolving the difficulties at the International Secretariat, caused most likely by Chatto’s 
sudden fall from grace and the arrival of Clemens Dutt in Berlin, the Eastern Secretariat promised 
the “kom.Fraktion” to appoint a permanent liaison for the LAI at Comintern headquarters.1118 
Working conditions at the International Secretariat did not improve, however, especially after the 
ECCI appointed Ferdi as its emissary to the Communist Party of Turkey. This assignment required 
Ferdi to travel frequently to Turkey to hold meetings and to organise the party’s ideological and 
organisational work. Other members of the International Secretariat were becoming anxious and 
started to question whether it would ever be possible to get the work up and running again.1119 
      The major problem for the International Secretariat and the “new line” was its lack of reliable 
contacts to the national minority movement. It did not help that the propaganda emanating from 
the International Secretariat highlighted this problem, e.g. Informationsdienst (an LAI publication) 
included articles on the political situation in Eastern Europe, the “struggle of the Belorussian 
peasant”; the Ukrainian minority and its relation to the Polish state; the Basque nationalist 
movement; and the Flemish independence movement in Belgium. The results of this propaganda, 
and whether this undertaking increased the number of International Secretariat contacts, are 
complex questions to evaluate. The visit by the representative of the Irish Republican Party, 
Peader Or’donell [sic], to the International Secretariat, which focused on how to re-organise the 
Irish LAI Section in September 1931, is perhaps illustrative of the assumption that the propaganda 
did indeed have some kind of effect. After returning to Ireland, Peader O’Donell organised a 
public LAI meeting in Dublin in December 1931 against the extension of the Bill “to protect 
public security”, an event attended by “a thousand strong crowd of workers”.1120 
      The WEB monitored whether or not the International Secretariat was managing to put the “new 
line” into practice, however, it fairly quickly lost patience with how the work was progressing. 
                                               
1117 RGASPI 542/1/48, 139, Short note from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 25/7-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48,  
136, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Berlin/Moscow, to Kommfraktion des Sekretariats LAI, July, 1931. 
1118 RGASPI 542/1/48, 140-141, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 31/7-1931; 
RGASPI 542/1/48, 142-143, (Confidential) Letter from the Eastern Secretariat [Magyar], Moscow, to International 
Secretariat LAI, Berlin, 31/7-1931. Curiously, Magyar thanked Münzenberg for having sent a pair of shoes to him in 
Moscow, expressing that “you have made a man completely happy”. 
1119 This decision did not mean that Ferdi was about to resign from the International Secretariat, far from it, it merely 
added depth to his mission as a Comintern agent in Europe, above all to strengthen the national minority question, see 
fol. RGASPI 495/154/783, 12-14, Information re. Ferdi (streng vertraulich), Moscow, 3/8-1931. 
1120 RGASPI 542/1/48, 148-150, Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 24/9-1931; 
Informationsdienst der Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit, Internationales Sekretariat, No.2, 
Berlin, 2/9-1931, pp.12-13; RA SE/RA/420640.02, Del 6, EK der IRH Agitprop, Information über Irland, December, 
1931. 
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Helmut/Dimitrov told the International Secretariat “kom.Fraktion” to let the WEB use the LAI’s 
European network in order to get the work heading in a new direction. In November, the WEB 
additionally provided the “kom.Fraktion” with a “sanctioned version” of a resolution on 
“oppressed nationalities” in Europe, along with the instruction to circulate this resolution to all 
LAI sections and to all organisations associated with the LAI. The perceived success of these 
WEB interventions was confirmed in a report by Helmut/Dimitrov to the ECCI: “I enjoy how the 
work on the oppressed nations and national minorities in Europe is progressing in the League”.1121 
The WEB’s active intervention to correct the work of the International Secretariat on the national 
minority question confirmed the LAI’s inability to adjust itself to the “new line” and to find new 
contacts. The issue of the national minority movements reduced the LAI to being nothing more 
than a distributor of propaganda, focusing on letter-writing campaigns, publishing articles and 
despatching resolutions. For example, on 8 December 1931, the LAI Executive published a protest 
in Inprecorr against the oppression and persecution of national minorities in Poland.1122 This 
strategy continued in 1932, with articles being published in the Informationsbulletin on the 
“oppressed national minorities” in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the Balkan region, Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia, reports which included criticism of the League of Nations and its treatment of the 
national minority question in Europe.1123 
      In 1931-32, the International Secretariat also organised public demonstrations, special 
seminars and introduced the idea of organising an “international conference of oppressed nations 
and national minorities”. While the former activities were supported by the MASCH in Berlin, 
which provided a location for the LAI to give a lecture on the “heroic Balkan struggle” on 19 
August, 1932,1124 the idea of an international conference was a test of faith involving a whole host 
of actors. An unknown representative of the IRH, who was either living in or was on a mission to 
Berlin, informed “Hertha” – the pseudonym for the Russian Elena Stasova, one of the leaders at 
                                               
1121 RGASPI 542/1/48, 169, Short note from kom.Fraktion Liga, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 6/11-
1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 176, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 7/11-1931. 
1122 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 72, Inprecorr, “Protest der ‘Liga gegen Imperialismus’”, No.49, 8/12-1931. The 
political situation in the eastern Polish borderlands, particularly the tense relations between the Polish and Ukrainian 
populaces, characterised by the nationalist struggle of the Ukrainian liberation movement, came to a head with the 
Polish drive for power and its revanchist ambitions. During the first years of the 1930s, this situation deteriorated even 
further. With the formation of the OUN (Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv; Organisation of Ukrainian 
Nationalists) in 1929, the Polish state was now facing a violent opponent. In addition, the national minority question 
in Poland was a source of discontent that troubled not just Poland, but also its relations with neighbouring nations and 
the League of Nations, see further in Tadeusz Piotrowski, Poland’s Holocaust. Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with 
Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, 1998, 
pp.177-178, and Steiner (2005). 
1123 The LAI accused the League of Nations of merely seeking “reconciliation and national reformism” rather than 
promoting national self-determination, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 126-129, Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus, Nummer 11, März 1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 136-139, Informationsbulletin der Liga 
gegen Imperialismus, Nummer 13, Mai 1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 145a, “Gegen nationale und koloniale 
Unterdrückung. Zum Achten Kongress der nationalen Minderheiten in Wien“, Inprecorr, No.25, 28/6-1932. 
1124 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 159, Die Welt am Abend, No.192, 17/8-1932. 
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IRH headquarters in Moscow – that Willi Budich and Heckert had met the “kom.Fraktion” in 
October. The primary aim of the session had been to convince the LAI to do “joint work” with the 
IRH and, that if they did so, this would be “of great help for our movement [the IRH] in the 
colonies and semi-colonies”. Apparently, these negotiations succeeded to some degree. In May 
1932, the IRH organ, the MOPR, announced in an article, “Die IRH und die antiimperialistische 
Liga”, the unification of the IRH and the LAI in the “struggle against imperialist war and the war 
threat against the Soviet Union” and in “defence of the Soviet Union”. A fundamental prerequisite 
for this collaboration was, nevertheless, a mutual consensus on how best to arrange the 
international conference. Firstly, the interactionism between the LAI and the IRH focused 
essentially on an interchange of services in order to cultivate political activism on a global scale. 
For the LAI, this meant helping the IRH to establish sections or committees in South Africa, India, 
and Indonesia, with the IRH network in Latin America being at the service of the LAI. Secondly, 
to celebrate this “joint work”, Ferdi, Berger and Münzenberg discussed with Budich and Heckert 
in Berlin in October 1931 the plan to organise an “international conference of oppressed nations 
and national minorities”. However, this meeting generated no definite answers1125 and remained 
unresolved until January 1933. During the visit of “Falkner” [?], a Comintern emissary, the 
members of the International Secretariat raised the question of the conference. Once “Falkner” had 
returned to Moscow, he/she informed the ECCI Secretariat of the International Secretariat’s 
request to prepare and hold a conference of “oppressed nations and national minorities”, but only 
on the condition that the Comintern granted the budget of 2,000 Marks.1126 On 27 January 1933, 
Kuusinen assessed the idea of this conference and convinced the Political Commission to endorse 
the decision to let the LAI arrange “a conference of European national minorities … in 3-4 
months”.1127 However, with the Nazi regime’s ascendancy to power in Germany on 30 January 
1933, the idea of and momentum for this conference evaporated. 
 
* 
 
The Decline of Curricular Activity      
When Clemens Dutt arrived in Berlin in August 1932, curricular activity at the International 
Secretariat entered its final phase. Internal constraints, caused by the structural changes to the 
                                               
1125 RGASPI 539/2/425/1, Letter from unknown author, Berlin, to “Hertha” [E. Stasova], Moscow, 1/11-1931. Other 
people attending these meetings at the International Secretariat were Padmore, Bilé and Luis Carlos Prestes from 
Brazil (a “Communist agitator” according to the notes of the MdI), see fol. RGASPI 534/3/668, 120-121, Report from 
Padmore, Hamburg, to Otto Huiswood, Moscow, 16/11-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 161, IAN 2165 p/7.9. 
Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, 20/9-1932. 
1126 RGASPI 542/1/58, 1, Letter from Falkner, Moscow, to “Anna/Aina” [?], Moscow, 11/1-1933. 
1127 RGASPI 495/4/228, 5-6, (Streng vertraulich) PROTOKOLL (B) Nr.291 der Sitzung der Politkommission des  
Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 27/1-1933. 
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International Secretariat apparatus, as well as the consequences of the global recession, increased 
both the radicalism and the political extremism of the Weimar Republic and contributed to putting 
the LAI’s nerve centre in a political gridlock. The social and economic situation was undermining 
the International Secretariat; however, the Eastern Secretariat did not consider this to be sufficient 
grounds on which to grant a rapid influx of money to sustain its curricular activity. Magyar told 
Münzenberg that “despite the crisis … the best and most correct method to raise money” was to 
organise proletarian solidarity “collections” in Paris and Berlin.1128 
      Its curricular activity represented an opportunity for the International Secretariat to find 
devoted anti-colonial activists in Europe. As Chatto had been forced to leave Berlin, the 
responsibility for evaluating the “political material” fell on Ferdi’s shoulders, a process which 
involved developing a technique to circumvent the surveillance of the French and German national 
security services. This left Dutt in charge of the courses, which were essentially focused on the 
Indian student community in Berlin, while Ferdi travelled to Paris to assess the anti-colonial 
movement and, in some cases, invite “desirable elements” to attend the courses in Berlin. 
However, the combination of a constant lack of money and the vigilance of the Sûreté in Paris, 
made it difficult to get the candidates to leave Paris and to cross the French-German border. This 
created a breach in the work to fulfil the original aim of the courses: to provide the educational 
units in Moscow (the ILS and the KUTV) with students. Despite Ferdi’s French hiccup, Dutt 
continued to hold the courses for colonial students in Berlin, attended primarily by individuals 
who were either living in Germany, or had arrived from England. The KOSTUFRA helped Dutt to 
“entice young people” at German universities to take the LAI’s colonial courses in Berlin. In 
addition, the International Secretariat instructed the KOSTUFRA to send information, if they 
found any promising candidates, to the leader of the local branch of the LAI, intelligence later 
passed on to Ferdi. This facilitated Ferdi’s work of assessing the candidates, particularly in 
determining whether the person(s) were reliable enough to take the course. If a candidate gained 
Ferdi’s trust, he/she could travel to Moscow and enrol for political education at either the KUTV 
or the ILS. The case of the Indian student Narain is illustrative of this process. In Clemens Dutt’s 
opinion, Narain was a reliable and ardent person, suitable for political education at KUTV. Yet, 
Ferdi questioned Narain’s intentions and wanted to do “a new inquiry about him” after having 
discovered “several inconsistencies in his statements”, telling the Eastern Secretariat the following 
about Narain: 
                                               
1128 RGASPI 542/1/48, 144, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 1/8-1931. 
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In general, this young man seems to have a healthy mentality, which indicates a small 
glimmer of adventure if he receives a good education, he is probably capable of a being a 
good, but mediocre, revolutionary fighter.1129 
In the end, Piatnitsky approved Dutt’s proposal to send Narain to Moscow; however, whether he 
ever arrived in Moscow remains unknown. Ferdi’s continual efforts to find students in Paris came 
to nothing as he “came back empty-handed” to Berlin.1130 Why did Ferdi’s attempt to find 
candidates in Paris fail? The “kom.Fraktion” stated that the central problem was the 
misunderstanding between the International Secretariat and the Central Committee of the PCF in 
Paris, with the latter refusing to respond to any communications or to provide any support. The 
Eastern Secretariat was able to draw its own conclusion since “we have not in the last three months 
received a single reply to our numerous letters and suggestions” to the PCF, the International 
Secretariat explained.1131 
      The second half of 1931 confirmed the dependency of the International Secretariat on the 
Eastern Secretariat at all levels, with the curricular activity being no exception. The courses had 
also veered away from the original vision once outlined by Chatto: to provide a fundamental 
understanding of the Marxist-Leninist perception of the colonial question and imperialism, and to 
find recruits for communism. Under Dutt and Ferdi’s leadership, these courses primarily 
functioned as a channel for finding “revolutionary fighters”. Yet, at same moment, the 
International Secretariat was not alone in wanting to find students inclined towards anti-
colonialism. In Hamburg, Padmore and Kouyaté were working together to send African students to 
Moscow for political education at the KUTV, an operation they co-ordinated through both the 
International Secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat.1132 
                                               
1129 RGASPI 542/1/48, 148-150, (Confidential) Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 24/9-
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“we don’t object to N. [Narain] coming to us if our Friend Fr. [Ferdi] agrees to it”, while on 13 January, 1932, 
Piatnitsky authorised the decision to send Narain. Whether he ever travelled to Moscow remains unknown, see fol. 
RGASPI 542/1/48, 177, Short note from “kom.Fraktion Liga”, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 11/11-1931; 
RGASPI 542/1/48, 181, Short note from “kom.Fraktion-Liga”, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 2/12-1931; RGASPI 
542/1/48, 187, Note from unknown source, Berlin or Moscow, to the LAI, Berlin, 31/12-1931; RGASPI 542/1/54, 21, 
Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 13/1-1932. 
1131 RGASPI 542/1/48, 154, Letter from “Komfraktion Liga“, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 4/11-1931; 
RGASPI 542/1/48, 169, Letter from “Komfraktion Liga”, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 6/11-1931. 
1132 Kouyaté organised a journey to Moscow and the KUTV for two African students [unknown] in November  1931.  
As a confirmation of the arrangements, Berger and Ferdi received a note from the Eastern Secretariat that “two Negro 
people” would soon arrive in Moscow. This line of work pressured Padmore, who complained about the ordeals of 
getting the proper support from the KPD. The organisational procedure Padmore had to confront in his contacts with 
the KPD was a structure defined by a rigorous bureaucracy administered by the secretary of the ZK KPD in Berlin, the 
Lithuanian Max Ziese, whose “attitude” according to Padmore was “simply objectionable”, see fol. RGASPI 
534/3/668, 120-121, Report from Padmore, Hamburg, to Otto Huiswood, Moscow, 16/11-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 
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Sectarianism determined the character of the International Secretariat after the resurrection of the 
LAI Executive at the meeting in Berlin in May-June 1931. Fear and paranoia led to exclusion 
becoming a common practice, with both believers and anti-colonial activists being described as 
either trustworthy or untrustworthy. However, in reality, sectarianism was consuming the 
International Secretariat, with its case against Chatto and its suspicious behavior vis-à-vis “the 
political material”, both symptoms of the worsening situation. For Chatto, it was not enough to 
have been an active member and believer in the anti-imperialist vision since 1926. No longer 
belonging to the inner core – a structure now reserved for Münzenberg, Smeral and Ferdi – and 
having to face the charge of having committed “political dishonesty”, Chatto was reduced to a 
shadow of his former self at the International Secretariat. For the International Secretariat in 
December 1931, it was no longer a question of “why we appear”, but rather the actors in Berlin 
were suddenly confronted with the question of “whether we appear at all”. 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
183, Short note from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Berger and Ferdi, Berlin, December 1931. For relations 
between Padmore and Ziese, see further in Weiss (2011). 
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Chapter 9. Nadir  
 
At about 11 am the door-bell rang. 
York/Thögersen, Berlin, to Chatto, 
Moscow, 21/1-1932 
 
The non-party League is in fact a communist organisation … [which] administers an 
extensive network of men of confidence [Vertrauensmännernetz] scattered over the whole 
Earth.   
Superintendent Sattler, Berlin, 24/12-19  
 
For us [the Eastern Secretariat] it was an incredibly painful surprise that the police were able 
to find in the League office documents not intended to fall into the hands of the police. You 
[Ferdi] write that the raid was a “disaster”. Concerning the current conditions in Germany, 
you should have been prepared that not one, but several house searches are being carried out. 
[…] We recommend Comrades quite categorically to immediately destroy our letters and 
telegrams after reading. 
The Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ferdi, 
Berlin, 19/1-1932 
  
The Schutzpolizei and the political police (IA) raided and ransacked the International Secretariat at 
24 Friedrichstraβe on 21 December, 1931. Leaving the heart of the LAI shattered and exposed, the 
incalculable consequences of this raid marked the beginning of the LAI’s nadir, defined in terms of 
illegality, external pressure, frailty, decline and depression. For the International Secretariat, whilst 
the former problems of the LAI had primarily been a question of combating internal clashes, this 
raid marked the beginning of the lowest point thus far in the history of the LAI. Once the 
consequences of the raid had become apparent, no further political space would be made available 
for the LAI in either Berlin or beyond. York/Thögersen contacted Chatto in Moscow (who was 
then awaiting the ICC’s verdict), to describe the raid in detail. After ringing the bell to the bureau 
of the International Secretariat, “22 bulls” from the Schutzpolizei and the political police (IA) 
stormed in, remained there for eight hours (11 am to 7 pm) and confiscated “all correspondence, 
printed matter, Cardex, accounting books, etc.”. York concluded that the police had “messed up the 
place, collected every scrap of paper or written matter which looked suspicious”. Every person 
visiting the bureau, members and individuals (sixteen in total) were arrested and hauled off to the 
IA for interrogation: Ferdi, Clemens Dutt, Berger (“Bob”), the Polish communist Valnitsky, 
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Kunizaki, York/Thögersen, Ella Windmüller, and Frieda Schiff, “Petigura”, “Vigdor”, “a Bulgarian 
Comrade” and “Odette”. At IA headquarters, the police officers subjected everyone to a body 
search before being cross-examined, and released each person after having first signed a written 
statement. Berger was the only one not released, charged with possessing “a false passport”. 
Transferred to the Moabit prison in Berlin, Berger received a minor sentence and spent a couple of 
months in prison and, when he was released, he had to leave Germany. To provide Berger with 
legal service, Münzenberg assigned a lawyer, “Dr. Apfel”, at the expense of the International 
Secretariat. It was a decision not appreciated by several of the International Secretariat members. 
According to York/Thögersen, this lawyer was a “money-grabber” who cost “a pretty penny!”, 
while concluding that the humiliation and disorder caused by the raid had shaken the International 
Secretariat to its very core: 
The “raid” has naturally retarded us to a great extent in carrying on our work. In fact, we 
only received our correspondence-files, Cardex, etc., the other day. Many documents (62 in 
number, according to the IA statement) are still with the CID authorities. Clemens, Valnitsky, 
Ella, Odette, Frieda and I are regularly in the Office while Ferdi avoids coming now-a-days 
(of course, we have arranged to meet him from time to time). All in all, the Office is rather 
“dead” just now. […] This state of affairs cannot continue any longer. It is very harmful, to 
say the least. Why! We haven’t as yet been able even to organise an open protest meeting!1133 
Before the raid, the International Secretariat had been suffering from an inherent weakness; 
however, the consequences of the raid hinted at the possible closure of the International Secretariat 
in Berlin or, in the words of York/Thögersen: “the Office is rather ‘dead’ just now”. What were the 
initial effects of this raid, and how did this episode affect the International Secretariat? 
 
The raid resulted in unwanted and unexpected exposure for the LAI in Germany. A dilemma not 
helped by the more deeply divisive political milieu in Berlin, characterised by actual violent battles 
between the communist and Nazi movements. According to Eric D. Weitz, 1932 was the year the 
Weimar Republic was “governed by a presidential dictatorship” which held two Reichstag 
elections, two presidential elections and had three consecutive Reich chancellors. In Berlin, the 
streets were dominated by a continual presence of police authority, a major factor interpreted as 
conservative and rather supportive of the Rightist political movement. Furthermore, as Sace Elder 
observes in a study of the police in Weimar Berlin after 1930, the police became “increasingly 
engaged in policing subversive political groups”. Exercising its influence over many aspects of 
everyday life in Berlin, the probationary techniques of the policy authority – surveillance and 
                                               
1133 RGASPI 542/1/56, 2, Letter from “Hans” [York/Thögersen], Berlin, to Chatto, Moscow, 21/1-1932. Articles in the 
German communist press also mentioned the figure of sixteen arrested individuals. 
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infiltration – cracked down on radical and subversive political movements. This strategy 
succeeded in reaching all the way into the inner sanctums of both the LAI and the anti-imperialist 
movement. Nevertheless, the raid had had different effects on those involved. According to 
York/Thögersen, despite Berger’s confinement to prison, he was “lively and active” while 
Clemens Dutt acted “medium” and was in “a bad state of health and frame of mind” and Ferdi was 
“as usual phlegmatic”.1134 Meanwhile, the MdI analysed the evidence collected from the raid (the 
confiscated documents), material which confirmed their suspicion that the LAI was both by its 
nature and its structure a cover organisation for the Comintern, used to foment and support the 
activities of both the international communist movement and the KPD. Moreover, the raid on the 
International Secretariat was a practical expression of the attempt by German authorities to 
suppress the left-wing movement in Germany. On 23 December, the Hamburg police stormed the 
bureau of the International Seaman’s Club (Internationalen Seemansclub), a cover and location for 
activities linked to both the ITUCNW and the Profintern. The police literally tore the club apart 
and confiscated propaganda material, brochures, magazines and documents. For Padmore, this 
episode was a humiliating experience, telling York/Thögersen that “since the affair we have been 
completely isolated from each other […]. For heaven’s sake, break the silence, for you are the only 
friend with whom we have any connection”.1135 
      The MdI and the Auswärtige Amt initially focused their attention on classifying and identifying 
the documents confiscated from the International Secretariat and, secondly, on analysing and 
verifying whether the LAI was a communist organisation sponsored by and part of an international 
network. Nonetheless, the independent act of the Schutzpolizei to raid the International Secretariat 
had provided the MdI and the Auswärtige Amt with sufficient evidence on the LAI. The question 
is, however, why did the raid take place when it did? According to the Berlin Chief of Police, the 
Schutzpolizei decided to act swiftly in order to confirm their inkling that “the bureau of the LAI” 
was a haven “for foreigners and foreign Communist refugees in the possession of not orderly 
passports”, and that the International Secretariat stored derogatory publications against the Weimar 
Republic.1136 
                                               
1134 Weitz 2007, pp.122-123; Sace Elder, ”Murder, Denunciation and Criminal Policing in Weimar Berlin”, in Journal  
of Contemporary History, Vol 41 (3), Sage Publications, London, 2006, p.404, 406; RGASPI 542/1/56, 2, Letter from 
“Hans” [York/Thögersen], Berlin, to Chatto, Moscow, 21/1-1932. 
1135 See Weiss (2011); Aitken (2008). See also the dated and biased article by Rüger 5/1967, pp.782-797. For  
Padmore’s letter, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/754, 25, Letter from Padmore, Hamburg, to Hans T. [York/Thögersen], 
Berlin, 7/1-1932. Padmore ended the letter by sending “best New Year wishes to Elly [Ella Windmüller] and yourself”. 
1136 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 76, Der Polizeipräsident, Abteilung I [Abschrift], Berlin, an den Herrn Minister 
des Innern, Berlin, 31/12-1932. The MdI received Sattler’s report on 12 January, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 75, 
Schönner, Berlin, an den Herrn Reichsminister des Innern, Berlin, 12/1-1932. The MdI Intelligence Department 
informed the Prussian Minister of the MdI of the raid on 24 December, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 74, 
Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, an den Herrn Preußischen MdI, Berlin, 24/12-
1931. 
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      The MdI completed a brief analysis of the LAI in January: a report distributed from Berlin to 
the provinces (Landesregierungen), while intelligence on the raid reached, for example, MI5 in 
London who kept minutiae on the raid of the LAI bureau.1137 The raid provided the German 
security services with access to and an in-depth understanding of the communist movement in the 
Weimar Republic, above all of the organisational structure and network of “Red Berlin”, which 
confirmed that the city functioned as a “Comintern village”. The documents at the International 
Secretariat had also disclosed a number of ties the LAI had to other subversive actors within the 
communist movement, but they also finally ended the illusion of the LAI being a non-party 
organisation. For example, correspondence between the International Secretariat and the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Belgium included directives and plans for future activities, 
while cash receipts from the ZK KPD cashier [Max Ziese] proved the regular flow of money back 
and forth between the LAI and the KPD.1138 Several documents also proved the “close contacts” 
between the International Secretariat and the WEB. The raid provided the Berlin Chief of Police 
with intelligence suggesting the presence of an actor called the WEB in Berlin, and its close links 
to the Comintern. Before the raid, the WEB had been perceived as a shadowy actor and just one of 
many actors on the communist subversive scene, however, the raid led the authorities to an 
understanding suggesting that the WEB was the institutional actor manoeuvring and controlling 
the West European communist movement. Consequently, if Berlin was the operative centre for the 
international communist movement outside the Soviet Union, this threatened the very foundation 
of German society, the Berlin Chief of Police concluded.1139 According to the Assistant Police 
                                               
1137 Information on the LAI went to every regional agency in Germany. According to the document 
“Nachrichtenstellen der Landesregierung” (Information Agencies of the National Provinces), 18 districts and 
provinces received in-depth intelligence on the LAI: 1. Preußische Minister des Innern [crossed over in the document]; 
2. Bayerisches Ministerium des Innern, München; 3. Polizeidirektion München; 4. Polizeidirektion Nürnberg-Fürth in 
Nürnberg; 5. Sächs. Ministerium des Innern Dresden-N, Königs Ufer 2; 6. Württembergisches Ministerium des Innern; 
7. Polizeipräsidium Stuttgart; 8. Badisches Landespolizeiamt in Karlsruhe; 9. Thüringisches Ministerium des Innern, 
Weimar; 10. Hessisches Polizeiamt Darmstadt; 11. Mecklenburg-Schwerinsches Ministerium des Innern, Schwerin; 
12. Kriminalabteilung der Staatspolizei Neustrelitz; 13. Polizeipräsidium Braunschweig; 14. Oldenburgisches 
Staatsministerium Oldenburg; 15. Anhaltisches Staatsministerium Dessau; 16. Polizeidirektion, (Z. St.), Polizeihaus, 
Zimmer 450, Bremen; 17. Polizeibehörde, Hamburg; 18. Polizeiamt Lübeck, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 
162, Nachrichtenstellen der Landesregierungen (In Doppelumschalg zu versenden), [compiled by:] Der Preußische 
Minister des Innern, 18/1-1932. Additionally, the raid had raised an interest in the LAI among foreign intelligence 
services, for example, MI5, which now gained access to information on individuals who worked at the International 
Secretariat. Intelligence added to the existing files on Gibarti and York/Thögersen, TNA PRO KV 2 1056 Information 
on H. P. THOGERSEN, taken from the Raid of the LAI Office in Berlin and given by German authorities [undated 
1932]. For Gibarti, see TNA PRO KV 2 1401, Relating to Gibarti, Louis Otto. REPORT ON DOCUMENTS SEIZED 
IN RAID ON LAI OFFICES IN BERLIN. 
1138 The Assistant Police Commissioner, Sattler, argued that evidence such as the articles in The Anti-Imperialist 
Review, and the finding of a Rotafix machine, which the International Secretariat used in order to print and distribute 
self-made pamphlets, were enough to confirm the subversive character of the LAI, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 
77-80, Bericht, Hilfskriminalkommissar Sattler, Berlin, 24/12-1931. 
1139 The Berlin Chief of Police suspected that the WEB was running a courier service between “Russia and the West 
European Communist parties and organisations” and was an actor that controlled every “organisation affiliated to the 
Comintern” in Germany. The documents from the raid provided an opportunity to initiate an analysis of the 
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Commissioner Sattler, the LAI wields authority over “an extensive network of men of confidence 
scattered over the whole Earth”,1140 while on 14 March 1932, the MdI concluded that: 
 […] there can be no doubt that the LAI in Berlin is a central point for international 
communist propaganda work, in particular for the anti-war work. […] it appears that the 
League, which claims to be a non-party organisation, in reality constitutes a communist 
organisation, which operates in almost all countries of the world in sections, a kind of work 
that simultaneously strives to influence the oppressed towards communism. The League 
maintains an extensive, scattered network of agents all over the world, who report [back on] 
all transactions of a political nature to the General [International] Secretariat in Berlin.1141  
 
* 
 
Public Reactions 
The German communist press covered the raid extensively. As a social institution in Germany and 
Berlin, the press had a decisive role in magnifying incidents or episodes of a political character.1142 
For Münzenberg, therefore, the raid offered an opportunity to instruct both the IAH’s media 
apparatus and his own Neuer Deutscher Verlag to set up a support campaign and to protest against 
the German authorities’ treatment of the LAI and its International Secretariat. The first reaction to 
“the “police action” appeared on 22 December 1931, in both Münzenberg’s Welt am Abend and in 
the KPD newspaper Die Rote Fahne, with the latter accusing the police of doing the dirty work of 
foreign governments. The reason why the press portrayed the police as being puppets in the 
service of foreign policy interests was a response to the protests linked to the nature of the LAI and 
its Manchurian campaign. According to Welt am Abend, the Japanese government experienced the 
LAI and its “colonial exploitation” as “an eyesore”. Thus, by shifting the focus from the raid to 
discussing Japan and its foreign policy, the German communist press hoped to use the opportunity 
to create propaganda against Japanese imperialism. This was in fact an initiative feverishly 
sponsored by the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow. In the aftermath of the raid, the Eastern 
Secretariat instructed the International Secretariat to develop the question of whether “Japanese 
                                                                                                                                                          
communist conspiracy and its network in Germany. According to a letter from the International Secretariat to the 
WEB, the contact between the LAI and the ZK KPD was evident: “To the ZK KPD, 6.10.31. The enclosed [letter] was 
handed over to the WEB. Since it is addressed to the German party, we pass it on to you after we have taken notice of 
it [the content]. We leave it to you to make use of it in a way you feel it right to do. With greetings. International 
Secretariat“. However, the Berlin Chief of Police was not able to decipher some of the individuals linked directly to 
the WEB, e.g. the identity behind the pseudonym “Helmut” remained a mystery. At this moment, Dimitrov was in 
Moscow, and he returned to Germany in June 1932, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 120-122, Der 
Polizeipräsident/ Goehrke, Der Preuβischer Minister des Innern, an den Herrn Reichsminister des Innern, Berlin, 18/3-
1932. For Dimitrov’s whereabouts, see “Zeittafel”, in Bernhard, 1982, p.194. 
1140 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 77-80, Bericht, Hilfskriminalkommissar Sattler, Berlin, 24/12-1931. 
1141 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 116, Herrn Oberregierungsrat Erbe, Berlin, 14/3-1932. 
1142 Elder 2006, p.409. 
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provocation had played a role”, a strategy set in motion after having read Kunizaki’s report to the 
Eastern Secretariat.1143  
      Articles on the ransacking of the International Secretariat poured out of the mouths of the 
Münzenbergian press apparatus. On 23 December, Welt am Abend published an article by 
Münzenberg, in which he introduced himself and Chatto (!) as the general secretaries of the LAI. 
In this article, Münzenberg criticised the social democratic newspaper, Vorwärts, for having used 
the raid as a pretext to “denounce” the LAI, and repudiated its claim that the LAI was “illegal and 
secret”. Münzenberg argued that the “public character” of the LAI had commenced in 1927, while 
the LAI in 1931 was “a broad, legal world organisation”, represented by German citizens at the 
International Secretariat. Münzenberg protested against the claim made in Vorwärts that the 
confiscation of forged passports found in the hands of “the foreigners … Bulgarians, Poles and 
Czechs” at the International Secretariat, sufficiently proved the fact that the LAI was a genuine 
communist front organisation. Vorwärts had highlighted the fact that “one person” [Berger] had 
intentionally concealed his identity by signing the interrogation statement with a false name, 
describing this as a shameful and deceitful act.1144 The LAI’s support campaign gained pace in 
January 1932, as Münzenberg’s “old guard” of prominent intellectuals declared their support for 
the LAI. Theodor Lessing expressed sympathy towards the higher purpose of “the Anti-Imperialist 
League” in Welt am Abend, while Ledebour referred to the “freedom of assembly” and the rights of 
the LAI to react and respond to the use of coercive policies by the authorities. In the end, however, 
the campaign slowly fizzled out. On 18 January 1932, Welt am Abend published its final 
pronouncement, “Für die Antiimperialistische Liga”, signed by Lessing, Otto Corbach, 
Goldschmidt, the secretary of the German IAH section Georg Dünninghaus, Lehmann-Russbüldt, 
Armin T. Wegner, the representative of the Internationalen Frauenliga für Frieden und Freiheit 
Magda Hoppstock-Hut, Wittfogel, Ledebour and Münzenberg.1145 
                                               
1143 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 83, “Polizei gegen Antiimperialistischen Liga“, Die Welt am Abend, No.298, 
22/12-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 73, “Polizeiaktion gegen die ‚Liga gegen den Imperialismus’”, Die Rote 
Fahne, No.215, 22/12-1931; RGASPI 542/1/54, 21, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the International 
Secretariat, Berlin, 13/1-1932. 
1144 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 86, “Die Aktion gegen die Antiimperialistische Liga”, Die Welt am Abend, 
No.299, 23/12-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 84, “Polizeiaktion gegen Münzenberg-Liga”, Vorwärts, 
No.599, 23/12-1931. The Eastern Secretariat was concerned about Berger, asking the International Secretariat whether 
he was going to remain in prison and, if so, what had happened in connection with the raid, and whether everything 
was being done to get him out of prison, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/54, 21. For other articles on the raid, see Die Rote 
Fahne, and Inprecorr, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 82, “Heraus mit den verhafteten Anti-imperialisten”, Die Rote 
Fahne, No.236, 23/12-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 85, Inprecorr, “Polizeiaktion gegen die Liga gegen 
Imperialismus“, No.51, 23/12-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 87, “Die Polizeiaktion gegen die 
Antiimperialistische Liga“, Die Rote Fahne, No.237, 24/12-1931. 
1145 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 88, “Für die antiimperialistische Liga”, von Professor Dr. Theodor Lessing 
(Hannover), Die Welt am Abend, No.6, 8/1-1932; SAPMO-ZPA BA R/1501/20200, 89, “Freiheit der 
Antiimperialistische Liga. Ein Appell von Georg Ledebour”, Die Welt am Abend, No.9, 12/1-1932; SAPMO-ZPA BA 
R/1501/20200, 91, “Für die Antiimperialistische Liga. Protesterklärung”, Die Welt am Abend, No.14, 18/1-1932. 
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* 
 
A Languishing Movement, Part II 
The chain of events after the raid confirmed the nadir of the International Secretariat in Berlin. The 
episode not only brought unwanted attention to the activities of the International Secretariat but, 
most importantly, it also damaged the structural relations between both the LAI and the Comintern 
and those between the LAI and other actors within the communist movement. While Comintern 
headquarters had a detached understanding of the actual consequences, the International 
Secretariat in Berlin, haphazardly thrown into a languishing state, was reduced to existing in a 
clandestine setting. In comparison to the languishing state of affairs during the anni confusionis of 
1930, this was a far worse situation, particularly as it appeared as though the International 
Secretariat had reached a dead-end. Still on its knees after the effects of the raid, the LAI also 
found itself overtaken by other operations run by the Comintern apparatus, especially the Anti-War 
Congress in Amsterdam on 27-29 August 1932, which inspired the establishment of the anti-war 
movement (the Amsterdam/Pleyel movement). For Münzenberg, the anti-war question was the re-
invention of the machine in terms of utilising his skills as instigator and organiser of sympathising 
organisations and committees. The anti-war campaign also witnessed the return of Gibarti as 
Münzenberg’s intermediary to both assist with and prepare the anti-war congress. 
 
The Eastern Secretariat could not initially understand the effects and damage the raid had inflicted 
on the International Secretariat. In one of the first communications from the Eastern Secretariat 
after the raid on 11 January 1932, the letter included no reference whatsoever to what had 
happened in Berlin. On the contrary, the Eastern Secretariat demanded that the International 
Secretariat contribute with $800 to financing a journey for Sukarno from Indonesia to Europe. The 
reason why Sukarno wanted to visit Europe was to leave Indonesia after his release from prison in 
Java on 31 December 1931, expecting to use the LAI as a way out.1146 The detached understanding 
at Comintern headquarters continued when the Political Commission ordered the International 
Secretariat to include an article written by Georgi Safarov, “Nationale Revolutionen in den 
Kolonien”, in its next issue of The Anti-Imperialist Review.1147 The central question at this stage, 
                                               
1146 It was estimated that Sukarno’s journey from Java to Europe would cost $2,000. However, Sukarno did not leave 
Java in 1932, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/54, 18a, “An die Liga”, Note from Boris (?)/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the 
International Secretariat, Berlin, 11/1-1932; Mrázek 1994, pp.87-89. 
1147 RGASPI 542/1/54, 24, (Confidential) Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ferdi, Berlin, 28/1-1932; 
RGASPI 495/4/161, 1-7, Protokoll (A) Nr.206 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, Moscow, 
31/1-1932. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Knorin, Pieck, Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Wassiljew, Gerisch, 
Codovilla, Miff and Magyar. 
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however, was whether the International Secretariat would ever be capable of publishing this 
journal again? 
      Another question was troubling the Comintern, however: the fact that the Schutzpolizei and the 
IA had got their hands on Ferdi’s documents, material which exposed the covert and highly secret 
organisational modus operandi of the LAI, as well as the identities of several Comintern agents. 
The Political Commission also feared that these documents would curtail Ferdi’s work as both an 
ECCI plenipotentiary and as liaison for the Communist Party of Turkey. Therefore, and despite the 
fact that Ferdi managed to avoid imprisonment, the Political Commission transferred the 
“conspiracy against Ferdi” to the ICC for further investigation. The major aim for doing so was to 
assess whether the “damage”, caused initially by Ferdi by letting sensitive documents fall into the 
wrong hands, constituted a serious breach in discipline.1148 The Eastern Secretariat did not approve 
of Ferdi’s mistake and accused him of acting irresponsibly because he had not destroyed sensitive 
documents after reading them. This careless act had affected other individuals. The German 
communist and Comintern agent, Grete Wilde (party name: Erna Mertens; 1904–1943/44?), 
explained in a letter to the OMS in Moscow in January 1932, that Ferdi’s arrest was a “very 
uncomfortable” incident as it put her mission in Turkey at risk, especially as the seized documents 
included “some very important addresses” in Turkey.1149 
      Ferdi had not followed the protocol every Comintern emissary, plenipotentiary, instructor or 
agent on a mission outside the Soviet Union had to adhere to. On 19 January 1932, the Eastern 
Secretariat reminded him that, “we recommend Comrades quite categorically to immediately 
destroy our letters and telegrams after reading”. Aside from its criticism of Ferdi’s negligent 
behaviour, the Eastern Secretariat wondered when the International Secretariat could resume 
activity despite the chaos caused by the raid. The central question was if and when the 
International Secretariat could begin developing “an independent field of activity”, according to 
the Eastern Secretariat. The latter request did concern political activity, it was a remark made 
                                               
1148 RGASPI 495/4/163, 1-3, Protokoll (A) Nr.208 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 9/1-
1932. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Pieck, Knorin, Gerisch, Wassiljew, Thorez, Kun, 
Angaretis, Codovilla, Miff, Williams and Safarov. 
1149 RGASPI 495/266/38, 160, (Streng vertraulich), Auszug aus dem Brief aus Konstantinopel von Grete Wilde, OMS, 
Moscow, January, 1932 [arrived in Moscow 19/1-1932]. The accusation against Ferdi was a serious one, the Eastern 
Secretariat stated. On 19 January, the Eastern Secretariat asked in a letter to Ferdi whether Wilde/Merten’s 
interpretation was correct, and whether “a series of letters and addresses” had been “found” during the raid. If so, this 
could result in the arrest of “people in Turkey”. In order to position himself, Ferdi explained to the secretary of the 
ICC, the Lithuanian communist Zigmas Angaretis (real name: Aleksa; 1882 – 1940) that the German authorities had 
not made “any statement to the Turkish embassy”, and that the seized documents were “entirely legal matters: 
correspondence and information to sections, general opinions, manifestos and press material” and not, as Wilde had 
stated, ciphered letters. Additionally, Ferdi claimed to have contacted the OMS apparatus in Berlin, as well as sent a 
warning to the “Turkish comrades” in Constantinople on 23 December, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/54, 23, Letter from the  
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ferdi, Berlin, 19/1-1932; RGASPI 495/266/38, 168, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to 
Angaretis, ICC, Moscow, 3/3-1932 [arrived in Moscow 7/3-1932]. 
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against both the inability of the International Secretariat to take its own “initiatives” and its 
dependency on consulting the Eastern Secretariat on “every question”. However, the Eastern 
Secretariat did admit that the situation in Berlin was serious. Ferdi should therefore make every 
effort to take the step “to go temporarily into illegality” and for a brief period, shut down all 
communications with Moscow after having sent “a detailed report on the house search”.1150 This 
period of illegality ended in March 1932. After abandoning the bureau at 24 Friedrichstraβe, the 
International Secretariat re-located itself in an office at 13 Hedemannstraβe.1151 
      Both prior to and after the raid, Münzenberg had, apart from his press campaign, disassociated 
himself from the International Secretariat. In February 1932, Münzenberg used the occasion of the 
fifth anniversary of the LAI to re-introduce the LAI and to raise awareness of the anti-imperialist 
movement in Germany. In a number of articles, Münzenberg outlined the history of the LAI in 
relation to the recent series of events, all written using the Comintern’s endorsed policy. As noted 
in the articles (“Fünf Jahre Antiimperialistische Liga” in Welt am Abend, “Fünf Jahre anti-
imperialistischer Kampf” in Der Rote Aufbau and “Fünf Jahre Liga” in Pressedienst), Münzenberg 
concluded that the LAI aimed to continue with “its gaze from the left”. This referred explicitly to 
condemning the behaviour of former “reformist” members (Lansbury, Maxton and Nehru), which 
had contributed to bringing the LAI down and had prevented the organisation from “earning the 
trust of workers and peasants in the colonies”.1152 Münzenberg wanted to re-define the reasons 
why the LAI had found it so difficult to generate activity. Thus, the answer was not to be found in 
the repression by governmental agencies in Germany, but in the contempt displayed by the LAI’s 
adversaries. The celebration of the LAI’s fifth anniversary passed by unnoticed, particularly as the 
International Secretariat had momentarily gone underground and consequently lost all contact with 
the anti-colonial community in Berlin. Apparently, anti-colonial activists began to experience 
Berlin as a location curtailed by the coercion of the Schutzpolizei and, at the same time, the LAI as 
an organisation was perceived with distrust within the German communist movement.1153 
                                               
1150 RGASPI 542/1/54, 21, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 13/1-
1932; RGASPI 542/1/54, 23, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ferdi, Berlin, 19/1-1932. For an 
introduction to the “conspiratorial environment” and the destruction of sensitive documents, see Rosenfeldt vol.2, 
2009, p.179. 
1151 SAPMO-BA ZPA 1507/279, 79-93, Der Polizeipräsident, Abteilung I, Berlin, an den Herrn Minister des Innern, 
Berlin, 19/8-1932; RGASPI 542/1/54, 23, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ferdi, Berlin, 19/1-1932. In 
March 1932, the International Secretariat announced in the Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus 
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1152 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 94, “Blick von links. Fünf Jahre Antiimperialistische Liga”, Die Welt am Abend, 
No.39, 16/2-1932; Willi Münzenberg, ” Fünf Jahre anti-imperialistischer Kampf“, in Der Rote Aufbau, Berlin, 1. Mai 
1932, V. Jahrg. Heft 9, pp.387-390; RGASPI 542/1/46a, 37-39, “Fünf Jahre Liga”, Pressedienst, Nr. 3 (Der deutschen 
Sektion der Liga), Berlin. 
1153 For example, the Chief of Police had examined the document “Kurse für koloniale Studenten in Berlin”, SAPMO-
BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 105-106, Der Polizeipräsident, Berlin, an den Herrn Minister des Innern, Berlin, 24/2-1932; 
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      In the beginning of 1932, local police authorities in Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen increased 
their pressure against foreign elements in Germany, particularly against those suspected of 
carrying out subversive, political activism.1154 The case of the Indian journalist, Ayi Ganpat 
Tendulkar, further illustrates how the International Secretariat had to answer to the paranoia 
developing within the KPD. In April 1932, the Schutzpolizei decided to monitor the activities of 
Tendulkar in Berlin more closely, particularly his contacts with the International Secretariat, which 
led to the internal question of Tendulkar within the German communist movement exposing 
paranoia as an accepted frame of mind not only within the KOSTUFRA, but also within both the 
International Secretariat “kom.Fraktion” and the ZK KPD. The International Secretariat knew that 
Tendulkar had, with the support of “English money”, established the pro-Hindustan committee, 
Sobhan. By using the boarding-house at 41 Ansbacherstraβe as the base for this committee, 
Tendulkar was primarily aiming to assist Asians who were either visiting or living in Berlin. The 
International Secretariat wanted to approach Tendulkar and the Sobhan committee, however the 
KOSTUFRA considered this to be a bad idea due to Tendulkar’s connections with other suspicious 
German communists. For example, the medical student and member of the KOSTUFRA, Katja 
Klapper (“Katja”, 18/12-1906–?), had a reputation within KPD circles for her eager and 
enthusiastic participation at organised party events. However, in April 1932, a rumour started to 
circulate which implied that Klapper could not be trusted. Since Klapper frequently visited the 
boarding house of the Sobhan committee, the KOSTUFRA told the International Secretariat not to 
trust the “prattling” Klapper. The reason for this was as follows. According to the KOSTUFRA, 
Klapper had applied for a visa at the Soviet consulate in Berlin in January 1932, stating that she 
wanted to travel to Moscow to pursue her medical studies to become a nurse. The KOSTUFRA 
stated, however, that this did not correspond with intelligence from several Chinese communists in 
Berlin, suggesting that Klapper was an agent in the service of the Chinese embassy who had 
infiltrated the Asian student community. Consequently, the International Secretariat had to 
understand that “under no circumstances” should they give their support to Klapper to realise her 
objective of pursuing studies in Moscow. After having examined the KOSTUFRA documents, the 
International Secretariat passed on this material to the ZK KPD for further consideration.1155 
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1154 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 125, Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Häntzschel, 
Berlin, an die Polizeibehörde Hamburg und die Polizeidirektion Bremen, 6/4-1932. 
1155 SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 1 I 2/5/14, 282, Betr. Inder [Maschinenschrift, Durchschlag], ZK KPD, Berlin, 19/4-1932. 
Tendulkar returned to India (year unknown) as an avid nationalist and convinced anti-communist. In 1964, the 
Bombay Provincial Congress Committee published a pamphlet authored by Tendulkar, Nation Betrayed? A Case 
Against Communists: their Own Evidence, an analysis of the conduct of the Communist Party of India in times of war, 
Overstreet & Windmiller, 1959, p.580. For Klepper, see SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 1 I 2/5/14, 283, Sekretariat an die 
Reichsfraktionsleitung der Kommunisten in der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, an ZK KPD, Berlin, 22/4-1932; 
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      The raid also brought the International Secretariat’s curricular activity to a sudden halt. This 
left the International Secretariat with the only option of functioning as a channel for propaganda 
campaigns in 1932, all of which were essentially centred on the question of the war threat and in 
defence of the Soviet Union. One exception to this was the LAI’s solidarity campaign in support of 
Hilaire Noulens and his wife (real names: Yakov Rudnik and Tatyana Moiseenko, better known as 
the Ruegg case). On 15 June 1931, Chinese authorities arrested the Noulens in Shanghai charging 
them with having carried out clandestine activities in the service of the Soviet foreign apartment. 
This involved, for example, utilising covert methods to maintain a hub for the communist 
movement in the Far East by linking together the activities of the Profintern Shanghai Bureau 
(TOSS; branch of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat), the ECCI Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) 
and the LAI. These arrests inspired Münzenberg to get the IAH apparatus to set up proletarian 
solidarity campaigns across Western Europe declaring their support for the Ruegg couple, an 
initiative which depended on using the IAH and the LAI networks.1156 While the International 
Secretariat published articles in Informationsbulletin, Welt am Abend urged the KMT “in the name 
of millions of workers and thousands of intellectuals” to release the Ruegg couple.1157 In 
connection with the Ruegg campaign, and perhaps inspired by a long-held interest in China, 
Münzenberg suddenly wanted to travel to Shanghai in the company of Barbusse, an idea which 
nevertheless required the consent of the Political Commission in Moscow. Whether Münzenberg 
expected to use the Ruegg campaign as a cover for IAH activities in China remains unknown. 
Moreover, as Münzenberg explained to the Political Commission, the journey would serve the 
purpose of raising money and organising “demonstrations of solidarity” in support of the Chinese 
workers. Bela Kun notified Münzenberg that the Political Commission had turned down the idea, 
telling him that the IAH could carry out that kind of work in Germany by organising “a day of 
solidarity” in Berlin and that the occasion could be used to raise money.1158 
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1156 Frederick S. Litten writes in his research note “The Noulens Affair” (1994), that the campaign was “orchestrated” 
by Münzenberg in August 1931 using, for example, the Inprecorr as a channel to distribute articles and propaganda. A 
representative of the IRH [unknown] was critical though towards Münzenberg, wondering whether the campaign 
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committee, “Zentrales Verteidigungskomitee zur Rettung Rueggs”, Frederick S. Litten, “The Noulens Affair”, 
(Research Note) in The China Quarterly, No. 138 (Jun. 1994), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.492-512. 
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1157 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 154-158, Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nummer 18, Juli 
1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 146, Die Welt am Abend, No.159, 9/7-1932. 
1158 RGASPI 495/4/182, 8-9 Protokoll (B) Nr. 234, 9/4-1932; RGASPI 495/4/186, 5 Protokoll (B) 27/4-1932. Moscow 
“started an operation” in May 1932 to save the Ruegg couple from the death sentence. However, in connection with 
the release of the Ruegg couple on 27 August, 1937, rumors began to circulate about the drama behind the scenes. 
According to Litten, the most fragrant rumour was that Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in the Far East, had been 
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      The British LAI Section highlighted the Ruegg case at its “Second Annual Conference” at 
Friars Hall in London on 21-22 May, 1932. According to its official report, the section had 
convinced James Maxton to raise the question in a debate in the House of Commons. Whether the 
section was also the source behind Maxton’s initiative to highlight the Ruegg case during a 
parliamentary debate in London on 23 February is, however, unknown. In fact, Anthony Eden [not 
Sir John Simon as mentioned in the Second Annual Conference report], the British Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, blocked Maxton’s attempt to confront the British government on the 
question regarding the “treatment by the Chinese authorities of Mr. and Mrs. Ruegg”. Eden told 
Maxton that the Ruegg case was not a question for the British to solve; it was entirely a matter 
under the jurisdiction of the “extra-Settlement authorities” in Shanghai.1159 The pièce de résistance 
for the British LAI Section were the Meerut campaign and the support for the Chinese liberation 
struggle, propaganda campaigns which frequently found their way out onto the streets of London 
in 1932. The section arranged, for example, together with the British ILD section [the British IRH 
section] an anti-war “monster demonstration” at Trafalgar Square on 20 February with the slogan: 
“Hands off China, withdrawal of troops and warships, a free Soviet China!”, while a second event 
in March commemorated the “Third Anniversary of the Imprisonment of the Meerut Prisoners”. 
Bridgeman was at the centre organising and distributing press material on the campaigns to the 
left-wing and bourgeois press in Great Britain, documents which called for the organisation of 
“demonstrations, meetings and processions” in support of the Indian independence movement 
using the slogan: “Down with imperialism!”1160 
      Somehow, the International Secretariat adapted itself to the complex reality caused by the raid. 
As the Manchurian campaign ran its course in Germany, Welt am Abend announced that the 
“General Secretary of the LAI” Münzenberg planned to deliver a speech on the “predatory war of 
the Japanese imperialist” in connection with the celebration of the “Fifth Anniversary of the LAI” 
at a public rally at “Pharussälen” in Berlin on 16 February.1161 Apparently, the LAI and the anti-
Japanese campaign constituted only part of a larger scheme that was about to emerge in 1932. For 
Münzenberg, the rally at “Pharussälen” aimed to re-introduce the LAI’s anti-Japanese propaganda 
by connecting the Manchurian crisis with the war threat against the Soviet Union. If the strategy 
                                                                                                                                                          
in Shanghai in 1932, provided with $20,000 from the Comintern with which to guarantee the release of the couple. 
This was nevertheless only hearsay, Litten states (1994, pp.497-498). 
1159 RGASPI 495/100/875, 7-28, Report of 2nd Annual Conference of LAI’s British Section, held 21st-22nd May 1932, 
Friars Hall London. For Maxton’s question and Eden’s reply in the House of Commons, see:  
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worked out as planned, Münzenberg pondered the idea of arranging an “international congress 
against the war” sometime in 1932. The campaign called for a strengthening of the structural 
foundations of the LAI in order to amplify its anti-war propaganda. On 20 February, Münzenberg 
sent a letter to Fritz Brupbacher in Zurich, requesting him to give his opinion on “Japanese 
imperialism”, and asking him whether he would sign a petition in the name of the LAI in support 
of Mme Sun Yat-sen’s protest against the threat of a “Japanese invasion” of Shanghai.1162 The anti-
war theme was an idea further outlined in a letter from the “kom.Fraktion Liga” to the Central 
Committee of the CPUSA on 25 February, describing the anti-war campaign as a potential field of 
activity in which to develop the LAI despite “the organisational weakness of most of our sections”: 
The International Secretariat of the LAI is conducting a wide campaign against the war in 
the Far East. It has called upon its national sections to develop extensive activity in this 
connection and it has provided them with detailed instructions on the tasks which they must 
undertake.1163 
The political situation in the Far East was a discourse that would be the opportunity to “draw the 
masses into the movement”, yet, ultimately, it would again be a question of turning theory into 
practice for the International Secretariat. For example, the Central Committee of the CPUSA had 
to stir up fervour on the anti-war question within the anti-imperialist movement, while at the same 
time “exercising a close control over the work of those comrades who are charged with dealing 
with the activity of the League section”.1164 
      The idea of connecting the Manchurian campaign with the anti-war propaganda also brought 
Gibarti back to Berlin. After having performed his role as liaison for both the IAH and 
Münzenberg in the USA since 1929, by 1932 Europe was Gibarti’s operative field as an agent of 
the Comintern. MI5 noted in its “summary of traces” that Gibarti had been in Paris in February 
and travelled to Berlin in April to begin some kind of activity in “a committee”.1165 What kind of 
“committee” was MI5 referring to, and what were its functions and aims? Münzenberg sent a 
strictly confidential proposal on 30 March from Berlin to the Political Commission with the idea 
of arranging “an international congress of struggle against war” in Geneva. As a crucial part of his 
plan, Münzenberg wanted to assemble a “preparatory committee” to lead the work up until the 
formal opening of the “international anti-war congress”. Scheduled for 28 July, Münzenberg 
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argued that the congress aimed to pay homage to “the day of the Sarajevo murders” in 1914. 
Gibarti’s role in the committee, according to Münzenberg, was to assume a leading position and to 
act as Münzenberg’s right-hand-man in directing the preparatory work. In fact, the idea was a 
blueprint of Gibarti’s functions during the preparations for the Brussels Congress in 1926-27.1166 
Thus, in the context of the anti-war movement, the LAI was the forerunner in uniting the question 
of the Manchurian campaign with the anti-war question, an idea which later evolved into the 
Amsterdam-Pleyel movement. 
      What role did the International Secretariat play in all of this? The International Secretariat 
played a central role, above all in evaluating whether the anti-war issue was managing to attract 
any attention and whether the idea could be sustained for more than a month in Germany. 
Münzenberg had prepared his idea thoroughly before contacting the Political Commission on 30 
March. On 3 March, the International Secretariat, together with the IAH Berlin-Brandenburg 
district, had organised an “international demonstration” against “the threat of world war” at the 
“Sportpalats” in Berlin. The invited speakers nevertheless revealed the rally to be overtly 
communist: the PCF member Marcel Cachin, the pacifist and member of the CPGB and IAH 
Isabel Brown, Nakanome Otsuka from Japan, Chuang Tang from China, the KPD delegate Albert 
Kuntz and Münzenberg. Moreover, the entrance ticket (“eintrittspreis 40 Pfennig”) declared that it 
was a demonstration “against the predatory Japanese war, in defence of the Soviet Union, against 
the Hindenburg-Hitler-Front and in support of the red workers’ candidate Thälmann!”.1167 This 
demonstration at the “Sportpalats” was an operation co-ordinated by the International Secretariat, 
along with the active assistance of the national LAI sections. According to Ferdi in a report to the 
Eastern Secretariat, the sections had received the instruction to organise demonstrations of 
“protests against Japanese imperialism [and] in defence of the Soviet Union” on the very same day 
as the “Sportpalats” rally. From a broader perspective, the “massive rally” of the LAI and IAH on 
3 March also reflected the increasingly heated political scene in Weimar Berlin. The demonstration 
was such a success that it attracted widespread attention across Germany and encouraged the 
International Secretariat to organise similar events in Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg and Upper 
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Silesia.1168 The International Secretariat was, however, unable to carry the weight of the entire 
anti-war campaign on its own shoulders. Due to the political pressures caused by the daily political 
struggle in Germany, as well as the prohibitive measures of the German authorities, the LAI 
wanted to establish a closer co-operation with the IAH in order to develop this campaign. The first 
step was to send out invitations to the various demonstrations or conferences. Clemens Dutt told 
Padmore in Hamburg of the “absolute necessity” of coming to Berlin and participating in an 
“International Conference against Imperialist War” on 20 March.1169 However, things took a turn 
for the worse with regard to this conference. As the political extremism and literal violence on the 
streets in Berlin reached new heights in 1932, due to the clashes between the military branch of the 
KPD (Roter Frontkämpfer Bund, RFB) and the brown-shirted vanguard of the NSDAP 
(Sturmabteilung, SA), in March the MdI adopted its “Emergency Decree” (Notverordnung). This 
decree was intended to bring an end to the political chaos, above all to curtail the political 
campaigns of both the communists and the Nazis. This strict governmental policy contributed 
therefore to bringing the propaganda work at the International Secretariat to a sudden end. 
However, the German communist movement believed that the “Emergency Decree” was only an 
unforeseen obstacle to overcome on the road to achieving political victory in Germany, as noted by 
the historian, Christian Striefler. The practical implications of the decree were, however, somewhat 
more difficult. For the International Secretariat, the only option left was to postpone the 
conference ad infinitum which, according to a short notice in Welt am Abend on 17 March, meant 
that “new invitations are going to be sent to every organisation”.1170  
      The primary goal now for Münzenberg was to organise the international anti-war congress in 
Geneva. As the anti-war issue had proven to be a successful undertaking for both the LAI and the 
International Secretariat, especially as the issue indicated that it was perhaps still possible to revive 
the LAI after the raid, the cancellation of the “International Conference against Imperialist War” in 
Berlin was a huge disappointment with broader implications. While the LAI had assumed the 
symbolic role as instigator and defender of the anti-war campaign in Germany at the beginning of 
1932, once Münzenberg started mooting the idea of holding the anti-war congress in Geneva, the 
International Secretariat found itself obsolete. The initial enthusiasm for both the anti-war issue 
and the International Secretariat’s grand plans were initiatives more or less brought to a premature 
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end with the publication on 15 March of Clemens Dutt’s article, “Die imperialistischen 
Kriegstreiber und der antiimperialistische Kampf”, in Der Rote Aufbau.1171 
      By April, the International Secretariat no longer had any direct involvement in either the 
further planning of the anti-war campaign or the international anti-war congress. Alone at the 
bureau as “the other people have fallen ill”, Ferdi told Kuusinen that the LAI was still 
experiencing the paralysing indifference of the European communist parties. Ferdi contacted 
Magyar in an attempt to explain the precarious situation in Berlin, telling him that every member 
at the International Secretariat felt that the situation was extremely depressing. Ferdi conceded that 
hardly any money seemed to exist to fund anti-imperialist activity, although he suspected the ZK 
KPD of intentionally not providing the LAI with the money set aside for its activities. To correct 
Ferdi’s suspicions about the money issue, Freier at the Eastern Secretariat explained that the 
International Secretariat had received its “full share for January and February”.1172 
      In March, Joseph Berger was released from Moabit prison. However, Berger did not intend to 
leave Berlin, even after realising that the crisis amongst the staff at the International Secretariat 
had reached a critical level. York/Thögersen wanted to return to the ILS in Moscow to resume his 
studies. In November 1931, York/Thögersen had sent an application to the Eastern Secretariat, 
although the dramatic series of events in December had disrupted everything. As the ILS had 
avoided giving York/Thögersen a definite answer, Berger tried to help by asking an unknown 
contact in Moscow when York/Thögersen would get a “decision on his departure”.1173 Did 
York/Thögersen leave Berlin in 1932 and what was the outcome of his application to the ILS? The 
following observations only confirm York/Thögersen’s obscure fate. In May 1932, MI5 received 
intelligence on York/Thögersen suggesting that he intended to “leave Berlin shortly for Moscow en 
route to the Far East” on a mission for the Comintern. However, in August, MI5 observed that 
York/Thögersen had “not yet left Berlin for Moscow”. The reason why MI5 was monitoring the 
whereabouts of York/Thögersen in 1932 was to confirm whether the following rumour was 
correct: “in League circles rumours … that it had been proposed in Moscow to establish a new 
Asiatic section of the League with headquarters probably in China, to carry on the necessary work 
in China, Korea, Indo-China and, possibly, India; and it had been hinted that Hans THOGERSEN 
                                               
1171 Clemens Dutt, “Die imperialistischen Kriegstreiber und der antiimperialistische Kampf“, in Der Rote Aufbau, 
Berlin, 15. März 1932, V. Jahrg. Heft 6, pp.249-255. Labour Monthly translated Dutt’s article and published it in its 
April issue, see Clemens Dutt, “The Imperialist War-Makers and the Anti-Imperialist Struggle”, in Labour Monthly, 
Volume 14, April 1932, Number 4, pp.208-216. 
1172 RGASPI 542/1/54, 36, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, [stamped:] 14/3-1932. For the money issue 
and personnel issues, see brief note from Freier to Ferdi, fol. RGASPI 542/1/54, 37, Letter from FR [Freier], Moscow, 
to F [Ferdi], Berlin, 15/3-1932. 
1173 RGASPI 542/1/54, 38a, Note from B[Berger], Berlin, to unknown recipient, Moscow, 23/3-1932; RGASPI 
542/1/56, 2, Letter from “Hans” [York/Thögersen], Berlin, to Chatto, Moscow, 21/1-1932. 
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might be sent to China to take charge”.1174 In retrospect, however, with the social disorder in China 
and with the setbacks of the Comintern caused by the Ruegg affair, an “Asiatic section” of the LAI 
was an illogical proposal in 1932. 
      The primary reason why York/Thögersen hoped to leave Germany was the German authorities’ 
increasingly rigid control of foreigners’ residence permits. This bureaucratic procedure had had a 
negative impact on the individuals at the International Secretariat. While the Berlin police 
authority (I.A. section) denied having renewed Kunizaki’s residence permit, Clemens Dutt 
received an “expulsion order” in April,1175 forcing the latter to go underground in Berlin. 
Consequently, York/Thögersen most likely also received notification from the authorities of his 
imminent expulsion from Germany. Hence, it is possible that the I.A.’s decision not to renew 
existing permits was a sanctioned strategy, related to the MdI’s on-going investigation of the LAI 
and its International Secretariat. For Dutt, therefore, the only option left (aside from leaving Berlin 
and Germany) was to adopt a clandestine lifestyle, hiding in safe houses and living with the 
constant threat of immediate deportation. The last trace of York/Thögersen in Berlin was as editor 
of the October issue of the Informationsbulletin.1176 
 
* 
 
Predicting the End, and Its Solution  
The internal decline at the International Secretariat was an established fact in relation to its 
individual setbacks. As the communist parties in Europe continued to act indifferently towards the 
LAI, and while the political situation in Weimar Germany was worsening by the day, there was no 
turning back. Valnitsky at the International Secretariat observed how the unwillingness of the ZK 
KPD to provide any administrative support had contributed to isolating the LAI within the 
European communist movement: 
[…] the political hegemony of the Communist Party [in Europe] is now in every country so 
huge and great that any initiative […] from the International Secretariat of the LAI, which is 
                                               
1174 MI5 knew that York/Thögersen was “on very intimate terms” with Ella Windmüller, the steno-typist at the 
International Secretariat who, in turn, was married to another functionary at the office, Benno Windmüller. 
Furthermore, MI5 had a fair description of the interior at 13 Hedemannstraβe, an office that consisted of “three or four 
rooms on the first floor, one of which is usually occupied” by York/Thögersen, TNA PRO KV2/1056, Biography of 
Hans Peter Thogersen; TNA PRO KV2/1056, EXTRACT, International Secretariat of the LAI, 8/8-1932. Any trace of 
York/Thögersen’s personal file in the Comintern Archive remains missing. However, if one exists, it most likely 
contains information on whether or not his application to the ILS was eventually approved. 
1175 RGASPI 542/1/54, 72-73, Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to Boris [Berger], Berlin, 27/4-1932. 
1176 SCA CL Collection, volume 131, Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus - Sondernummer,  
Herausgegeben vom Internationalen Sekretariat, Nr. 20a, September 1932; Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus, Herausgegeben vom Internationalen Sekretariat, Nr. 22, Oktober 1932. 
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only carried out on our own [initiative], in the future and without the active support from the 
parties, will have no success.1177 
Valnitsky’s criticism of the omnipotent position of the communist parties and their relations 
towards the sympathising organisations highlighted one of the fundamental problems within the 
international communist movement during the inter-war years. For the LAI, the turning point came 
when the parties refused to adhere to or even to acknowledge the directives emanating from 
Comintern headquarters to support the organisation. In 1932, the responses to such commands 
were nil. The LAI’s isolation in Berlin forced the Eastern Secretariat to begin reassessing the 
future of the International Secretariat in April-May. The central issue for the Eastern Secretariat 
was the decentralisation of the International Secretariat apparatus in Berlin, and then the relocation 
of the “centre” of the LAI to another European city. With Kunizaki, Dutt and (probably) 
York/Thögersen having had their residence permits revoked and most likely about to be expelled 
from Germany, this would leave only Ferdi at the International Secretariat. Magyar was 
determined to find a solution and used Berger, who had managed to avoid the attention of the 
Schutzpolizei, as his liaison in Berlin. In April, Magyar notified Berger that the most logical step 
was to “decentralise the central apparatus of the League” in Berlin. At the same time as the 
organisational structure was being dismantled, the LAI’s political agenda was also being 
substantially modified. Ferdi notified the “Genossen” at the WEB in Berlin that the International 
Secretariat was incapable of keeping up the momentum on the issue of the European national 
minority movement. In Moscow, Magyar concluded that it was just a matter of time before the 
entire LAI apparatus in Berlin collapsed. Yet, for as long as the authorities allowed the activities of 
the International Secretariat, the “centre” had to remain in Berlin, Magyar argued. If relocation of 
“the centre” was the only option left, however, Magyar wanted to split the International Secretariat 
into two parts. In Berlin, the LAI would have an “illegal secretariat” with Münzenberg as general 
secretary, working together with a “German Comrade”, while a legal secretariat in London would 
be governed by Clemens Dutt.1178 Magyar, Safarov and Mif re-assessed this issue on 27 May and 
convinced the Political Commission to endorse the idea of transferring the International Secretariat 
to Paris if the situation in Berlin worsened to such a degree that it was impossible to carry out any 
organisational or political work. The Political Commission added that the decision was irrevocable 
for the staff at the International Secretariat, who under no circumstances would be able to demand 
a renegotiation. Magyar added that this decision depended on the consent of the Colonial 
Commissions of both the PCF and of the CPGB to support the LAI. This solution indicated the 
                                               
1177 RGASPI 542/1/54, 54-55, Report by Valnitzki, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 14/4-1932. 
1178 RGASPI 499/1/37, 19-20, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to “Genossen”/WEB,  Berlin, 15/4-1932; RGASPI 542/1/54, 
72-73, Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to Boris [Berger], Berlin, 27/4-1932. 
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definitive partition of the International Secretariat, just as it also confirmed the artificial existence 
of “the centre” in Berlin if the LAI was formally declared an illegal organisation in Germany. The 
Political Commission recommended reducing the LAI apparatus to a minimum, keeping one 
“responsible comrade” [York/Thögersen] to “continue the work of the Informationsbulletin” in 
Berlin.1179 Freier at the Eastern Secretariat informed Ferdi and Berger in a letter dated 2 June that 
the Political Secretariat had authorised Magyar’s plan, expecting the International Secretariat to 
give their “attitude to the decision”. According to Freier, Ferdi and Berger had to understand that 
the decision was a response to the low level of efficiency and capacity “at the secretariat”. Thus, 
the decentralisation of the International Secretariat would be put “into effect at the proper 
moment” if the LAI was banned in Germany.1180 
      The discussion of the LAI at Comintern headquarters was part of a broader context: the 
prediction of the possible collapse of the German communist movement in 1932. If this happened, 
the movement would have to resort to clandestine activity. Discussions of a similar nature were 
also taking place outside Moscow. On 20 July, Dimitrov met the PCF representative, Jacques 
Duclos, and the leader of the KPD, Thälmann, at the WEB’s rendezvous (the “Bayerhof” 
restaurant) in Berlin, to assess the “extremely serious” situation in Germany. For Münzenberg, 
who, according to Gross, had become an anxious and nervous man, the results of the Reichstag 
Elections on 31 July, was a crucial moment for the German communist movement.1181 The KPD 
was caught in the middle. Obliged to follow the Comintern’s strategy, which urged the KPD to 
continue its antagonism against the SPD in order to establish a power balance in relation to the 
NSDAP, the party seemed incapable of acting independently and, therefore, suffered the 
consequences. According to Hermann Weber, this was an indication of the “conversion” 
(Wandlung) within the KPD where its “uncompromising attitude towards the Weimar Republic” 
and social democracy brought the party precariously close, from time to time, to the extreme 
right.1182 In the summer of 1932, the political scene in Berlin was about to self-destruct, whereas in 
Amsterdam, the Anti-War Congress emerged as a refreshing contrast to the radicalism and 
extremism on display in the Weimar Republic. 
 
                                               
1179 RGASPI 495/4/191, 8, Protokoll (B) Nr.244 der Sitzung der Polit. Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 27/5-1932. 
1180 RGASPI 542/1/54, 80, Letter from Freier/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 
[stamped:] 2/6-1932. 
1181 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 227-229, Betrifft: Westeuropäisches Büro der kommunistischen Internationale 
(WEB), Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, an die Nachrichtenstellen der Länder, 
14/2-1933; Dontscho Daskalow, “Georgi Dimitroff als Theoretiker und Schöpfer der Einheitsfront und der Macht der 
Volksdemokratie”, in Georgi Dimitroff, Bernhard (ed.), Urania Verlag, Leipzig, 1982, p.62; Gross 1967, p.242. In the 
July 31 elections, the NSDAP polled in at 37,3 %, the KPD 14,3 %, and SPD 21,6 %, see Hoppe 2007, p.315; Degras 
vol.III, 1965, p.217. 
1182 Hoppe 2007, p.303; Weber 1969, pp.241-242. 
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* 
 
Prologue to the End 
The Amsterdam Anti-War Congress, held on 27-29 August, was Münzenberg’s major 
organisational achievement in 1932. For the LAI, however, the congress confirmed the 
organisation as a political bystander within the anti-war movement. During the congress, the 
Schutzpolizei supposedly ransacked the International Secretariat at Hedemannstraβe. However, the 
relative lack of documents usually linked to such a raid, makes it difficult to verify whether the 
Schutzpolizei ever carried out the raid. According to Barooah, this episode also witnessed the 
definitive closing down of the “LAI building” in Berlin. A scrutiny of Barooah’s rather ambiguous 
conclusion shows that it is based on a single account, “Betrifft: Durchsuchung der Räume der 
‘Liga gegen den Imperialismus’”,1183 a report signed by the Berlin Chief of Police and despatched 
to the MdI on 19 August. Any additional reports on the raid have gone missing, if they indeed ever 
existed. In Barooah’s defence, however, the Berlin Chief of Police appears to have gained access 
to new intelligence on the LAI in August, information which disclosed the international 
connections of the International Secretariat. While the December raid in 1931 had exposed the LAI 
as a cover organisation for the Comintern, even if a second raid did take place in August 1932, it 
did not lead to the definitive closing down of the International Secretariat, as Barooah suggests. 
The August report is, nonetheless, very detailed in that it describes the functions and activities of 
various actors connected to the LAI, e.g. Münzenberg, Smeral, Chatto, Gibarti and Ferdi. 
Furthermore, the report analyses the constitution of the LAI Executive and the General Council as 
well as the contacts between the International Secretariat and both the national LAI sections and 
other communist mass and sympathising organisations (Krestintern, the International of 
Proletarian Freethinkers’, the IAH, the IRH and KOSTUFRA). According to the Berlin Chief of 
Police: 
[…] the material provided with proper evidence that the League is a communist organisation. 
The suspicion that it is in connection with illegal organisations, has come true. […] The 
League is anxious not to abandon its Communist character […] The League has tried to 
capture many people and organisations for its own purposes […] The material also verifies 
that the League is a department of the Comintern.1184 
                                               
1183 Barooah 2005, p.283, 309. 
1184 The Berlin Chief of Police sent this report to the MdI, recommending it as being wise to limit the political space of 
the LAI in Germany, thus, circular information had to be issued to Auswärtige Amt, the Ministry of Defence and the 
German police districts. This circular information, which the RMdI compiled and distributed in September, announced 
its conclusion on the LAI: “[…] the League is a communist organisation which operates with the Comintern, the 
Communist Party [KPD] and its auxiliary and subsidiary organisations, [and maintains] the closest relations with 
illegal communist organisations […] even in the realm of illegal work (Intelligence, military intelligence service)”, 
SAPMO-BA ZPA 1507/279, 79-93, Der Polizeipräsident, Abteilung I, Berlin, an den Herrn Minister des Innern, 
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Hence, on the question of the second raid, the only reference was the seized “card index … in 
August” by the Schutzpolizei. The Berlin Chief of Police stated that with this “card index”, the 
German police finally had the information needed to expose the international extent of the LAI 
network. According to this report, the LAI was a communist organisation in control of an 
extensive network linking together individuals and organisations around the world and supervising 
particular “men of confidence”.1185 Within the network, the LAI sections functioned as a “means 
of transmission” for the International Secretariat in Europe, USA, Latin America, India, Japan, 
China and Africa, obliged to provide the “men of confidence” with material support. This 
arrangement also had a reverse function, where the sections were to channel intelligence to the 
International Secretariat, information which was then passed on to Comintern headquarters in 
Moscow. In August, the Berlin Chief of Police had to face the fact that, aside from the LAI being 
an actor in the possession of an international network, Berlin was the nerve centre for the 
international communist movement. In relation to the above, the Schutzpolizei received the 
instruction to continue monitoring the contacts between the International Secretariat and IAH 
headquarters; however, the Chief of Police noted: “the International Secretariat […] seems 
recently not satisfied with the direction of the work”.1186 
      The Amsterdam Anti-War Congress was an event which confronted the political scene in 
Europe, while at the same time briefly strengthening the German communist movement against the 
“terror of the National Socialists against communists and socialists”.1187 The anti-war congress 
was, however, never meant to be a response to the Nazi movement in Germany; its primary aim 
was to discuss the international crisis caused by the effects of the global recession, a socio-political 
mixture which could lead to the coming of a new world war. At first scheduled to convene in 
Geneva on 28 July 1932, the congress location was moved to Amsterdam after the Swiss 
                                                                                                                                                          
Berlin, 19/8-1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1507/279, 78, (Circular information) Nachrichtensammelstelle im 
Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, 20/9-1932. A copy of this circular is filed in SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 
161. 
1185 The “men of confidence” were required to send reports “every 14 days” on how their missions were progressing, 
enclose “newspaper clippings and photographs”, and write an account of the socio-political situation. The Berlin Chief 
of Police used these reports to confirm the assumption that the LAI agents were carrying out their missions either 
legally or by using illegal methods. For example, if police authorities in a country had a “very strict” attitude, the 
agent should use “sympathising travellers” as a method for its courier service, preferably seamen. For the LAI, noted 
the Chief of Police, the establishment of a safe route from Europe to India was an essential goal. According to a seized 
document, “Fragebogen”, the LAI recommended that their agents enter India via trade routes (sea and land), and the 
railway, see SAPMO-BA ZPA 1507/279, 79-93, Der Polizeipräsident, Abteilung I, Berlin, an den Herrn Minister des 
Innern, Berlin, 19/8-1932. 
1186 The Berlin Chief of Police highlighted the close and intimate collaboration that existed between the LAI and the 
IAH. For example, the organisations assisted each other in establishing themselves around the world, a strategy that 
depended on mutual understanding. If the LAI assisted the IAH to establish sections in the colonies as well as 
provided the IAH apparatus with contacts to the European national minority movement (intelligence, addresses, 
contacts and translation of documents “into local languages”), the IAH had to let the LAI use its propaganda apparatus 
and assist the LAI with organising campaigns and public meetings, SAPMO-BA ZPA 1507/279, 79-93, Der 
Polizeipräsident, Abteilung I, Berlin, an den Herrn Minister des Innern, Berlin, 19/8-1932. 
1187 Gross 1967, p.242; Striefler 1993, pp.355-372; Hoppe 2007, p.296. 
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government refused to give the organisers (“Komitee zur Einberufung des internationalen 
Kongresses gegen den Krieg”) permission to hold it. Dimitrov had also advised a change of 
location.1188  
      Dimitrov and the WEB assumed a leading role in preparing the congress. For Münzenberg, this 
shift in authority was a disappointment, especially since he had convinced the Political 
Commission to give him the mandate to organise a congress “on a broad basis”, involving 
“proletarian mass organisations and leading public figures (writers, scientists, artists)”. In May, 
however, the WEB notified the ZK KPD that they had taken control of the preparations.1189 
Nevertheless, Gibarti remained a key figure for Münzenberg and, before being expelled from 
Germany in July on the explicit orders of the MdI,1190 was the true architect of the “Komitee zur 
Einberufung des internationalen Kongresses gegen den Krieg”. The committee consisted of the 
members Maxim Gorki, Barbusse, Albert Einstein, Mme Sun-Yat Sen, Upton Sinclair, Theodor 
Dreiser, Romain Rolland, Helene Stöcker, Sen Katayama, Marcel Cachin, Saklatvala, Thälmann, 
Münzenberg, Clara Zetkin, Pollitt and Stasova.1191 Gibarti’s primary focus was to assess the 
political character and reliability of the members in the committee, describing Romain Rolland, for 
example, as an uncertain person: 
The biggest difficulty with Romain Rolland, despite him having a very strong sympathy for 
the Communist Party, is that he believes that you can invite “all parties” to a conference. He 
is totally politically naïve and has only vague ideas about tactics and strategy, which should 
be followed in the preparation of the Congress.1192 
Albert Einstein’s participation in the committee was a result of Barbusse’s efforts to convince him 
to come. In a letter from Einstein to Barbusse, his belief in the idealism and utopianism of the anti-
war issue appears: “I see that you have a great goal in mind, […] in that endeavour I would like to 
participate as best as I can”. Furthermore, as rightfully observed by Carr, both Barbusse and 
                                               
1188 Carr 1982, p.390; Daskalow 1982, p.62. 
1189 RGASPI 543/1/17, 4-6, Betrifft Internationalen Kampfkongress gegen den Krieg, Political Commission, Moscow, 
April 1932; RGASPI 543/1/17, 21-22, (Vertraulich) Instructions from the WEB, Berlin, to ZK KPD, Berlin, 14/5-
1932. The Amsterdam Anti-War Congress in 1932 is a topic that needs additional research and evaluation, above all its 
links to the second congress, the Pleyel Congress in Paris in July 1933, and that the Amsterdam/Pleyel movement was 
one of the first public reactions against Hitler and the Nazi regime in 1933. One of the few available studies is E. H. 
Carr (1982) and David James Fisher, Romain Rolland and the Politics of Intellectual Engagement, Transaction 
Publishers, Rutgers, (2003). 
1190 TNA PRO KV2/1401, Summary of MI5 traces up to January 1932 – Gibarti, Louis. Intercepted letter from 
Münzenberg to the British IAH Section, London, 26/7-1932. 
1191 RGASPI 543/1/17, 14, Komitee zur Einberufung des internationalen Kongresses gegen den Krieg auf den 28. – 
30. Juli 1932 nach Genf, undated, year: 1932. 
1192 RGASPI 543/1/17, 133-135, (Streng vertraulich) Auszug aus einem Berichte Gibartis über die letzten Entwicklung 
im Internationalen Initiativkomitee, Berlin, June 1932. See Stern (2007) on how the communists perceived (and used) 
intellectuals for their own purposes. 
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Rolland symbolised a source of inspiration in the context of the anti-war congress,1193 although 
neither of them were ever the actual organisers of the congress. 
      The Amsterdam Anti-War Congress was a major achievement for the international communist 
movement. Attending the congress were 2,165 delegates from 27 countries, represented by 1,865 
workers, 290 social democrats and 830 communists. Dimitrov acted in the background as the 
leader of the “communist fraction” which comprised Heckert, Hans Kippenberger, Münzenberg, 
Gottwald, Pollitt and Marty. This “communist fraction” had two objectives to fulfil in Amsterdam: 
on the one hand, “the pursuit of a unified Marxist line in the fight against the war threat” and, on 
the other, to establish a permanent anti-war movement. This was a vision that turned into reality 
and, in the aftermath of the congress, Helmut/Dimitrov kept feeding the ECCI with reports on how 
the work with the anti-war “mass movement” was progressing.1194 The Amsterdam Congress was 
the beginning of the anti-war movement in Europe, although the movement did not manage to gain 
any momentum until the “Salle Pleyel” Congress in Paris on 4-6 June, 1933. In Paris, the congress 
aptly re-labelled itself as a “peace movement” under the title, Committee against Fascist Terror, 
which essentially was a response to the deeds being committed by the Nazi regime in Germany in 
1933. According to Rundschau (the successor to the Inprecorr), the congress at the “Salle Pleyel” 
was attended by more than 3,000 delegates, representing three million workers. In addition, the 
congress witnessed the inauguration of the Amsterdam/Pleyel movement.1195 
      At what level did the LAI contribute to the Amsterdam Congress and did the event serve any 
other purpose? Aside from the symbolic declaration of “brotherly greetings” from the LAI to the 
congress in its support of the struggle to achieve “national liberation from the Imperialist 
yoke”,1196 the congress functioned as a cover for the International Secretariat to hold a closed 
conference (“Interne Konferenz der Vertreter der Ligasektionen”) for its members. The meeting 
had been an operation carefully planned by the WEB before the congress. According to the draft 
                                               
1193 RGASPI 543/1/17, 11, (Abschrift) Letter from A. Einstein, Berlin, Henri Barbusse, Aumont par Senlis (Oise), 
26/4-1932; Carr 1982, p.387. 
1194 For number of participants, see Carr 1982, p.390, and the biased Anti-Comintern publication, Adolf Ehrt (Hg.), 
Der Weltbolschewismus. Ein internationales Gemeinschaftswerk über die bolschewistische Wühlarbeit und die 
Umsturzversuche der Komintern in allen Ländern, Anti-Komintern, Berlin, (1936). Ehrt’s book contains several 
pictures from the congress. The article “Der Amsterdamer Kongress. Eine gewaltige Kundgebung gegen den 
Imperialistischen Kriege”, published in (Sondernummer) Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus 
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“communist fraction”, see fol. RGASPI 543/1/17, 280-281, Vorschläge an die Politkommission, Moscow, WEB, 
Berlin, August 1932; , Daskalow 1982, p.62; Hans-Joachim Bernhard, “Georgi Dimitroff – ein treuer Freund der 
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung und Mitgestalter ihres revolutinären Kampfes”, in Georgi Dimitroff, Bernhard (ed.), 
Urania-Verlag, Leipzig, 1982, p.156; “Zeittafel”, Bernhard (ed.), 1982, p.194. For official documents (printed 
speeches, congress material, pamphlets, newspaper articles), see IISG “World Congress Against the Imperialist War 
Collection 3390.2”, consulted by the author in 2010. 
1195 Carr 1982, p.392-393; Gross 1967, p.270. 
1196 SCA CL Collection, volume 131, “Manifest des Internationalen Sekretariats der Liga gegen Imperialismus auf 
dem Weltkongress gegen den Imperialistischen Krieg”, (Sondernummer) Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus, Nr. 20a, September 1932. 
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on how to proceed, (“Der Antikriegskongress und die Antiimperialistische Liga. Plan – Entwurf”), 
the “Interne Konferenz” of the LAI was to address two particular questions. Firstly, the anti-war 
congress was the occasion for the LAI to alter its political agenda, above all to unify the anti-
imperialist movement and the anti-war movement into one. While it may seem as though this was 
a question motivated by an ideological impetus, this was, in fact, never the case. The WEB’s 
primary aim was to make use of the LAI’s transcontinental network to spread the word about the 
anti-war congress and, thereby, facilitate the process of establishing “where possible […] anti-war 
committees” in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Secondly, the “Interne Konferenz” could 
be a forum for the International Secretariat to play down the difficult situation in Berlin. The 
representatives of the International Secretariat should under no circumstance indicate the decline 
in activity in Berlin, the WEB stated, but rather explain that their primary focus for the moment 
was “the publication of literature in the languages of the colonial peoples and oppressed 
nationalities”.1197 
      In Amsterdam, the “Interne Konferenz” reassessed the status in the national sections in the 
USA, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain and Palestine. The major conclusion drawn from this session 
was to increase anti-imperialist activity, while continuing to perceive the International Secretariat 
as “the centre” for the LAI. Bridgeman attended the meeting and declared that the surveillance and 
coercion of “the colonial element” in London by the British police made it extremely difficult to 
maintain any kind of activity in England. This observation only verified, however, the fragile 
organisational structure of the LAI on an international scale. Moreover, the Amsterdam session 
was a definite dividing line in the history of the LAI, especially as this was the last time the 
organisation ever held a conference. Despite the decision to “improve general operations” by 
unifying the movement with the anti-war question, the “Interne Konferenz” confirmed that the 
LAI was caught in an ideological and organisational deadlock.1198 In an attempt to reinvigorate its 
revised political agenda in October, the International Secretariat despatched a circular letter to 
every “section and affiliated organisation” stating that the LAI campaigns (the Meerut conspiracy 
trial,1199 the Scottsboro trial and Ruegg case) were of a peripheral interest. The LAI and the anti-
imperialist movement aimed instead to give its fullest support to the Amsterdam anti-war 
campaign, a statement that also obliged every section to give its moral support in defence of the 
                                               
1197 RGASPI 543/1/17, 296-297, Der Antikriegskongress und die Antiimperialistische Liga, WEB, Berlin, July 1932. 
1198 SCA CL Collection volume 131, “Interne Konferenz der Vertreter der Ligasektionen”, (Sondernummer) 
Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nr. 20a, September 1932. 
1199 The German IRH Section administered the Meerut conspiracy trial campaign in Germany. On 11 November, the 
section declared that the LAI and the Profintern aimed to “unify their forces” to strengthen the campaign, see 
SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/320, 3-5, 3-5, Rettet die Gefangenen von Meerut! Mitteilung Nr. B/137., Berlin, 2/11-1932. 
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Soviet Union against the “imperialist war threat”.1200 The Amsterdam anti-war campaign usurped 
the International Secretariat’s role. Reduced to functioning merely as a supplier and distributor of 
anti-war propaganda, and ignoring their existing anti-imperialist campaigns, Ferdi and Clemens 
Dutt asked Dimitrov at a meeting in Berlin on 30 January 1933, why it seemed as though the anti-
war question had “unconsciously” sidelined the LAI. Irritated about hearing the complaint, 
Dimitrov told Ferdi and Clemens Dutt to “remove this false attitude” and to rather focus on getting 
the International Secretariat and “the main League sections” up and running again.1201 
      Between 1 September 1932 and 30 January 1933, a decisive period in the history of Weimar 
Germany, the struggle of the German communist movement came to an end. On 1 September 
1932, the Schutzpolizei stormed and ransacked IAH headquarters in Berlin, seizing every 
document on the Amsterdam Anti-War Congress. On this occasion, Münzenberg was in Moscow 
attending the Twelfth ECCI Plenum (27 August – 15 September 1932). At this plenum, the 
delegates evaluated reports on both the international situation and the tasks of the sections, the Far 
Eastern conflict and the continued “struggle against imperialist war and the anti-Soviet 
intervention”. The ECCI Plenum concluded that, in the “event of a new world war”, Germany 
would become “one of the main centres of the most heated and most intense world imperialist 
conflicts”. This statement did not, however refer to the on-going struggle for power between the 
KPD and NSDAP, but rather the ECCI Plenum meant that the colonial ambitions of the Weimar 
Republic was a symptom of the current war threat against the Soviet Union. This was a conclusion 
illustrating the somewhat detached understanding at Comintern headquarters of the political 
struggle in Germany. It was decided at this ECCI Plenum that it was an obligation for the national 
communist parties to “apply with the greatest persistence and energy the Comintern’s decisions on 
the question of the struggle against imperialist war and intervention”.1202  
      In an attempt to put the Comintern’s dictates into practice, on 12 December the International 
Secretariat and the German IRH Section organised a public demonstration in Berlin against 
“imperialist war and intervention” and to celebrate an “international day of struggle against 
colonialism” to remember the “Canton Commune” in 1927.1203 This demonstration aimed to show 
an increase of public communist activity in Berlin, particularly to counteract the campaigns of the 
                                               
1200 RGASPI 542/1/55, Rundschreiben an alle Sektionen und angeschlossenen Organisationen der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus, Internationale Sekretariat, Berlin, 27/10-1932. 
1201 RGASPI 542/1/59, 29, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow [?], 6/2-1933. 
1202 For the raid on IAH headquarters and Münzenberg, see Gross 1967, p.243. For the Twelfth ECCI Plenum, see 
Degras vol.III, 1965, p.208, 223-224. 
1203 RGASPI 542/1/55, Rundschreiben an alle Sektionen und angeschlossenen Organisationen der Liga gegen 
Imperialismus, Internationale Sekretariat, Berlin, 27/10-1932. Informationsbulletin (No.25, November) published 
information on the ”day of struggle against Colonialism”, an account the MdI used as reference material to monitor 
the activities of the LAI, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/320, 87-90, Reichskommissar – Report – Betrifft: RHD – 
Winterhilfskampagne – Internationaler Kampftag am 12. Dezember d.Js., Berlin, 19/11-1932. 
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Nazi movement. The German IRH Section stated in a report that public agitation was a source of 
inspiration to continue political activity in Germany: 
Due to the deepening of class divisions, the intensification of terror on a national and 
international scale, the number of national and international campaigns in recent months […] 
has greatly increased.1204 
At the beginning of 1933, the German communist movement was clinging to life by its fingernails. 
For the International Secretariat, this was a moment defined by political forces beyond their 
control. 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1204 SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/321, 137-141, Bericht über die Kampagnen von Anfang Juli bis Ende Oktober 1932. 
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Chapter 10. Collapse and Ruin 
 
 
[…] the League has shown once again that good opportunities for mass work are present; 
however, there is a great lack of understanding of how to exploit these opportunities in the 
direct leadership [International Secretariat]. […] A terrible political impotence at the very 
moment when the imperialists and their agents develop almost everywhere very active 
business. […] There is also the matter of the International Secretariat that has to be 
considered. Even without the current worsening situation in Germany, it seems to me that 
Paris is the temporary place for such an international body. […] we must change as soon as 
possible the current unacceptable situation in the League. 
Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Magyar, 
Berlin, 6/2-1933 
 
   
On 30 January 1933, Hitler became the Reich Chancellor of Germany after the Reichstag election, 
a victorious undertaking by the NSDAP. On the night of 27 February, the Reichstag Fire in Berlin 
bore witness to the symbolic end of the Weimar Republic. As the flames ravaged the building, the 
disaster of the moment presaged a nation on the verge of entering a period of unchartered political 
territory. In the ruins of the burnt-out Reichstag, the Berlin police found and arrested the confused 
Dutch communist Marius van der Lubbe. Accused of having started the fire, Lubbe received the 
death sentence; however, the political discourse surrounding the fire is of a peculiar nature. For 
Hitler and the NSDAP, the primary aim was to confirm whether the fire had been a conspiracy 
organised by the communists. With the arrest of Dimitrov and his Bulgarian companions, Vassil 
Tanev and Blagoi Popov, at the “Bayerhof” in Berlin on 9 March, the NSDAP found both the 
pretext and the actors with which to corroborate the above. The German police discovered that 
Dimitrov had a false passport, made out in the name of “Rudolf Hediger”, thus, while this was the 
cause for his arrest, the entire process culminated in the monumental Leipzig trial in 1933. 
Dimitrov was acquitted after making a grandiose concluding speech at the trial in December, an 
act celebrated by the international communist movement and contributing to establishing the myth 
of Dimitrov as the figurehead in the struggle against fascism.1205 
                                               
1205 Georgi Dimitroff, “Skriftlig inlaga till polisens rannsakningsmyndigheter”, in Dokument, brev och anteckningar 
från Leipzigprocessen, Fram förlag, Stockholm, 1936, p.13; Markus Wien, ”Georgi Dimitrov: Three Manifestations of 
His Cult”, in The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships. Stalin and the Eastern Bloc, Apor, Behrends, Jones and 
Rees (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, pp.194-208; Marin Pundeff, “Dimitrov at Leipzig: Was There a 
Deal?”, in Slavic Review, Vol.45, No.3 (autumn, 1986), The American Association for the Advancement of Slavic 
Studies, pp.545-549. For a biased interpretation, see Jakob Rosner, “Zum Kampf Georgi Dimitroffs in Leipzig gegen 
478 
 
      The NSDAP’s ascendancy to power confirmed the end of activity for the LAI and its 
International Secretariat in Berlin. The historiography covering the final few dramatic months of 
the Weimar Republic in 1933, e.g. the debated views of conservative historian Ernst Nolte, has 
primarily interpreted the NSDAP’s coming to power in terms of intrigue and crime. However, this 
supposition does not provide a fair account from a broader contextual perspective. Nolte argues, as 
noted in his book Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945, that the NSDAP’s huge social and 
political impact in 1933, particularly Hitler’s nomination as Reich chancellor on 30 January, was 
an epochal event explaining why the Weimar Republic ended.1206 Eric D. Weitz gives a more 
concise interpretation of the political impact of the first few months of 1933, referring to it as the 
beginning of the Anni terribli for the KPD, as the “establishment of the Nazi regime” resulted in 
the “immediate and massive repression of German communism”. The KPD had, however, not just 
stood by and watched the NSDAP and Hitler come to power on 30 January. On 25 January, the 
KPD had, together with several other communist organisations, arranged a public demonstration in 
Berlin, drawing 130,000 participants. In January, however, the WEB was still channelling the 
detached understanding of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, sending out the 
instruction to “the most important parties” in Europe to avoid establishing collaboration with the 
social democratic movement even if the Nazi regime banned the KPD in Germany.1207 The socio-
political reality in Germany was, however, by then somewhat different, with the systematic use of 
violence by the militant forces of the NSDAP (the SA and the SS), assisted by the gullible 
Schutzpolizei, against the German communist movement, ending in personal suffering and 
“haphazardly plunging” the movement “into illegality”. On the night of 27 February, nearly four 
thousand KPD members in Prussia ended up in prison, and were later transferred to concentration 
camps.1208 Meanwhile, Comintern headquarters in Moscow observed how the KPD, one of its 
most important sections, was facing extinction. In February and March, the socio-political chaos in 
Germany resulted in the emigration of German communists and other nationalities to the Soviet 
                                                                                                                                                          
den Faschismus”, in Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Leipzig, 2/1962, pp.358-370. For a 
concise biography of Blagoi Popov, see Chase 2002, p.490. 
1206 Ernst Nolte, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus, Herbig, München, 
1997, p.56. For an assessment of the historiographical debate which erupted after the release of Der europäische 
Bürgerkrieg, see, for example, Daniel Schönpflug, “Histoires croisées: Francois Furet, Ernst Nolte and a Comparative 
History of Totalitarian Movements”, in European History Quarterly, April 2007, vol.37, no.2, Sage Publications, 
London, pp.265-290. For a concise description of the post-war development of German historiography, see David E. 
Barclay & Eric D. Weitz, “Introduction”, in Between Reform and Revolution, Barclay & Weitz (eds.), 1998, pp.13-18. 
1207 RGASPI 499/1/38, 2, Information from the WEB, Berlin, an die wichtigste Parteien, 19/1-1933. The ECCI 
appealed to “the workers of all countries” to protest against the “establishment of the openly Fascist dictatorship in 
Germany”, a statement released in the communist press in April 1933. Taken from Labour Monthly, Vol.15, April 
1933, No.4, London, pp.267-269. 
1208 Weitz 1997, p.280. Towards the end of 1933, the Nazi regime had imprisoned between sixty and one hundred  
thousand communists, according to the historian Horst Duhnke’s calculation in Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945, Cologne, 
1972, p.104; Epstein 2003, p.45; Bernhard 1982, p.63; McMeekin 2003, p.258. 
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Union. As the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters acted more or less indifferently both 
prior to and after the NSDAP had come to power, this is a period in the history of international 
communism which has caused substantial scholarly debate, above all whether Stalin’s lenient 
policy towards the NSDAP and Hitler contributed to paving the way for the Nazi movement. This 
was the perspective presented in historian Robert C. Tucker’s study on Stalinism, however, it 
merely corroborates a prejudiced understanding of Soviet foreign policy as having been dogmatic 
during the inter-war years, McDermott and Agnew argue. A more nuanced understanding of the 
KPD and its physical destruction in February 1933 is to see it instead not just as the end of the 
party; this epochal event also dealt the Comintern itself a fatal blow. However, the Comintern did 
not react immediately to the literal decimation of the German communist movement. This critical 
turning point, created by the autocratic rise to power of the German national socialist movement in 
1933 and its support for the fascist movement in Europe, was the incentive for the communist 
movement to initiate a move towards the Popular Front doctrine against fascism, a doctrine the 
Comintern endorsed at the Seventh (and final) International Comintern Congress in Moscow in 
1935.1209 
      The year 1933 was the ruination of the German communist movement. The NSDAP’s impact 
on the societal and political milieu in Germany also had a lasting imprint on the communist 
movement’s organisational structure and its network(s), as the Nazi regime succeeded to radically 
re-shape German society. But how did it do this? By going “a long way towards destroying the 
solidarities built” on the ideological and practical experiences of “class”, the Nazi movement won 
over the loyalty of the German working class as it shifted attention towards the “bonds of nation 
and race”.1210 Nazi repression against subversive communist organisations had increased during 
1932, while in January and February 1933 its coercive policies reached their climax. For the 
colonial groups in Germany, e.g. the Indian community, this was the end for both students and 
political émigrés, with a majority ending up in German prisons before deportation, as in the cases 
of A. C. N. Nambiar and M. J. S. Naidu.1211 “Red Berlin”/the “Comintern village” became just a 
                                               
1209 Robert C. Tucker (ed.), Stalinism. Essays in Historical Interpretation, W. W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 
1977; Vatlin 2009, p.192; Hoppe (2007); McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp.116-119; Heinrich August Winkler, 
”Choosing the Lesser Evil: The German Social Democrats and the Fall of the Weimar Republic, in Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol.25, Sage Publications, London, 1990, pp.205-227; Jonathan Haslam, “The Comintern and 
the Origins of the Popular Front 1934-1935, in The Historical Journal, Vol.22, No.3 (Sep., 1979), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, pp.673-691. 
1210 This meant the structural destruction and ruin of the left-wing movement in Germany (communist, socialist and 
social democratic movements). For example, the NSDAP sanctioned the prohibition of both the social democratic 
newspaper, Vorwärts, and the communist Die Rote Fahne, while at the same time hindering KPD activities in Berlin. 
On 7 February, the ZK KPD held its last meeting in Berlin and, on 23 February, the headquarters of the KPD  (“Karl-
Liebknecht-Haus”) was ransacked, searched and closed by the police, see Hoppe 2007, p.323; Weitz 1997, p.281. 
1211 Israel 1994, p.275. Weiss’ study (2011) includes a brief description of how George Padmore escaped from 
Germany to England in January 1933. 
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memory as the suppression of both subversive and dissident political and social movements gained 
strength on all levels after 30 January. On 2 February, with the appointment of Hermann Göring as 
Reichsminister of the MdI, the ministry issued a decree prohibiting the KPD and other communist 
organisations from holding public demonstrations both in Berlin and across Germany. However, 
this was only the beginning of things to come. On 4 February, the NSDAP endorsed the emergency 
decree, “Schutze des deutschen Volkes!” (Protect the German People!) which, according to 
Angriff, the Nazi party newspaper, demanded that the German authorities stop the “blood plague” 
being organised by the “Foreign legions” of Moscow (KPD). For the Nazi regime, this decree also 
functioned as an incentive to gain total political and administrative control, as well as provided 
governmental agencies with the impetus to control the press and to end the freedom of 
assembly.1212 All these measures contributed to physically abolishing the political space(s) for 
German communism in Berlin. In February, the KPD headquarters in Berlin, “Karl-Liebknecht-
Haus”, was ransacked. The “well-known bureau of Willi Münzenberg [IAH headquarters]” at 48 
Wilhelmstraβe was also closed down.1213 The International Secretariat also fell victim to this 
enhanced suppression, yet, unlike the KPD and the IAH, the “centre” of the LAI managed to 
remain in operation until the end, i.e. until the Reichstag Fire on 27 February. 
      The aim of this chapter is to focus on why the International Secretariat realised that it not was 
possible to stay in Berlin, choosing instead to transfer its bureau to Paris. Is it possible to give an 
account of the International Secretariat’s final moments? Was there any wish to continue LAI 
activity in Germany? Despite everything that was happening in Berlin, and prior to its move to 
Paris, the International Secretariat still managed to prepare and carry out some level of anti-
imperialist activism in a milieu defined by activism, anger, hope and despair. 
 
* 
 
Continuation of Campaigns 
The International Secretariat did not become complacent in January 1933. The decline of the LAI 
throughout 1932 had, however, reduced it to a shadow of its former self, capable only of 
prolonging activity through propaganda campaigns. This propaganda focused essentially on 
supporting the conclusive work of the British LAI Section in connection with the end of the 
Meerut trial, and to initiating a letter-writing campaign to protest against the arrest in China of 
                                               
1212 Striefler 1993, p.376-378. The NSDAP endorsed this decree as a response to the murder of the SA leader, Zauritz, 
in Berlin on 30 January. The German communist, Maikowski, was arrested and charged with the crime, and became a 
symbol for the struggling communist movement. 
1213 SAPMO-BA ZPA R1501/20200, 227-229, Betreff: Westeuropäisches Büro der kommunistischen Internationale 
(WEB), Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, an die Nachrichtenstellen der Länder, 
Berlin, 14/2-1933; Rosenfeldt, vol.2, 2009, p.285. 
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Huang Ping, the Chinese trade unionist and LAI Executive member. These two campaigns indicate 
that, despite the increased pressure on the LAI in Germany, particularly its repression by both the 
Schutzpolizei and the MdI, the International Secretariat still had a functional transcontinental 
network. 
      In the beginning of 1933, the communist movement in Europe realised that Germany would 
soon face a socio-political change. As early as in October 1932, Helmut/Dimitrov informed 
Wilhem Knorin (1890 – 1939) in Moscow of the WEB’s initiative to establish a 
“Revisionskommission für die Massenorganisationen”. The primary aim of this commission was to 
evaluate the complex political situation of the mass and sympathising organisations in Europe. In 
this context, Helmut/Dimitrov concluded that Germany was of particular interest since the 
movement there was experiencing the “aggravating circumstances” as troublesome. The WEB 
planned to use the symbolic authority of this “Revisionskommission” to send instructors across 
Europe to examine the “auxiliary bodies” of the Comintern: the IRH, the Friends of the Soviet 
Union, Sportintern, Krestintern, the LAI and the IAH. In December, the WEB intended to carry 
out a thorough inspection of the German communist movement.1214 Is it possible to outline the 
results of this “Revisionskommission”, or did the initiative fizzle out? From a chronological 
perspective, another episode may help to explain what happened: the “Essener Konferenz”. The 
WEB organised this “extremely illegal” conference on 30 December 1932, for representatives of 
the European communist parties (the KPD, the PCF, the CPCz, the Communist Party of Belgium, 
the Communist Party of Austria and the Communist Party of Poland, while the Communist Party 
of Italy and the CPGB were unable to participate). According to the German communist, Walter 
Gollmick (1900 – 1945), for “conspiratorial reasons” the conference took place either in 
Remscheid or outside the small town of Sauerland in Germany. Whether the question of the 
communist mass and sympathising organisations in Europe was a topic addressed at the 
conference remains unknown. At the conference, the WEB focused apparently on one issue only, 
the enforcement of Comintern directives on the parties, urging the need to establish and “conduct a 
strong campaign against the Versailles Treaty to take the wind out of the sails of the NSDAP”. If 
successful, this would establish a “fighting alliance between the German-French working 
class”.1215 Yet, prior to the “Essener Konferenz”, Helmut/Dimitrov had suggested a different 
                                               
1214 RGASPI 499/1/37a, 11, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to “Freunde”/Knorin, Moscow, 3/10-1932; RGASPI 
499/1/37a, 13, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to “Freunde”/Knorin, Moscow, 3/10-1932; RGASPI 499/1/37a, 
14, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to “Freunde”/Knorin, Moscow, 19/10-1932.  
1215 This reference to “conspiratorial reasons” was a statement given by Gollmick during an interrogation by the SS in 
Hamburg on 23 July, 1943, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/58/3833a, 58-60, II A I-158/43. Walter Gollmick, Westeuropäisches 
Büro (Web), Hamburg, 23/6-1943. Dimitrov informed the ECCI in the autumn of 1932 of the “fractional failures” of 
the “ultra left-wing” within the KPD which were causing disorder and hindering the ZK KPD from carrying out 
“Leninist work”. According to the report on Gollmick’s interrogation, the small city of Sauerland was the location for 
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solution in order to unify the socialist and communist movements in Germany against the NSDAP. 
In a letter to the Political Commission in October, Helmut/Dimitrov urged the Commission to 
understand the fact that organised public demonstrations in Germany had the potential to 
counteract the Nazi movement. However, this would require creating an alliance, referring 
explicitly to the united front strategy. For Helmut/Dimitrov, it was important to unify the 
communist, socialist, social democrat and Christian movements into a front, controlled by the 
communists, under the slogan: “Come with us! Fight with us against fascism … Create a Red 
Front under the Leadership of the Com. Party [KPD]”.1216 The Political Commission ignored 
Helmut/Dimitrov’s proposal and, even if the “Revisionskommission” ever carried out any of its 
intended work, its results were insignificant. The primary aim of the “Essener Konferenz” was to 
enforce the policy of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters on the European communist 
parties. Obviously, this aim flew in the face of the harsh political reality the communist movement 
in Europe had to struggle against at the end of 1932. Thus, in the beginning of 1933, this was a 
movement characterised by internal inconsistencies. The Comintern seemed to act with 
indifference to the KPD crisis, particularly when the “world party” commanded its German section 
to continue to be suspicious of the German labour movement, even if they declared their support 
for the communists. The Comintern also criticised the KPD leadership for having failed to take 
advantage of the opportunity to realise revolution in Germany in December 1932. According to 
Hermann Weber’s illustrative appraisal of this dilemma, these were “the burdensome 
consequences of Stalinization”.1217 
      In the beginning of 1933, reduced to being a pawn in the internal contradictions both between 
the Comintern and the KPD and in the political game in general in Germany, as well as being 
crippled by its own organisational weakness, the International Secretariat focused completely on 
propaganda campaigns. With the arrest of Huang Ping on the orders of the Tientsin Committee of 
the KMT in Peiping, China, on 4 January 1933, the International Secretariat assisted with the 
efforts of both the IAH and other actors in the global labour movement to establish a massive 
protest campaign.1218 According to Welt am Abend on 6 January, the International Secretariat of the 
                                                                                                                                                          
this conference, while Bernhard (1982, p.156, 194) writes that it was convened in Remscheid. Carr (1982, p.393) 
suggested that it took place “somewhere in the Ruhr area of Germany”. The Gestapo arrested Gollmick in Copenhagen 
in 1941 and transferred him to Hamburg, where the SS pressured him to give information on the German communist 
movement. As the Nazi regime was beginning to crumble towards the end of World War II, Gollmick committed 
suicide on 15 February, 1945, see Weber & Herbst 2004, pp.257-258. 
1216 RGASPI 499/1/37a, 20-25, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to the Political Commission, Moscow, October  
1932. 
1217 Hoppe 2007, pp.320-321; Weber 2008, p.26. 
1218 RGASPI 542/1/59, 2, (Confidential) Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to General Ma, Li-Du, Sun Bin-Wen,  
Nanking, 21/1-1933; for Huang Ping, see Daniel Y. K. Kwan, Marxist Intellectuals and the Chinese Labour 
Movement. A Study of Deng Zhongxia (1894-1933), University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1997, p.94; for Ping’s 
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LAI had acted swiftly to establish an “international rescue campaign”,1219 a campaign utilising the 
transcontinental networks of both the LAI and the IAH. On 10 January, an unknown correspondent 
in New York and IAH liaison in the USA, sent information to Münzenberg that the Huang Ping 
campaign had unified the USA LAI Section, the IAH, the IRH, the TUUL and “friends” [CPUSA] 
behind Münzenberg’s “plan of action”. What did this plan entail? Firstly, that the networks of the 
IRH [ILD] and the IAH should administer the Huang Ping campaign in the USA. Secondly, that by 
sending a delegation to visit a number of governmental agencies in Washington, Huang Ping’s 
“solidarity rescue campaign” would receive public exposure, particularly the demand to support 
the “immediate release of Ping”. This unknown liaison promised Münzenberg that the final aim 
was to organise a series of public demonstrations in New York, Boston, Chicago and San 
Francisco in the near future. Apparently, this liaison had travelled to Washington to discuss the 
Huang Ping case with several Chinese scholars, and had met Theodor Dreiser (who was also 
connected to the anti-war campaign), who had published a couple of articles on the campaign in 
the American labour press. “The hardest thing” for the liaison though was to “raise the money for 
the telegram” to Münzenberg, especially as “each word cost 88 cents”, thus, the liaison had had “to 
work for an entire day” to get the money needed.1220 
      On 25 January, Münzenberg contacted Magyar assuring him that he would do everything 
possible to intensify the Huang Ping campaign, e.g. the International Secretariat had established a 
connection in Washington, “Borah”, who could exert pressure on the USA government. The 
question is, however, who was “Borah”? One plausible candidate was the Republican Senator 
William E. Borah, the Chairman of the Senate of Foreign Relations Committee. As noted in 
Benjamin R. Beede’s study of US foreign policy in the years 1898-1934, Borah was strongly 
against the USA’s “imperialist policy”.1221 Towards the end of January, however, a rumour 
suggested that the KMT had executed Ping. If so, and in order to respond to “the atrocious act”, 
the Political Commission instructed the Eastern Secretariat to write a statement and send it to the 
                                                                                                                                                          
attendance at the Frankfurt Congress in July 1929, elected as LAI General Council member, see fol. RGASPI 
542/1/92, 28, 33.   
1219 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 215, Welt am Abend, No.5, 6/1-1933. 
1220 RGASPI 542/1/59, 5, Letter from unknown writer [name deleted with scissors], New York, to Münzenberg in 
Berlin, 10/1-1933. According to Epstein’s study, communists were “willing, indeed eager, to sacrifice their time, 
energy, work and relationships for the communist cause”, Epstein 2003, p.42. The unknown representative was not 
Gibarti. On 11 January, MI5 intercepted a telegram sent to Gibarti in Berlin, a document which mentioned that the 
“movement [had] started”. Whether this related to the Ping campaign was not disclosed, see TNA PRO KV2/1401, 
Positions, which are known to have been held by Dobos as Louis Gibarti in united front organisations, Summary of 
M.I.5 traces up to January 1933.   
1221 RGASPI 542/1/59, 7, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Magyar/ECCI, Moscow, 25/1-1933; Benjamin R. Beede, 
The War of 1898 and U.S. Interventions, 1898-1934, Taylor & Francis, London, 1994, p.444, 504. Borah’s stance 
against the “imperialist policy” of the USA was in connection to the idea of building a canal in Nicaragua in 1932. 
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International Secretariat “in case his murder is confirmed”.1222 In the meantime, Münzenberg 
asked whether Maxton would consider getting the ILP to support the Ping campaign. Maxton 
stated that he remembered Ping as a person who had “a fine working-class outlook” and he 
promised Münzenberg that the ILP eagerly supported the imminent release of Ping.1223 It was 
nevertheless through Bridgeman that Münzenberg heard “of the safety” of Ping, as Bridgeman had 
received the information from the Chinese chargé D’Affaries in London.1224 The KMT released 
Ping on 24 January, although whether this decision was a reaction to the pressure caused by the 
LAI’s rescue campaign is unknown. Nonetheless, the global protest campaign had drawn 
unwanted attention to the KMT and the Nanking government. According to Fowler, the Huang 
Ping campaign had unified the anti-colonial movement as “the activists began to experience some 
success in mobilising a broad constituency” among Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, American 
workers’ and the “so-called liberal elements”.1225 Spreading information in Europe about Ping’s 
release from prison seems to have been a slow process, however. Barbusse tried to co-ordinate a 
campaign with the Swiss communist Jean Vincent (who had also been involved in the Ruegg 
campaign) to pressure the Chinese delegation at the League of Nations in Geneva. To put an end to 
the unceasing flow of protest telegrams, the ambassador of the delegation, Yen, sent a note to 
Vincent on 1 February, stating that Ping was a free man after having made “a confession to the 
authorities” and becoming a “state witness”. Barbusse informed Münzenberg about what had 
happened, yet, still perhaps not willing to trust Ambassador Yen’s statement, Münzenberg 
questioned whether “Huang Ping was alive and is he free” in an article in Inprecorr on 12 
February. Ping was alive and managed to escape from the KMT. After the Second World War, Ping 
re-surfaced as a member of the CPCh.1226 
                                               
1222 RGASPI 495/4/228, 1-4, Protokoll (A) Nr.291 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 27/1-
1933. Present at the meeting were Manuilsky, Heckert, Knorin, Gusev, Lozovsky, Gerisch, Eisenberger, Kolarov and 
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1223 RGASPI 542/1/59, 11, Letter from Maxton, London [he used a sheet of paper with the insignia “House of 
Commons”], to Münzenberg, Berlin, 24/1-1933. Münzenberg passed on Maxton’s letter to Magyar on 27 January; see 
fol. RGASPI 542/1/59, 10, Letter from Münzenberg, Berlin, to Magyar, Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/1-1933. 
1224 The British LAI Section organised a demonstration outside the Chinese embassy in London on 28 January, an 
event Münzenberg informed Magyar about, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/59, 14, Letter from Bridgeman, London, to 
Münzenberg, Berlin, 24/1-1933; RGASPI 542/1/59, 27, Letter from Münzenberg, location unknown, to Magyar, 
Moscow, 5/2-1933. 
1225 Fowler 2007, p.168. 
1226 RGASPI 542/1/59, 26, Letter from the Chinese Delegation, League of Nations, Geneva, to Jean Vincent, Geneva, 
1/2-1933. The secretary of the Chinese delegation kindly asked Vincent to inform Barbusse and “your other friends” of 
Ping’s release, and to stop sending petitions. Münzenberg sent a copy of Vincent’s letter to Magyar on 5 February, see 
fol. RGASPI 542/1/59, 26. For Jean Vincent, see Huber 1995, p.456. Other sources on the nature of the Ping campaign 
are, for example, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 230, Willi Münzenberg, “Lebt Huanping und ist er frei?”, 
Inprecorr, No.21, 14/2-1933. For the further development of the Huang Ping campaign and its aftermath in relation to 
Bridgeman and Münzenberg, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/58, 27, (Handwritten) Letter from Bridgeman, London, to 
Münzenberg, Berlin, 29/5-1933; RGASPI 542/1/58, 25, (Excerpt) Letter from Münzenberg, Paris, to the ECCI 
Secretariat, Moscow, 31/5-1933. 
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      The end of the Meerut trial in January was the LAI’s second propaganda campaign. For the 
International Secretariat, the process essentially involved providing assistance to the British LAI 
Section and to Bridgeman. On 16 January, the accused received the “incredibly harsh” verdict 
from the Judge, R. L. Yorke, condemning them either to transportation for life or to imprisonment 
for between four to twelve years.1227 One of the accused, Philip Spratt, stated some time afterwards 
that the portrayal of the trial within the international communist movement had been a “contrast 
with the facts” and the entire episode had been a pretext for the Comintern to distribute 
propaganda.1228 However, while Spratt had his reasons for questioning the results of the Meerut 
campaign, he also ignored the involvement and belief invested in the campaign by some of the 
actors, especially Bridgeman. 
      Since the beginning of the Meerut campaign in 1929, Bridgeman kept feeding Münzenberg 
and the International Secretariat with information on how the work was progressing. In January 
1933, despite the official declaration of the verdicts, this was not the end of Bridgeman’s 
commitment to supporting the Meerut prisoners. Bridgeman told Münzenberg of his idea to 
establish a Special Meerut Release Committee in order to protest against the verdicts of the trial. 
By adopting the theme of “proletarian solidarity” to raise awareness, the committee should act in 
the vein of a typical “trade union” and focus its activities on collecting money to give the prisoners 
moral support, Bridgeman stated. The political stimulus for the committee was to continue 
utilising the international network which had been built up as a result of the Meerut campaign, 
according to Bridgeman, and, if this did not happen, it would be a huge mistake on behalf of the 
British LAI Section to lose contact with these “numerous persons and organisations”.1229 
Bridgeman had authored a letter of invitation to join the committee which he sent to Münzenberg 
for further reconsideration. Bridgeman’s primary aim was “to approach as many people as 
possible”: 
For some time past, the LAI has set itself to carry on the agitation among the British workers 
for the release of the Meerut prisoners, and has undertaken the task of raising money for the 
Defence Fund. So far approximately £750 has been sent to the accused since March 1929. 
                                               
1227 Bellamy & Saville (eds.), “The Meerut Trial, 1929-1933”, Volume VII, 1984, p.89. 
1228 Spratt wrote that “the proceedings, which were in any case largely formal, became such a bore that not one of the 
accused, so far as I remember, tried to follow them. We read, talked or slept in the dock, or when allowed spent the 
day in the garden of the house which was used as the court”, while describing the “lighter moments in jail” filled with 
playing various games, exercise, composing light verse and singing songs. At the end of the process, and after 
receiving a sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment (reduced to two years), Spratt became depressed, see Spratt 1955, 
pp.49, 52, 57-58. 
1229 Bridgeman told Münzenberg that he was in “telegraphic contact” with the prisoners in India, see fol. RGASPI 
542/1/59, 12, Letter from R. Bridgeman, London, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 14/1-1933; RGASPI 542/1/59, 14, Letter 
from Bridgeman, London, to Münzenberg, Berlin, 24/1-1933. 
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This sum sinks into insignificance when we compare it with the £124,000 spent by the 
Government.1230 
“Proletarian solidarity” was the moral incentive for the Special Meerut Release Committee. 
Moreover, the committee strove to highlight fundamental questions of elementary social and 
political rights for the Indian working class, e.g. the right to organise themselves in trade unions 
and in political organisations.1231 While Bridgeman conceptualised the idea of the committee, the 
only thing Münzenberg could contribute with at this stage, however, was to pass on the 
information from London to the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow.1232 The Special Meerut Release 
Committee managed to maintain the political drive of the Meerut conspiracy trial campaign. Over 
a period of six months, the committee collected £1,000 and established an active collaboration 
with the National Council of Labour in London, which resulted in the publication of a pamphlet 
demanding that the British government change the prison terms for the defendants. On 24 July 
1933, the High Court in Allahabad reduced the sentences in favour of the imprisoned 
individuals.1233 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1230 RGASPI 542/1/59, 15, Letter of invitation from the British LAI Section, author Bridgeman, January 1933. The 
CPGB member active in the LAI section in London, Percy Glading, fronted the committee.  
1231 RGASPI 542/1/59, 15, Letter of invitation from the British LAI Section, author Bridgeman, January 1933. The 
committee had planned to hold its first meeting in London on 26 January, at 8 pm, at the London District Office of the 
Amalgamate Engineering Union, at 39 Doughty Street. 
1232 The Political Commission endorsed the idea of the Eastern Secretariat organising “a specific Meerut day”, under 
the direction of the LAI in Europe. However, due to the unforeseen series of events in Germany, particularly the 
Reichstag Fire, this plan was suddenly cancelled. The only reaction from the LAI was a written protest, published in 
the February issue of the Informationsbulletin (printed in Paris in March), see fol. RGASPI 495/4/228, 1-4, Protokoll 
(A) Nr.291 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 27/1-1933. For the article, see SAPMO-BA ZPA 
R/1501-20200, 220-225, Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nummer 2, Februar 1933. 
1233 Bellamy & Saville (eds.), “The Meerut Trial, 1929-1933”, Volume VII, 1984, p.89. 
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Organisation No More  
 
On the day Hitler took over the government in Berlin, there was a meeting of the Enlarged 
[International] Secretariat, […] The extremely important decisions taken at this meeting 
concerned the political and organisational work of the International Secretariat […] due to 
the changes made in the bureau because the situation in Germany had made it objectively 
impossible [to continue]. 
Allo Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris,  
1/4-1933 
   
A terrible political impotence is present now. 
Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Magyar, 
Moscow, 6/2-1933 
 
If there is one particular moment in the decline of the LAI – day, month and year – 30 January 
1933 is its decisive turning point. In the history of the Weimar Republic, this date refers to Hitler’s 
appointment as Reich Chancellor, while for the International Secretariat, this date refers to the last 
meeting ever to take place at its bureau at 13 Hedemannstraβe. After this meeting, everyone knew 
that the game was up. The irrevocable decision to transfer the International Secretariat from Berlin 
to Paris had made this perfectly clear to everyone. The dismantling of the International Secretariat 
was an operation determined by how to put into practice the directives given from one person to 
another in February and March. With the literal dispersal of the International Secretariat out of 
Berlin, this process marks the definitive disintegration of the anti-imperialist movement in 
Germany during the inter-war years. Additionally, it also reveals the different reactions amongst 
the actors.1234  
      While the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor on 30 January is a chronological fixture 
in the history of Germany during the inter-war years, the socio-political consequences of the 
Reichstag Fire on 27 February witnessed the painful end of the Weimar Republic.1235 Moreover, 
with the arrest of Dimitrov in Berlin on 9 March, this was a signal for the communists remaining 
                                               
1234 Based on to two accounts, one a report from the German communist Allo Bayer “Bericht über Lage und Tätigkeit 
des Intern.Sekretariats der Liga ab 30.Januar 1933” and the other Helmut/Dimitrov’s report to Magyar on 6 February, 
documenting the dramatic and planned end of the International Secretariat in Berlin. 
1235 The scholarly debate on causality, intent, and the question of guilt as to who had started the fire is still raging. The 
principal question is whether it was an act committed by a disillusioned individual, or whether it was a conspiracy 
organised by the NSDAP and Hitler, or the KPD. Criminological investigations, scholarly interpretations, and general 
discussions have yielded the same conclusion, that the fire was not a put-up job organised by the NSDAP. See further 
in Fritz Tobias groundbreaking analysis Der Reichstagsbrand: Legende und Wirklichkeit, Grote, Rastatt/Baden, 1962, 
p.28; Martin Moll, “Zur Historikerkontroverse um den Reichstagsbrand”, in Jahrbuch für Forschungen zur Geschichte 
der Arbeiterbewegung, Verlag NDZ, Berlin, 2003/I, Januar, pp.177-183; Erwin Eckert & Emil Fuchs, Blick in den 
Abgrund. Das Ende der Weimarer Republik im Spiegel zeitgenössischer Berichte und Interpretationen, Pahl-
Rugenstein, Bonn (2002). 
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in the city to escape and leave Germany. In the period from 30 January to 27 February, the German 
security services focused their attention on gathering intelligence on the German communist 
movement. The raids on the headquarters of both the KPD and the IAH in February provided the 
MdI with a rich cache of documents on the organisational network of the German communist 
movement. It was logical for the International Secretariat to blame the Reichstag Fire for its 
liquidation and transfer to Paris. Yet, this overstates the consequences of the Reichstag Fire and 
conceals the fact that the NSDAP’s electoral victory on 30 January simply enabled the 
International Secretariat to implement earlier than planned the Political Secretariat’s decision in 
June 1932 (see previous chapter) to remove the nerve centre of the LAI from Berlin to Paris. 
 
The Eastern Secretariat partly contributed to supporting the International Secretariat in its efforts 
to mobilise the campaign for Huang Ping and to influence the Meerut verdicts in January. Also in 
January, Berger returned from Berlin to Moscow to assist Magyar in setting up a plan on how to 
re-organise the International Secretariat. On 27 January, Piatnitsky summoned Magyar and Berger 
to a “closed session” in his office to listen to the plan. They agreed that it was crucial to keep 
Münzenberg as the General Secretary of the LAI, above all for him to function as the liaison 
between the “kom.Fraktion Liga” and the ECCI in Moscow. This was primarily because Clemens 
Dutt and Ferdi would be leaving Berlin at any moment and returning to Moscow. The Comintern 
had already made plans for Clemens Dutt. Michael E. Kreps (1895 – 1937), the leader of the 
publishing department at Comintern headquarters, had proposed that the Political Commission 
invite Clemens Dutt to Moscow and, if he accepted, he would be given a position in the publishing 
department. Ferdi’s future was less clear. He only knew that he had to leave Berlin for Moscow at 
a given signal. Magyar and Berger focused essentially on the International Secretariat’s “technical 
apparatus”, telling Piatnitsky that “1-2 Comrades” had to remain in charge in Berlin for as long as 
possible. The first candidate was Allo Bayer, who would replace York/Thögersen as the editor of 
the Informationsbulletin, while the second candidate was Wittfogel, designated to act as the editor 
of The Anti-Imperialist Review. Bayer and Wittfogel would also take care of the daily routine work 
at the bureau. To confirm the re-organisation of the International Secretariat, Magyar and Berger 
expected to present this plan at an extended “plenary session” at the International Secretariat in 
Berlin sometime “over the next 14 days” in February.1236 However, due to the series of events in 
                                               
1236 Magyar and Berger presented the re-organisation plan at a “closed session” in Piatnitsky’s office (“11 Uhr 
Vormittage”) at Comintern headquarters, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/228, 80, Tagesordnung, 27/1-1933. For Kreps’ 
request, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/228, 1-4, Protokoll (A) Nr.291 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. des 
EKKI, 27/1-1933. Manuilsky authorised Clemens Dutt’s journey to Moscow. For a biography of Kreps, see Huber 
1995, p.431; for this protocol, which includes the “strictly confidential” plan of reorganisation, see fol. RGASPI 
495/4/228, 5-6, (Streng vertraulich) PROTOKOLL (B) Nr.291 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. des 
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Berlin on 30 January, Magyar and Berger’s original intention had to be drastically altered. Instead, 
it was Helmut/Dimitrov who emerged as the messenger to enforce the Political Commission’s 
decision to re-organise and dismantle the International Secretariat. 
      On 14 February, Inprecorr published the article “Gegen nationale und koloniale 
Unterdrückung. Eine wichtige Sitzung des Erweiterten Internationalen Sekretariats der LAI”, 
which gives the impression that the International Secretariat had held a meeting on that very same 
day in Berlin. This was a deliberate deception, however. Apparently, the so-called “extended 
plenary session” (die erweiterte Sitzung) was carried out in all haste at 13 Hedemannstraβe on 30 
January, after Helmut/Dimitrov had summoned Clemens Dutt, Ferdi and Bayer for “the last 
meeting of the International Secretariat”. At this meeting, Helmut/Dimitrov talked about how to 
secure the International Secretariat’s future political and organisational activities as well as 
criticised “the centre” for its inability to develop any sustainable work. While the Inprecorr article 
depicted the LAI as an active and vigorous organisation, this article was based on the draft of a 
resolution authored by the WEB (“Entwurf einer politischen Resolution über die Kriegslage im 
Fernen Osten und die Aufgaben der anti-imperialistischen Organisationen”) which supported the 
anti-war campaign in its protests against “Japanese imperialism” in the Far East. According to this 
article, the LAI was one of the few “real, revolutionary organisations” in Germany which, in 
comparison to the treachery of social democracy and the reformist trade unions, strove to continue 
the struggle against imperialism.1237 This depiction was nonetheless an erroneous recapitulation of 
what had really happened at the last meeting of the International Secretariat on 30 January. 
Helmut/Dimitrov stated in his report to Magyar that he had criticised the members of the 
International Secretariat for their “lack of understanding” in how to exploit “good opportunities” to 
create anti-imperialist “mass work”, a dilemma mainly “prevalent in the leadership of the LAI”. 
The “terrible political impotence” at the International Secretariat and its inability to carry out 
organisational work, explained why the “promotion and support of the movement in the colonies 
and in areas of national oppressed minorities in Europe” had been a complete failure, 
Helmut/Dimitrov argued. While briefly touching upon the “raging” political situation in Germany, 
Helmut/Dimitrov concluded that the fate of the International Secretariat depended on realising 
other factors: 
                                                                                                                                                          
EKKI, 27/1-1933; For Allo Bayer as editor of the Informationsbulletin, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501,20200, 220-225, 
Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nummer 2, Februar 1933. 
1237 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 231, “Gegen nationale und koloniale Unterdrückung. Eine wichtige Sitzung des 
Erweiterten Internationalen Sekretariats der LAI” (Against National and Colonial Oppression. An Important Meeting 
of the Enlarged International Secretariat of the LAI), in Inprecorr, No. 21, 14/2-1933 [published around the date 
suggested by Magyar and Berger]; RGASPI 499/1/37, 27-36, Entwurf einer politischen Resolution über die Kriegslage 
im Fernen Osten und die Aufgaben der anti-imperialistischen Organisationen, WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 
[stamped date: 14/2-1933]. 
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I have concluded that the current line, as it is, even with the best will cannot do that [develop 
mass anti-imperialist work]. […] a workable International Secretariat, a living centre capable 
of taking the initiative, suggestions, to help and control the implementation of directives in 
the sections, establish new contacts, take the initiative for the establishment of new sections 
(Belgium for example), make a political stand against current imperialist policy and colonial 
oppression, organise a series of campaigns aimed against imperialist activity and provide the 
sections with appropriate material, organise international anti-imperialist propaganda, to 
promote and take advantage of the possibilities [in the political work], the current 
[International] Secretariat is not suitable. An immediate change is absolutely necessary 
according to me.1238 
According to Helmut/Dimitrov, the International Secretariat was a defunct leader of the LAI, 
unable either to carry out the obligations required of it, to subsist on its own strength or, most 
importantly, to realise the Comintern’s colonial work. Thus, the only logical solution at hand was 
to “temporarily” relocate the International Secretariat to Paris. This would preserve the original 
aim of the LAI acting as a Comintern intermediary to the colonies. Helmut/Dimitrov argued that 
this was a crucial question for the ECCI to consider, especially as the LAI constituted one of the 
few communist organisations which had established contacts with “reformist unions, social 
democratic parties, petite bourgeoisie circles and among intellectuals”. However, Helmut/Dimitrov 
left the matter of transferring the International Secretariat to Paris in the hands of Magyar, 
concluding that it was still possible to create a vigorous anti-imperialist movement despite the 
“movement still being far away […] we must change the current unacceptable situation in the 
League as soon as possible”.1239 
      Helmut/Dimitrov did not, however, inform Magyar that several of the members had already 
begun to dismantle and liquidate the International Secretariat after this meeting. In March, after 
Bayer had escaped from Berlin and arrived in Paris, he completed a report on every stage in the 
process, and passed it on to Magyar. According to Bayer, the operation had begun with a scattering 
of personnel: 
Immediately after the meeting, the secretaries Ferdi and Dutt were recalled [to Moscow]. A 
short time later, the Hitler government made it impossible to conduct any useful work. Willi 
M. [Münzenberg] disappeared shortly thereafter.1240 
                                               
1238 RGASPI 542/1/59, 29, Letter from “Helmut”/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 6/2-1933. 
1239 RGASPI 542/1/59, 29, Letter from “Helmut”/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 6/2-1933. 
1240 RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Bericht über Lage und Tätigkeit des Intern. Sekretariats der Liga ab 30. Januar 1933, 
author: A. Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933. Bayer handed over the report in person to Magyar in Paris on 6 
April. Enclosed with the report was a short note from Bayer, stating that the report was a “valuable” piece of 
information, which described the precarious situation of the International Secretariat. Thus, Magyar had to dispatch 
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Dutt and Ferdi arrived safely in Moscow.1241 Magyar had a meeting with Ferdi at Comintern 
headquarters to receive additional information on the last meeting at the International Secretariat 
[any report of this meeting remains missing]. After listening to Ferdi’s evaluation, and having 
examined Helmut/Dimitrov’s report, Magyar told Münzenberg that the recent activities at the 
International Secretariat had been “weak and trivial in nature”, while it seemed “obvious” that the 
LAI sections were incapable of carrying out “real work”.1242 
      The question is nevertheless whether Münzenberg even took the time to reflect upon Magyar’s 
criticism. Concerned about the situation in Berlin, Münzenberg virtually “disappeared” in Berlin 
after the NSDAP came to power on 30 January. Gross wrote that Münzenberg never went back to 
his apartment, hiding “anonymously in a room” somewhere in the western part of Berlin.1243 
 
* 
 
Liquidation 
The liquidation of the International Secretariat was an undertaking fraught with mistakes from the 
start, characterised by a hesitancy that corresponded to the harsh realities imposed on the German 
communist movement in February.1244 At the last meeting of the International Secretariat on 30 
January, Helmut/Dimitrov had instructed Bayer to work alone at the bureau and to dismantle the 
bureau. Nonetheless, Bayer had “to wait for a few days for your [Magyar] instructions”, a decision 
which delayed the process of transferring sensitive documents at the International Secretariat to 
Paris. Bayer concluded that Helmut/Dimitrov’s advice had hampered the securing of a safe transfer 
of “every document, correspondence and archive” to Paris, especially as the Schutzpolizei and the 
SA raided and temporarily closed down the International Secretariat in the beginning of February. 
                                                                                                                                                          
the report as soon as possible “to our friends [Comintern] in order to ensure that we as soon as possible get an answer” 
on the future of the International Secretariat in Paris, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/60, 38, Short note from A. Bayer, Paris, 
to Magyar, Paris, 6/4-1933. 
1241 RGASPI 495/198/1140, 29-30, Lebenslauf Clemens Palme Dutt, author: Clemens Palme Dutt, year: 1933. At the 
end of 1933, Krebs contacted Müller at the OMS in Moscow to inform him of the strictly confidential decision of the 
Comintern Cadre Department to send Clemens Dutt to London on a two-month mission [purpose unknown]. Müller 
had to ensure that the “visa is not granted on the passport, but on a separate sheet”, see fol. RGASPI 495/198/1140, 26, 
Streng vertraulich, Kreps, Moscow, to Müller, OMS, Moscow, 7/12-1933. 
1242 RGASPI 542/1/58, 17, Confidential letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Münzenberg, unknown 
location, Germany, 17/2-1933. This letter did not contain any further information on Ferdi after his arrival in Moscow. 
Nonetheless, Ferdi remained in Moscow where he worked at the Eastern Secretariat in 1933. On 3 January 1934, the 
Political Commission discussed Ferdi and resolved, due to his networks in Turkey and the Balkans, to give him a 
position in the ECCI Balkan “Länder Sekretariat” and to appoint him a standing member in the Collegium of the 
Eastern Secretariat, RGASPI 495/266/38, 108, Auszug aus dem Protokoll Nr.352 der Sitzung der Politkommission des 
PS, des EKKI vom 3.1.1934, Moscow [signed: Knorin].  
1243 On 22 February, Gross sent a letter to Fritz Brupbacher informing him of her intentions to visit Zürich on 27 
February, and asking whether they could meet for a short meeting at the railway station, Gross 1967, p.244; IISG 
4249.10/194, Letter from Gross, Berlin, to F. Brupbacher, Zürich, 22/2-1933. 
1244 SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 227-229, Betreff: Westeuropäische Büro des Kommunistischen Internationale 
(WEB), Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, an die Nachrichtenstellen der Länder, 
14/2-1933. 
492 
 
The MdI had also prohibited the printing and publication of both the Informationsbulletin and The 
Anti-Imperialist Review in Germany. Apparently, the vindictiveness of both the Schutzpolizei and 
armed forces of the SA had destroyed every printed copy of the February issue of the 
Informationsbulletin at the printing house. Realising that the situation in Berlin would not 
improve, Bayer informed some of the LAI sections of the impending threat. On 13 February, 
Bridgeman received a letter from the International Secretariat containing the directive to use the 
address “Walter Gabbeh, 14 Ahrweilerstr. Berlin” if he wanted to correspond with the International 
Secretariat and, at any cost, to avoid “the old one”. Despite Helmut/Dimitrov’s bad advice, Bayer 
managed to send “most of the important correspondence as well as the addresses and other 
materials to Paris”.1245 Did Bayer’s consignment of documents ever arrive in Paris? Is it plausible 
that the documents were captured at the German-French border? And if the documents did arrive 
in Paris, who was the receiver and where did the material end up? These are all questions which, 
sadly, remain unresolved. Nevertheless, a plausible scenario is that the consignment was 
confiscated somewhere en route to Paris. According to a remark made by Münzenberg to “Franz” 
[?] on 3 March, the failure of getting the “last consignment” from Germany to France – whether 
this concerned the consignment of LAI documents was not disclosed – was an “unforgivable” loss 
which had caused enormous damage.1246 
      The eerie setting in Berlin in February was “the road to silence” for the German communist 
movement, determined by the successful purging and shutting down of the movement by the state 
security services. This process received the assistance of a network of gullible informants in the 
service of the Schutzpolizei, with the raids against the headquarters of both the KPD and the IAH 
confirming that the WEB had been the driving force behind the “activity of the communists” in 
both Berlin and across Europe. Furthermore, the MdI observed that in connection with the closing 
down of the IAH headquarters on 14 February that: 
On the same occasion, the office of the German LAI Section, also located at 48 
Wilhelmstraβe, was no longer to be found there. This could not be determined until now.1247 
                                               
1245 MI5 intercepted the letter to Bridgeman, a document which contained the following information: “[T]here is 
definite evidence that owing to the advent of the Hitler regime, this address is to be used as a cover for the 
correspondence of the League against Imperialism”, TNA KV5/135, Register No. O.F.6/10, Minute Sheet No., 13/2-
1933; RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Bericht über Lage und Tätigkeit des Intern. Sekretariats der Liga ab 30. Januar 1933, 
author: A. Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933. 
1246 RGASPI 542/1/58, 21, Letter from Münzenberg, unknown location [France], to “Franz”, 3/3-1933 [stamped: 8/4-
1933]. Evaluation of the fonds in the Archives Nationales (Fontainebleau, Paris) and the Archives nationals du monde 
du travail has not provided any further clue as to whether the documents ever arrived in Paris, see: 
 < http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/ >. 
1247 Gross 1965, pp.244-245; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 227-229, Betreff: Westeuropäische Büro des 
Kommunistischen Internationale (WEB), Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, an die 
Nachrichtenstellen der Länder, 14/2-1933. For an in-depth interpretation of the network of informants in Germany, see 
Claire M. Hall, “An Army of Spies? The Gestapo Spy Network 1933-45”, in Journal of Contemporary History, 
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However, despite the raid of the International Secretariat at 13 Hedemannstraβe in February, this 
was not the definitive end of the bureau. Bayer, alone at the International Secretariat, experienced 
the desolate and obscure atmosphere of the Weimar capital while being preoccupied with 
liquidating the International Secretariat. On 9 March, Bayer had no other option than to escape in 
all haste from Berlin. 
 
* 
 
Fire, Dismantling and Escape  
At 21.14 pm on 27 February, an alarm sounded across Berlin, declaring that the Reichstag was on 
fire. Due to the chaos caused by the fire, Hitler and the Nazi regime ordered the SA and the 
Prussian police to arrest well-known communist leaders. Münzenberg’s name was on its most 
wanted list, yet on 27 February, he was attending a KPD party meeting in Langenselbold in the 
outskirts of Frankfurt am Main and managed to avoid arrest.1248 On 28 February, the national radio 
in Germany broadcast the warrant for Münzenberg’s arrest, accusing him of having committed 
high treason and, on 1 March, the Deutsches Kriminalpolizeiblatt published a picture of 
Münzenberg.1249 
      Meanwhile, Bayer was waiting for further instructions on how to proceed in Berlin, although 
“after hearing that Helmut had been arrested”, this was the code to abandon the International 
Secretariat and to escape from Berlin and Germany.1250 However, as logical as Bayer’s decision to 
leave Berlin may appear, the liquidation of the International Secretariat was not dramatic. Far from 
                                                                                                                                                          
2009:44, Sage Publications, London, pp.247-265. Hall writes that the “reliability of an informer was very important”, 
which forced the Gestapo to question whether intelligence from a source was accurate or not. 
1248 Münzenberg did not stay at a hotel during his visit, instead Münzenberg’s driver Emil was in charge of the 
arrangements, Gross 1967, p.246; Wessel (1991). 
1249 On March 5, the Nazi paper, Völkischer Beobachter, released the article, “Pestherd des kommunistischen 
Untermenschentums”, which included a photograph of the “fleeing Münzenberg” (next to van der Lubbe), Gross 1967, 
p.257. Tony Le Tissier’s topographical study of Berlin contains the official Nazi regime press release after the 
Reichstag Fire, a document which announced the German nation’s aim to protect the “people and the State”: “The 
burning of the Reichstag was intended to be the signal for a bloody uprising and civil war. Large-scale pillaging in 
Berlin was planned for as early as four o’clock in the morning on Tuesday. It has been determined that starting today 
throughout Germany acts of terrorism were to begin against prominent individuals, against private property, against 
the lives and safety of the peaceful population and general civil war was to be unleashed. […] Warrants have been 
issued for the arrest of two leading Communist Reichstag deputies on grounds of urgent suspicion. The other deputies 
and functionaries of the Communist Party are being taken into protective custody. Communist newspapers, magazines, 
leaflets and posters are banned for four months throughout Prussia. For two weeks all newspapers, magazines, leaflets 
and posters of the Social Democratic Party are banned”, Tony Le Tissier, Berlin then and now, Battle of Britain Prints, 
London, 1992, p.46, see also Alan Bullock, Hitler: a study in tyranny, Pelican Books, London, 1962 (first published in 
1952), p.263, and for Münzenberg, see Martin Schumacher (ed.), M.d.R. Die Reichstagsabgeordneten der Weimarer 
Republik in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus Politische Verfolgung, Emigration und Ausbürgerung 1933-1945, 
Düsseldorf, 1991, p.405. 
1250 RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Bericht über Lage und Tätigkeit des Intern. Sekretariats der Liga ab 30. Januar 1933, 
author: A. Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933. For a dramatic narrative of the consequences and immediate series 
of events after the Reichstag Fire, see G. L. Ulmen’s biography of Wittfogel, which outlines in great detail Wittfogel’s 
struggle to avoid arrest, his unfortunate incarceration and, finally, his deportation from Germany (1978, pp.157-169). 
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it, the dispersal of the “centre” had been a meticulously-planned process. From Berlin, Bayer 
arranged for the destroyed February issue of the Informationsbulletin to be re-printed in Paris 
which, in the name of the International Secretariat, included one of the first public protests against 
the “openly Fascist dictatorship in Germany … [and the] new German Imperialism”.1251 However, 
the psychological pressure on Bayer in Berlin had been a trying and nerve-racking experience. 
According to Münzenberg, Bayer had been working alone at the bureau for almost four weeks, a 
task which had almost driven him insane.1252 Nevertheless, Bayer had managed to carry out the 
work of dismantling the International Secretariat, re-routing the LAI propaganda apparatus to 
Paris, securing a liaison between Paris and Germany and eradicating all traces of individual 
activity at the bureau. 
      Bayer left Berlin on 10 March, the day after Dimitrov’s arrest. Before his departure, Bayer had 
a last meeting with some “German friends”, who promised Bayer that they would continue LAI 
activity and distribute anti-imperialist propaganda in Germany. However, Bayer realised after 
arriving in Paris that this promise would most likely never become a reality. The symbolic end of 
the International Secretariat was an act carried out by Bayer as he divided between the members at 
the International Secretariat whatever amount of money was left at the bureau. Recording the 
balance, noting that “overdue debts had been not paid”, Bayer burned all remaining books and 
documents at the bureau.1253 
 
* 
 
Empty Place 
The International Secretariat, once both the cradle and intersection of the anti-imperialist 
movement in Berlin as well as the hub and junction of “particular bundles of activity”, was 
dismantled and abandoned in March 1933. This last act was a result of external factors 
characterised by the socio-political setting in Berlin, which effectively ended the idea of an anti-
imperialist movement in Germany during the inter-war years. On 16 March, the Berlin Chief of 
Police concluded, after several officers of the Kreutzberg-Tempelhof police district had entered 
and searched the International Secretariat at 13 Hedemansstraβe, that the “facilities of the League 
                                               
1251 RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Bericht über Lage und Tätigkeit des Intern. Sekretariats der Liga ab 30. Januar 1933, 
author: A. Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933; Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus 
(Herausgegeben vom Internationalen Sekretariat, Paris, 57, rue Charlot), 2 Jahrgang, Nummer 3, Ende Februar. 
1252 RGASPI 542/1/58, 21, Letter from Münzenberg, France (unknown location) to “Franz” [?], unknown location 
[Moscow?], 3/3-1933 [stamped: 8/4-1933]. 
1253 RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Bericht über Lage und Tätigkeit des Intern. Sekretariats der Liga ab 30. Januar 1933, 
author: A. Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933. 
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against Imperialism” were empty.1254 The items confiscated from the bureau by the “Polizeiamt 
Kreutzberg-Tempelhof” were typical of the kinds of material and furniture usually found in an 
office. These objects were recorded in an inventory list (a document which signals the definitive 
end of the International Secretariat in Berlin). In 1925, the IAH had been developing its anti-
colonial project under the guise of a philanthropic agenda which, in 1927, realised its objective of 
establishing the LAI in Brussels; however, in 1933, “the centre” of the LAI reflected the abrupt 
end of the colonial question in the histories of both the LAI and the Comintern in Berlin.  
      The bureau at 13 Hedemannstraβe was located on the first floor in the building and consisted 
of four separate rooms. The entrance hall and the first room had shelves, tables, a typewriter table, 
a number of chairs and a litter bin, an electric “hanging lamp”, a newspaper holder, typing and 
writing materials, and curtains. The second room, which faced the street and had a blind at the 
window, contained document cabinets, chairs, a punch holder, electric lamps, transcript and 
newspaper holders, a clothes hanger and curtains. The third room had an office desk and 
typewriter tables (no typewriters were left, only the tables), a clothes hanger and a telephone, a 
filing cabinet and a card index with four empty compartments, a window cabinet, a hanging 
electrical lamp, empty baskets and curtains. The last room had a diplomat’s desk, typewriter tables, 
chairs, electric lamps and a standard lamp, a document stand, a filing cabinet, a shelf and a clothes 
hanger, empty litter bins, various writing materials, inkwells and net curtains. The Schutzpolizei 
observed that a number of newspapers, books, empty folders and files were scattered in “all of the 
rooms”.1255  
      One year later, on 9 March 1934, the Prussian Ministry of Finance made the entry that the 
furniture and office material confiscated from the International Secretariat of the LAI had been 
used to furnish the rooms at SS headquarters at 8 Prince Albrechtstraβe1256 – almost an inverted 
poetic justice. 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1254 Fowler 2007, p.5; Weitz 1997, p.6; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 234, Polizeipräsident, Berlin, Aus 
Lagebericht, 16/3-1933. 
1255 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preuβischer Kulturbesitz (GStA_PK) Rep. 151, IA, Nr.8350, 99-100, Abschrift: Polizeiamt 
Kreutzberg-Tempelhof SW 29, Berlin, 4/5-1933. 
1256 GStA_PK Rep. 151, Nr.8350, 102, Der Preußische Finanzminister; Berlin, 9/3-1934. 
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Chapter 11. Postscript: The LAI in Exile – Paris 1933 and London 1933-37 – A New 
Beginning … and the End… 
In March 1933, the International Secretariat was just a memory, while for Münzenberg and Gross, 
this was the beginning of a new phase. After escaping from Germany and the crumbling Weimar 
Republic by crossing the German-French border by car in the beginning of March, the two of them 
arrived in Paris. In a letter from Gross to Paulete Brubacher in Zurich, Münzenberg wrote, “we are 
still alive and quite safe” and that Paris was like coming to “a new world”.1257 In March and April, 
Paris was a hectic and confused scene with the arrival of German émigré communists, with the 
French capital emerging as a haven in which the German communist movement could resume its 
activity. With the transference of the LAI and its International Secretariat to its exile in Paris, once 
Bayer had arrived in Paris in March, he concluded that, in order to re-construct the structural basis 
of the organisation from top to bottom, “large sums of money” would be required. Bayer wanted 
Münzenberg’s opinion on the matter, only to receive the recommendation that a far more 
constructive solution would be to locate the International Secretariat permanently in Brussels. 
Perhaps Münzenberg came up with this idea after understanding that the “Paris friends” (Central 
Committee of the PCF) showed no interest in supporting the LAI.1258 Exile in Paris was the 
definite turning point for the LAI, therefore, is it possible to distinguish any organisational 
initiatives by the LAI in Paris; and what character did the discussion of the LAI assume at 
Comintern headquarters concerning the future of the International Secretariat? 
      The interest amongst the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters to re-construct the 
International Secretariat apparatus in Paris gradually ebbed away. Magyar went on a short trip to 
Paris in March to observe the turmoil amid the German communist émigré community, only to 
return to Moscow at the end of the month. At a meeting of the Political Commission, Magyar 
challenged the attending members to come up with a solution in order to revive the activities of the 
International Secretariat in Paris. According to Magyar, the International Secretariat was at this 
stage much reduced; a more constructive solution would, therefore, be to transfer the LAI 
apparatus to London. If so, the Political Commission had to sanction “Comrade” Bridgeman to 
assume the role as the official leader, and convince Münzenberg to remain on as General 
Secretary.1259 Magyar most likely met Münzenberg in Paris, only to realise that he appeared to be 
                                               
1257 Gross 1967, pp.246-250; IISG 4249.10/194, Letter from Gross, Berlin, to Fritz Brupbacher, Zürich, 22/2-1933; 
IISG 4249.10/195, Letter from Gross, Paris, to Paulette Brupbacher, Zürich, 29/4-1933.   
1258 RGASPI 542/1/60, 37, Letter sent by Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 29/3-1933 [stamped date: 23/6-1933]; 
RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Report from Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933. 
1259 The Political Commission suggested, if it were possible, to transfer a majority of the colonial work carried out by 
the International Secretariat in Berlin to the French IRH section, and to get the work re-started by using the contacts of 
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preoccupied with more urgent matters rather than dealing with the LAI. At this point in time, 
Münzenberg’s primary focus was on the anti-fascist campaign, better known as the World 
Committee for the Victims of German Fascism, a campaign which culminated in the convening of 
the anti-war conference at the “Salle Pleyel” in Paris on 4-6 June, 1933. Furthermore, Münzenberg 
furnished propaganda against the Nazi regime by co-ordinating the publication of the renowned 
The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror and the Burning of the Reichstag in 1933.1260 Magyar’s 
recommendation to the Political Commission in April also contradicts Saville’s otherwise 
discerning analysis of the British LAI Section, in which he concludes that the International 
Secretariat quite simply “was handed over” to Bridgeman at “the end of 1933”.1261 However, the 
matter involved an in-depth discussion at Comintern headquarters, with a number of actors 
(Münzenberg, Magyar, Piatnitsky, Saklatvala and Pollitt) being engaged to examine whether 
Bridgeman was the most suitable candidate to assume the leadership of the LAI. 
      Münzenberg’s lack of interest in the LAI determined whether it would be possible to re-
construct and develop the activities of the LAI in Paris. In June 1933, Münzenberg travelled to 
Moscow in the company of Gross and, once there, used the opportunity to declare his opinion on 
the LAI. In a letter to Magyar, Münzenberg explained that the trying social conditions in Paris 
made it difficult for the LAI to develop any kind of activity. This letter is also the document of a 
resigned persona remembering past glories, where Berlin had provided Münzenberg with a 
political and organisational scene in which to establish propaganda campaigns. For Münzenberg, 
the result of having being been forced to escape from Germany, while attempting to re-adapt 
himself to the situation in Paris, a city offering only a fraction of the number of former 
possibilities, it was no longer possible to carry out the work the Comintern demanded of him. 
According to Münzenberg, it was even impossible to “find the suitable word” to describe his loss 
of engagement, or to present any kind of solution, especially as the Comintern did not send “any 
                                                                                                                                                          
the Colonial Commission of the PCF as an “intermediary” to the colonies. Yet, the Political Commission realised that 
this would be an insecure arrangement, considering that “for the moment” there existed “extremely limited channels of 
contact with the colonies”, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/242, 6-7, Protokoll (B) Nr.308 der Sitzung der Politkommission des 
Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 27/4-1933; RGASPI 495/4/242, 1-5, Protokoll (A) Nr.308 der Sitzung der Politkommission des 
Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 27/4-1933; RGASPI 495/4/242, 175-183, Confidential resolution on the colonial work of the 
French Section of the IRH, adopted by the Political Commission, 7/5-1933. 
1260 The “Salle-Pleyel” Congress was attended by more than 3,000 delegates according to Rundschau, which described 
the congress as a propagandist feat: “[T]he international advance of Fascism announces an immediate transition to 
imperialist war […] Fascism is an international danger for the workers of all countries”. For the preparations for the 
second congress, see fol. RGASPI 495/100/931, 1-2, Official letter from the European Workers’ Anti-Fascist 
Congress, 28/3-1933; RGASPI 495/100/931, 4, Note from the German Relief Committee, 4/4-1933. See also Carr 
1982, pp.392-393; Gross 1967, pp.270-272; McMeekin 2003, p.264. For Münzenberg’s work on the Brown Book, 
SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 9/I 6/7, 18, Letter from Münzenberg, Paris, to Knorin, Smoliansky, Kuusinen, Moscow, 13/5-
1933; and, World Committee for the Victims of German Fascism, The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror and the 
Burning of the Reichstag, Gollancz, London, 1933.   
1261 Saville referred to the “Report of the International Secretariat for 1934”, a document that mentions how difficult 
Bridgeman was finding it to re-activate the LAI, Saville vol.VII 1984, p.45; RGASPI 542/1/61, 1-43, Report from 
Bridgeman, London, to Saklatvala CPGB, 1934 [arrived in Moscow 10/3-1935]. 
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notification, information and assistance” on how to solve the question. Consequently, Münzenberg 
argued that the only solution for him was to resign from the LAI: 
[…] if we are finished and I was formally released from any connection with the L. [LAI], 
[…] The time is past when I could give newspapers a number of instructions to do this and 
that.1262 
On 15 June, Magyar notified the Political Commission of Münzenberg’s wish to resign from the 
LAI, thus, it was essential to decide whether the International Secretariat should be transferred 
from Paris to London. If the Political Commission endorsed this plan, Magyar argued that this 
would require the “central apparatus” of the LAI in London being guaranteed a monthly allowance 
of $220, and the sections of the LAI in France, England, Belgium and the Netherlands being 
guaranteed $205 per month.1263 The decision-makers at Comintern headquarters were, however, 
reluctant to let go of Münzenberg as the General Secretary of the LAI. Münzenberg could not cope 
with the situation of not receiving a definite answer. On 20 August, Münzenberg sent Piatnitsky a 
short note, including his desire to sever his ties to the LAI: 
Dear Comrade P. [Piatnitsky]. After my proposal to move the headquarters and secretariat of 
the Anti-Imperialist League to London, I ask to be relieved from my former work in the 
League and to no longer be cited as secretary of the League. With party greetings / W. 
Münzenberg1264 
This short note was Münzenberg’s final act in the history of the LAI. The Political Commission 
granted Münzenberg’s wish and, on 27 August 1933, terminated his position as General Secretary. 
After this Political Commission session, Piatnitsky summoned Magyar and Bela Kun for a closed 
discussion in his office at Comintern headquarters at 11am. In Piatnitsky’s office, the three of them 
worked out the details of how to transfer the International Secretariat from Paris to London and to 
appoint Bridgeman as the new leader of the LAI.1265 
      The history of the LAI “at the end of 1933”, and up until its formal end in 1937, is a question 
that deserves a thorough re-assessment. This question involves, aside from its chronological 
delineation (1933-37), an examination of the individual relationships after the transfer of the 
International Secretariat to London, e.g. the complex relationship between Münzenberg and 
Bridgeman. Münzenberg believed that Bridgeman was a capable and effective person to lead the 
                                               
1262 RGASPI 542/1/59, 45, Letter from Münzenberg, Moscow, to Magyar, Moscow, 8/6-1933. For the journey to 
Moscow, see Gross 1967, p.272. This quote is also included in Haikal (1995, p.152). 
1263 RGASPI 495/4/250, 15-16, Protokoll (B) Nr.318 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 15/6-1933. 
Magyar continued the LAI discussion at 11am in Piatnitsky’s office, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/250, 47, Running order of 
topics, Piatnitsky’s office, Moscow, 15/6-1933. 
1264 RGASPI 495/4/260, 72, Short note from Münzenberg, Moscow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 20/8-1933. 
1265 RGASPI 495/4/258, 1-4, Protokoll (A) Nr.331 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 27/8-
1933; RGASPI 495/4/258, 12, Tagesordnung, 27/8-1933. 
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LAI’s public campaigns in England in 1933 (the Huang Ping campaign and to bring the Meerut 
trial campaign to a conclusive and constructive end). Yet Münzenberg also seems to have been a 
bit skeptical towards Bridgeman. According to MI5, the CPGB member, Percy Glading, stated that 
Münzenberg had made “great efforts … to get rid of Bridgeman from the LAI” because his 
political inclination was not “extreme enough and he has always refused to become a 
Communist”.1266 
      Despite the fact that Bridgeman assumed the role as the official leader of the LAI, in reality, in 
fact, he was in the minority. The International Secretariat of the LAI in London was dominated by 
communist members such as Pollitt, Saklatvala and Glading. However, Bridgeman considered the 
LAI’s connections with the communist movement to be secondary. According to J. Ayodele 
Langley’s interview with Bridgeman on 20 April 1967, he “made it clear” that he still believed that 
the LAI “was not a Communist front organisation”. Bridgeman nevertheless found the task of 
reconstructing the LAI, after having been appointed as its leader in October 1933, as 
insurmountable. The only document sent to Bridgeman from Paris (or Moscow) was “a list of 
addresses which was not up to date and so of little value”; therefore, the only option was to 
“reconstitute the work of the League from the beginning”.1267 
      From November 1933 until the beginning of 1937, the LAI remained active in England, before 
deciding to formally dissolve itself and replacing it with the Colonial Information Bureau (CIB), a 
socialist association which publicly renounced the former communist ties of the anti-imperialist 
movement. The CIB did not, however, disavow the historic impact of the LAI, and initiated a 
nostalgic narrative of the LAI: 
Since its foundation in 1927 the League against Imperialism has done consistent work in 
connection with the different aspects of the colonial struggle; but it is essential that we 
should advance from the position of a small group of people interested in the colonial 
struggle, seriously restricted in their activities because of their association with a ‘banned 
organisation’, and activate the working class organisations and peace societies,…1268 
The LAI existed from 1927 until 1937. The establishment of the LAI in Brussels had been 
followed by a process which attempted to link together the anti-colonial movements in both Berlin 
and beyond, which, in 1927-33, witnessed both the rise and fall of the anti-imperialist movement 
                                               
1266 RGASPI 542/1/59, 45, Letter from Münzenberg, Moscow, to Magyar, Moscow, 8/6-1933; TNA KV5/135, 50, 
Personal M/12, League against Imperialism, 25/8-1933. The rest of the quote reads as follows: “Willi Muntzenberg 
[sic] has three times ‘requested’ him to leave the Movement, but Bridgeman has refused. Bridgeman has rather a large 
personal following in this country and, as he also has independent means, he is a very difficult person to get rid of”. 
1267 RGASPI 542/1/61, 1-43, Report from Bridgeman, London, to Saklatvala CPGB, 1934 [arriving in Moscow on 10 
March 1935]; Langley 1973, p.310 (see footnote 70). Much of Langley’s interpretation of the LAI was based on his 
interview with Bridgeman in Middlesex, England, on 20 April, 1967. 
1268 Saville vol.VII 1984, pp.45-46. 
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in Berlin. Its “successor” in London, 1933-37, offers the logical possibility of seeing these two 
topics as separate historical accounts, particularly if one considers the differing socio-political 
contexts in London and Berlin. However, what unifies the narratives of these “two” LAI 
organisations is the organisational connection of both of them to the structure and network(s) of 
the Comintern. The history of the LAI is one which remains firmly rooted within the context of 
international communism, as it is also a history which explains itself as a source of inspiration for 
the decolonisation process in the colonial and semi-colonial countries after World War II.  
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Conclusion 
The history of the LAI is not ambiguous. Far from it, the history of the LAI is a narrative 
characterised not only by tragedy, failure, self-deception, control, resignation and dejection, but 
also by commitment, eagerness, anticipation, self-sacrifice and euphoria. The visionaries and 
utopian dreamers who believed in the LAI, particularly the actors at the International Secretariat, 
journeyed through the political and social landscape of the 1920s, characterised by its hope and 
possibilities, with the first years of the 1930s forcing them to realise that everything had been a 
dream. The euphoria of the Brussels Congress and the establishment of the LAI in 1927 fulfilled 
the Comintern’s objective of having an international anti-imperialist organisation at its disposal. 
Despite the feeling of a spiritual bond and the expressions of collective joy in 1927, the 
momentum of the Brussels Congress contrasts starkly with the collapse of the anti-imperialist 
vision in 1933. Furthermore, the disintegration of a sympathising communist organisation belongs 
to this discussion, with the argument that the Comintern was a grandiose failure due to its 
dissolution in 1943, a theory inspired by the understanding that the world party never 
accomplished what it set out to do at the beginning: to create a world of communism. However, 
this raises a few questions. Is it logical to assume that either the physical discontinuity of the 
Comintern in 1943, the liquidation of the International Secretariat in Berlin 1933 or the formal 
dissolution of the LAI in 1937, signified the definitive end of what these movements represented? 
The history of the LAI is a “lost history” which contains a variety of dynamic aspects. The above 
analysis has striven to disclose perspectives which existed and took place both from below and 
from above, located in hierarchical structure(s), thus, the history of the LAI is a story enacted both 
in horizontal and vertical dimensions. By combining the impact of both internal and external 
factors with the effects of decisive events, the drama of the LAI emerged in the heyday of the 
inter-war years; decisive events which both contributed to and shaped, and ultimately confirmed 
the end of the LAI. 
      On 30 August 1945, just thirteen days after Indonesia had finally won its independence (on 17 
August 1945) from both the Dutch and Japanese imperialists, after more than 300 years of Dutch 
colonial rule, with Sukarno and Hatta having been the main leaders of the Indonesian 
independence movement and Sukarno being proclaimed the first President of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Mohammad Hatta sent “a personal message to my old comrades wherever they may 
be”. According to Hatta, the memories of his life in Europe and his “many friends there” had made 
him reflect upon the leaders of movements and “those champions of humanitarianism” who had 
rallied against colonialism and imperialism, concluding that the 1927 Brussels Congress had been 
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a conference of “world importance”.1269 In 1945, however, the leaders and “champions of 
humanitarianism” connected to the LAI had either died in mysterious circumstances (Münzenberg) 
or had fallen victim to an ideology they had defended and believed in (communism). One cannot 
summarise and conclude the history of the LAI without taking the above into account. As Karl 
Schlögel rightfully observes in his study of the terror and dreams in Moscow in 1937, the normal 
approach for an author in the epilogue is to recapitulate the main contentions which have emerged 
during the analysis, before summarising and reaching a conclusion. When it comes to the tragedy 
of the LAI, it is relevant to emphasise two aspects similar to the ones raised by Schlögel, aspects 
explicitly linked to the historical connection of the state-sanctioned violence against the Russian 
population during the Great Terror in 1937, and to the history of international communism.1270  
      Firstly, a majority of the visionaries and utopian dreamers involved in the LAI at some 
ideological, organisational or individual level faced a brutal end during the Terror and purging of 
Soviet society during the 1930s. These were individuals who had given the whole of their lives to 
creating utopia and defending an ideology, only to finally witness the end of utopia. After 1933, 
Moscow became the capital and symbolic haven for communist émigrés, particularly for those 
from Germany. A majority of the actors connected to the LAI did not live to see the end of the 
Second World War in 1945 but, even worse, many did not even live to see the war begin in 1939, 
while the fates of some of them are still not known today. Münzenberg was found dead in France 
in 1940; Chatto was executed in Moscow in 1937; Teido Kunizaki most likely disappeared into the 
GULAG penal system sometime during the 1930s, probably after the ICC in Moscow had refused 
to transfer his KPD membership to the CPSU (B) due to his “bourgeois background”; Hansin Liau 
died in 1964, shortly after arriving back in China after having served a sentence in the GULAG 
together with his wife; and Hans Thögersen (“York”; 1902 – ?) vanished without trace in January 
1933. In Moscow, a majority of the actors at Comintern headquarters, who at some level had had a 
role in the LAI, suffered a tragic end and were executed during the Great Terror in 1937-38: 
Heimo (1937); Magyar (1937); Petrovsky (1937); Melnitschansky (1937); Piatnitsky (1938); Mif 
(1938); and Bukharin (1938).1271  
      Secondly, the ascendancy of the NSDAP as the leading power in Germany on 30 January 1933, 
resulting in the chaotic and somewhat anticipated end of the Weimar Republic in February-March, 
was also the end for the LAI and the International Secretariat in Berlin. This also announced in the 
                                               
1269 “A personal message to my old comrades wherever they may be”, in Hatta 1972, p.504. For Indonesia’s  
independence, see Merle Calvin Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1200, (Third Edition), Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2001, pp.261-264. 
1270 Karl Schlögel, Terror och dröm – Moskva år 1937 (original title: Terror und Traum – Moskau 1937; 2008), Natur 
& Kultur, Stockholm, 2011, p.654. 
1271 See further in Chase (2002); Hermann Weber & Dietrich Staritz (Hrsg.), Kommunisten verfolgen Kommunisten, 
Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1993; Arch Getty & Naumov (2010). 
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most violent terms the end of the German communist movement, and laid the foundation for a new 
political and social milieu in Germany. However, the development of German society after 1933 
was a period overshadowed by the inhumane and devastating consequences of the Second World 
War. Consequently, the impact of the 1930s contributed to the end of the history of the LAI in both 
a national and international context. In the post-war societies of the Cold War, the LAI, as both a 
topic and a phenomena, was either consigned to the dustbin of history, exposed to the politics of 
biography or had become an object of nostalgia. The understanding of the LAI was a topic 
included in many discussions and assessments which attempted to make a distinction between 
“good and bad” history, often within an ideological framework, while in Bandung in 1955, the LAI 
emerged as a fond memory and nostalgic point of reference for the leaders of the decolonisation 
movement. These factors shed some light on why the topic of the LAI, one of the first protesters 
against the system of colonialism and imperialism in the twentieth century, has been perceived as 
being ambiguous. The issue is, however, far more complex. 
 
* 
 
Success and Failure 
The Brussels Congress and the establishment of the LAI in 1927 were unexpected successes for 
the IAH, the LACO, for Münzenberg and for the Comintern. The dynamic message of its anti-
imperialist agenda, as presented in Brussels, showed the Comintern the possibilities of producing a 
political message which attracted attention to the colonial question from outside the international 
communist movement. Once Münzenberg, with Gibarti’s help, had managed to transfer the LAI’s 
inaugural congress to Brussels – one of the “hearts of imperialism” in Europe – Münzenberg’s 
position as the leading organiser of communist propaganda and covert activities of the Comintern 
in Europe was confirmed. To the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, the LAI suddenly 
appeared as the solution to establishing a channel for communism to the colonial and semi-
colonial countries. In Brussels, disparate political camps – socialists, social democrats, trade 
unionists, nationalists, pacifists and radical elements – all united around a common aim: the 
struggle against colonialism and imperialism. However, the central issue for Münzenberg and the 
Comintern was that the establishment of the LAI signified the essence of the united front strategy 
which, according to the vision outlined by Kuusinen in 1926, aimed to create a “Solar System” to 
realise the building of a world of communism. For Münzenberg, the Brussels Congress was the 
opportunity to merge the LAI with already existing anti-colonial committees and campaigns 
established by the IAH apparatus in Berlin which, through the active leadership of the 
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International Secretariat in Berlin, expected to turn the LAI into one of the most vociferous critics 
of the policies of the League of Nations. 
      The LAI was a success for the simple reason that it provided some of the anti-colonial 
activists, who later re-surfaced as leaders of liberation movements in their home countries, e.g. 
Hatta, M. J. S. Naidu and Nehru, with a life-long experience and knowledge of organising. For 
example, the necessary steps to work out and structure propaganda campaigns, schedule activities, 
work out budgets and to organise public meetings.1272 The LAI was a success because it mobilised 
the euphoria amongst the visionaries and utopian dreamers in the struggle against colonialism and 
imperialism. For a brief moment, the LAI succeeded in living up to its vision of actually posing as 
a non-party organisation, a crucial factor enabling actors holding different political points of view 
to stand on the same political platform around a common cause. However, once the Comintern 
resolved to correct the ideological agenda and organisational structure of the LAI after its 
inception in 1927, this created a scenario which ultimately established a dividing line between its 
communist and its non-communist members. 
      The impact of the LAI on the anti-colonial movement left a lasting imprint. Culminating in the 
Bandung conference in 1955, the LAI’s heritage was one of inspiration which, according to 
Sukarno, was a “result of sacrifices”, which had ultimately ended in the understanding that “[N]ow 
we are free, sovereign and independent. We are again masters in our own house. We do not need to 
go to other continents to confer”.1273 Both the Bandung Conference and the Brussels Congress are 
chronological fixtures in the historiography of decolonization, in which the LAI plays a key role in 
the subaltern understanding of global history, a perspective which stands in stark contrast to the 
perception of Empire as an idea and its global dominance. On the other hand, it is curious to point 
out the conviction that the LAI engendered amongst some of the decision-makers at Comintern 
headquarters. For example, the institutional liaison of the International Secretariat in Moscow, the 
Eastern Secretariat, argued in 1930 that the LAI was by far the most important sympathising 
communist organisation among the Comintern’s “auxiliary organisations”. The reason why the 
Eastern Secretariat considered the LAI to be a pivotal actor for the international communist 
movement was its role as a distributor of Bolshevik propaganda in colonial and semi-colonial 
countries, as well as the fact of it having established contact with individuals inclined towards 
communism. From a broader perspective, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that the LAI led the 
way in inspiring and maintaining anti-imperialist networks of a transcontinental character during 
the inter-war years. Its success in doing this drew attention to the LAI from actors who, on the one 
                                               
1272 See further on the legacy, experience, and organisation inside of mass organisations in Kasza 1995, pp.183-188. 
1273 Opening Speech by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno, at the Asian – African Conference 
(Bandung, 17th – 24th April, 1955). 
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hand, defended and believed in the LAI as a political actor, and those who, on the other hand, 
condemned the activities of the LAI. Free to act on the basis of being a “focus-centered” 
organisation, the LAI took measures to rally against the system of colonialism and imperialism. 
However, this is also what contributed to the LAI’s downfall. Once the Comintern, the LAI’s 
parent body and financial supporter, decided to take a more active part in the decision-making 
process and, ultimately, subject every aspect of its activism to its own standards and rhetoric, the 
outcome was an unwanted exposure which played into the hands of the LAI’s main antagonists: 
the LSI and the national security services. 
 
In the end, the LAI was a failure. The primary explanation for this is that the LAI did not realise its 
ambition of becoming an international anti-imperialist organisation. However, this simplified 
generalisation deserves a more thorough and rational explanation. By seeking an answer in internal 
and external factors, one can explain why the LAI headed off in a different direction than the one 
originally intended. Crucial to the above was the establishment of a hierarchy of relations at the 
International Secretariat, an internal factor which determined its relations to Comintern  
headquarters in Moscow, with the latter following its own set of hierarchical structure(s) in order 
to guide and supervise the activities of the LAI in Berlin. Control and the struggle for power were 
dominant features throughout the history of the LAI. Fuelled by a desire to attain a prestigious 
position among the central actors in the hierarchy, the core at the International Secretariat 
conspicuously separated itself from the believers. What were the principal reasons for doing this? 
The fundamental difference was ideology. Hence, the core represented a structural factor reserved 
for individuals considered to be reliable and genuine communists, whereas the believers, in spite 
of their desire to both contribute to and develop the political work of the International Secretariat, 
had a different political or social background, e.g. as nationalists or socialists. This conclusion is 
based on the characters, behaviours and fates of some of the individuals engaged at the 
International Secretariat. The relationship between Münzenberg and Chatto is illustrative of the 
above. Whilst reaching a mutual understanding in the context of anti-imperialism, once Chatto had 
received the order to leave Berlin in 1931 and was then instructed to resign from his post as 
“International Secretary” of the LAI, Münzenberg made no effort to change this decision. The 
second case is Hansin Liau’s experience of how the core separated itself from the believers, a 
hierarchy of relations which ultimately led him to chastise himself as an “oppressed colonial slave 
of the LAI”. It was rather the omnipotent core of individuals who were either deemed to be 
trustworthy and reliable, e.g. Münzenberg, or were authorised by the Comintern to travel from 
Moscow to Berlin and be located at the International Secretariat, e.g. Smeral and Ferdi, which 
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earned the respect and prestige the believers were seeking. A product of ideology, and established 
for the sole purpose of acting as an “intermediary between the Comintern and nationalist 
movements in the colonies”, the LAI faced the challenge of having to combat ideological 
ambitions within its organisational structure. Communism was an ideology expecting to “build 
bridges” to the colonial countries, which, according to the maxim introduced by Stalin in 1918, 
was an aphorism used by the LAI as a pretext and a guiding principle for its activities. However, 
the LAI failed in its endeavour to construct viable and functional “bridges” to the colonies. 
Consequently, the question is why did the LAI and its International Secretariat take the route they 
did? 
      The time-line of the LAI and the International Secretariat followed a course initially set in 
motion and determined by internal constraints, which ultimately came to its end due to external 
events. In 1925, the anti-colonial project was a product of the philanthropic agenda the IAH was 
sponsoring, an initiative which gained momentum with the successful establishment of propaganda 
campaigns such as Hands off China and the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee. For 
Münzenberg, the outcome of the Hands off China campaign was the impetus used to convince the 
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters of the necessity to keep supporting the activities of the 
IAH as a proletarian solidarity mass organisation. With the success of the Hands off China 
campaign, the rhetoric of anti-colonialism as espoused and supported by the IAH created a 
reaction outside the communist movement, especially amongst anti-colonial activists in Berlin and 
Europe. Making the most of this opportunity, Münzenberg proposed to the Comintern the idea of 
allowing the IAH organise an international congress against colonialism and imperialism. 
However, the Indian communist Manabendra Nath Roy was the key who, after analysing the 
achievements of the IAH’s colonial work, and in connection with the establishment of the LACO 
in February 1926, suggested to the Comintern that they should endorse the idea of creating “a 
permanent organisation to support the liberation movement in the colonies”. Hence, the hitherto 
general understanding of the LAI, that it was a product of Münzenberg and the IAH, is an 
erroneous assumption. In fact, the establishment of the LAI as an organisation was never a priority 
for Münzenberg. Münzenberg’s primary focus was to organise an international anti-imperialist 
congress in Brussels, in 1927, and to turn this event into a grandiose demonstration of anti-
imperialist propaganda, as well as finding candidates suitable for communist influence. The 
euphoric reaction to the Brussels Congress nevertheless caught Münzenberg off guard, with 
Münzenberg conceding that it would be foolish to ignore the establishment of the LAI as an 
organisation. Hence, neither Münzenberg, the IAH nor the Comintern could disregard the 
magnitude of this event. However, the ensuing work to co-ordinate the organisational structure of 
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the LAI after the Brussels Congress developed into a conflict between the International Secretariat 
and the Comintern, which in turn added anxiety to a relationship which was already under 
pressure. Efforts to find solutions to practical questions (personnel, money) were provisional from 
the outset: e.g. the International Secretariat being located within the headquarters of the IAH in 
Berlin; or the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters not swiftly solving the crucial question 
of funding for the LAI; as well as intentionally delaying the despatch of directives to the 
International Secretariat. Meanwhile, Münzenberg’s primary concern was to get Piatnitsky to 
reimburse the IAH for the expenses spent on the congress. Thus, the LAI missed its opportunity to 
take full advantage of the euphoria and momentum generated by the Brussels Congress for the sole 
reason that the decision-makers in Moscow chose not to react to the extent, functionality and 
intentions of the LAI until June 1927. By then, however, the interest in the ethos of the 
organisation had begun to fade among the visionaries. At the same time, the LAI’s antagonists (the 
LSI, and the German, British and French security services) were increasing their efforts to 
understand and verify their suspicion that the LAI was indeed a communist organisation. Due to 
the above, in the period from February till June 1927, the LAI and the Comintern missed their 
chance to establish a vigorous international anti-imperialist organisation, as they had hoped and 
intended. In retrospect, and in order to avoid a deterministic understanding of the history of the 
LAI, the organisation remained in existence despite experiencing a downward spiral after June 
1927, a process which included suffering the humiliation of its transfer from Berlin to Paris in 
March 1933, and finally its definitive dissolution in Great Britain under Bridgeman’s supervision 
in 1937.  
      The International Secretariat was an institutional actor subjected to the dictates of the 
Comintern. These constraints and obligations were, however, a prerequisite set in place to allow 
the International Secretariat to exist, so therefore this was a logical arrangement based on a mutual 
understanding. Yet, the process ran in one direction only. The Comintern issued either directives or 
political instructions to the International Secretariat which were aimed at maintaining activity as 
long as the LAI continued to fulfil and comply with the expectations of Moscow. A symptom of 
the hierarchy of relations at play, the system depended on the co-operation and administrative 
services of Münzenberg and/or the Comintern emissaries (Smeral, Ferdi and Clemens Dutt). For 
the Comintern, maintaining control was crucial and it was prepared to use every available means 
to ensure that the International Secretariat carried out its decisions. This was a structural 
relationship, which gained in strength over time, defined by the policy changes within the 
Comintern. The shift from the united front strategy to “the new line” in 1928, and with the 
confirmation of the “correctness” of class against class in 1929, signified a drastic “turn to the left” 
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within the communist movement. After 1928, the LAI was literally heading towards an uncertain 
future, one characterised by alienation and internal chaos. It is nevertheless through the words 
expressed by one the actors involved (Smeral) that one discovers the internal dilemma which the 
LAI had to confront. In connection with the anni confusionis and the LAI’s trial in 1930, Smeral 
informed the top-strata of the Comintern apparatus in Moscow that the LAI’s misfortune was the 
fact that the organisation had come into existence while the united front strategy was still the 
Comintern’s endorsed policy. The radicalism and isolationism of “the new line” ignored the 
instrumental use of the sympathising communist organisations as a cover for the operations of the 
Comintern. For the LAI, the policy change from the united front strategy to “the new line” 
hampered its every attempt to become an international organisation, producing instead a confused 
and hostile relationship to the political, social and cultural groups, and individuals connected to the 
LAI. In addition, how was the LAI going to behave in public, and present its political message? 
      Internal hostility and fear grew because of this policy shift in 1928: a doctrine advocated by the 
Comintern and which the prominent leaders of the national communist parties fervently supported. 
This in turn stimulated a frame of mind more aptly described as paranoia, with the communists 
devoting a great deal of time, energy and attention to making a distinction between “friend and 
foe”. At the “Second International Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism” in Frankfurt am 
Main in July 1929, the hostility from the communist elements put the LAI to the test. While the 
Brussels Congress in 1927 had been a scene of euphoria, the Frankfurt Congress was the exact 
opposite, leaving the LAI gasping for air before the organisation began to devour itself from the 
inside. As a result of all this, the aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress – the anni confusionis – not 
only purged the LAI from an organisational and ideological perspective, but the “prominente 
Persönlichkeiten” (Nehru, Maxton, Fimmen and Hatta) themselves became either victims or 
resigned individuals during the “purification” process. A process which focused exclusively on 
preserving the dictum once envisaged and endorsed by the Comintern in 1926: to preserve control 
and for the LAI “to remain in our hands”, a frame of mind fervently advocated by Münzenberg, 
Katayama, Smeral and Magyar. It did not matter that the pragmatism of the communists 
contributed to ending to the LAI’s utopianism and, ultimately, bringing the organisation to its 
knees. The reason for this was based on suspicion and distrust, a mentality the Bolsheviks 
endorsed for the sole reason of getting the international communist movement to implement a 
conspiratorial behaviour as a moral impetus for its activities. 
      After the 1927 Brussels Congress, the International Secretariat was unable to capitalise on the 
euphoria of the event and, rather than linking together the anti-colonial movement, represented by 
organisations, associations, committees and individuals, into a broad anti-imperialist movement, 
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the International Secretariat was dependent upon egocentric networks. The LAI was in fact never a 
broad, unified organisation on an international basis. This becomes evident when one compares the 
opinions of fear and suspicion expressed by the national security services to the internal 
discussions at both the International Secretariat and within the Comintern on the geographical 
ramifications of the LAI. The German security service took notice of the international network of 
the “men of confidence” connected to the International Secretariat which was, in retrospect an 
exaggeration. In reality, the LAI network was made up of a fairly limited number of individuals 
sensitive to both internal and external pressures, and to coercion. The central issue is nevertheless 
that the initial indecisiveness, as well as the subsequent policy shifts and sudden changes in 
attitude among the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, traumatised the International 
Secretariat, and, in turn, also affected the organisational structure of the LAI. Due to the radicalism 
of “the new line” in 1928, the adoption of the class-against-class policy in 1929 and the 
consequences of the anni confusionis in 1930, once the decision-makers in Moscow had finally 
admitted that mistakes had been made, it was too late to use the LAI as an “intermediary” to “build 
bridges” to colonial and semi-colonial countries. By 1931, there was no road back to the united 
front strategy. 
 
The LAI was an expression of the communist vision. It was also an organisation representative of 
the enthusiasm and anticipation of the inter-war years to create a better and more just world. The 
international events preceding the inception of the LAI in 1927 also contributed to defining the 
objectives of the organisation. The key event had been the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 
and its aftermath. After the end of the Great War in 1918, and in connection with the poor 
treatment and ignorance of the colonial question among the leaders of the victorious powers during 
the Peace Conference (despite disturbances in the colonies throughout 1919), the end result was 
that the “Wilsonian moment” gradually evaporated. This contributed to radicalising the anti-
colonial movement which, in some instances found an ideological haven in the internationalism 
expressed by the Bolshevik regime in Soviet Russia after its establishment in 1917, a relationship 
which came to fruition after the symbolic formation of the Comintern in 1919. Expecting to act as 
the leading spokesperson in support of the anti-colonial movement, the LAI was an institutional 
actor both intertwined with and subjected to the endorsed ideology and administrative directives of 
the Comintern. While these factors set the boundaries for the International Secretariat, the socio-
political situation in Germany provided the political backdrop. After 1929, in connection with the 
crash of the global economy and the ensuing recession, the Weimar Republic was a political scene 
which, at the beginning of the 1930s, had turned into a political battlefield between forces of the 
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extreme Left (the Communists) and the extreme Right (the Nazis) on the streets in Berlin. For the 
LAI and the International Secretariat, further subjected to the crisis of the anni confusionis and on 
the brink of self-destruction, external factors gave them their final death blow. In 1930, German 
authorities (the RKÜöO, Auswärtige Amt, MdI and the Schutzpolizei in Berlin) descended upon the 
International Secretariat and, as a result of the raid on 21 December 1931, exposed the communist 
nature of the LAI. Furthermore, the security services in Germany were collaborating with other 
national security services, particularly the British, to uncover the activities of the LAI. With the 
NSDAP competing with the KPD for political power in Germany in 1932, some of the decision-
makers at Comintern headquarters conceded that the only available solution was to disband the 
International Secretariat en masse and to re-locate its activities to Paris. In January and February 
1933, after the Nazi regime’s ascendancy to power in Germany, this period witnessed the 
humiliating defeat of the KPD and symbolised the end of the German communist movement. Was 
it even logical or, for that matter, possible for the LAI and its International Secretariat to remain in 
Berlin during this period? By 1933, the LAI was a mere vision and shadow of its former self. 
Thus, a more justified and fair understanding of the LAI at the beginning of the NSDAP’s period 
of omnipotent influence is to conclude that the LAI’s aim to act as the hub for the anti-imperialist 
movement had come to an end. However, the idea sponsored by the LAI – the struggle against 
colonialism and imperialism – was a belief which persisted amongst the visionaries and utopian 
dreamers, despite the contradictions and complications taking place at “the centre”, i.e. at the 
International Secretariat in Berlin. 
 
* 
 
Towards an Understanding of the LAI 
Is it possible to achieve an understanding of the LAI? This thesis and its analysis have aimed to 
question, through the study of primary sources linked either directly or indirectly to the LAI, the 
conclusions drawn by previous research and, above all, to discuss and reveal the dynamics and 
activities of a sympathising communist organisation. What is the primary reason for evaluating the 
LAI from such a methodological approach? This approach has assisted the analytical process in 
reaching an understanding as to why the Comintern endorsed the decision to establish the LAI, and 
how the Comintern supported the LAI’s work. Furthermore, this approach confronts the relative 
scarcity of previous research on the LAI. One of the fundamental results of this study is having 
revealed how difficult the actors found it to create an anti-imperialist utopia, a conundrum which 
also confirms the utopianism of communism, i.e. that the LAI was an expression of communism 
and belonged to the complex ideological and administrative system of international communism, 
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represented by the Comintern. A two-fold dimension kept the LAI together: firstly, the LAI wanted 
to create a public platform against the system of colonialism and imperialism and, secondly, it 
belonged to a movement wanting to spread communism on a global scale. This required and 
depended upon the active participation of convinced individuals, while at the same time, the entire 
process was, however, an undertaking manoeuvred by the communists in the background. Stripped 
of its communist ties, the LAI would have resembled a business enterprise or a religious clique, 
restricted by its incapacity to act due to a weak financial structure, while confronting ambitions of 
power within its hierarchy. The LAI was one of several sympathising communist organisations 
connected to the Comintern's network, e.g. the Friends of the Soviet Union, the Anti-Fascist 
League, the International of Revolutionary Writers’, the International Trade Union Committee of 
Negro Workers’ and the Amsterdam-Pleyel Anti-War movement. However, the LAI also provided a 
political platform for several of these sympathising organisations, particularly the emergence of 
both the anti-war movement in 1932 and the ITUCNW in 1929. While all of the above 
organisations had their own distinctive features and political agendas, they nevertheless all shared 
the same stigma of dissolution during the societal darkness of the 1930s. A comparative approach 
may help to create an in-depth understanding of the dynamics and interactionism of the 
sympathising communist organisations of the Comintern. Therefore, the following proposal is that 
the organisational activity which took place in these organisations was an interactionist process, 
e.g. the mandatory attendance of delegates from other sympathising organisations at congresses 
and conferences organised by a communist organisation, the publication and distribution of 
political material, the interchange of personnel, financial assistance and joint preparatory work to 
organise public demonstrations. Furthermore, the sympathising organisation was an institution 
within the communist movement where individuals could share inspiration and experiences, but it 
was also an arena representing either an inclusive or exclusive institution for its members. 
      Critical assessments and analytical research of the many activities of the LAI may yet produce 
fruitful and insightful knowledge of the international communist movement during the inter-war 
years, e.g. by evaluating how the LAI presented itself in a public context. Through the publications 
released by the International Secretariat and the public campaigns organised by LAI, a plausible 
approach would be to adopt either a discursive or a comparative analysis. Points of departure 
which may strengthen the assumption that the LAI could, in some way, be seen as a forerunner to 
the letter-writing campaigns initiated by Amnesty International in the 1960s or the environment-
awareness campaigns organised by Greenpeace. This postulation addresses in turn the question of 
reaching a deeper and historical understanding of the behaviour and activities amongst the interest 
groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which emerged in the post-war society after 
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the Second World War. Another question is the radical youth movement in both Germany and 
beyond during the inter-war years, and how the LAI strove to portray itself as a source of 
inspiration for youth. For example, the “Second International Congress against Imperialism and 
Colonialism” in Frankfurt am Main acted as the host for a LAI youth conference on 20 July 1929, 
which essentially discussed how to mobilise youth to rally in support of the anti-imperialist 
movement. This episode in Frankfurt may contribute to better understanding the reception of the 
LAI and its political message, but it also illustrates the youthful bliss of belonging to a movement 
based on humanitarian ideals. 
      If we are seeking quantitative results by measuring in degrees of success, e.g. by the number of 
registered members, geographical spread and long-lasting continuity, the answer is relatively 
disheartening. It is rather through a qualitative perspective that it is possible to interpret and 
understand the LAI. By analysing the dynamics and character of the institutional and individual 
networks connected to the LAI, a history emerges depicting the spread of anti-imperialism both as 
an idea and as a practice. This qualitative focus is, in its essence, a narrative of the interactionism 
and relations that existed both within and between the LAI, the national sections, the International 
Secretariat and the Comintern. In conclusion, this also explains why the LAI turned into an 
illusion of utopia. Despite the initiative of the IAH, Münzenberg and the Comintern to establish 
the LAI, its very structure contributed to its downfall on the political arena and, consequently, the 
LAI was never able to capitalise on the euphoria of the 1927 Brussels Congress. A majority of the 
undertakings invested in the LAI by Comintern headquarters (administrative and political work) 
concerned, above all, the question of formulating theoretical concepts for if and possibilities, rather 
than choosing to understand the harsh realities taking place in Berlin or, for that matter, anywhere 
else outside the Soviet Union. While some people have interpreted the LAI as being either 
ambiguous or a mere mouthpiece for Soviet foreign policy, these erroneous assessments ignore the 
fact that the LAI did function as a source of experience and inspiration for both anti-colonial 
activists and the anti-colonial movement. It is almost as if the liquidation of the International 
Secretariat in Berlin 1933, its conclusive end in London 1937 and the communist overtones of the 
LAI, have defined the historical understanding of the LAI. As a consequence of this, the LAI as a 
topic has been perceived as a “lost” history, remembered either in critical terms or as a nostalgic 
memory. 
 
* 
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We must return to walk in the city, or to be more precise, in two cities. Brussels, the capital of the 
Belgian kingdom, was, towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
century, a place of conferences, a tradition which is still maintained to this day, being the heart of 
the European Union. According to a map of Brussels from the 1930s, squashed in between the 
sheer size of the Palace of Justice and the Royal Palace, walking along the rue de la Regence, one 
finds the medieval Palais d’Egmont. The political intersection and “bundles of activity” which 
occurred here on 10-14 February 1927, were specifically chosen to declare a symbolic 
demonstration against colonialism and imperialism, which in turn aimed to fulfil the desires and 
anticipations of the visionaries and utopian dreamers. The inauguration of the LAI at the 1927 
Brussels Congress, in one of the “hearts of imperialism”, was designed to confront both the system 
and the idea of Empire as a global determinant. The second city, Berlin (“Red Berlin”), was, in a 
sense, the direct opposite of Brussels, as Germany was no longer an imperial power. However, for 
the LAI, Berlin was the most logical place in which to concentrate its activities. The combination 
of radicalism, liberalism, conservatism, socialism and communism, social and political expressions 
on display for everyone to see, was a milieu that stimulated the growth of an anti-imperialist 
movement supported by the LAI, as it would likewise contribute to its downfall. To walk around 
Berlin during the years of the Weimar Republic, with the magnitude of movements colouring 
everyday life must have been a remarkable scene. For the LAI and the International Secretariat, 
however, theirs was a history enacted in a narrow geographical space, housed in crowded bureaux 
in a few blocks of the pulsating heart of the city. The history of the LAI was a tragic one, leaving 
many with a sense of unfulfilled hopes and dreams, particularly those of the collective joys of 
belonging and euphoria, which ultimately exposed the true essence of the LAI: a mere vision. 
 
* 
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Appendix I: Chronology: 1925 – 1933  
1925 
Hands off China campaign, June 
Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, December 
1926 
Founding conference of the League against Colonial Oppression (LACO) in Berlin: 
“Rathauskeller” conference, 10 February  
Meeting of the LACO Executive, Berlin, 13 September  
1927 
“First Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism” in Brussels, 10-14 February  
LAI Executive meeting, Amsterdam, 28-29 March  
LAI Executive meeting, Cologne, 20-21 August  
LAI General Council, Brussels, 9-11 December  
1928 
LAI Executive meeting, Brussels, 28-29 April  
LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 18-19 August  
1929 
LAI Executive meeting, Cologne, 15-16 January  
LAI Executive meeting, Amsterdam, 13-14 April  
LAI Executive meeting, Frankfurt am Main, 20 July  
“Second Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism”, Frankfurt am Main, 21-28 July  
1930 
–  
1931 
LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31 May – 2 June  
1932 
“Interne Konferenz” of the LAI at the Amsterdam Anti-War Conference, August  
1933 
Last meeting of the International Secretariat, Berlin, 30 January  
Reichstag Fire, 27 February  
Re-located to Paris, March – August 
The International Secretariat transferred to London, September 
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Appendix II: Dramatis personae  
 
Adler, Friedrich (1879 – 1960). Born in Vienna; historian and journalist by trade, became active 
in the Social Democratic Party of Austria in 1911. Involved in the anti-war and pacifist 
movements during the Great War; secretary of the “Two and a half” International 1921-1923; 
secretary of the LSI 1923-1939; member of the LACO Executive 1926.  
Arnot, Robin Page (1890 – 1986; “Jack Cade”). CPGB member; secretary of the LDR in 1920; 
left the LDR in 1928. Attended the Sixth Comintern Congress 1928, remained in Moscow as 
CPGB representative and worked as Deputy Head at the Eastern Secretariat, elected as member of 
the “Ost-Länder-Sekretariat II Sektion” [India] in 1928. Leader of the work to organise the 
“Colonial Conference” and examine the colonial work among the West European communist 
parties in 1929. Prepared the second LAI congress and was Münzenberg’s liaison on LAI 
questions. Travelled to the USA as ECCI plenipotentiary in May 1929, returned to England in 
December 1929. 
Bach, Federico (1897 – 1978; real name: Fritz Sulzbacher). Journalist by trade; engaged in the 
KIM in Berlin in 1922; IAH functionary 1923-1925; LACO secretary in Berlin in 1926. Travelled 
to Mexico on an LAI mission in 1927; delegate of the IRH Executive in Mexico in 1928. Bach 
resigned from the KPD and broke with the German communist movement in 1929. Worked as a 
professor at Mexico University, remained and died in Mexico.  
Bayer, Allo (? – ?). German communist, IAH functionary. Representative of the Central 
Committee of the IAH in Paris October 1928 – December 1930; worked at the International 
Secretariat in Berlin and Paris January 1933 – August 1933.    
Berger, Joseph (1904 – ?, “Bob”). Communist from Poland; co-founder of the Communist Party 
of Palestine in 1920; went to Moscow in 1924. Assigned to work at the International Secretariat in 
1931; arrested by the Schutzpolizei on 21 December, 1931. Remained in Berlin after being released 
in 1932 and returned to Moscow in January 1933, given a position in the Eastern Secretariat.  
Bilé, Joseph Ekwe (1892 – 1959; “Morris”). Anti-colonial activist from Cameroon. Co-founder 
of the Berlin LDRN section in September 1929; performed work for the International Secretariat, 
considered by Münzenberg as the leading expert on West Africa in Berlin. Attended the founding 
conference of the ITUCNW in July 1930.  
Bittelman, Alexander (1890 – 1982; “Alex”). Born in Russia and emigrated to the USA. Member 
of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of America in 1919. Visited Moscow in 1922; 
involved in fractional disputes within the American party. Member of the CPUSA Politburo, but 
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relieved of this position in May 1929, instructed to act as Münzenberg’s liaison, organise the 
“Colonial Conference” and to supervise the preparations for the second LAI congress in Moscow. 
Resigned as LAI liaison in September 1929; travelled to India on a mission. Moved to the USA 
after the Second World War, arrested and sentenced to prison for five years during the McCarthy 
era, released in 1957.  
Bridgeman, Reginald Francis Orlando (1884 – 1968). Pursued a diplomatic career, promoted in 
1920 as Counsellor of Embassy, appointed to the British Legation at Teheran. This experience 
made Bridgeman turn towards socialism and anti-imperialism, and became acquainted with Soviet 
diplomats. Dismissed in 1922 and, after a trip to India, Bridgeman returned to England in 1923. 
One of the co-founders of the British LACO Section in 1926, Bridgeman attended the Brussels 
Congress and was nominated as a deputy member on the LAI Executive. Perceived by 
Münzenberg as the key figure within the British LAI Section, Bridgeman remained in the section 
and was in charge of, for example, the propaganda campaign in support of the defendants in the 
Meerut Conspiracy Trial. Assumed the leadership of the LAI and the International Secretariat in 
September 1933, and continued in this position until 1937, taking the decisions both to disband the 
LAI and to establish the CIB.   
Brockway, A. Fenner (1888 – 1988). Involved in the Fabian Society, prominent leader in the ILP. 
Attended the 1927 Brussels Congress, elected as member of the LAI General Council. Assisted in 
founding the “provisional” British LAI Section in 1927. Main opposing voice against Adler in 
discussions of the LAI within the LSI; acted temporarily as LAI chairman after Lansbury had 
resigned, left the LAI in 1927. 
Bukharin, Nikolai (1888 – 1938). Well-known communist persona from Russia; one of Lenin’s 
closest collaborators and theoretician in the history of Bolshevism and international communism. 
During the years 1919-28 held a prominent position within the Comintern; replaced Grigori 
Zinoviev as chairman in 1926; due to factional disputes and the struggle for power, ousted by 
Stalin in 1928-29. Assisted Münzenberg in promoting the idea of the Brussels Congress, e.g. co-
authored the article “Für eine Kolonialkonferenz”. Arrested in Moscow in 1937, was as one of the 
defendants in the third show trial, executed in Moscow in 1938. 
Chattophadyaya, Virendranath (1880 – 1937; “Hussein”, Chatto). Indian nationalist and leader 
of the anti-British movement in Europe during the Great War. Lived in Stockholm 1917-21 but, 
after having been denied an extension of his residence permit, re-located to Berlin. Given a 
function at the LACO secretariat in 1926, Chatto assisted with the preparations for the Brussels 
Congress. Appointed as LAI “International Secretary” in 1928, a position he held until June 1931. 
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Due to allegations raised in Moscow by the Political Commission and the ICC, Chatto travelled to 
Moscow in August/September 1931. Executed during the Great Terror in 1937.  
Chiu-pai, Chü (1899 – 1935; “Strakhov”; “Tsiu Wito”). Born in China; travelled to Soviet 
Russia in 1920 as a journalist. Instructor and interpreter for Chinese students at KUTV. Member of 
the Central Committee of the CPCh in 1922. Lived in Moscow 1928-30; Chiu-pai attended the 
Tenth ECCI Plenum and assisted with the preparations for the second LAI congress, which he also 
attended. Held leading posts in the ECCI before returning to China in 1934. Arrested and executed 
by KMT troops in 1935. 
Codovilla, Vittorio (1894 – 1970; “Victorio”). Born in Italy, moved to Argentina in 1912. 
Member of the Communist Party of Argentina in 1921. Held a position in the Eastern Secretariat 
1926, assisted with the work to prepare the Brussels Congress. Visited the International Secretariat 
in Berlin in October 1927. Performed sanctioned ECCI missions in Latin America during the 
1930s, passed away in Moscow in 1970. 
Cowl, Margaret (? – ?; “Margaret Dean”). Communist from the USA, also known as Margaret 
Undjus, and wife of veteran CPUSA leader Charles Krumbein. Given a position within the 
Profintern, visited the International Secretariat in 1930 after having completed a Profintern mission 
in England.  
Dimitrov, Georgi (1882 – 1949; “Helmut”). Communist from Bulgaria; joined the Communist 
Party of Bulgaria after its establishment after the Great War; accused and sentenced to death in his 
absence for having performed terrorist acts in Sofia in 1923. Secretary of the Balkanförderation in 
1926; appointed as the leader of the WEB in Berlin 1929-33. Key figure co-ordinating the 
activities of the International Secretariat from 1930 to 1933. Arrested in Berlin on 9 March 1933, 
accused by the NSDAP of having organised the Reichstag Fire. Dimitrov was the leading figure in 
the infamous Leipzig Trial. Acquitted of all charges, Dimitrov travelled to Moscow and, during the 
Seventh Comintern Congress (July – August 1935), was appointed as General Secretary of the 
Comintern. 
Dutt, Clemens Palme (1893 – 1974). Rajani Palme Dutt’s elder brother; researcher in Bristol 
1919-1922; founding member of the CPGB. Secretary of the International Section of LRD in 
London 1922-23; editor of the “Russian Information and Review” published by ARCOS, London, 
1923-25; editor of the “Masses of India”, published in Paris, and engaged in the Indian Party’s 
work 1925-28. Attended the Sixth International Comintern Congress as Indian Party delegate with 
a consultative voice. Worked for the Colonial Commission of the CPGB; publications editor of 
Markus Lawrence Ltd, in 1930-31. “International secretary” at the International Secretariat August 
1931 – January 1933. Left Berlin and returned to Moscow in January/February 1933.  
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Dutt, Rajani Palme (1896 – 1974). The well-known British communist and leading spokesperson 
for the Indian communist movement. Joined the CPGB in 1920; founded the Labour Monthly in 
1921. Acted as theoretical adviser in the Comintern on the colonial question and was involved in, 
for example, the ICBu and the LAI. Lived in Brussels for most of his life.    
Ferdi, Bekar (1890 – ?; real name: Mechnet Schafik). Born in Macedonia, the leading 
spokesperson for the Communist Party of Turkey in the 1920s. Attended the Sixth Comintern 
Congress in 1928, elected as ECCI member. From 1928 to 1932 acted as a Comintern agent, e.g. 
as secretary of the LAI at the International Secretariat 1930-33, and as plenipotentiary of the ECCI 
in the Turkish Party 1931-33. Escaped together with Clemens Dutt from Berlin in 
January/February 1933. Given a position at the Balkan Länder-Sekretariat 1934, member of the 
ICC in 1935 and, in 1946, worked at the Soviet news agency TASS. 
Fimmen, Eduard “Edo” (1881 – 1942). Born in the Netherlands, engaged in the trade union 
movement, Fimmen was a leader in the International Transport Workers’ Federation, also known 
as the Amsterdam International. As one of Münzenberg’s friends, involved in the establishment of 
the “Auslandskomitee zur Organisierung der Arbeiterhilfe für die Hungernden in Russland” in 
1921. Attended the 1927 Brussels congress, elected as vice deputy chairman; member of the LAI 
Executive 1927-1930; and left the LAI voluntarily in 1930. Fimmen passed away in Cuernavaca, 
Mexico in 1942.  
Flieg, Leopold (1893 – 1939; “Leo”). Engaged in the German socialist youth movement in 1908; 
active in the Spartacus group, and founding member of the KPD. Münzenberg’s friend and assisted 
in establishing the KIM in 1919. Flieg was entrusted with the illegal apparatus of the KPD, was 
the “grey emissary” in the relations with Piatnitsky and the OMS. Executed in Moscow in 1939, 
rehabilitated posthumously in 1957. 
Ford, James W. (1893 – 1957). Prominent figure in the Negro question and trade union activist; 
member of the WPA in 1925; member of the Profintern Executive Bureau 1928; prepared the 
ITUCNW and the Hamburg Congress in 1930. Attended the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne, 
15-16 January 1929; the second LAI congress in Frankfurt am Main 21-27 July 1929, where he 
was elected member of the LAI Executive as representative of the “Negro race”; attended the LAI 
Executive meeting in Berlin 30/5-2/6-1931. 
Gibarti, Louis (1895 – 1967; real name: Laszlo Dobos. Known pseudonyms: “Otto”, 
“Kaminski”, “Feliks Gasbarra”, “Karl Feller”). Hungarian communist, journalist by trade. 
Emigrated to Germany in 1921/22. LACO secretary and Münzenberg’s right-hand-man in 
preparing the Brussels Congress. Resigned abruptly from his position in the LAI in 1928, but re-
appeared as LAI representative (International Secretariat) in the USA in 1929; involved in anti-
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fascist and anti-war campaigns (“Amsterdam Anti-War Congress”, 1932), as well as the Spanish 
Civil War. Attempted to gain a position at UNESCO after the Second World War. 
Gillies, William (1884 – 1958). Secretary of the International Department of the Labour Party; 
worked closely with the secretary of the LSI, Friedrich Adler, to monitor the European left-wing 
movement. In 1933, published a critical analysis, The Communist Solar System, on communist 
mass and “front” organisations.  
Gomez, Manuel (1895 – 1989; real name: Charles Shipman; “Frank Seaman”, “Jesús 
Ramírez”). Born in the USA, frequently travelled to Mexico where, in 1919, he met Roy and 
Mikhail Borodin. After attending the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 and returning to the 
USA, assumed the name Manuel Gomez. Key figure in developing colonial work in the USA as 
founding leader of the AAAIL in 1925. Attended the Brussels Congress and nominated as LAI 
General Council member. Expelled from the CPUSA in 1929.  
Gross, Babette (1898 – 1990; “Ruplie Berta”). Münzenberg’s companion and partner; editor at 
Neuer Deutscher Verlag; carried out missions to England in the service of the International 
Secretariat. Escaped together with Münzenberg in 1933 to Paris. After the German invasion of 
France in 1940, Gross fled to Portugal from where she departed on a ship to the USA and ended up 
in Mexico. Returned to West Germany in 1949. 
Gumede, Josiah Tshangana (1867 – 1947). Founder and chairman of the ANC 1927-30. Attended 
the 1927 Brussels Congress and travelled through Germany and the Soviet Union together with 
Jimmy La Guma the same year. Invited to the second LAI congress, but was prevented from 
leaving South Africa due to a lack of finance. Expelled from the ANC in 1930 because of his ties 
to and sympathy towards the Communist Party of South Africa.  
Gyptner, Richard (1901 – 1972; “Alarich”, “Magnus”). German communist and KIM 
representative in the ZK KPD in 1920. Travelled to Moscow in 1922 and was appointed KIM 
secretary in the West European Secretariat in Berlin in 1923. From the end of 1928 to February 
1933, Gyptner acted as WEB secretary and worked together with Georgi Dimitrov in Berlin. Via 
Scandinavia and France, where he acted as IAH secretary 1933-35, Gyptner emigrated to Moscow, 
acting as Dimitrov’s personal secretary.  
Hatta, Mohammad (1902 – 1980). Prominent and distinguished leader of the Indonesian 
nationalist movement in the inter-war years. Hatta lived in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and later, 
Locarno, Switzerland, acting as leader of the Perhimpunan Indonesia, from which he resigned in 
1929. Attended the 1927 Brussels Congress, nominated as member of the LAI Executive and acted 
Chatto’s liaison. After attending the second LAI congress, Hatta expressed criticism and was 
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expelled from the LAI. Returning to Indonesia in 1932, Hatta established an active collaboration 
with Achmed Sukarno.   
Heimo, Mauno (1894 – 1937; “Lindberg”). Communist from Finland, emigrated to Soviet 
Russia in 1920, holding an influential position within the Comintern apparatus as head of various 
chancellery offices. Associated with Kuusinen, Heimo also acted as Münzenberg’s liaison during 
preparations for the Brussels congress in 1927, and again in 1928. Executed in Moscow in 1937.   
Johnstone, Jack W. (1880 – 1942; “Jack”, “Jack Godfrey”, “Jack Courtland”, “John 
Johnstone”). Member of the WPA. Appointed as LAI emissary to India in 1928, where he was 
arrested and deported. Given a position at the ECCI Caribbean Bureau in Moscow 1931. 
Jäger, Hans (1899 – 1975). Born in Berlin; a member of the KPD in 1920; carrying out 
functionary services. Member of the Institute of Social Research at Frankfurt am Main and leader 
of the Marx-Engels Verlages. Secretary of the LACO (“Süd-deutsche Sektion”) in 1926; secretary 
and leader of the German LAI Section in Berlin 1927-32. Escaped from Germany to Prague and 
emigrated to Moscow for a short period. Abandoned his KPD membership in 1935, expelled from 
the Comintern on the recommendation of the ICC. Moved to London, where Jäger lived for the 
rest of his life.  
Katayama, Sen (1859 – 1933; real name: Yasutaro Yabuki; “Yavki”, “Kiyoda”). Japanese 
communist who spent most of his life outside Japan, e.g. in the USA and the Soviet Union. 
Attended the Brussels Congress as the secret leader of the ECCI delegation; leader of the ECCI 
delegation at the LAI General Council in Brussels 1927; member of the ECCI delegation at the 
second LAI congress in 1929; participated at the Amsterdam Anti-War congress in 1932. Passed 
away in Moscow in 1933. 
Khankhoji, Pandurang S. (? – ?; pseudonym: “Aga Khan”). National revolutionary and 
communist from India; visited Moscow in 1921 in the company of Chatto; travelled to Mexico, 
where he remained during the 1920s, and joined the Communist Party of Mexico. Visited Berlin in 
1930, then Moscow, and ended up in Kabul as representative of the Hindustan communist 
organisation, the Ghadr Party.  
Kunizaki, Teido (1894 – ?; pseudonyms: “A. Kon”, “Kohn”). Engaged in the Japanese workers’ 
and peasants’ movements 1924-1926. Emigrated from Japan to Berlin as a student in 1926. Joined 
the KPD in 1928; leader of the Marxist study group Japanische Sprachgruppe der KPD; carried 
out work in the Wilmersdorf district party cell. Given a position at the International Secretariat 
1930-1932; expelled from Germany in August 1932; arrived in Moscow in September 1932. Most 
likely suppressed, fate unknown.  
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Jalabi, Hajj Muhammad (? – ?). Pan-Arab movement advocate of Persian origin and lived in 
Berlin. Attended the inaugural meeting of the LACO at the “Rathauskeller” in Berlin on 10 
February, 1926.  
Kouyaté, Garan Tiemoko (1892 – 1942). Communist of Malian origin, lived in France. PCF 
member and leader of the LDRN in Paris. Attended the second LAI congress in Frankfurt am Main 
in 1929, elected as member of the LAI General Council. Visited Moscow after the congress, 
returned to Berlin and founded the Berlin LDRN section together with Joseph Bilé (see above). 
Attended the Fifth Profintern Congress as delegate of the ITUCNW. Expelled from the Profintern, 
the ITUCNW and the PCF in 1933. Executed by the Nazis in France. 
Kuusinen, Otto Wilgelmovich (known pseudonyms: “Kuku”, “Alfons”, “Jansen”; 1881 – 
1964). Earned a PhD in History in 1905; entered the social democratic movement in 1905, acted as 
leader 1911-1917; co-founder of the Communist Party of Finland in 1918 before escaping from 
Finland. Participated at the foundation of the Comintern in March 1919, held various positions 
within the Comintern apparatus 1919-1943. Responsible for the “Solar System” theory, acted as 
Münzenberg’s liaison on LAI questions, and was the Head of the Eastern Secretariat.  
Lansbury, George (1859 – 1940). Prominent leader within the British socialist movement; 
member of the Social Democratic Federation, the ILP, and the Labour Party; pacifist, and editor 
of the Daily Herald. Attended the Brussels Congress, elected as Chairman of the LAI; cashier of 
the British LAI Section; resigned from his position in the LAI in June 1927.   
Liau, Hansin (? – 1964; Liao Khuan’sin, Liau Gunzin, Liao Gongxing, Liao Huanxing). 
Chinese emigrant, nationalist, member of the KMT and member of the CPCh in 1922. His CPCh 
membership was transferred to the KPD in 1923. Given a position by the Hungarian communist 
Jenö (Eugen) Varga in the economic institute, the “Vargabüro”, in Berlin 1925-27. Attended the 
Brussels Congress as delegate of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT, and given a seat 
on the LAI Executive. Appointed in 1927 by Münzenberg as the leader of the Chinese National 
Agency in Berlin; functionary/secretary at the International Secretariat 1927-28. After a personal 
dispute with Münzenberg and Gibarti, Liau emigrated together with his wife, Dora Liau-
Dombrowski, to Moscow in December 1928. Attended the second LAI congress in 1929, and had 
his KPD membership transferred to the CPSU (B) in 1929. Accused and acquitted of political 
dishonesty by the Chinese communist émigré group in Berlin in 1929. Sentenced together with his 
wife to the GULAG penal system; released in the first years of the 1960s, moved to China in 1964, 
passed away the same year.  
Magyar, Ludwig (1891 – 1937; real name, Lajos Milgorf). Communist of Hungarian origin; 
member of the Communist Party of Hungary 1919, went to Moscow in 1922 after an exchange of 
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political prisoners. Acted as Comintern official in China in the mid 1920s, and later given a 
position within the ECCI apparatus. As Deputy Head in the Eastern Secretariat, Magyar co-
ordinated a majority of the questions connected to the LAI (“the Magyar Thesis”) and visited 
Berlin, Amsterdam and Paris to assess progress and to give instructions. In 1934, he was accused 
and performed an act of self-criticism during the “Magyar case”. Executed in 1937. 
Manuilsky, Dmitri Zajarovich (1883 – 1959; “Felix”, “Numa”, “Mefodij”, “Thomas 
Bezrabotny”, “Beruzzi”, “Ivanov”, “Samuely”, “Pellicano”, “Kirsch”, “Serednjak”, “Foma”, 
“Robert”, “Paul”, “Stefan Dolicki”, “Petrov”, “Marmor”, “Mayor”). Communist veteran 
from Ukraine and member of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party; in exile in France 
1907-1917 and expelled in 1919. One of the leading decision-makers at Comintern headquarters: 
member of the Small Commission, the Political Commission, the ECCI Presidium, the ECCI 
Secretariat, the Organisational Department. Provided Münzenberg with guidelines on the anti-
colonial project in 1925-1926. Acted as leader of the WEB in Berlin 1928-29; formulated the “new 
agenda” for the LAI in 1931. 
Mattar, Achmed Hassan (? – ?). Anti-colonial activist from the Sudan; arrived in Berlin 1925/26. 
Attended the inaugral conference of the LACO in Berlin on 10 February, 1926. Journalist by trade, 
with relations to the Rif region, Mattar was the IAH connection to the nationalist Klub der 
Zaglulisten (“Zaglulist Club”) in Berlin. Mattar frequently travelled between Tangiers and Berlin. 
Expelled from Germany in 1927 on the direct orders of the RKÜöO. 
Melnitschansky, Grigorij Natnovic (1886 – 1937). Communist from Ukraine; member of the 
Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party in 1902; emigrated in 1910 to the USA; worked as 
journalist and published articles in the Russian socialist paper Novyj mir. Returned to Russia 
together with Trotsky after the October Bolshevik coup in 1917. Involved in the Russian trade 
union movement and given a position within the Profintern as a functionary. Melnitschansky 
carried out international missions in 1928; attended the LAI Executive in Cologne 1929, and the 
second LAI congress in Frankfurt am Main, appointed as LAI Executive member. Executed in 
Moscow in 1937. 
Misiano, Francesco (1884 – 1936). Communist from Italy; in charge of the IAH’s film production 
(Mezhrabpom-Film) at IAH headquarters in Moscow. Assisted Münzenberg in co-ordinating the 
Hands off China campaign in 1925. Attended the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow in 1929. Died in 
August 1936 due to illness.  
Maxton, James (1885 – 1946). Born in Scotland; distinguished leader of the ILP; and opposed the 
militancy of the Great War. Attended the LAI General Council in Brussels, December 1927, and 
was later appointed as chairman of the LAI replacing Lansbury. Participated at every LAI 
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Executive meeting up until the second LAI congress in 1929. After the Frankfurt am Main 
Congress, ousted from his position as Chairman on the initiative of the British LAI Section, 
remained in contact with Münzenberg. 
Müller, Kurt (? – ?). German communist and functionary at IAH headquarters in Moscow. 
Münzenberg’s liaison in developing the IAH’s colonial work in 1925-26. Visited Beijing in 1925 
to assess the work of the IAH. Fate unknown.  
Münzenberg, Willi (1889 – 1940; “Herfurt”, “Albert Schneider”, “A. Sonnenburg”, 
“Studzinsky”, “Berg”). German communist who, at an early age, was involved in the socialist 
and pacifist movements. Emigrated during the Great War to Switzerland, where he met Lenin and 
other prominent characters in the Zimmerwald Left; after the war, one of the leading figures to 
found the Communist Youth International (KIM) in 1919. In connection with the Third 
International Comintern Congress in Moscow in 1921, Lenin instructed Münzenberg to establish 
the forerunner of the IAH, the “Auslandskomitees zur Organisierung der Arbeiterhilfe für die 
Hungernden in Russland”. Münzenberg and the IAH were the entrepreneurial force behind a range 
of committees, associations and sympathising communist organisations during the inter-war years, 
which epitomised Kuusinen’s vision of the communist “Solar System”. As the architect of the anti-
colonial project and the LAI, Münzenberg held the position as its secretary 1927-33. In August 
1933, he was formally released from his obligations to the LAI. The LAI’s exile in Paris added to 
his isolation. His last visit to Moscow took place in 1936; and in 1938, the KPD revoked his 
membership, while the Comintern categorised him as persona non grata. Confined to a 
concentration camp in France after the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, and in 
connection with the German invasion of France in 1940, Münzenberg fled, only to be found dead 
later the same year. 
Naidu, M. Jayasurya S. (? – ?). The son of “the Nightingale of India”, Sarojini Naidu, and 
Chatto’s nephew. Lived in Berlin as a student and worked at the International Secretariat and the 
“Indian Bureau” 1928-1933. Arrested and expelled from Germany in 1933. 
Nambiar, A. C. N. (? – ?). Nationalist activist, émigré from India, and Chatto’s personal friend. In 
1923, he left London and moved to Berlin, where Nambiar and Chatto organised the Indian anti-
colonial movement. Journalist by trade, Nambiar was a correspondent of the pro-nationalist 
agency Free Press of India, and member of the All India Congress Committee (AICC). Attended 
the inaugural “Rathauskeller” conference of the LACO in 1926; the Brussels Congress as delegate 
of the “Verband Indischer Journalisten in Europa”; and, together with Chatto, formed the “Indian 
Bureau” in 1929. Arrested and expelled from Germany in 1933. Appointed by Nehru after the 
Second World War as Ambassador of India in West Germany.   
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Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889 – 1964). Leader of the Indian national liberation movement in the inter-
war years, protégé of Gandhi, India’s first Prime Minister in 1947. Visited Germany in 1926 
together with his wife Kamala, and was involved in preparing the Brussels Congress. Attended the 
Brussels Congress as accredited delegate of the INC; appointed as LAI Executive member (1927-
30). Formed the Independence for India League in 1928, a radical outgrowth of the INC, shaped 
on the agenda of the LAI. Supported Chatto and Nambiar in establishing the “Indian Bureau” in 
1929, and left the LAI in 1930. Attended the Bandung Conference in 1955.  
Padmore, George (1903 – 1959; real name: Malcolm Ivan Meredith Nurse; “Hamilton”). 
Born in Trinidad; communist, and later, leader of the Pan-Africanist movement. Guided the work 
in preparing the First International Congress of Negro Workers in Hamburg in July 1930, and head 
of the ITUCNW. Assisted Münzenberg in preparing the African question in A-I-Z in 1931. Studied 
at the KUTV in 1932; deported from Germany in 1933. Expelled from the ITUCNW, the 
Profintern and the Comintern in 1934.  
Patterson, William Lorenzo (1891 – 1980; “William Wilson”). Communist from the USA; 
studied at the KUTV 1927-31; member of the ECCI Negro Bureau. Attended the second LAI 
congress as “Negro” trade union delegate.  
Petrovsky, David Alexandrovich (1886 – 1937; real name: David Lipetz; “A. J. Bennet”, 
“Humbold”, “Max”, “Max Breguer”, “David Goldfarb”, “Isolde”). Communist from Russia, 
held various positions within the Comintern apparatus; head of Agitprop Department, ECCI 
emissary to the CPGB. Assisted Münzenberg in preparing the political material for the Brussels 
Congress in Berlin in January-February 1927. Assessed the work of the British LAI Section in 
London 1927-28. Demoted from his position after the “decolonisation” debate at the Sixth 
Comintern Congress. Carried out covert missions in Europe in 1929 as WEB representative. 
Married to British communist Rose Cohen. Executed in Moscow in 1937.  
Piatnitsky, Osip (1882 – 1938; real name: Iosif Aranovich Tarshis; “Freitag”, “Michail”, 
“Sonntag”). Given a position within the Comintern in 1921. Operative head for the Department 
for International Communications (OMS) and the administrative key figure in co-ordinating the 
activities of the Comintern. Evaluated and authorised, for example, the budget and personnel 
questions of the LAI. Removed from the Comintern apparatus in 1935, arrested in Moscow 1937 
and executed, after brutal interrogations and torture, in 1938.    
Ping, Huang (? – ?). Communist from China and KMT member; Ping travelled to Moscow in 
1924 to study Russian; returned to Hong Kong in 1925 as CPCh delegate. Returned to Moscow 
where he remained until 1927, engaged in the Chinese trade union movement. Attended the second 
LAI congress in 1929, given a seat on the LAI Executive (1929-33). Arrested by the KMT in 
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China in 1933 and the subject of an international campaign organised partly by the IAH, which 
partly contributed to his release. Appeared in the CPCh after the Second World War. 
Pollitt, Harry (1890 – 1960). British communist, joined the CPGB in 1920, attended the inaugural 
conference of the Profintern in Moscow in 1921. Attended the Brussels Congress as delegate of the 
National Minority Movement, given a position in the LAI General Council; attended the second 
LAI congress, again as delegate of the NMM, given a seat on the LAI Executive (1929-31). 
Assisted Smeral’s work in co-ordinating the re-organisation of the British LAI Section in 1930. 
Roy, Manabendra Nath (1887 – 1954; real name: Narendranath Bjattacharya; “Robert 
Allen”, “Roberto Allen y Villagarcía”, “García”, “Richards”, “C. A. Martin”, “Dr. 
Mahmud”, “Manuel Méndez”, “Dr. Banerji”, “Roberts”). Communist from India, attended the 
Second Comintern Congress in 1920 as delegate of the Communist Party of Mexico. Involved in a 
debate with Lenin on the colonial question at this congress. Appointed as leader of the ICBu in 
Paris in 1924. Held various positions within the Comintern apparatus during the 1920s; ’guided’ 
the preparatory work in Moscow for the Brussels Congress via different commissions, acting as 
Münzenberg’s liaison. In 1929, accused of “rightist deviations” and expelled from the Comintern. 
Lived in Berlin for a brief moment before returning to India where he was arrested.  
Saklatvala, Shapurji (1874 – 1936). Communist from England of Indian origin; linked to the 
IAH’s activities and colonial work in 1925-26. Member of the LACO Executive Committee and 
established, together with Bridgeman, the British LACO Section in December 1926. Unable to 
attend the Brussels Congress due to his visit to India, Saklatvala was given a seat in the LAI 
General Council. Attended several of the LAI Executive meetings; and at the second LAI congress 
in Frankfurt am Main, participated as “member of the LAI Executive”. Key figure in co-ordinating 
LAI work in India and the Meerut Conspiracy Trial campaign in England.    
Schudel, Otto (1902 – 1979). Communist from Switzerland and IAH functionary given a post at 
the International Secretariat after the 1927 Brussels Congress. Schudel resigned from the LAI in 
1930, and left for Basel to work in the press organ Rundschau (successor of Inprecorr). Carried 
out an LAI mission to Geneva in 1929 to convince delegates, who were attending the ILO 
Congress, to attend the second LAI congress.   
Senghor, Lamine (1889 – 1927). Born in the French colony of Senegal, Senghor (no relation to 
poet Léopold Sédar Senghor), he was conscripted to French military service during the Great War. 
In the war, Senghor contracted a serious health problem. As an ardent defender of the social rights 
of the black race and as an anti-colonial activist, Senghor co-founded the La Comité de Défense de 
la Race Nègre (CDNR), and was also a member of the PCF. Attended the Brussels Congress in 
1927, and given a seat on the LAI Executive. After factional disputes within the CDNR, Senghor 
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resigned and formed, together with Kouyaté, the radical organisation LDRN. Due to sickness 
(tuberculosis), Senghor passed away on 25 November, 1927. 
Smeral, Bohumíl (1880 – 1941). Communist from Czechoslovakia; involved at an early age in the 
socialist movement; moved to the left during the Great War; and was the leader of the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia after its foundation in 1921. Held various positions within the Comintern 
apparatus, e.g. the Organisational Department and, in 1929, instructed to act as secretary of the 
International Secretariat, as well as the WEB. In charge of the Arab question in the LAI, Smeral 
also monitored the work of the International Secretariat and supervised its re-organisation in 1930. 
Smeral left his position in 1931; remained in Czechoslovakia 1931-32; departed for Mongolia in 
1934 and was nominated as member of the ICC in 1935. In 1941, Smeral passed away due to 
sickness in Moscow. 
Thögersen, Hans Peter (1902 – ?; “York”, ”Miller”; “Hans Tiergen”). Danish father and a 
Japanese mother; no relation to Danish communist leader Thöger Thögersen. Studied at the ILS in 
1928 and worked at the International Secretariat in 1928 on Far Eastern questions. Returned to 
Berlin as “York” in 1931, in charge of the LAI Youth Secretariat; disappeared in January 1933.  
Trilliser, Mikhail (1883 – 1940; “Moskvin”). Communist from Russia; in charge of the “red 
terror” in Siberia during the Civil War and involved with the Soviet state security services from 
1921. Head of the Foreign Department from 1922 and founder of the Soviet intelligence apparatus. 
Acted as intermediary between the secretaries at Comintern headquarters in 1930 during the 
preparations to re-organise the LAI.  
Windmüller, Ella (? – ?). German communist; steno-typist at the International Secretariat, 1927-
1932; fate unknown.  
Wittfogel, Karl August (1896 – 1988). Sinologist and German communist during the inter-war 
years; involved and employed at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt am Main. Requested 
to assist with the work to complete the political resolution for the Brussels Congress, Wittfogel 
attended the Brussels Congress off the record; involved at various stages in the work of the LAI in 
Germany, e.g. attended the second LAI congress as leader of the LAI branch in Frankfurt am 
Main. Appointed by Chatto to take care of the LAI’s curricular activity in Berlin 1930-31; and in 
charge of The Anti-Imperialist Review in 1932-33. Arrested by German authorities after attempting 
to escape from the country in connection with the Reichstag Fire in 1933; confined to a 
concentration camp from which he was released in 1934. From England, Wittfogel departed for the 
USA. In 1939, the Central Committee of the CPUSA, via the direct orders of the Comintern Cadre 
Department, revoked Wittfogel’s communist membership on the grounds that he “was not worthy 
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of being a member of the Party”. After the Second World War, Wittfogel became a committed and 
fervent anti-communist.  
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“We Are Neither Visionaries 
Nor Utopian Dreamers”. 
Willi Münzenberg, the League against Imperialism, 
and the Comintern, 1925 – 1933
On 10 February 1927, the “First International Congress against Imperialism and Co-
lonialism” in Brussels marked the establishment of the anti-imperialist organisation, 
the League against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI, 1927-37). The 
complex preparations for the congress were though initiated already in 1925 by Willi 
Münzenberg, a German communist and General Secretary of the communist mass 
organisation, Internationale Arbeiterhilfe (IAH, 1921-35), together with the Com-
munist International (Comintern, 1919-43). Berlin was the centre for the LAI and its 
International Secretariat (1927-33), a city serving the intentions of the communists 
to fi nd colonial émigré activists in the Weimar capital, acting as representatives for 
the anti-colonial movement in Europe after the Great War. With the ascendancy to 
power of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) on 30 January 1933, the LAI reached an abrupt, but 
nonetheless, expected end in Berlin. This doctoral thesis examines the role, purpose 
and functions of a sympathising communist organization (LAI): to act as an inter-
mediary for the Comintern to the colonies. The analysis evaluates the structure and 
activities of the LAI, and by doing so, establish a complex understanding on one of 
the most infl uential communist organisations during the interwar period, which, de-
spite its short existence, assumed a nostalgic reference and historical bond for anti-
colonial movements during the transition from colonialism to post-colonialism after 
the Second World War, e.g. the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. 
Fredrik Petersson’s study, based on archives in Moscow, Berlin, Amsterdam, London, 
and Stockholm, uncovers why the Comintern established and supported the LAI 
and its anti-imperialist agenda, disclosing a complicated undertaking, characterised 
by confl ict and the internal struggle for power, involving structural constraints and 
individual ambitions defi ned by communist ideology and strategy.
Åbo Akademis förlag
2013
